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Instrumentalizing Human Rights: The On-Stage and Off-Stage of the Blacklisted Workers’ Movement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2026

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Abstract

Has international human rights law become a tool reserved for the global elite? While some argue that human rights frameworks empower advocacy groups to pressure governments, others claim these institutions are accessible only to well-funded, transnational nongovernmental organizations and risk depoliticizing activists’ demands. Based on a study of the blacklisted workers’ movement in the United Kingdom, this study shows a new way in which human rights laws and institutions can catalyze social movements. Recognizing the limitations of human rights, activists take an instrumental approach that creates a duality in their movement. On-stage before public audiences, they leverage human rights to amplify grievances and push for reform. However, off-stage, human rights norms do not shape their ideological commitments or solidarity, which remain rooted in class-based identities. These findings demonstrate how human rights law can spur grassroots mobilization while decoupling the material and cultural drivers of social movements.

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Has international human rights law become a tool accessible only to the global elite? This question has caused rifts among human rights scholars. Proponents argue that human rights frameworks can empower transnational movements and advocacy organizations, facilitating successful naming-and-shaming campaigns that pressure governments into action (Brysk Reference Brysk2013; Keck and Sikkink Reference Keck and Sikkink1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink Reference Risse, Ropp and Sikkink2013; Simmons Reference Simmons2009). Historical examples, from the dismantling of authoritarian regimes in Latin America to advancements in LGBTQ rights in Europe, illustrate how human rights institutions have strengthened state protections for basic rights and bolstered civil society (Alter Reference Alter2014; Cichowski Reference Cichowski2016; Engstrom and Low Reference Engstrom, Low and Engstrom2019; Helfer and Voeten Reference Helfer and Voeten2014; Hillebrecht Reference Hillebrecht2014; Sundstrom, Sperling, and Sayoglu Reference Sundstrom, Sperling and Sayoglu2019; Tsutsui Reference Tsutsui2017). Yet even proponents and practitioners of human rights acknowledge a persistent weakness: international laws and institutions often struggle to mobilize broad grassroots support (Roth Reference Roth2004; Snyder Reference Snyder, Hopgood, Snyder and Vinjamuri2017).

Critics extend this concern in two directions. One argues that international frameworks primarily mobilize the elites. As these institutions have become increasingly professionalized and legally complex, only well-funded, transnationally connected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights professionals have the expertise required to navigate them (Bob Reference Bob2005; Hopgood Reference Hopgood2013). In this view, the promise of human rights is sustained by a narrow circle of advocates operating at a considerable distance from the communities whose rights are at stake. A second line of critique warns that even when social movements engage with human rights law, they do so by domesticating dissent (Brown Reference Brown2006; Whyte Reference Whyte2019). Channeling collective grievances into legalistic or technocratic forms risks diverting activists’ limited time, energy, and resources toward arenas that temper rather than amplify contention (Baxi Reference Baxi2008; Douzinas and Gearty Reference Douzinas and Gearty2014; Moyn Reference Moyn2018; Savage and Smith Reference Savage and Smith2017). These concerns have also intensified beyond academia, where right-wing parties and governments, albeit for very different reasons, have echoed similar accusations of elitism to challenge the legitimacy of international human rights institutions (Madsen et al. Reference Madsen, Mayoral, Strezhnev and Voeten2022; Voeten Reference Voeten2020). As a result, some scholars have suggested that we may be witnessing the “end times” of human rights (Hopgood Reference Hopgood2013).Footnote 1

One underlying assumption in these debates is that when social movements turn to human rights law, their engagement is expected to shape their identities, moral commitments, or ambitions (Chua Reference Chua2020; Merry Reference Merry2006; Tsutsui Reference Tsutsui2017). Human rights frameworks are presumed to exert a cultural and ideational pull that molds individuals’ “moral instincts and reflexes” (Ignatieff Reference Ignatieff2017; see also Benhabib Reference Benhabib2009; Sikkink Reference Sikkink2017). Combined with the caution raised by critical scholars, this presumption has profound implications for social movements: if human rights institutions diminish activists’ aspirations or sap their mobilization power, grassroots actors may be better off pursuing alternative strategies (Bishara Reference Bishara2021; Doherty and Hayes Reference Doherty and Hayes2014; Fu Reference Fu2017; Lacouture Reference Lacouture2024; Pearlman Reference Pearlman2021). The task of holding states accountable for their obligations under international human rights instruments may be relegated to a select group of experts, further narrowing the political reach of human rights frameworks.

This article theorizes an alternative form of engagement in which grassroots actors adopt human rights frameworks without internalizing the moral or institutional logics that animate them: instrumental mobilization of human rights. I build on sociolegal research on law and social movements (Arrington Reference Arrington2019; Chua Reference Chua2020; Gallagher Reference Gallagher2017; McCann Reference McCann1994; Merry Reference Merry2006; NeJaime Reference NeJaime2010; Taylor and Tarrow Reference Taylor and Tarrow2024; Tsutsui Reference Tsutsui2017) to show how activists deploy human rights law to advance their goals, while the cultural drivers of contention—such as collective identities, solidarities, and ideological foundations—continue to be grounded in preexisting political commitments. Human rights law becomes a resource for activists to expand repertoires, frames, and institutional pressure, but not a moral compass. The activists’ recognition of the limits of human rights institutions produces a duality in the movement: an on-stage and an off-stage dimension. On-stage, they capitalize on the opportunities and visibility provided by human rights frameworks to raise awareness about their grievances and press for structural reforms. Off-stage, when they are away from public scrutiny, human rights norms do not shape activists’ worldviews, moral commitments, or their internal bonds that sustain their collective action.

This model emerges from an in-depth analysis of the blacklisted construction workers’ movement in the United Kingdom. At first glance, a group of workers with a long-standing commitment to rank-and-file mobilization and deep skepticism toward legal instruments appear unlikely adopters of international human rights. Yet they not only litigated their claims as human rights violations before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) but also incorporated human rights language into their public campaigns. Their instrumental approach emerged from a political context in which domestic avenues for labor organizing had contracted under neoliberal reforms while new international legal remedies became available through the ECtHR. As workers encountered these possibilities through ongoing litigation and interactions with union-linked legal advocates, human rights law became a strategic tool for amplifying their public campaign.

The findings from this study contribute to three areas of scholarship. First, this research builds on and extends the literature on domestic actors that compel states to comply with their international human rights obligations (Alter Reference Alter2014; Hillebrecht Reference Hillebrecht2014; Simmons Reference Simmons2009). While existing studies mostly focus on elite actors, such as human rights practitioners and state actors, this article explores the role of local social movements as agents of democratic change at the domestic level. Second, this research advances social movement studies by illustrating the transformative effect of international human rights law on social movements. Contrary to prevailing assumptions (Armstrong and Bernstein Reference Armstrong and Bernstein2008; Arrington Reference Arrington2019; Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000; Chua Reference Chua2020; McCann Reference McCann1994; Merry Reference Merry2006; Polletta and Jasper Reference Polletta and Jasper2001; Tsutsui Reference Tsutsui2017), I demonstrate a decoupling between the cultural and material drivers of social movements: activists need not embrace the normative foundations of human rights frameworks to effectively utilize them in their campaigns. Finally, against the expectations of critical scholars (Hopgood Reference Hopgood2013; Moyn Reference Moyn2018; Savage and Smith Reference Savage and Smith2017), I argue that human rights institutions do not necessarily depoliticize or individualize labor movements; rather, they can ignite and expand them.

