2.1. A primer on peer disagreement: conciliationism and steadfastness

In this section, I will introduce the basic concepts of peer disagreement and feminist standpoint theory, starting with the former. Let me start with the received view of ‘epistemic peerhood’. In the strict sense, epistemic peers are agents who, as Feldman and Warfield (Reference Feldman and Warfield2010: 2) express it, ‘literally share all evidence and are equal with respect to their abilities and disposition relevant to interpreting that evidence’. Similarly, Matheson (Reference Matheson2016: 124) describes them as

Epistemic peer disagreement centers on two main views: conciliationism and steadfastness. These accounts can be spelled out in terms of full beliefs or degrees of beliefs. I will preferably use the latter.Footnote ¹ In such a framework, conciliationism contends that upon encountering disagreement with an epistemic peer, one should adjust one’s credences in a specific way. Following Fleisher (Reference Fleisher2021), this can be spelled out as follows:

Paradigmatic defenders of steadfastness, on the other hand, contend that one may rationally maintain one’s original credences in the face of peer disagreement. For example, Kelly’s (Reference Kelly, Gendler and Hawthorne2005) Right Reasons View holds that what rationally matters are the first-order reasons bearing on p. Learning that an epistemic peer disagrees is not by itself a defeater, since it does not add new first-order evidence about p. Such views can still recommend revision when disagreement is paired with further evidence – e.g., if one were to learn that the other party has an evidential advantage in the relevant domain, this can rationally prompt reassessment of the first-order reasons, and thus, revising can be rational without giving up steadfastness because the case would cease to be one of peer disagreement in the strict sense.

Conciliationism is a family of views – one prominent type being the Equal Weight View (EWV). EWV claims that the opinions of epistemic peers should be given equal consideration in a disagreement (Elga Reference Elga2007). The most straightforward version of this is the following. Given n epistemic peers with individual credences c₁,c₂,…,c_n, all n epistemic peers should form the credence C, calculated asFootnote ²:

$C = {{{c_1} + {c_2} + \ldots + {c_n}} \over n}$

Conciliationists in a full belief framework typically claim that upon encountering an epistemic peer who believes the opposite, one should suspend judgment (see beside Feldman Reference Feldman and Antony2007 also Barnett and Li Reference Barnett and Li2016). Conciliationism is predicated on the notion of epistemic humility, acknowledging that one’s perspective is not inherently superior to that of one’s peers. Critics of EWV argue that this position undervalues the role of private evidence and personal judgment. For instance, Lackey (Reference Lackey, Haddock, Millar and Pritchard2008) advocates for a less strict interpretation of the conciliationist view, positing that the weight we accord to the views of others should depend on the specifics of the disagreement and the context in question. As such, not all peer disagreements necessitate giving other opinions the same weight as one’s own when adjusting one’s credences. Another version of conciliationism that rejects EWV comes from Kelly (Reference Kelly, Feldman and Warfield2010). While Kelly (Reference Kelly, Gendler and Hawthorne2005) is an advocate of steadfastness with his Right Reasons View, Kelly (Reference Kelly, Feldman and Warfield2010) moved towards the so-called Total Evidence View according to which both agents should change their minds upon disclosure of the disagreement, but not in an equal way (see also Worsnip Reference Worsnip2023: 340). Kelly suggests that the evidential significance of a disagreement depends on the total evidence of the agent, including the evidence concerning the disagreement. Such views usually suggest that the magnitude of credence change in peer disagreement is context-dependent.

2.2. A primer to feminist standpoint theory

Feminist standpoint theory originated in the late 20th century, drawing especially from Marx’s theory of the proletariat and Lukács’s concept of the standpoint of the proletariat. These theories posited that one’s social position influences one’s perspective and understanding of the world. Feminist scholars, recognizing the potential for such a framework to illuminate women’s unique experiences of the world, adapted it to highlight the unique insights that could be gained from women’s, and other marginalized groups’, standpoints (Harding Reference Harding2004).

Key contributors to feminist standpoint theory include Nancy Hartsock, Sandra Harding, and Patricia Collins. Hartsock (Reference Hartsock, Harding and Hintikka1983) developed the concept of a feminist standpoint derived from women’s labor and material conditions, arguing that this perspective offers a more comprehensive understanding of societal structures than that of the dominant classes. Harding extended this idea, criticizing the ‘god trick’ or the idea that anyone can have a ‘view from nowhere’ (Harding Reference Harding1993). Collins (Reference Collins and Harding2004) introduced the idea of intersectionality and the importance of recognizing the multiple, intersecting social identities that contribute to individual perspectives. Intersectionality became the received view in today’s standpoint theory.Footnote ³

Feminist standpoint theories’ core claim is that marginalized perspectives can offer unique insights due to their distinctive experiences and challenges. These unique standpoints allow for a better understanding of social and power structures that may be invisible or taken for granted by dominant groups. (Wylie Reference Wylie, Figueroa and Harding2003; Tanesini forthcoming). Toole (Reference Toole2024) extends this line of thought by likening marginalized standpoints to a form of expertise training.

