2. The Scorekeeping Approach to Language Use

In his seminal paper ‘Scorekeeping in a Language Game’, Lewis famously compares conversations to playing baseball. For Lewis, just like baseball, conversations have a score which, together with rules for correct play, determines which utterances are acceptable or even true in the course of a conversation. While the score of a baseball game is a septuple of numbers ⟨r_v, r_h, h, i, s, b, o⟩ consisting of the runs of the visiting team, the runs of the home team, the half, the inning, the strikes, the balls, and the outs, the score of a conversation consists of the underlying circumstances that make a conversation possible. These circumstances contain, among other things, a set of presupposed propositions, a boundary between relevant possibilities and ignored ones, a boundary between the permissible and the impermissible, standards of precision for the uses of vague terms, and the like. For example, an utterance of ‘Italy is boot-shaped’ is true if and only if the standards of precision for ‘boot-shaped’ in place are such that Italy counts as boot-shaped. Lewis compares this to the fact that in a baseball game it is correct play that the batter advances to first base if the score counts four balls.

For all similarities, however, there is a crucial difference between conversations and baseball games, viz. regarding the rules that determine the kinematics of the score. Unlike baseball, conversations have so-called rules of accommodation. For example, if in a baseball game the batter walks to first base after only three balls, his behaviour does not make it the case that there are four balls and his behaviour is correct. Conversations are different. Lewis illustrates this using the example of presuppositions. Even if the score of a conversation does not already include the proposition that Fred has children, an utterance of ‘Fred's children are asleep’ results in the score adjusting in such a way that the utterance counts as correct play (unless somebody objects ‘Hey, wait a minute, I didn't know that Fred has children’). A similar rule has been discussed by Karttunen (Reference Karttunen1974) and Stalnaker (Reference Stalnaker, Munitz and Unger1974). However, Lewis points out that accommodation rules also exist in connection with other components of the conversational score. For instance, an utterance of ‘Italy is boot-shaped’ can lead to the standards of precision for ‘boot-shaped’ adjusting in such a way that the utterance comes out true. Similarly, in a master/slave game where two people are both willing that one of them should be under the control of the other, an utterance of the master that such-and-such courses of action are permissible/impermissible expands/restricts the permissibility range if this is required to make the utterance of the master true.

Against the scorekeeping approach, Abbott (Reference Abbott2008) objects that accommodation is much like a magical process. Gauker (Reference Gauker1998, Reference Gauker2008) expresses similar concerns. However, starting from Stalnaker's (Reference Stalnaker1998, Reference Stalnaker2002) conception of a score as common ground, Thomason (Reference Thomason, Cohen, Morgan and Pollack1990) and von Fintel (Reference von Fintel2000, Reference von Fintel2008) could very much demystify Lewis’ accommodation rules, at least those for presuppositions. According to Thomason and von Fintel, following an utterance of ‘Fred's children are asleep’, the conversational parties adjust their beliefs because they recognise: (i) that the speaker wants to add to the common ground that Fred's children are asleep, and (ii) that this is only possible if it is already entailed by the common ground that Fred has children. Von Fintel mentions two cases where the hearers are disposed to cooperate with the speaker in this way: (i) the hearers may be genuinely agnostic as to the truth of the relevant proposition, assume that the speaker knows about its truth, and trust the speaker not to speak inappropriately or falsely; (ii) the hearers may not want to challenge the speaker about the presupposed proposition because it is irrelevant to their concerns and the smoothness of the conversation is important enough to them to warrant a little leeway. Hence, for Thomason and von Fintel, accommodation is not something magical, but something utterly pragmatic.

A significant development and application of the scorekeeping model has been in connection with the philosophical discussion of hate speech, i.e., speech that promotes hatred toward an individual or group on the basis of their race, gender, nationality, or the like. Philosophers such as Langton and West (Reference Langton and West1999), Langton (Reference Langton, Maitra and McGowan2012), West (Reference West, Lippert-Rasmussen, Brownlee and Coady2016), McGowan (Reference McGowan2003, Reference McGowan2004, Reference McGowan2009, Reference McGowan2019), and Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (Reference Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt2018) have argued that accommodation plays a crucial role in connection with the attitudinal, emotional, and behavioural changes that come with hate speech. For example, if a speaker utters the sentence ‘Even George can read’, the hearers tend to adjust their beliefs so that the utterance counts as correct play, i.e., they start to believe that George has intellectual deficits. Langton (Reference Langton, Maitra and McGowan2012) extends this explanation to desires and feelings. In this way, the scorekeeping model provides an explanation of how speech, and in particular hate speech, brings attitudinal and emotional changes about, even if the speaker has no intellectual or social authority whatsoever (Langton, Reference Langton, Fogal, Harris and Moss2018). This does not only hold for conversational contributions using presupposition accommodation, but also for utterances that lead to the adjustment of other components of the conversational score, such as the standards of precision for vague terms. For instance, if a speaker utters the sentence ‘Italy is boot-shaped’, the standards of precision for ‘boot-shaped’ tend to adjust so that the utterance comes out true and, thereby, add that Italy is boot-shaped to the common ground of the conversational parties.