Conventional Wisdom on Human Rights and Social Movements

Most studies on human rights activism explore the role of transnational movements and NGOs in leading naming-and-shaming campaigns (Hafner-Burton Reference Hafner-Burton2013; Keck and Sikkink Reference Keck and Sikkink1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink Reference Risse, Ropp and Sikkink2013; Tarrow Reference Tarrow2005). In transnational movements, such as the boomerang model, the local actors initiate resistance against their states but rely heavily on support from transnationally connected civil society organizations for their global reach and expertise in human rights law to hold abusing governments accountable (Keck and Sikkink Reference Keck and Sikkink1998). A second wave of research has shifted attention to “pro-compliance” groups that operate at the domestic level, including civil society actors, judges, lawyers, and politicians (Alter Reference Alter2014; Bernardi Reference Bernardi and Engstrom2019; Hillebrecht Reference Hillebrecht2014; Huneeus Reference Huneeus, Alter, Helfer and Madsen2018; Simmons Reference Simmons2009). Ratified international treaties “increase the likelihood of success” for compliance-minded actors, enabling them to advocate for their agenda through parliaments, courts, or naming-and-shaming campaigns (Simmons Reference Simmons2009). The civil society actors in this second model, however, consist of NGOs, human rights practitioners, and lawyers, rather than grassroots activists directly experiencing the violations. Hence this scholarship provides little insight into whether and how human rights institutions empower victims to become advocates for their own causes through local social movements.Footnote 2

In contrast to NGOs or interest groups, social movements typically operate through noninstitutional channels and engage in contentious action, such as demonstrations, protests, and strikes, rather than regular interactions with the state (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi Reference Snow, Soule, Kriesi, Snow, Soule and Kriesi2008; Tarrow Reference Tarrow[1994] 2011).Footnote 3 These movements rally diverse groups and depend less on experts and technocrats to advocate for political change. Yet scholars disagree on the impact of human rights law and institutions on social movements. Comparative case studies on gender, sexual orientation, and minority groups suggest that human rights laws and norms can become cultural drivers of mobilization. They can facilitate collective action by helping victims to recognize their experiences as human rights violations, construct a collective identity based on these rights, and recruit new members by raising awareness of the issue (Chua Reference Chua2020; Merry Reference Merry2006; Tsutsui Reference Tsutsui2017). This symbolic power of human rights on activists is crucial, as collective identity, awareness, motivation, and discourse are essential for building social movements (Armstrong and Bernstein Reference Armstrong and Bernstein2008; Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000; Polletta and Jasper Reference Polletta and Jasper2001). While this constructivist approach acknowledges that human rights can provide material resources and opportunities for social movements, it primarily emphasizes their influence on activists’ perceptions of their grievances and identities. As Tsutsui (Reference Tsutsui2017, 1091–92) notes, “the recurring pattern that emerges is that global human rights first transforms local actors’ movement actorhood, which concurrently shapes their goals and strategies, and then provides political opportunities to propel the movements into new activities.”

This optimistic view stands in stark contrast to the concerns raised by critical scholars, who argue that invoking human rights law and institutions can entangle movements in conventional politics, leading them to lose the radical edge that drives them to push for systemic changes (Baxi Reference Baxi2008; Corntassel Reference Corntassel2007; Moyn Reference Moyn2018; Rajagopal Reference Rajagopal2003; Savage and Smith Reference Savage and Smith2017). These critiques are particularly pronounced for groups advancing social and economic rights, such as trade union rights, where international human rights instruments typically establish only a minimal baseline and weak enforcement mechanisms (Alston and Goodman Reference Alston and Goodman2013). Human rights, these scholars suggest, have not only failed to challenge neoliberal policies that dismantled welfare programs and protections for trade unions (Moyn Reference Moyn2018; Savage and Smith Reference Savage and Smith2017), but have also provided a normative cover for their advancement (Brown Reference Brown2006; Whyte Reference Whyte2019). It is no surprise, according to this perspective, that neoliberalism and human rights ascended around the same time in the 1970s, as both prioritized individual liberties while leaving the settlement of distributive outcomes to politics or the market (Douzinas Reference Douzinas, Douzinas and Gearty2014).

Instrumental Mobilization of Human Rights

This study diverges from existing scholarship that locates the primary impact of international human rights law in social construction processes by proposing an alternative path through which international human rights frameworks can catalyze social movements. I argue that activists can capitalize on the opportunities and resources these frameworks provide without deriving the moral and symbolic meanings essential for building a social movement from them. In this instrumental approach to human rights, the pursuit of human rights is not motivated by their moral virtue but by the strategic openings and legitimating resources they offer to advance their cause. Mobilizing human rights norms and institutions enhances the external legitimacy of activists’ claims in the eyes of the general public and state actors, but they do not derive internal legitimacy from these norms. Instead, the cultural drivers of social movements—such as solidarity ties, collective identity, ideological commitments, and internal legitimacy—are defined by their preexisting moral commitments and worldviews. Thus, activists utilize human rights law and norms as a means to an end.

This disjuncture between the material and cultural drivers creates a duality between the on-stage and off-stage dimensions of activism, summarized in table 1. On-stage, activists engage in activities visible to external audiences, such as protests, marches, social media campaigns, litigation, and lobbying efforts. By framing their grievances as human rights abuses, they appeal to pro-compliance judges and political actors (Alter Reference Alter2014; Hillebrecht Reference Hillebrecht2014; Simmons Reference Simmons2009) and highlight gaps between states’ legal obligations and their practice (Goodman and Jinks Reference Goodman and Jinks2008; Simmons Reference Simmons2009). Rights language also provides resonant rhetoric for activists to present their cause in a favorable light and gain public sympathy. Off-stage refers to the private discussions and strategizing that occur behind the scenes during meetings among activists and their supporters. The absence of human rights rhetoric in this sphere, where activists are no longer performing for a public audience, indicates that these laws and norms do not penetrate into activists’ inner worlds or shape their identities. For labor activists, these commitments often center around class-based themes that precede their engagement with human rights.

Table 1 Typology of Social Movements’ Engagement with International Human Rights

This theorization echoes Goffman’s ([1956] Reference Goffman2007) “frontstage” and “backstage” concepts, which describe how individuals present themselves in their everyday lives when they are being observed versus when they are in private. However, while Goffman characterizes the backstage as a space removed from the scrutiny of others, the off-stage of human rights activism is a collective setting where activists can lower their guard and interact without the need to perform for an audience.Footnote 4 The intentionality in workers’ distinct behavior off-stage also bears similarities to Scott’s (Reference Scott2008, 4–5) description of “hidden transcripts” consisting of “offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript.” At the same time, the objectives and the behavior of social movements demanding political change are distinct from the survival strategies developed by the slave laborers or serfs that Scott examines. Unlike “public transcripts,” the on-stage sphere is not one in which workers must conceal frustrations or grievances for fear of repercussions, nor do they need to avoid transgressive behavior. The contrast between the on-stage and off-stage of mobilization arises from workers’ strategies to attract greater attention to their cause from a broader audience, rather than from avoiding the ire of employers or state agents.