One fundamental tenet of standpoint epistemology is the concept of Perspectival Differences (Pils and Schoenegger Reference Pils and Schoenegger2021: 171–2; Toole Reference Toole2019: 607–8). Perspectival differences concern the essentially different perspectives individuals or groups can have on a certain domain of inquiry. It is contended that an individual or group’s unique perspective, molded by their specific experiences tied to their social identity, fundamentally shapes their understanding of the world. Some (e.g., Pils and Schoenegger Reference Pils and Schoenegger2021: 171–2) suggest that certain knowledge, influenced by specific group experiences, is inaccessible to those outside of the group. This is known as the Group Fragmentation Thesis which can be broken down into two sub-theses:

1. (i) a group’s unique belief-forming processes generate certain knowledge that outsiders cannot generate, and

2. (ii) the distinct nature of these processes hinders knowledge transfer to outsiders at least to some extent.

Others (e.g., Toole Reference Toole2021; Reference Toole2024) suggest that, for instance, a feminist standpoint can encompass men who have engaged in feminist consciousness-raising, while it may not extend to women who have not undergone such processes, pointing to the fact that inter-identity group shareability of knowledge is possible. Both versions suggest that our ability to understand evidence is shaped by our social positions, implying that some individuals qua their standpoint have a kind of epistemic privilege when it comes to understanding certain social phenomena (Tanesini forthcoming). Various influential standpoint epistemologists (Hartsock Reference Hartsock, Harding and Hintikka1983; Collins Reference Collins2000; Harding Reference Harding2004) argued that especially marginalized individuals are in an epistemically privileged position, as they have a form of ‘double vision’ (Hartsock Reference Hartsock, Harding and Hintikka1983) which allows them both to understand their own experiences and to critically appraise the dominant ideologies and norms that subjugate them.

3.1. A new challenge for the notion of epistemic peers

The concept of peer disagreement is predicated on the notion of epistemic peers. As introduced before, epistemic peers are typically viewed as individuals who have equality in evidence and in the abilities to evaluate that evidence (see Feldman and Warfield Reference Feldman and Warfield2010, 2; Matheson Reference Matheson2016: 124). It has been argued, however, that a strict understanding of ‘epistemic peerhood’ renders the notion largely unusable, since virtually no two individuals share exactly the same evidence or cognitive abilities (King Reference King2012). As Feldman and Warfield (Reference Feldman and Warfield2010: 2) themselves note, equality requirements are an ‘idealization’. In real-world scenarios, we move from equality to strong similarity or closeness, as Cohen (Reference Cohen, Christensen and Lackey2013: 99) suggests for a reasoning condition of ‘epistemic peerhood’ that epistemic peers are ‘in general equal in their reasoning abilities, or at least, close enough so there is no basis for supposing either party is in general the superior reasoner’ (Cohen Reference Cohen, Christensen and Lackey2013: 99).

This raises the familiar question of how much symmetry in evidence and ability is required for epistemic peerhood in real-world scenarios. It should be strong enough to (i) keep the motivation for the philosophical issue but weak enough to (ii) make epistemic peerhood not impossible. Standpoint theory intensifies the worry that too strict notions of epistemic peerhood make epistemic peerhood almost impossible. This section is concerned with expressing this worry even for current broadened notions of epistemic peers. Putting the challenge bluntly, if we add ‘epistemic standpoint’ (on top of evidence, cognitive abilities, etc.) as an additional equality or strong similarity parameter, we hopelessly fragment the landscape of epistemic peer groups. As a response, I will suggest a two-step broadening of the concept of epistemic peerhood by utilizing the insights from standpoint theories’ community model of knowledge.

As mentioned in the primer, feminist standpoint theory posits that individuals’ social positions – defined by factors such as gender, race, class, and other axes of identity – shape their perspectives and, consequently, their understandings of the world. Those in marginalized positions develop unique insights into the workings of social structures precisely because of their marginalization. Thus, it is argued, their standpoints can afford them a certain epistemic advantage or privilege in understanding social phenomena, an idea termed ‘the epistemic privilege of the oppressed’ (Medina Reference Medina2013). Rolin (Reference Rolin2006; Reference Rolin2009) calls this the Thesis of Epistemic Advantage. As Harding puts it, standpoint theories ‘map how a social and political disadvantage can be turned into an epistemic, scientific and political advantage’ (Harding Reference Harding2004: 7–8; see also Ashton Reference Ashton and Kush2019).

This complicates peer disagreement in several ways. Let me start with the traditional strict notion of epistemic peers, i.e., two individuals with highly similar evidence, cognitive abilities to evaluate that evidence, and intellectual virtues. Standpoint theory, rooted in the premise that unique perspectives are intrinsically linked to an individual’s social position, challenges the conventional equality/strong similarity assumption inherent in the idea of epistemic peers. If we accept the claim that our social positions can mold our perspectives and offer unique insights, then individuals occupying divergent social positions will not meet the criteria to be classified as ‘epistemic peers’. Take, for instance, the contrasting standpoints of privileged and marginalized individuals. According to standpoint theory, marginalized individuals, by virtue of their lived experiences of societal marginalization, possess unique kinds of knowledge or insights inaccessible to their privileged counterparts. Given a narrow definition of ‘epistemic peers’ an individual from a marginalized group can then not be a peer of an individual of a dominant group when it comes to claims that involve their social position as it contradicts the condition of having equality or strong similarity of evidence. They can arguably be epistemic peers in domains where their social position do not matter, but the point of standpoint theory is that social position matters in a multitude of issues, ranging from experiential accounts, social interpretations, to nuanced cultural understandings; encompassing systemic discrimination, microaggressions, cultural rituals, and many more. Essentially, a sizable portion of any individual’s epistemic realm is shaped by their unique social experiences, making epistemic peerhood across different identity groups unattainable for all propositions within this domain.