If successful, such conversational contributions even change what future moves are permissible, or even possible, in the course of the conversation. For instance, if successful, an utterance of ‘Even George can read’ may license making snide remarks about George or jokes at his expense. Therefore, McGowan (Reference McGowan2003, Reference McGowan2004, Reference McGowan2009, Reference McGowan2019) calls conversational contributions, especially those using accommodation rules, covert exercitives. Exercitives are speech acts that enact rules (or permissibility facts). For example, if a lawmaker declares that it is not allowed to smoke in the vicinity of a pregnant woman, this utterance (said under the appropriate circumstances) makes it the case that it is not allowed to smoke in the vicinity of a pregnant woman. Usually, such speech acts require the speaker to have a certain kind of authority in order to be successful. However, McGowan notes that conversational contributions can change what future moves are permissible in the context of a conversation without satisfying the felicity conditions of standard exercitives, such as authority, speaker intention, and hearer recognition. As we have seen with the example of ‘Even George can read’, this can be exploited in socially relevant contexts such as hate speech.

The example of the lawmaker also shows that some utterances depend for their appropriateness on the social role of the speaker. Therefore, Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (Reference Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt2018) add so-called discourse roles to the conversational score. These roles determine what can be said by the conversational parties and are typically inherited from their social roles and the norms that come with them. An utterance of ‘I hereby declare you husband and wife’, for instance, is only appropriate if the speaker has a social role that allows them to marry people. In addition, the appropriateness of an utterance can also depend on the discourse roles of the hearers. For example, Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt point out that an utterance of ‘Johnny is a faggot’ is only appropriate if Johnny has been assigned a certain subordinating discourse role. If this discourse role has not already been assigned to Johnny, the conversational score will straightaway adjust so that the utterance counts as correct play. This, in turn, will license further derogatory remarks about Johnny, emphasising again how accommodation can be exploited in hate speech.

3. Scorekeeping in a Therapeutic Language Game

According to the scorekeeping approach to language use and its different developments, the methods and interventions of talking therapies are nothing other than covert exercitives which change the score of the therapeutic conversation. This suggests that the effectiveness of these methods and interventions is largely due to this change in the score. After all, many components of a conversational score are highly relevant when it comes to the effectiveness of talking therapies, such as the shared beliefs of the conversational parties, their discourse roles, and the possibility/permissibility range, to name just a few. Hence, by changing the score of the therapeutic conversation, the therapist can change the client's beliefs, expand their possibility and permissibility range, and the like. Furthermore, by changing the score of the therapeutic conversation, the therapist can make certain utterances of the client possible, utterances about certain events or one's attitudes and feelings. As Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, and Glaser (Reference Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser and Glaser1988) and Lieberman et al. (Reference Lieberman, Eisenberger, Crockett, Tom, Pfeifer and Way2007) point out, this is often what makes a therapeutic method or intervention effective.

According to the scorekeeping model, there are two ways in which the therapist can change the score of the therapeutic conversation. First, the therapist can change the score of the therapeutic conversation with their own conversational contributions, in particular those using rules of accommodation. Since such utterances, in turn, change what future moves are permissible, or even possible, in the course of a conversation, in this way the therapist also indirectly affects future scores of the therapeutic conversation. In addition, the therapist can affect the score of the therapeutic conversation by blocking the conversational moves of the client. In this case, the therapist makes a conversational move that prevents an utterance of the client from changing the score in a certain direction. Again, such blockings do not only prevent the conversational contributions of the client from changing the score directly, e.g., by using a rule of accommodation. They also prevent certain conversational contributions that the therapist would like to make later in the therapy from becoming unacceptable. Let me briefly illustrate the different ways in which the therapist can affect the score of the therapeutic conversation using the example of systemic questions.

With the use of a systemic question the therapist usually wants to provide the client with an alternative, and possibly less problematic, description of reality (von Schlippe and Schweitzer Reference von Schlippe and Schweitzer2016, pp. 249–51). For example, if a mother utters the sentence ‘My son is bad’, the therapist could respond with the systemic question ‘What is your son doing that you call “bad”?’. With this question the therapist (implicitly) provides the mother with a less problematic description of reality, according to which a behaviour of the son is perceived as bad, instead of the son having the property of being bad. If the mother responds with an utterance of ‘He throws things around’, then she has accepted the implicit offer of the therapist.