The interpretive labor of framing grievances is not evenly distributed within movements. Leadership, spokespersons, and legally connected activists typically shape the public-facing frames because their roles place them in frequent contact with courts, parliaments, media, and broader publics. Operating at the movement’s boundaries, their work involves not only representing the movement externally but also translating its demands into frames that resonate with wider audiences. Social movement scholars have long recognized this tactical element, defining framing as “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam Reference McAdam, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald1996; see also Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000). Yet constructivists have critiqued this approach for neglecting the culturally embedded processes that shape framing and collective identity, often “in ways unrecognized by the actors themselves” (Goodwin and Jasper Reference Goodwin and Jasper1999; see also Steinberg Reference Steinberg1999). Instrumental mobilization shows how both dynamics can coexist. Movements can deploy one set of frames to motivate internal participation and another to gain public visibility and leverage. In contrast to contexts where intermediaries intentionally vernacularize human rights to instill rights-bearing subjectivities (Chua Reference Chua2020; Merry Reference Merry2006; Tsutsui Reference Tsutsui2017), here leadership curates rights frames that carry persuasive force for public audiences, while internal cohesion rests on preexisting ideological foundations.

The pragmatism in framing does not reduce activists’ behavior to a pure logic of consequences guided solely by rational cost-benefit calculations (March and Olsen Reference March and Olsen1998). Even when actors use shared values insincerely in a communicative setting, norms still define which arguments are considered legitimate in political communities (Checkel Reference Checkel2001; Schimmelfennig Reference Schimmelfennig2001).Footnote 5 The decision to adopt human rights language is deliberate and intentional, yet it is situated in a context where human rights have become the socially and morally appropriate idiom—or as Moyn (Reference Moyn2018) put it, the “highest moral language”—to express social justice claims. This model also differs from a realist or cynical approach to human rights, the type of “legally parasitic” view against which Amartya Sen (Reference Sen2006, 2915) cautions. Clifford Bob’s (Reference Bob2005; Reference Bob2019) account of the “marketing” and “weaponization” of rights illustrates this perspective, where human rights language becomes a strategic resource for actors seeking attention or access in ways that risk overshadowing moral values with branding. In instrumental mobilization, the strategic deployment of human rights coexists with deep-seated ideological commitments grounded in the movements’ own histories.

This interpretive labor through which activists negotiate meanings of rights is more visible in sociolegal work (Lovell Reference Lovell2012; Matsuda Reference Matsuda1987; McCann Reference McCann1994; McCann and Lovell Reference McCann and Lovell2020; Merry Reference Merry2006). Comparative studies of legal mobilization show that activists often regard litigation as a last resort and express disillusionment with the limited nature of legal remedies and the half-hearted implementation of groundbreaking rulings (Gallagher Reference Gallagher2017; McCann Reference McCann1994; McCann and Lovell Reference McCann and Lovell2020; Schmidt Reference Schmidt2018). Consequently, even when activists pursue legal avenues to their fullest potential, they may resist adopting a rights-based identity (Lovell Reference Lovell2012) or exhibit a form of “double consciousness,” recognizing both the constraints of legal institutions and the strategic opportunities they provide (Matsuda Reference Matsuda1987; McCann Reference McCann1994).Footnote 6 This study contributes to this literature by demonstrating how such ambivalence can create a disconnect between the public and private dimensions of mobilization.

Conditions and Scope of Instrumental Mobilization

The insights on instrumental mobilization developed in this study are derived from a single case, but the conditions that led the blacklisted workers to adopt this approach are hardly unique to labor organizers in that setting. Below I identify the interrelated conditions that can create openings for instrumental mobilization to emerge. The goal here is not to claim generalizability in a statistical sense but to develop theoretically informed expectations for how other movements might engage with international law under comparable constraints.

First, the presence of intermediary actors—lawyers, advocacy networks, or other translators of international norms—is essential for making international law legible to activists and linking local struggles to global institutions (Chua Reference Chua2020; Merry Reference Merry2006; Merry and Stern Reference Merry and Stern2005). Without such brokers, activists are unlikely to be aware of any legal opportunities at the international level. Second, instrumental mobilization is most likely to occur among groups that have preexistent collective identities and moral or ideological commitments before their engagement with human rights law. Movements still in the process of forming their identity tend to be influenced by the unifying moral vocabulary of human rights (Chua Reference Chua2020; Merry Reference Merry2006; Tsutsui Reference Tsutsui2017); by contrast, established movements derive internal legitimacy from earlier solidarities and traditions of struggle and, therefore, are less susceptible to the identity-transforming effects of rights-based engagement.

Third, instrumental mobilization can only occur in a historical and political context where human rights are seen as a legitimate and authoritative idiom for expressing social justice claims. In the contemporary era, the malleable and indeterminate nature of human rights makes them adaptable to a wide array of causes (Dancy and Fariss Reference Dancy and Fariss2018; Johnson Reference Johnson2006; Tsutsui and Smith [2004] Reference Tsutsui, Smith, Snow, Soule, Kriesi and McCammon2018), allowing activists to counter stigmatizing portrayals, such as unions being cast as corrupt or militant, and reposition themselves as legitimate claimants before broader audiences. Despite the recent popular backlash against the institutions of human rights (Madsen et al. Reference Madsen, Mayoral, Strezhnev and Voeten2022; Voeten Reference Voeten2020), human rights discourses retain their popularity for reformist movements (Dancy and Fariss Reference Dancy and Fariss2023; Moyn Reference Moyn2018).

Finally, instrumental mobilization requires a measured skepticism toward legal institutions. Movements that have experienced limited protection or stalled reforms through legal channels are more likely to approach human rights pragmatically rather than normatively. Such distrust becomes politically productive when international institutions offer real opportunities to advance movement goals through legal remedies, reputational leverage, or alliance building. Yet if skepticism turns into cynicism and activists see no plausible way for international institutions to influence state behavior, engagement becomes unlikely altogether. In contexts where international institutions lack authority or credibility, or in highly repressive settings where the cost of mobilization is severe, activists are unlikely to mobilize human rights, instrumentally or otherwise (Ritter and Conrad Reference Ritter and Conrad2016; Simmons Reference Simmons2009).