This gets particularly salient if we consider the principle of Perspectival Differences (see section 2.2). If two individuals belong to different identity groups, their social experiences, and consequently their perspectives, will differ substantially. They do not share the same evidence nor interpret available evidence on knowledge claims rooted in social positions in the same manner due to their distinct social experiences. Consequently, when individuals from different identity groups are involved in a disagreement concerning knowledge claims rooted in social positions, they cannot reasonably be thought to be epistemic peers on such matters given the strict understanding of ‘epistemic peers’.

This gets exacerbated by the introduction of an intersectional lens to standpoint theory which is currently the received view of how to understand standpoint theory. The core intersectional claim is that we all navigate an intricate maze of social identities – including race, gender, class, disability, age, religion, sexuality, nationality, and linguistic background – that coalesce to shape our distinctive standpoint. Given the profound complexity, multidimensionality, and interplay of these identities, adherence to the strict definition of ‘epistemic peerhood’ will render the concept virtually impossible to apply when it comes to the mentioned wide array of claims that involve social position. After all, it would be exceedingly rare to find two individuals who share the exact same intricate web of intersecting social identities and thus the same standpoint.

3.2. Broadening the notion of epistemic peers

Instead of giving up the notion of epistemic peerhood in these domains, the other option is to broaden the strict notion of epistemic peers. The two most well-known accounts that do exactly that are those by Kelly (Reference Kelly, Gendler and Hawthorne2005) and Christensen (Reference Christensen2007). Kelly (Reference Kelly, Gendler and Hawthorne2005) argues that recognizing an epistemic peer depends more on a shared disposition or ability to respond reasonably to evidence, rather than identical access to the same evidence. On this view, two people might be considered epistemic peers if they are generally equally reliable or competent in forming beliefs, even if their access to evidence or their perspectives on that evidence might differ. Similarly, Christensen (Reference Christensen2007) proposes that epistemic peers need not have access to exactly the same body of evidence. Instead, they must be roughly equally competent with respect to the relevant domain and must have shared roughly the same evidence. Removing the condition for a need of access to the exact same body of evidence is already helpful for the current task. However, on both of those accounts given the notion of Perspectival Differences and especially the idea of Epistemic Advantage in cases of differing social positions, epistemic peerhood is still difficult to achieve. After all, competence, reliability, and the ability to respond reasonably to evidence in a domain where knowledge claims are rooted in social positions still differ between identity groups. One main reason is that socially situated domains impose asymmetric epistemic tasks. Competence in such domains partly consists in reliably detecting social phenomena, such as subtle exclusion, social expectations, and behavioral norms, and such competence is trained by repeated exposure. Standpoint theorists have long argued (see e.g., Hartsock Reference Hartsock, Harding and Hintikka1983) that this leads to differences in reliability: members of marginalized groups are more frequently placed in contexts that supply the relevant first-order evidence, and so their belief-forming processes track the target phenomena more consistently in these contexts. Concerning the ability to respond reasonably to evidence, here testimonial evidence (Fricker Reference Fricker2007) is a good case in point: it is argued that individuals from a dominant group have at least a tendency to undervalue testimonial evidence from marginalized individuals. This is a systematic mismanagement of responding correctly to the evidence available even if the individuals involved share the same evidence and have comparable general cognitive abilities and intellectual virtues. As such, two epistemic agents who occupy different social positions will rarely qualify as epistemic peers even on weakened accounts.

Given this dim prospect for a notion of epistemic peers within current frameworks – narrow or broad – one might say: Well, then we simply have no epistemic peers when it comes to claims where social position plays a role. This is surely one plausible way to go is and similar to Toole’s (Reference Toole2024) conceptualization. I want to develop a different pathway, however, because I want to resist reducing disagreements between dominant and marginalized individuals to simple novice-expert relations, where the privileged party must defer and the marginalized party has no reason to revise. I think such a conceptualization does not capture the communal aspect of knowledge production sufficiently, as I will show soon. Furthermore, it also does not capture our successful academic research practice sufficiently. Disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies rely on cross-standpoint comparisons precisely because differently situated knowers can challenge, refine, and correct one another. This works eye-to-eye even if there are epistemic differences on different dimensions, but it is not an expert-novice relation. Similarly, community-based participatory research presupposes that researchers and participants engage as epistemic agents within a shared evidential space, where each can call the other to account. To deny that epistemic peerhood extends across social positions would thus strip us of the conceptual tools needed to explain how knowledge is produced through reciprocal engagement, reducing disagreement to hierarchical authority rather than a genuinely collective epistemic practice.

As such, I propose that we switch to a broader concept of epistemic peers that is particularly suited for social epistemology – broader than the one’s developed by Christensen, Kelly, and others. Standpoint theorists frequently advocate for a community model of knowledge instead (Harding Reference Harding1993; Longino Reference Longino1990; Nelson Reference Nelson1990; Potter Reference Potter, Alcoff and Potter1993). Here, the knowledge of individuals can in principle not be isolated from the community perspective. From this perspective, viewing the individual knowledge tokens of one individual as isolated from the broader knowledge of the group is mistaken. Since intersectionality suggests that a multitude of identity groups are always present in social engagement, looking at isolated peers is arguably a mistake to begin with.