Systemic questions are often ascribed an almost hypnotic effect, since clients tend to tacitly accept their implicit offers. This is why Schmidt (Reference Schmidt1985) describes systemic questions as a kind of hypnotherapy. It is very likely that the almost hypnotic effect of systemic questions can be explained by the fact that their implicit offers are presuppositions that are accommodated by the client. In addition, the scorekeeping model provides an explanation of how, exactly, systemic questions open up alternative, and possibly less problematic, descriptions of reality on the part of the client. By changing the conversational score, the systemic question ‘What is your son doing that you call “bad”?’ makes new utterances possible in the context of the therapeutic conversation, i.e., utterances that presuppose that a behaviour of the son is perceived as bad (e.g., ‘He throws things around’). Finally, the use of the systemic question also blocks the mother's conversational contribution ‘My son is bad’, preventing the score from changing in such a way that it includes that the son has the property of being bad.Footnote ²

Note that in the example of systemic questions the use of accommodation directly leads to the intended effect of the therapist's intervention, i.e., providing the client with a less problematic description of reality. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the intervention depends to a large extent on the use of accommodation. After all, an explicit utterance of the therapist's implicit offer (‘Your son isn't bad, but a behaviour of your son is perceived by you as being bad’) wouldn't have the desired effect. However, the causal connection between the use of covert exercitives and accommodation, on the one hand, and the intended effect of the respective therapeutic method or intervention, on the other hand, is not always that obvious. For example, if Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (Reference Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt2018) are correct about the accommodation of discourse roles, then it is very likely that the effectiveness of transference and countertransference depends to a large extent on accommodation rules for the discourse roles of therapist and client. According to this explanation, in transference, the utterances of the client (and the therapist) result in the score adjusting in such a way that the therapist suddenly takes on the discourse role of someone from the client's past, making it possible to process unresolved conflicts. Similarly, the client could take on the discourse role of one of their past selves. In such cases the use of accommodation does not directly result in the intended effect of the examined method, i.e., to process unresolved conflicts, but it is nevertheless decisive for its effectiveness.

We see that, according to the scorekeeping model, therapeutic methods and interventions can affect different components of a conversational score. Hence, in order to get a better understanding of how individual methods and interventions work from a linguistic point of view, we have to investigate which components of the conversational score are affected by the respective method or intervention. What all the different methods and interventions of talking therapies have in common, according to the scorekeeping model, is the fact that they are covert exercitives, and, as such, they change the score of the therapeutic conversation, possibly using the linguistic phenomenon of accommodation. This has significant implications for the therapeutic practice, as it highlights the importance of training therapists in performing and blocking covert exercitives using rules of accommodation. The latter would also require that the therapists be trained to recognise the performance of potentially problematic exercitives on the part of the client. For example, Sbisà (Reference Sbisà1996) carried out an empirical study that shows that speakers can be trained to identify potentially problematic presuppositions of an utterance. Similarly, Langton (Reference Langton, Fogal, Harris and Moss2018, p. 149) notes that speakers can be trained to block problematic presuppositions via explication, paraphrasing, a raised eyebrow, and the like.

4. Concluding Remarks

Investigating the linguistic aspects of the different methods and interventions of talking therapies starting from the scorekeeping model constitutes a research field in its own right. The primary aim of this paper was to provide a general understanding of how the methods and interventions of talking therapies work from a linguistic point of view. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the methods and interventions of the various forms of talking therapy depends in large part on the performance of conversational exercitives, in particular those using rules of accommodation. This was illustrated using the examples of systemic questions and transference/countertransference. Concluding, I will briefly address the question of how the use of covert exercitives and accommodation interacts with another important factor for the effectiveness of talking therapy, i.e., the therapeutic relationship.

The only way to prevent accommodation is by blocking. For example, if the therapist uses the systemic question ‘What is your son doing that you call “bad”?’, the mother could respond with an utterance of ‘What do you mean by “call ‘bad’”? He is bad!’. In this way, she would prevent the score of the therapeutic conversation from adjusting in such a way that it includes that a behaviour of the son is perceived as bad. Hence, if the effectiveness of the methods and interventions of talking therapies depends in large part on the performance of covert exercitives using rules of accommodation, the effectiveness of these methods and interventions can be expected to strongly correlate with the clients’ blocking behaviour. Therefore, it is important to investigate what influences the clients’ blocking behaviour.

If the mother blocks the presupposition of the therapist's utterance in the described way, it won't count as correct play. This, in turn, would amount to an interruption of the conversation. It is very likely that this is the main reason why listeners tend not to block the conversational moves of the speaker, because they usually have a strong interest in keeping the conversation going. The reasons for this can vary. However, it is plausible that listeners have a strong interest in keeping a conversation going if they want to build or maintain a relationship with the speaker. This suggests that the degree of blocking decreases if the importance of the relationship to the conversational parties increases. Together with the claim that the effectiveness of the methods and interventions of talking therapy depends in large part on the use of covert exercitives, in particular those using rules of accommodation, this promises a completely new explanation of why the therapeutic relationship has such a large influence on the effectiveness of talking therapies. By reducing the blockings on the part of the client, the therapeutic relationship increases the effectiveness of the therapeutic methods and interventions.

The influence of the relationship of the conversational parties on their blocking behaviour has to be tested empirically, which goes beyond the scope of this paper. A confirmed correlation between blocking and certain aspects of the relationship of the conversational parties would not only provide a better understanding of how the therapeutic relationship affects the effectiveness of the methods and interventions of talking therapies, but it would also contribute to the demystification of the linguistic phenomenon of accommodation, by providing an explanation of why speakers tend to adjust their attitudes and feelings so that the utterances made in the course of a conversation count as correct play. This illustrates again how research at the intersection of psychotherapy research and philosophy of language can be highly beneficial for both research areas.