Methodology

This study develops the theory of instrumental mobilization through an in-depth examination of the Blacklist Support Group (BSG), a workers’ movement in the UK. The UK offers particularly favorable conditions for examining how international human rights law might spur mobilization. It has a robust network of human rights lawyers and advocacy groups, providing grassroots activists with vital access to expertise in human rights issues. Additionally, because the UK is subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, activists have strong incentives to employ human rights law and language in their campaigns. The court has prompted significant policy reforms across member states (Grewal and Voeten Reference Grewal and Voeten2015; Helfer and Voeten Reference Helfer and Voeten2014; Stiansen Reference Stiansen2019), and the UK has one of the highest rates of compliance, even while publicly criticizing the institution and periodically threatening withdrawal.Footnote 7

Yet even in this relatively positive institutional environment, workers have compelling reasons to be skeptical of the capacity of human rights law to deliver meaningful change. States commonly implement ECtHR rulings through minimal reforms (Búzás Reference Búzás2018; Von Staden Reference von Staden2018), fueling doubts about the court’s effectiveness. Skepticism among workers is further reinforced by the historically marginal position of socioeconomic rights within international human rights frameworks (Alston and Goodman Reference Alston and Goodman2013) and by the legacy of British trade unionism, which has long relied on rank-and-file mobilization rather than domestic or international litigation (Brown et al. Reference Brown, Deakin, Nash and Oxenbridge2000). The BSG therefore provides a deviant case: human rights mobilization emerged despite activists’ limited faith in legal remedies and without reshaping the movement’s foundational solidarities.Footnote 8 These conditions provide analytical leverage for identifying how international human rights institutions can activate social movements even when they do not transform the worldviews and identities that sustain collective action.

This in-depth focus on a single case study allows for a close examination of the mechanisms that mobilize activists into action. As Bateson (Reference Bateson2025, 252) points out, such an approach helps us to “understand the worldviews and motivations of a group of people whose agency and beliefs are driving important policy outcomes.” To make sense of the on-stage and off-stage dimensions of BSG activism, I draw on qualitative data collected from 2010 through 2024, including participant observation, media analysis, social media analysis, parliamentary records, and interviews with activists and lawyers.Footnote 9

From 2013 to 2014, I conducted six months of participant observation, accompanying BSG activists to meetings, demonstrations, pub gatherings, dinners, and domestic court proceedings, while engaging in informal conversations throughout these events. Since I was often the only woman among a group of mostly white male worker-activists, my presence was always noticeable. Accustomed to being surveilled, activists asked questions to get to know me. Over time, however, my regular presence and small contributions to the group (such as helping with event setup) made me a familiar face. This immersion provided opportunities for me to observe how workers articulated their grievances, interacted with one another, praised fellow activists for their bravery, expressed frustration with legal proceedings, celebrated victories, and voiced anger toward blacklisting companies off-stage.Footnote 10 These observations helped to distinguish the performative aspects of their activism from their more candid discussions and strategizing that took place away from the public eye.

In addition to these interactions during participant observation, I conducted 34 formal interviews with BSG activists, trade union representatives, lawyers, and other human rights activists from 2013 to 2024. These interviews gave me insights into how activists and lawyers reflected on the remedies provided by courts and their own campaigns. I recognize the limitations inherent in using interviews, as they rely on participants’ verbal awareness, which might mask the unconscious influences on their behaviors, motivations, and identity formations (Jerolmack and Khan Reference Jerolmack and Khan2014; Vaisey Reference Vaisey2009). To address this, I triangulated interviews with other data sources, which enabled me to situate activists’ stated motivations and skepticism toward human rights frameworks within their broader mobilization practices. For example, in addition to asking activists about their thoughts on human rights institutions, I observed unprompted expressions of frustration and disappointment regarding adverse rulings.

Supplementing my fieldwork, I examined the BSG’s media narratives and social media to capture their public messages. My analysis of posts from the BSG’s Facebook page between 2010 and 2019 was particularly useful in identifying the differences in how prominent members of the BSG utilized human rights language compared with the rest of the group. To examine how the BSG activists presented themselves for the media, I analyzed coverage of the blacklisting scandal in the Guardian, focusing on both news articles and opinion pieces authored by BSG activists. This analysis aimed at understanding how the BSG constructed its public narrative and utilized the media as a platform to amplify its voice, rather than providing a general account of how the scandal was reported in the national newspapers. I chose the Guardian for its left-wing position, nationwide readership, and close tracking of developments related to blacklisting.Footnote 11

The House of Commons minutes allowed me to examine the extent to which politicians invoked human rights language in their discussions of blacklisting.Footnote 12 I also traced links between BSG’s lobbying efforts and parliamentary debates on trade union rights and blacklisting legislation. Finally, I reviewed official reports, media articles, and court cases (both domestic and international) to identify the major political developments, legal reforms, changes in political party agendas, and judicial rulings on blacklisting. Tracing these developments helped me to situate activist strategies within broader institutional and political changes and evaluate the effectiveness of workers’ mobilization efforts.

Because the data sources served different purposes, I used complementary strategies in analyzing them. For interview and participant observation materials, which were open ended, conversational, and context dependent, I employed an iterative, abductive coding process.Footnote 13 I began with open coding to identify emergent themes related to legal strategy, international institutions, political opportunities, and rights-based language. In the second stage, I developed a focused coding scheme to capture activists’ approaches to human rights institutions and norms. I defined the codes by tracing (1) explicit use of terms such as “human rights,” specific international institutions, or article-based language; (2) implicit appeals to fairness, dignity, or international norms; and (3) metacommentary about the effectiveness of international institutions or the limits of rights-based approaches. For documentary sources with more standardized language and larger volume—such as the BSG Facebook page, House of Commons debates, and Guardian articles—I used a deductive strategy. I systematically searched for explicit references to “human rights,” the ECtHR, the European Convention on Human Rights, and specific Convention articles. These searches made it possible for me to track how activists and political actors used rights discourse in their public representations.

Blacklisting in the UK Construction Industry

The BSG was established in 2009 following an investigation by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the UK’s data protection agency, which exposed a widespread blacklisting scandal in the British construction industry. The ICO investigation was prompted by an employment tribunal case involving three electricians who alleged that they were dismissed from their jobs and denied employment due to their trade union activities. Whistleblower testimony during the trials revealed that this issue extended beyond the three electricians, indicating an institutionalized system established to blacklist workers engaged in trade union activism throughout the construction sector.

The ICO’s investigation uncovered that construction companies had formed an organization called the Consulting Association to systematically collect data on workers across the industry, aiming to exclude workers labeled as “trouble-makers, criminal elements or other undesirable people” from employment (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2009, 10). The blacklist included information about over 3,200 individuals, with data collected from 44 construction companies. Additionally, legal proceedings following the ICO investigation revealed that intelligence from the Metropolitan Police’s Special Demonstration Squad,Footnote 14 including information gathered by undercover officers posing as trade union activists, was provided to the ICO regarding the political activities of these workers.

Although evidence of blacklisting in the construction industry has surfaced before, the government failed to implement measures to ban this practice. Throughout the twentieth century, employers and security services relied on the Economic League, a private intelligence organization that compiled dossiers on “subversive” and union-active workers and aided in political vetting, as well as business groups like Aims of Industry, which advanced a broader anti-union agenda that normalized such practices within the industry and politics (Hollingsworth and Norton-Taylor Reference Hollingsworth and Norton-Taylor1988; Mustchin Reference Mustchin2019). During the 1960s and 1970s at the height of union power, organized labor largely used collective bargaining and political channels to confront these pressure groups; international legal forums offered little leverage in comparison. Only as union strength eroded in the 1980s did labor actors begin to test international avenues.Footnote 15 In 1991, the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the largest trade union confederation in the UK, submitted a grievance to the Committee on Freedom of Association within the International Labour Organization (ILO) regarding blacklisting conducted by the Economic League. The ILO urged the British government to enact stronger legislation to protect workers from blacklisting; however, the Labour government under Tony Blair dismissed these concerns, pointing to the league’s dissolution in 1993 following media exposure. Shortly after its closure, however, construction companies proceeded to establish the Consulting Association and appointed the former head of the Economic League as its new president.