As such, the unique insights and perspectives of various identity groups, rather than disqualifying them as peers, should be seen as enriching the shared pool of evidence and experience from which they draw. This conceptualization captures the spirit of standpoint theory, which values the unique contributions of marginalized voices to our collective understanding and collective knowledge. The notion of epistemic peers becomes a broad notion that does not include similar access to the same type of evidence but access to a shared pool of evidence. I want the notion of a shared pool to be understood as exemplifying the following features:

1. 1. Communal Accessibility: The pool is open and available to all members of a specific community or group, even if the manner in which they engage with it may differ. For instance, while someone might contribute testimonial evidence, another might access it for understanding or validation.

2. 2. Dynamic and Evolving Nature: The pool is not static. As new evidence is presented or old evidence is reinterpreted or invalidated, the collective body of evidence changes.

3. 3. Interpretative Flexibility: Even with access to the same pool of evidence, peers typically interpret or weigh evidence differently based on their unique backgrounds, experiences, or epistemic positions.

Given these considerations, I suggest the following broadening of the definition of ‘epistemic peerhood’.

‘Broad Epistemic Peerhood in Context of Perspectival Differences’

For instances where knowledge claims are tied to social position, an individual is considered an epistemic peer of another if and only if:

1. (i) Practical Access. They share roughly equal practical access to a common pool of evidence, understanding, and knowledge that is relevant to the subject matter of their disagreement. This pool of evidence includes not only objective facts but also the subjective experiences and perspectives of various identity groups.

2. (ii) Ability. They possess roughly equal domain-relevant cognitive abilities and diligence in considering the available evidence and in employing their reasoning faculties.

3. (iii) Virtue. They are epistemically roughly equally virtuous with respect to traits relevant to inquiry and uptake.

Note that ‘shared access’ in (i) concerns the practical availability of the relevant evidence, not its competent assessment or appropriate uptake; those further dimensions of epistemic comparability are captured by (ii) and (iii). Regarding condition (i): The specifics of what constitutes the pool of evidence can be tailored based on one’s stance on the nature of evidence. For instance, mentalists might not want to include objective facts. Others may advocate for evidence being essentially propositional or might insist on a doxastic requirement. These distinctions do not impact the core tenet of my proposal. Central to my argument is the shared access to a collective repository of evidence, understanding, and knowledge pertinent to the matter of disagreement. The importance from a standpoint epistemology perspective is that this pool encompasses the rich subjective experiences and viewpoints from diverse identity groups.

In order to spell out epistemic peerhood in terms of a shared pool of evidence, it is important not to trivialize the concept of a shared evidential pool; otherwise, epistemic peerhood would be way too broad. Access to a shared pool of evidence should not be merely in-principle access to publicly available facts making everything part of a shared evidential pool that is not explicitly kept secret. Such a notion would indeed make the concept of epistemic peerhood implausibly wide. For instance, if it just meant that both parties could, in principle, google the relevant information and solicit testimony from the relevant individuals, then almost everyone would count as sharing a common evidential pool in almost every disagreement, except perhaps in cases involving evidence that is not publicly reachable (e.g., classified information) or evidence that is constitutively unavailable to some agents (e.g., certain first-person experiences that cannot be had by them in principle). But that would drain the condition of its intention to capture the epistemically relevant symmetry or at least similarity condition of epistemic peerhood.

What I have in mind is a much more consequential notion of a shared pool: evidence counts as part of the pool only insofar as it is mutually available as evidence in the context of the dispute, and the participants have similar relevant abilities and virtues. Many disagreements fail this explication of epistemic peerhood.

For instance, take the following case where condition (i) fails. Suppose two equally competent researchers disagree about whether a classroom intervention improved outcomes in practice. Only one of them observed the implementation firsthand across weeks. Here, the evidential basis is practically no longer mutually available for assessment once the relevant episodes have passed, and thus, the researchers do not have equal access to the common pool. (This does not rule out that, during dialogue, such evidence can be introduced, made mutually accessible, and enter the common pool).

Concerning failing to meet condition (ii), consider an academic and a layperson who both have in-principle access to the same set of papers on PubMed, but only one of them can realistically locate the relevant paper, assess its methods, and put the strength of evidence in context. In that case, the parties do not satisfy condition (ii): they do not have a similar ability to integrate the relevant evidence into their doxastic states. Finally, concerning failing to meet condition (iii), consider disputes in which one party can contribute testimony in principle; however, their testimony may not function as evidence for the others because it is systematically discounted or subjected to higher burdens of proof, for instance in cases of epistemic injustice. In such cases, the parties do not share the same evidential base in the relevant sense: one party’s experiences and reports never become relevant evidence in the dispute. One can say that epistemic peerhood requires roughly comparable access to what the parties jointly treat as the relevant evidential base.

Regarding the notion of ‘roughly equal’ in (i), (ii), and (iii): This recognizes the natural variation in cognitive abilities and virtues among individuals. The notion of epistemic peers does not require similar access to identical types of evidence, but rather shared access to the overall body of evidence. To better understand this condition, I want to discuss how this account captures typical perspectival knowledge. Consider the following standard example of child birthing experiences as an illustration. Although someone who has not given birth can never have the same experiential knowledge of childbirth as someone who has, they can still access the socially shared evidence provided by those who have experienced childbirth. If they are in such a context, individuals who have not given birth can be epistemic peers of those who have even on epistemic matters that are informed by the experience of childbirth. On this definition, even though some individual experiences of child birthing are in principle inaccessible by those who did not give birth, this does not exclude them from a notion of epistemic peers on matters where childbirth is relevant since they can access the pool of evidence provided by those who have given birth.

