Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-9nbrm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-03-29T12:25:58.567Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Making Bribery Profitable Again? The Market Effects of Suspending Accountability for Overseas Bribery – CORRIGENDUM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2026

Lorenzo Crippa Open the ORCID record for Lorenzo Crippa [Opens in a new window] ,
Edmund J. Malesky Open the ORCID record for Edmund J. Malesky [Opens in a new window]  and
Lucio Picci Open the ORCID record for Lucio Picci [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Information

Type
CORRIGENDUM
Information
International Organization , Volume 80 , Issue 1 , Winter 2026 , pp. 235
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The IO Foundation

Upon publication of this article only one of two supplementary material files were included with the publication.

This has now been updated to include the missing file.

References

Crippa, Lorenzo, Malesky, Edmund J., and Picci, Lucio. 2025. Making Bribery Profitable Again? The Market Effects of Suspending Accountability for Overseas Bribery, International Organization 79 (4): 739–58.10.1017/S0020818325100970CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Crippa et al. supplementary material

Crippa et al. supplementary material
Download Crippa et al. supplementary material(File)
File 5 MB