After the ICO exposure made headlines in the media in 2009, the government enacted new regulations on blacklisting, based on draft legislation that had failed to pass back in 1999. But these regulations contained many loopholes, including ambiguity surrounding the compensation award for blacklisted workers, a lack of procedures for the destruction of the blacklist, and, crucially, the inability to bring criminal charges against those responsible for blacklisting (Ewing Reference Ewing2009). For example, a civil suit brought against Ian Kerr, the head of the Consulting Association, resulted in a mere £5,000 fine, which was ultimately paid by the construction companies (Ewing Reference Ewing2009). In response, the blacklisted workers formed the BSG, uniting around three key demands: legal reform to classify blacklisting as a criminal offense, retribution for blacklisted workers, and blacklisting the blacklisters by denying public sector contracts to the companies engaged in blacklisting.

Leveraging International Human Rights Law: Pathways to Justice for Blacklisted Workers

The persistence of blacklisting, despite its public exposure and formal recognition by the state, pushed labor activists and lawyers to explore alternative avenues for redress at the international level. The potential of these international channels had been visible since the early 1990s, when the ILO called on the UK government to prohibit blacklisting and protect workers’ rights. But earlier recourse to the ILO had limited appeal, given its weak enforcement authority and the long-standing unwillingness of UK governments to reform labor practices in response to its findings (Kahraman Reference Kahraman2023).

Momentum shifted only when the ECtHR began to offer a more authoritative judicial pathway. Initially established as a court focused on civil and political rights, the ECtHR dismissed the few labor rights claims that were brought before it in the first four decades of its existence. However, in the early 2000s, the court began to integrate fundamental trade union rights into its jurisprudence. By 2010, the court had recognized basic trade union rights as human rights and established obligations for states to protect these rights. For instance, it ruled that states must take measures to prevent employers from dismissing workers who participate in strike actionFootnote 16 and from coercing workers into relinquishing their union membership by offering more attractive contracts.Footnote 17 At the same time, British labor lawyers gained experience in how to take winning cases to the ECtHR. The coordination of trade union rights cases was led by Keith Ewing, a legal scholar and expert on labor law, and Lord Hendy KC, a prominent barrister specializing in trade union rights. Together, they established the Institute for Employment Rights to disseminate their expertise in domestic and international labor law to trade unions and workers.

Shortly after the blacklisting scandal erupted, a construction union commissioned Ewing to prepare a report wherein he identified the weaknesses in Britain’s domestic laws and emphasized its legal obligations toward blacklisted workers under international human rights law, including the ILO and the ECtHR (Ewing Reference Ewing2009). Specifically, the report outlined the grounds on which a blacklisted worker could bring a case before the ECtHR. In addition to highlighting the need for reform in current legislation, Ewing (Reference Ewing2009, 13) cited a previous ECtHR case that had led to the establishment of a retroactive compensation scheme for workers, suggesting that a similar scheme could be implemented for blacklisted workers. Thus, the report not only announced the potential for individual benefits for affected workers but also signaled the possibility of legal reform on blacklisting based on international human rights law.

Protections under human rights law created two significant legal opportunities for workers. First, guided by their lawyers, workers initiated a class action suit against the blacklisting companies at the High Court. A substantial portion of the plaintiffs’ legal argumentation centered on how blacklisting violated the UK’s obligations under international law, particularly Article 8 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Second, two blacklisted workers who lost their cases in domestic courts escalated their claims to the ECtHR: the first was filed in 2011,Footnote 18 and the second was filed in 2015.Footnote 19

A Deliberate Decision: Adopting Human Rights Language

The BSG’s engagement with international human rights law facilitated the incorporation of human rights language into their public campaigns. The knowledge of human rights law was conveyed to the workers by the lawyers who were committed to representing their clients’ interests while also advancing the labor case.Footnote 20 Dave Smith, the secretary of the BSG, first found out about the applicability of international human rights to blacklisting when he read Ewing’s report, which outlined a clear litigation strategy for blacklisted workers at the international level. The report sparked a moment of clarity, as he thought, “Now we know what to do.”Footnote 21 Ongoing lawsuits in domestic courts created occasions for other blacklisted workers to learn more about human rights law and have encounters with lawyers. In particular, the class action suit at the High Court became a significant recruitment tool for the blacklisted workers’ movement. The BSG activists reached out to previously blacklisted workers, many of whom had moved to different sectors, to inform them about the new evidence and invite them to join the case. Eventually, hundreds of workers joined the group litigation. After each hearing, blacklisted workers met at a nearby pub, the Seven Stars, to debrief and discuss the next steps. Lawyers often attended the beginning of these meetings to update workers on developments regarding their ongoing case as well as the ECtHR cases. As an applicant in one of the ECtHR cases, Smith developed a close relationship with the lawyers, gaining deep knowledge of international human rights law.

The BSG leadership made a deliberate decision to integrate human rights language in their campaigns. But the strategic nature of this choice was not simply a matter of selecting a discursive frame from a range of options. Instead, their decision-making process was deeply influenced by the political and historical context of British workers’ activism since the 1980s. Organized labor in the UK has a long history of resolving its disputes through contention and mobilization, and workers identified strongly with that legacy. As one trade union activist explained,

[b]efore the advent of Margaret Thatcher … we had a system of labor rights that existed since 1906, and that system held with one or two aberrations. We were happy with that. We never articulated a strong or deep understanding of or affiliation to international human rights.Footnote 22

Thus, for the BSG, it was important to engage in grassroots mobilization and not just delegate its problems to domestic or international courts. At the same time, trade unions’ power had stagnated since the onset of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, and restoring trade union rights had not been a priority of the government, even under Labour’s leadership.Footnote 23 To mount pressure on the government, the workers needed to present themselves in a sympathetic light. The BSG leadership was aware that class-based language was no longer a resonant frame to reach the general audience. As BSG Secretary Smith put it, “I can get ten blacklisted workers who can all bang on the table and moan about how terrible big business is, and how we need to fight out, you know.”Footnote 24 But he knew that “the newspapers aren’t interested in that. They are interested in human rights violations at Crossrail,” referencing the fact that in 2007, employers at London’s major railway project at Crossrail consulted the Consulting Association’s blacklist more than nine hundred times (Boffey Reference Boffey2012).