Does this not contradict the just-introduced condition of mutually available evidence? A natural worry is that if anything discounts two individuals as epistemic peers, then it is when one has a specific type of experience, such as childbirth, that the other one does not have, and that experience is directly relevant to the dispute. This objection overlooks the force of the community model of knowledge. A central motivation for adopting a community model of knowledge is precisely to reject the traditional epistemological picture on which knowledge is primarily generated by private experiences that confer epistemic authority independently of any social environment. On the community model, even paradigmatic unique first-person experiences, such as childbirth, are not epistemically self-contained. The surrounding social environment at least partly constitutes the way the experience manifests itself and how it is made intelligible by the experiencer; in turn, the experiencer feeds back their perspective into the social environment. As such, understanding child birthing, and its relevance as evidence for a dispute, is a communal and not individualistic endeavor as much as anything else. This is not meant to deny that lived experience can have epistemic significance; on the contrary, these often function as prime examples in standpoint-theoretic explanations of epistemic advantage. What I deny is that their epistemic significance is categorical, i.e., that they have such a unique status that they can never enter a shared pool of evidence in principle. The experience of childbirth can enter the common pool of evidence via testimony and other means, but it is also not automatically part of a shared pool merely because it is reported. For instance, if the testimony is systematically discounted, then the relevant evidence has not been made mutually available, and condition (iii) can fail even though the experience has been ‘shared’ in a thin sense.

Additionally, it is too easy to prematurely limit the ways in which our collective pool of evidence can grow. Take as an example the development of TENS (Transcutaneous Electrical Nerve Stimulation) machines. TENS machines, often used to simulate the sensations of childbirth for individuals who cannot experience it biologically, offer a practical example of how to gain some experiential understanding of childbirth pain. Of course, TENS machines cannot reproduce the full spectrum of childbirth experience, but they provide an approximation of some facets that allows individuals who did not undergo childbirth to access even some of the subjective experiences related to childbirth. Hence, an individual who never experienced childbirth who has experienced a TENS session, in addition to listening to and empathizing with stories and descriptions of childbirth, further solidifies their position as an epistemic peer to those who have given birth. This illustrates that some experience-based evidence can sometimes be partially mediated – here by technology – so that it can enter the shared evidential pool more robustly than testimony alone. Within a community model of knowledge, many perceived barriers might thus be more permeable than initially assumed.

This approach differs from Toole’s (Reference Toole2024) recent explication of marginalized standpoints in terms of evidential or cognitive superiority akin to expertise. I resist reframing epistemic peerhood solely in this narrow way because of the mentioned problems. My model instead preserves the concept of epistemic peerhood by reconceiving it communally: peers share access to a dynamic and collective pool of evidence. What fundamentally matters is the epistemic structure of access to evidence: marginalized standpoints provide non-redundant evidence that dominant perspectives cannot generate on their own. The weighting of marginalized perspectives thus follows from generative evidential asymmetry. Even if marginalized individuals were not better knowers in a domain where their marginalization matters (although often they are), their situatedness supplies distinctive evidence that must, epistemically, be accounted for in certain domains of disagreement.

The considerations discussed thus far should sufficiently establish the idea that, despite the complexities introduced by standpoint epistemology, we can still maintain a viable concept of epistemic peerhood even though it will be a broader one than the traditional concept – in this sense, I am conceptually revisionary. Here, it is important to clarify the theoretical role that ‘epistemic peerhood’ is intended to play. The motivating philosophical thought behind the issue of peer disagreement is that if someone with the same evidence and roughly equal intellectual abilities disagrees with me, should that not by itself already undermine my confidence that I am right? Accordingly, discussions of the issue are often most compelling when working with a narrow notion of peerhood that then yields general epistemic advice, e.g., give the credence of epistemic peers the same weight as yours when updating. On the broader construal that I suggest here, we can still have general epistemic advice. This is because the notion still marks disagreements in which the epistemic positions of the parties are sufficiently comparable that disagreement itself carries normative significance, meaning that such disagreement by itself constitutes non-trivial higher-order evidence which bears on rational belief revision. As I will argue in the next section, the default advice is conciliationist. However, I will also argue that how much weight we assign to a peer’s viewpoint will be context-dependent.

Recently, Borge and Guercio (Reference Borge and Lo Guercio2021) differentiated a strong sense of peerhood – where agents are closely matched in evidential position and in the abilities relevant to assessing that evidence – from a weaker sense in which agents can still be comparably competent and intellectually serious, even though their epistemic perspectives and evidential routes diverge. This is a conceptually clean option, although I want to stress that, as argued, once standpoint theory is combined with an intersectional lens, strong peerhood becomes very rare. Thus, standpoint theory really shifts the action to weak peerhood. The developed community model should be read as a way of making this weaker notion epistemically substantive – by cashing out epistemic peerhood in terms of participation in a shared, socially distributed evidential pool, so that disagreement across social positions can still generate norms for belief revision.

For the remainder of this article, I will set out the task as follows: Suppose that we can make sense of a concept of epistemic peers across identity groups within the presented community model of knowledge, how should we then navigate peer disagreement from the perspective of standpoint theory?

4.1. Standpoint epistemology and steadfastness: a disconnect

In this section, I discuss how to navigate disagreements when one party has a standpoint arising from a marginalized position. It will be argued that the main tenets of standpoint theory are in tension with a steadfast approach, synergize well with a non-equal weight version of conciliationism, and sometimes justify ‘Peer-Predominant Conciliationism’; i.e., in certain contexts it is appropriate to accord more weight to a peer’s viewpoint than to one’s own.

