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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2020
The concept of semi-sovereignty, a now obsolete category of international entities possessing limited sovereignty, remains hazily understood. However, the historical examination of how semi-sovereignty was defined and practised during the long nineteenth century can provide insights on the interplay between authority and control within the hierarchies of international relations. This paper examines one specific type of semi-sovereignty—namely, suzerainty—which is often used to describe China's traditional authority in Tibet and Mongolia. By examining the events that led to the acceptance of suzerainty as the legal framing for the China-Tibet and China-Mongolia relationships, I argue that suzerainty was a deliberately vague concept that could be used to create liminal international legal spaces to the advantage of Western states, and to mediate between competing claims of political authority. Finally, I point to the importance of semi-sovereignty as an arena of legal contestation between the Western and non-Western members of the “Family of Nations”.
Lecturer in Politics, Pembroke College, Oxford, and DPhil candidate in International Relations, Nuffield College, Oxford. I wish to thank Gordon Barrett, Benjamin de Carvalho, Andrew Hurrell, Edward Keene, Halvard Leira, Rana Mitter, and Ewan Smith for their comments.
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78. Ibid., at 91, 146.
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90. Convention Between Great Britain and Russia Relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, signed at St Petersburg, 31 August 1907, 204 CTS 404. The Entente was a general settlement of the two powers’ respective spheres of influence, a preliminary step to the formation of the Triple Entente.
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95. Ibid., at 23–87.
96. Ibid., at 15–16.
97. Ibid., at 7–11.
98. Ibid., at 91.
99. Ibid., at 91–5.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid., at 101–14.
102. Ibid., at 102.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid., at 140.
105. Ibid., at 145–50.
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109. Waijiaobu archives, 03-28-024-03-004. This is an important document, as it is one of the few insights into the private attitude of the Chinese government towards both sets of tripartite talks.
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115. Lord George Hamilton to Lord Curzon of Kedleston, 27 February 1903, in East India (Tibet). Papers Relating to Tibet, Cd. 1920, 183.
116. Convention between Belgium, Bolivia, the British Empire, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam and the United States relative to the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, signed at St Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919, 225 CTS 482.
117. Curzon to India Office, 23 April 1920, FO 535/F660/22/10.
118. L/P&S/18/344 B. 344, India Office Records, The British Library. The argument was similar to Thomas Baty's and Japan's argument that China, because of its internal disorder, could not be a state. See Thomas BATY, “Can an Anarchy be a State?” (1934) 28 American Journal of International Law 444. From the British point of view, however, this was a somewhat unappealing argument, given its longstanding public support for the integrity of China.
119. Beilby Alston to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, 27 April 1920, FO 371/5315 F/677/22/10.
120. Memorandum by Charles Henry Bentinck, 13 May 1920, FO 371/5315 F/834/22/10.
121. Minute by Miles Lampson, 14 April 1921, FO 371/6607 F/1238.
122. Minute by William Malkin, 14 April 1921, FO 371/6607 F/1238. Malkin thought that Tibet's status as a vassal tended to suggest it was not a part of China, but ignored the fact that the British had accepted the opposite view at Simla. He quoted Oppenheim at some length, but did not take a strong stance either way.
123. India Office to Foreign Office, 15 October 1919, L/P&S/18/344 B.344 P5833.
124. In order to induce China to resume the talks, in 1921 Curzon (by then foreign secretary) told Wellington Koo that unless China came back to the negotiating table Britain would recognize Tibet “as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, and intend dealing on this basis with Tibet in the future”. It is not obvious why the Foreign Office thought this would be an effective threat, given that these were the terms China all but accepted at Simla and sought in 1915. In the event the Chinese stalled, and the talks never resumed. The text of Curzon's ultimatum is in FO 371/6609/59/10.
125. Files on this issue are at FO 371/35755 and L/P&S/12/4196.
126. Similarly, “dependent” and “owing some degree of allegiance” were both rejected. See Ashley Clarke to Peel, 17 January 1944, L/P&S/12/4194.
127. Anand, supra note 11 at 240. Tibet considered joining the League of Nations and the Universal Postal Union, but in neither case did the Tibetans pursue the application with any seriousness. Had an application been made, it would have been most unlikely to be granted, even putting the legal problems aside.
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