One might question whether human rights language can continue to be effective amid the growing backlash against international institutions in the UK. Public opinion regarding the ECtHR has been declining since the 2000s and the Conservative Party has advocated for the repeal of the Human Rights Act, which incorporates the European Convention and the ECtHR rulings into the domestic legal framework. Unlike many other international courts, the ECtHR is frequently mentioned in the British media, albeit with widespread misconceptions about its role and functions (Dinas and Gonzalez‐Ocantos Reference Dinas and Gonzalez‐Ocantos2021; Jay Reference Jay2022). Leaving the ECtHR system has been a prominent aspect of the Conservative agenda, even in the aftermath of Brexit and the subsequent political crisis. However, there is a distinction between the public legitimacy of human rights norms and institutions. While politicians and media critics may oppose the authority of an international court on issues such as deportation or voting rights of prisoners, such opposition does not necessarily equate to a wholesale rejection of human rights. For example, even as the government proposed the repeal of the Human Rights Act, it suggested replacing it with a British bill of rights, indicating that their opposition was more about the court’s authority over national sovereignty than a disagreement about the legitimacy of human rights per se. Hence, human rights norms can retain significant moral weight and continue to serve as powerful frameworks for advocacy.

The contentious nature of human rights has also created opportunities for activists to engage in this polarizing debate, aligning themselves with pro–human rights groups and positioning themselves as advocates for human rights.Footnote 25 For instance, in a post on the BSG’s Facebook page, Smith referenced the two pending cases at the ECtHR to call on workers to oppose the government’s plans to repeal the Human Rights Act: “UK employment law does not protect blacklisted construction workers—mainly because none of us were directly employed by the multinational companies that orchestrated the blacklisting against us. DEFEND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT.”Footnote 26 Moreover, as noted earlier, the UK has a high compliance rate with ECtHR rulings. Even in cases where the government drags its feet, it ultimately complies with these rulings, albeit begrudgingly (Hillebrecht Reference Hillebrecht2014). Consequently, activists have reasons to believe that claiming their rights as human rights could enhance the external legitimacy of their cause.

Blacklisted Workers’ Movement On-Stage

Along with their litigation efforts, the BSG launched a public campaign that framed the blacklisting scandal as a human rights abuse. Human rights became a prominent theme in their on-stage mobilization, shaping workers’ protests, media narratives, social media campaigns, and political advocacy.

The initial point of pressure against the blacklisting firms and the government was the group litigation at the High Court. Inside the courtroom, lawyers representing the blacklisted workers consistently reminded the judges of the government’s obligations under the ECtHR’s established case law on trade union rights and the ILO conventions. Outside the courtroom, the BSG initiated a series of targeted protests to highlight the plight of the workers and the egregious nature of blacklisting. The legal language surrounding human rights from the court cases informed the framing of these activities. For example, the BSG organized a protest tour titled “Crocodile Tears,” designed to spotlight the insincerity of the apologies issued by blacklisting companies following the ICO investigation and shame the blacklisters. Workers, accompanied by a crocodile mascot, held protests outside the blacklisting companies, and chanted slogans including “Blacklisters come clean” and “Nuremberg defense on blacklisting won’t wash,” a reference to the defense used by Nazi soldiers who said that they were just following orders during the Nuremberg trials after World War II. This reference to the Nuremberg trials and the allusion to blacklisting in Nazi Germany were included in a submission made by Liberty, a pro-union legal advocacy organization, to the ECtHR in support of the blacklisted workers.

To broaden their movement and reach, the BSG also teamed up with other human rights activists. Among these, the Campaign Opposing Police Surveillance (COPS) became one of the movement’s biggest allies since its inception. The ICO investigation revealed that the blacklist extended beyond construction workers to include journalists, academics, and other activists, raising serious concerns about police involvement. Further investigations confirmed that the Metropolitan Police had established the Special Demonstration Squad to monitor leftist groups by presenting themselves as trade union members or activists, with some officers forming intimate relationships with the activists they surveilled (Evans Reference Evans2020). Consequently, COPS aimed to expose the extent of police surveillance and seek justice. Together, COPS and the BSG organized demonstrations, panels, and briefings with a consistent emphasis on human rights. One notable event organized by the BSG and supported by COPS was called the “citizens’ arrest.” As the blacklisted workers could not bring criminal charges against the blacklisters, activists staged symbolic arrests of the managers involved in blacklisting at the offices of blacklisting companies. The “arrest warrants” they issued against the blacklisters and held up during their demonstrations cited a breach of Article 11 of the European Convention.

The BSG activists also utilized social media to advocate for their cause, making explicit references to the UK’s obligations under international law and employing human rights language broadly. At High Court hearings, which attracted significant gatherings of applicants, supporters, and reporters, BSG activists posted live updates from their lawyers’ oral submissions to the court, highlighting how blacklisting violated international laws. During one such hearing, an activist posted a comment on the BSG Facebook page regarding how their lawyer defended their rights by referring to the European Convention:

John Hendy QC representing also underlines the importance of the Human Rights legislation and gives previous cases and law that is now set in stone. He then reminds the court of its duty and its obligation to the state regarding everybody’s right freedom [sic] to join a trade union under article 11 and article 14 which covers discrimination also.Footnote 27

In addition to these informative posts, they relayed personal experiences using human rights language. For example, Greig McArthur, a prominent BSG activist, shared the following:

Apparently under Article 11 of the European Human Rights Act, we have a right to freedom of association i.e. we have a human right to join a trade union, to be active within that trade union, to be democratically elected as a representative within that union, to collectively bargain on behalf of the members of that trade union and to not suffer any form of discrimination, blacklisting, bullying or intimidation for belonging to a trade union.

Funny … my experience of trade unions in the construction industry are akin to prisoners of war having to operate covert organising practices whilst constantly watching over our shoulders for fear of being caught!Footnote 28

While media coverage of blacklisting did not uniformly adopt a human rights framework, blacklisted workers consistently framed their grievances as human rights violations during media appearances. My analysis of articles in the Guardian shows that only 14 out of 74 articles on blacklisting from 2011 to 2019 made references to human rights. Notably, almost all of the 14 articles were either op-eds written by the BSG activists themselves or news pieces featuring quotes from them.Footnote 29 For example, one BSG activist is quoted in a news article:

The workers have said they intend to continue their legal claim at the high court on 29 November for compensation for being blacklisted, as well as their campaign for a public inquiry “to expose everyone involved in this human rights conspiracy.” (Evans Reference Evans2013, emphasis added)

Steve Acheson, chairman of the BSG, echoed this sentiment, stating, “Until such time that the full conspiracy is exposed and those responsible for the human rights abuse are called to account in a court of law, we will never stop fighting” (quoted in Evans Reference Evans2016, emphasis added). The human rights framing was particularly pronounced in the op-eds. For instance, the headline of an op-ed written by Dave Smith (Reference Smith2013) read, “Blacklisting Activists Is a Human Rights Scandal. An Inquiry Is Overdue” (emphasis added). Another article featured a new book on blacklisting by Dave Smith and Phil Chamberlain, a journalist from the Guardian, and was titled “New Book Puts Spotlight on Role of Covert Police in Human Rights Controversy” (Evans Reference Evans2015, emphasis added).