Specifically, in this section I will present three arguments: firstly, a steadfast approach overlooks the situatedness of knowledge; secondly, it can intensify epistemic injustice; and thirdly, it risks championing ‘false objectivity’.

Let me start with the first argument. Standpoint theory emphasizes that knowledge and understanding are fundamentally situated, shaped significantly by one’s social identities and lived experiences. A steadfast approach to disagreement will neglect this dimension, by failing to sufficiently acknowledge the potential epistemic value of perspectives shaped by different experiences and social locations. Since individuals are at the intersections of a multitude of identities, each individual, and especially each marginalized group, will have unique insights in various situations pertaining to their social location. Such individuals are thus in a unique perspectival situation at the intersection of a multitude of identities and have unique access to knowledge that needs to be accounted for in disagreement. Maintaining one’s original credences in the face of disagreement – particularly when the disagreement concerns social position – risks foregoing the epistemic gains that come from engaging with alternative standpoints. Standpoint theory stresses the importance of learning from the perspectives of others, especially those shaped by marginalization, and in this respect aligns with conciliationism. Both approaches treat disagreement as an opportunity for epistemic improvement. This is probably the most straightforward challenge for the steadfast approach from a standpoint epistemology perspective, and I will return in the next two subsections which version of conciliationism that exactly entails.

Secondly, an indiscriminate application of steadfastness in peer disagreement may inadvertently reinforce the power dynamics that perpetuate marginalization. Since status quo belief systems are dominant belief systems, steadfastness leads to a conservation of current power structures. Adherence to one’s own viewpoint could then result in a form of epistemic harm, where certain voices and experiences are continually marginalized, an outcome that is diametrically opposed to the objectives of standpoint epistemology. This potential bias against the experiences of marginalized groups can lead to an impoverished and narrow understanding of reality where only dominant or widely accepted belief systems keep getting perpetuated. However, steadfastness might also have its advantages. Fricker (Reference Fricker2007) differentiates between two types of harm caused by epistemic injustice: primary and secondary harm. Primary harm refers to a reduction in trust in one’s own convictions, abilities, etc. By firmly holding onto one’s beliefs, an individual can shield themselves from the primary harm of diminished trust in their convictions. This steadfastness, in essence, acts as a protective mechanism against certain damages caused by the broader epistemic environment. However, this very resilience could still expose one to secondary harms, like facing biases in opportunities. Yet, there is a question of whether engaging in dialogues, as a response to these harms, is the most effective approach. The dialogue may not always be the right or sufficient mechanism to counter the deeper societal structures that perpetuate discrimination. Thus, while the presented arguments show a tension of standpoint theory and the steadfast approach on the background of epistemic injustice, there is nuance to be explored, as the steadfast approach might offer individual protective benefits.

Third, standpoint epistemology’s critique of the illusion of pure objectivity significantly problematizes the steadfast position. Standpoint theory advances the premise that all perspectives are shaped by an individual’s specific socio-historical location and lived experiences. By this token, application of steadfastness may be unwittingly subscribing to what Harding (Reference Harding2004) calls ‘false objectivity’ – a neglect of the situated nature of their own knowledge and perspectives.

This criticism might raise contentions by mainstream epistemologists. Is it not possible to approach objectivity by factoring in one’s biases and striving to correct for them? One can offer a nuanced perspective within standpoint epistemology here. First, the situatedness of knowledge does not preclude objective truth, the issue is epistemic, i.e., with accessibility of truth. Second, the critique of false objectivity does not completely deny the possibility of achieving objectivity either. Standpoint theorists like Haraway (Reference Haraway1988) propose a notion of situated knowledges, which involves acknowledging the partial perspective that every observer has and, yet, striving for a more comprehensive understanding by valuing and integrating diverse perspectives.Footnote ⁴ Hence, the critique of false objectivity is not a call to abandon the pursuit of objective truth, not even of an objective access to it but rather a call to reevaluate our own beliefs and credences about the world on matters where standpoints matter without falling into the trap to think that we already achieved objective knowledge.

In sum, the tenets of standpoint theory – situated knowledge, the critique of false objectivity, and the emphasis on preventing epistemic injustice – all point towards a conciliationist treatment of peer disagreement, especially when it comes to engaging with, rather than resisting, the insights provided by diverse perspectives in the face of disagreement.

4.2. Non-equal weight conciliationism

There is at least one major qualification to how standpoint theory aligns with conciliationism. Standpoint theory emphasizes that marginalized individuals often have unique insights about social structures and experiences precisely because of their marginalization. These insights may not be fully accessible or understandable to individuals from dominant groups without such experiences. In this case, the epistemic significance of disagreement is typically asymmetric: the marginalized party may have reason to give the disagreement comparatively less weight, whereas the privileged party may have reason to give it comparatively more weight. It will be useful to give a practical example:

In Workplace Microaggressions, Susan’s standpoint gives her access to a form of knowledge that Bob, given his different social position and experiences, may not fully grasp. Standpoint theory, in this scenario, at least initially (I will say more on that later) suggests that Susan should not treat Bob’s dissent as carrying equal evidential weight, in fact, it implies only minimal adjustment of her initial credences. Susan, having unique and valuable insights stemming from her lived experiences, has legitimate reasons to adjust her credences only minimally in the face of such disagreement.

