Somalia today stands as one of the most persistent contexts of child soldier recruitment and use globally. The emergence of the Islamic militant group Al Shabaab has intensified fears about the insecurity of – and threat posed by – children as agents of war in Somalia. This article contextualises Al-Shabaab’s recruitment and use of children within its specific historical, political and cultural dimensions, challenging the emphasis in terrorism studies on the ‘unique’ phenomenon of children in extremist groups and relating the pathways of youth in Al-Shabaab with wider trends in criminality and violence, including piracy. This research responds to the need for deeper analysis of Somalia’s history of youth mobilisation that considers the specific constructions of age and masculinity that have influenced the participation of young people in diverse armed groups.

How ruling parties in competitive authoritarian regimes adapt their strategies to sustain power while evading accountability remains central to scholarly inquiry. Yet, little attention has been paid to the role of quasi-state actors in electoral manipulation or how citizens respond. Drawing on fieldwork in Gutu District, this study examines Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ), a Government-Organised Non-Governmental Organisation (GONGO) aligned with the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). FAZ operated as a parallel intelligence structure, deploying covert tactics including unauthorised data collection, surveillance at voters’ roll inspection centres, opposition infiltration and illegal ‘exit polls’. Citizens responded variably; some complied, and others utilised quiet resistance, avoidance or moral denunciation. We argue that FAZ represents an authoritarian innovation that enabled repression while offering ruling elites plausible deniability. Contributing to debates on GONGOs and regime survival, this study shows how such actors entrench dominance and undermine democratic consolidation in Africa.

Despite increases in the military capabilities of Sahelian jihadists over the last decade, similarities and differences between the fighting styles of groups with common transnational jihadist affiliations remain underexplored. This article compares the activities of the two Islamic State (IS)-affiliated groups in the wider Sahel: the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). Despite a common affiliation, these groups operate in different local contexts, over a thousand kilometres apart. Similarities and differences in their military approaches can thus help us understand the respective impact of local and transnational dynamics on jihadist behaviour. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork and quantitative/geospatial analysis, this article explores this issue through analysis of strategic goals, command and control, military hybridisation, tactics/attack profiles and spatial variations. While their activities are by no means uniform, we find a growing convergence between these groups over time driven by a mix of IS influence and local dynamics.