Political supporters of the BSG similarly adopted human rights language to advocate for legal reforms on blacklisting. The BSG activists most closely engaged with the Labour Party, where they cultivated relationships with sympathetic lawmakers, as well as the Scottish National Party. Since the inception of the BSG, Labour members of parliament (MPs), including party leaders, have attended BSG meetings, High Court hearings, and mass demonstrations. For example, John McDonnell, the shadow chancellor under Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, chaired the meeting that launched the BSG in 2009 and is considered a founding member. My analysis of discussions regarding blacklisting in the House of Commons from 2009 to 2020 indicates that the BSG’s human rights framing was mirrored in parliamentary debates, particularly in the speeches given by Labour MPs. For example, one MP highlighted the severity of the issue by stating, “Denial of the most basic of human rights—the right to work and provide for your family—by the same companies that have grown rich on lucrative public sector contracts is a shameful act and an abuse of power.”Footnote 30 Another MP noted, “Blacklisting, as many honorable Members have said, is arguably the worst human rights abuse against workers in the UK since the war.”Footnote 31 Labour MPs have also introduced two motions on blacklisting referencing human rights. One of them urged the House to join “calls by the Blacklisting Support Group and other campaigners for a full public inquiry into this human rights injustice.Footnote 32 Beyond these discursive frames, Labour MPs regularly invoked both the ILO and the European Convention to push for pro-union legislation concerning employment relations and police surveillance.Footnote 33

Blacklisted Workers’ Movement Off-Stage

Despite utilizing these sources to gain external legitimacy for their grievances, my fieldwork data indicate that human rights law and language did not become sources of internal legitimacy within the blacklisted workers’ movement. Human rights did not create bonds of cohesion among the workers, and they largely refrained from adopting human rights language or identity off-stage. This contrast between public and private discourse is particularly evident in my participant observation data. During posttrial pub gatherings, informal conversations, or internal meetings, blacklisted workers hardly ever referred to human rights law or language. They articulated the legal entanglements that many agency workers faced—specifically, the challenges of not having direct employment relationships with blacklisting companies—and their frustrations with the unions for not doing enough or not “owning up” to the complicity of union representatives in blacklisting without any references to human rights.Footnote 34 Although prior scholarship notes that collective action frames are inherently contested and can spur internal disputes over their meaning and effectiveness (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000), in this case, the coexistence of class-based internal narratives and human-rights-based public narratives proved complementary: working-class identity continued to sustain internal solidarity while human rights language was used strategically to appeal to external political resonance.

In off-stage discussions, themes of working-class identity and class solidarity prevailed, overshadowing any focus on human rights. Blacklisted workers viewed the injustices they encountered in the workplace as a direct consequence of the disproportionate power held by employers, which motivated them to join the movement. BSG activists frequently emphasized class-based narratives to articulate their anger toward the blacklisters and their accomplices, as well as to rally fellow blacklisted workers for collective action. For instance, following a High Court hearing, one activist remarked on their precarious conditions, “We are the precariat … we have no job security … we work on zero-hour contracts.”Footnote 35 In conversations with other workers, they similarly voiced frustrations about the years spent struggling to provide for their children or having to “fix somebody else’s kitchen” after being blacklisted, as well as their demands to see blacklisters “behind bars” without any mention of human rights.Footnote 36

The intentional use of human rights on-stage becomes clear when we pay closer attention to who makes these references. The BSG activists in leadership positions—those more likely to make media appearances and shape the collective discourse—were much more inclined to present blacklisting as a human rights issue, whereas others are less likely to articulate their grievances using human rights language. In my analysis of the BSG’s Facebook group from 2010 to 2019, I identified 294 entries that made references to human rights. An overwhelming majority of these entries were posted by Dave Smith, who is one of the administrators of the Facebook group.Footnote 37 Following him, six other prominent BSG members, involved in organizing campaigns and events, made between six to 15 posts with human rights references. For example, Lee James Fowler and Royston Bentham, also administrators of the Facebook group, posted eight and seven such entries, respectively.Footnote 38 There were 48 other individuals who posted one or two entries with references to human rights, often intertwining human rights references with traditional working-class identity narratives.Footnote 39

Rather than identifying as “human rights activists,” blacklisted workers often described themselves as “socialists” in Facebook posts. For instance, they wrote, “We are ENTITLED to a socialist Labour party to give us real hope and not false promises and accusations like management and Tories do,”Footnote 40 “[D]etermined more than ever at the age of 71 to fight for a socialist Britain,”Footnote 41 or “[A]s a socialist.”Footnote 42 During internal meetings and on Facebook, BSG activists praised those who faced victimization, whether through being dismissed or arrested, for their participation in risky trade union action by referring to them as “working-class heroes.” In response to a post about a blacklisted worker’s file containing information from his phone calls and activities as an elected union representative, BSG activists expressed solidarity by pointing out that “he has done more work fighting for and organizing our class” by “fighting against capitalism and in favour of his class,” and drew a contrast between themselves and the blacklisters by referring to the latter as “sneaky little spies,” “bosses,” and “big business.”Footnote 43

Human rights did not provide a source of motivation for blacklisted workers to seek redemption or to join the movement either. During a posttrial pub gathering, while I was discussing the usefulness of human rights law with Dave Smith, another blacklisted worker interjected by reminding us about Helen Steel, a close ally of the BSG and a prominent environmental activist who had been subjected to an intimate relationship with an undercover police officer under false pretenses. He remarked, “It’s not about logic or law; it’s about emotions and morals. Like what happened to Helen, it’s not just illegal, but it’s immoral.”Footnote 44 This distinction he makes between law and morals underscores how the workers perceive human rights as a tool, rather than as an idiom for expressing their moral outrage about being blacklisted and spied on.

This perspective was shared by other activists who emphasized that while litigation efforts contribute to the visibility of the BSG, the true priority was rank-and-file mobilization.Footnote 45 Smith also reiterated this view, stating, “The law is useful, but in and of itself, it’s not going to win you stuff.”Footnote 46 Referring to his pending ECtHR case at the time, he added, “Even if we win, what’s going to happen? I’m going to get a few thousand pounds. […]Footnote 47 You’re better off going on, and actually trying to mobilize your members—get[ting] your members to stick together is what makes the difference.” At the same time, as an organizer, Smith acknowledged that class politics and socialism no longer resonate with the general public as they once did. Recognizing the utility of human rights discourse, he exhibited a clear instrumental approach: “And do I quote human rights? When I think it’s going to make it more likely to get people to come on our side.”

The Effectiveness and Endurance of the Instrumental Mobilization of Human Rights

There are several ways in which we can assess the efficacy of mobilizing human rights in the blacklisted workers’ movement. At the international level, the two blacklisted workers, in the cases Brough v. the United Kingdom Footnote 48 and Smith v. the United Kingdom,Footnote 49 ultimately lost their appeals at the ECtHR. But the court’s dismissal was primarily based on procedural grounds, including the time limits and the availability of domestic remedies. Notably, the ECtHR acknowledged the group litigation at the High Court, suggesting that domestic courts were adequately addressing the workers’ claims, and left the resolution to be handled at the domestic level.Footnote 50 Thus, the court’s reasoning does not preclude the possibility that a future case on blacklisting may be deemed to constitute a breach of workers’ right to association under Article 11.