Note that this reasoning has similarities to van Inwagen’s (Reference Van Inwagen, Jordan and Howard-Snyder1996) and Huemer’s (Reference Huemer and Dougherty2011), who argue that one’s incommunicable insights that the other party lacks and one’s own experience have special evidential weight. This is contrary to Feldman (Reference Feldman and Hetherington2006) who argues that this goes both ways and is, thus, not a reason for steadfastness. Here, standpoint theory has a powerful answer against Feldman’s contention without going all the way to steadfastness. Susan is correct in assigning low epistemic weight to Bob disagreeing even if Bob has some special experience that Susan does not have. Since standpoint theory puts an additional weight on the lived experience of the marginalized, given their respective social positions and experiences, her non-equal weight response is justified. Note further that, contrary to what one can infer from Inwagen’s and Huemer’s reasoning, the reverse is not the case. Bob needs to adjust his credences way more (more on this in the next section).

A similar strategy applies in cases of epistemic injustice – situations where the testimonies or perspectives of marginalized individuals are unfairly discounted or dismissed. If a marginalized individual perceives a peer disagreement with someone from a dominant group as a potential instance of such injustice, standpoint theory might also justify given only minimal weight to the other perspective in the disagreement. The individual could, quite rightly, question the epistemic capacity of the privileged peer to fully understand the complexities of the lived experience of marginalization.

It is important to note nuances here. The potential justification for adjusting one’s credences only minimally in such cases is not an outright dismissal of other perspectives. Standpoint theory still argues for the importance of dialogue and mutual understanding. It is not an affirmation of steadfastness. Standpoint theory is in such situations rather best viewed as in tension with the Equal Weight View (EWV), the view that, upon encountering a dissenting opinion from an epistemic peer, one should give equal consideration to both perspectives, thereby equally adjusting one’s credences. If one’s disagreement is with an individual from a different social position, particularly a marginalized position, standpoint theory suggests that their viewpoint may carry additional epistemic weight due to the unique insights their standpoint could provide. Consequently, an uncritical application of EWV might inadvertently neglect the potential enrichment derived from diverse standpoints and even reinforce epistemic injustice by undervaluing or dismissing the contributions of marginalized groups.

As such, standpoint theory aligns very well with a non-equal-weight version of conciliationism particularly because it emphasizes the particularities of experience and the understanding derived from them. For example, Lackey’s (Reference Lackey, Haddock, Millar and Pritchard2008) conciliatory stance, which suggests that sometimes the weight we accord to others’ views depends on the specifics of the disagreement, aligns well with standpoint theory (see also Kelly Reference Kelly, Feldman and Warfield2010). This approach acknowledges that the weight of a perspective may depend on factors related to the individual’s social position and experiences. This is not to say that every marginalized standpoint carries more weight in every disagreement. Rather, it indicates that in some contexts, particularly those closely tied to social identities and experiences, the standpoints of marginalized individuals will likely offer critical insights that should be given additional weight in the process of updating one’s credences.

I have previously critiqued the steadfast approach on the background of standpoint theories’ criticism of false objectivity. Let me now lay out how the critique offered by standpoint theory towards the concept of objective knowledge not only troubles the steadfast stance, but also presents considerable challenges to EWV. As previously stated, knowledge, in the eyes of standpoint epistemology, is never disembodied or detached from social, cultural, or historical context. Instead, it arises from and reflects the unique vantage points offered by individuals’ specific social locations. This understanding stands in opposition to the traditional view of knowledge as something universal, accessible independently of an inquirer’s social standing or identity. This is a further tension with EWV since EWV hinges on the idea that all perspectives hold a kind of ‘objective’ epistemic weight that warrants equal consideration.

Standpoint theory problematizes this assumption. If we accept the assertion that knowledge is always socially situated, then we must also acknowledge that the epistemic weight of different perspectives is not equal. Standpoints stemming from marginalized identities, for instance, offer unique insights into the workings of power and inequality – insights that might be inaccessible from privileged standpoints. Therefore, a blanket application of EWV inadvertently overlooks these insights, potentially falling into the trap of false objectivity by failing to account for the inherently situated nature of knowledge.

In this sense, standpoint theory not only challenges the presumption of objective epistemic weight inherent in EWV but also compels us to consider how we might navigate disagreements in a manner that respects the situatedness of knowledge. This requires a nuanced understanding of conciliationism, one that allows for the weighting of differing perspectives to be influenced by the unique insights provided by divergent social locations. Less stringent interpretations of conciliationism will better accommodate standpoint theory’s insights. These views maintain that disagreement should typically lead to some degree of revising one’s credences, without prescribing equal weight to all dissenting opinions in a peer disagreement (Lackey Reference Lackey, Haddock, Millar and Pritchard2008; Kelly Reference Kelly, Feldman and Warfield2010). Such a position allows for permitting the revision of credences and beliefs to be influenced by the potential epistemic privilege offered by different standpoints and the intersections thereof.

4.3. Peer-predominant conciliationism

I want to discuss now one central assumption by the current literature on peer disagreement that gets challenged by the presented perspective of standpoint theory. As stated in the introduction, usually there are three treatments of peer disagreement on the table when it comes to meta-evidence from peer disagreement: (i) The ‘equal weight view’ where both peers’ opinions are treated equally, (ii) a ‘non-equal weight conciliationism’ where one might give more weight to one’s own perspective in certain instances, or (iii) a ‘steadfast’ stance where the bare fact of peer disagreement does not, by itself, supply a reason to adjust one’s beliefs or credences. Both (i) and (ii) belong to the family of conciliationism. I want to extend now the family of conciliationism by introducing a fourth weighting distribution to the debate. Standpoint epistemology suggests in some instances a form of non-equal weight conciliationism that is different than the received version of (ii). I call it (iv) ‘Peer-Predominant Conciliationism’, giving in some instances more weight to the other’s perspective than one’s own. Since standpoint epistemology emphasizes that marginalized individuals, due to their lived experiences, may have unique insights not readily accessible to those with privileged social identities, it implies that when individuals with dominant social identities find themselves in disagreement with individuals with marginalized identities on issues where their marginalization matters, they should give more weight to the latter’s perspectives.

Consider the earlier disagreement between Susan and Bob in Workplace Microaggressions. Remember, Susan belongs to a marginalized social group, while Bob belongs to a privileged one. If Susan’s standpoint offers unique insights rooted in her marginalized experiences, then Bob, in following the tenets of standpoint epistemology, should accord more weight to Susan’s perspective even if Bob’s perspective is backed up by the totality of all his evidence. It is important to stress again here that this does not imply that Bob’s perspective has no weight at all, but rather acknowledges the epistemic value of Susan’s standpoint, particularly in understanding social phenomena related to her experiences of marginalization. It shows that sometimes a Peer-Predominant Conciliationist approach is justified given certain power dynamics. This Peer-Predominant Conciliationist approach can be explicated with the following three conditions.

Peer-Predominant Conciliationist Treatment

A Peer-Predominant Conciliationist treatment of peer disagreement is warranted if and only if

1. (i) there is a presence of two or more epistemic peersFootnote ⁵ engaged in a disagreement about whether p.

2. (ii) the disagreement involves at least one peer from a marginalized social group and one from a privileged social group.

3. (iii) the peer from the marginalized group possesses a standpoint that offers unique insights into p which is derived from their specific marginalized experiences.

This warrants a Peer-Predominant Conciliationist response, consisting of two sub-responses:

1. (a) In revising beliefs or credences, the peer from the privileged social group accords greater weight to the perspective of the marginalized individual, even if their own perspective is supported by their total available evidence.

2. (b) This privileging of the marginalized perspective does not render the privileged perspective without weight, but acknowledges the additional epistemic value of the marginalized standpoint, especially when the topic of disagreement pertains to the experiences of marginalization.

4.4. A primary objection

The suggested balancing of the evidence raises an important objection. Firstly, especially evidentialists might worry that giving more weight to marginalized perspectives in certain contexts of disagreement might create epistemic imbalance, where certain standpoints are privileged over others based on social identities, rather than the validity or soundness of their arguments. Secondly, beside such epistemic defects, practically, this could risk a form of reverse discrimination, where dominant perspectives might be unfairly devalued.

It should indeed be taken seriously that there might be a danger of unwarranted dismissal of sound argumentation and evidence and a danger of reverse discrimination. However, standpoint theory does not indiscriminately privilege marginalized perspectives. It merely highlights that in certain contexts, particularly those closely related to their lived experiences, marginalized individuals provide unique insights that would otherwise be overlooked. This is not about ignoring evidence and sound argumentation, also not if it is provided by a member of a dominant group. A nuanced understanding of standpoint theory will not try to undermine functioning standards of evidence in peer disagreement. Standpoint theory simply asserts that if a disagreement concerns aspects related to the experiences and realities of marginalization, then those with lived experiences of such realities are likely to offer unique and insightful perspectives. That does not mean to discount the potential insights that can arise from any standpoint, including dominant ones. Consider Workplace Microaggressions again. If Bob can provide really good evidence and sound argumentation that the perceived microaggressions were a misperception by Susan, then (given a reconciliatory interpretation) this should still count as evidence for Susan to adjust her credences concerning whether she is discriminated against. The case only suggests that the evidential weight of Bob’s point of view and Susan’s is initially unequal because Susan’s unique perspective as a marginalized individual gives her perspective more evidential weight, justifying that, initially, she adjusts her credences only minimally. This nuanced application preserves the foundations about rational discussions between identity groups. Sure, there might now be a danger that we fall back to emotionally exhausting practices of marginalized individuals needing to justify themselves. But note that the initial justification of changing Susan’s credences only minimally already puts her out of her defensive position, i.e., she is exactly not in constant need to justify her experiences and can initially give Bob’s perspective only minimal weight. On the other hand, it still gives Bob the chance to provide evidence for his claim, and thus not shutting down dialogue. If Susan were to ignore any possible argument Bob can give, no matter how sound it is, this would indeed rob Susan from understanding her situation fully.

Thus, standpoint theory’s alignment with a form of non-equal weight conciliationism neither reverses epistemic hierarchies nor leads to an untenable dismissal of evidence and sound argumentation.

4.5. Upshot

The objective of this section was to explore the nuances of navigating disagreements when one party holds a standpoint emanating from a marginalized position. I contended that three key tenets of standpoint theory – the concept of situated knowledge, the critique of false objectivity, and the emphasis on preventing epistemic injustice – are inherently incompatible with the steadfast approach when applied indiscriminately. Furthermore, I showed a tension between standpoint epistemology and the Equal Weight View and I put forward the view of Peer-Predominant Conciliationism, a stance suggesting that under certain circumstances, it is reasonable to accord more weight to an epistemic peer’s view than to one’s own.