Despite these setbacks, BSG activists achieved significant progress in three key areas at the domestic level. First, they made headway in their objective of blacklisting the blacklisting companies. The Scottish Affairs Committee (2015) produced the first parliamentary report on the issue, advocating for the exclusion of blacklisting firms from publicly funded work. As a result, the Scottish government barred these firms from public contracts, with similar actions taken by the Welsh government and other local authorities. Additionally, under Corbyn’s leadership, the Labour Party established new ethical guidelines to prevent Labour-run councils from contracting with blacklisting firms.

Second, the BSG achieved a notable victory at the High Court, where the lawyers repeatedly referenced international laws. In a settlement reached out of court, the blacklisting companies publicly apologized and agreed to pay multimillion-pound compensation to more than 250 affected workers. Following this settlement, Unite the Union initiated another group litigation against the blacklisting firms, ultimately requiring these companies to pay approximately £35 million to over 1,200 blacklisted workers.

Third, in 2015, the government responded to the BSG’s demand for transparency regarding blacklisting by initiating a public inquiry into police surveillance of political campaigners. The BSG welcomed this as a significant advancement in their campaign, as the blacklisted workers were granted core participant status in the inquiry. In their testimonies to the committee, the BSG continued to use human rights language to underscore the severity of the violations they experienced and highlighted the government’s obligations under Article 11 of the European Convention (D. Smith Reference Smith2020). The first phase of the inquiry, which examined the period from 1968 to 1982, concluded that undercover police officers spied on left-wing groups, including trade unions, and deemed the activities of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Demonstration Squad illegal (Undercover Policing Inquiry 2023, 96). The inquiry is ongoing for subsequent phases. While these accomplishments are significant for the BSG, they do not mark the conclusion of the workers’ struggle. The blacklisting companies have faced financial repercussions and investigations into covert police operations are underway, but the BSG continues to advocate for stronger preventive measures against future violations.

To be sure, it is not possible to conclude that BSG’s mobilization of human rights was the sole or primary reason behind these achievements. Success of legal mobilization campaigns depends on a confluence of factors, such as the receptiveness of political actors and the judiciary to activists’ demands, the organizational strength of the movement, and the material and legal resources available to activists, among others (Arrington Reference Arrington2019; McCann Reference McCann1994; Tarrow Reference Tarrow[1994] 2011). But given the prominence of human rights framing in its public and legal efforts, it helped to position the movement to pursue, and ultimately achieve, key advancements that may otherwise have been out of reach.

Finally, beyond concrete gains, the success of a movement can be evaluated by the enduring structures, aspirations, frames, and tactics it leaves behind for future activists (McCann and Lovell Reference McCann and Lovell2020). Activists can create collective interpretations of the causes of their problems and potential solutions (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000), which may inspire the repertoires and visions of later movements. However, the blacklisted workers’ instrumental approach to human rights suggests that their ties to human rights may be fleeting. Two conditions could facilitate workers’ embrace of this language on-stage and off-stage. First, they would need to continue to receive favorable rulings from human rights institutions, though this seems unlikely in the near future. Recent studies suggest that the ECtHR’s inadmissibility rulings on blacklisted workers’ cases reflect a broader trend of the court exercising more restraint in issuing pro-worker judgments in trade union rights cases (Kahraman Reference Kahraman2026). Though the court has not reversed any of its pro-union rulings, evidence suggests that the court is reluctant to expand its union rights jurisprudence into new issue areas. This trend may reflect the court’s response to political backlash from member-states, especially from the liberal democracies (Helfer and Voeten Reference Helfer and Voeten2020; Madsen Reference Madsen2018). Second, for workers to start identifying themselves as human rights activists, they would need to continue their collaborations with other human rights groups. Socializing, collaborating, and mobilizing with other human rights activists on a regular basis would likely foster solidarity ties and new forms of collective identity formations around human rights (Arrington Reference Arrington2019; McCann Reference McCann1994; Polletta and Jasper Reference Polletta and Jasper2001).

Conclusion

At a time of growing political backlash against international human rights institutions, this article documents an often overlooked avenue through which human rights laws and institutions influence domestic politics: social movements. While critics argue that these institutions are elite venues, accessible only to a small group of expert lawyers and human rights practitioners (Hopgood Reference Hopgood2013; Moyn Reference Moyn2018), this study demonstrates that human rights law and rhetoric can catalyze grassroots movements with broad participation. And despite claims that human rights frameworks are now passé or that they lack the capacity to effect change (Hopgood Reference Hopgood2013; Posner Reference Posner2014), the findings show that marginalized groups continue to find value in couching their struggles in human rights language (see also Dancy and Fariss Reference Dancy and Fariss2023).

This article presents a counterintuitive account of how human rights law and institutions can become constitutive elements of social movements. The analysis of the blacklisted workers’ movement shows that activists can instrumentally mobilize human rights law and institutions to advance their cause without viewing themselves, fellow activists, or their cause in human rights terms. Rather than embracing human rights as a cause around which to build a movement, workers used human rights to boost the external legitimacy of their grievances in a public discourse where unions are viewed as a hindrance to economic progress. International human rights law provided new legal tools and a resonant frame to draw attention to the plight of blacklisted workers in public campaigns.

The flexibility of human rights, what McCann (Reference McCann2014) calls their “unbearable lightness,” helps to explain their enduring appeal to marginalized groups. But at the same time, this same lightness limits their capacity to channel the weighty and ambitious goals that motivate, energize, and define movements. Consequently, the relationship between labor activists and human rights may be fleeting, unless using human rights law and language continues to gain allies and yield success for workers’ movements.

Labor activists’ instrumental approach toward human rights might appear idiosyncratic, since workers’ rights have long been sidelined in international human rights frameworks and labor movements have traditionally relied on rank-and-file mobilization rather than legal strategies. In the case of the BSG, human rights became a strategic resource precisely because of the movement’s historical skepticism toward legal institutions and its collaboration with labor lawyers expert in human rights law. Lord Hendy’s and Keith Ewing’s decades-long commitment to organized labor and their mastery of international law bridged the gap between grassroots organizing and litigation, while the UK’s relatively open political environment and its high rate of compliance with ECtHR judgments created incentives for legal mobilization despite the government’s persistent political hostility toward the court.

The patterns observed in the BSG, however, need not be confined to labor or the UK. Similar patterns can emerge where movements have cohesive collective identities, harbor skepticism grounded in past experiences with the law, and rely on intermediaries capable of making international laws accessible in political environments that allow at least some room for legal contestation. Groups that have historically had fraught relationships with legal institutions—such as racialized, Indigenous, or socioeconomic rights advocates—may likewise find themselves disillusioned with, yet strategically reliant on, human rights frameworks. Moreover, states’ tendency to evade international court rulings (Búzás Reference Búzás2018) or implement only the minimum requirements of international law (Von Staden Reference von Staden2018) can reinforce this ambivalence among movements seeking structural reform. Hence, the on-stage/off-stage duality observed in the BSG’s activism may also characterize a broader range of movements operating across domestic and international arenas. The dynamics traced here point to a broader research agenda on how activists navigate the promise and limits of international law. Comparative studies can further explore when human rights frameworks inspire moral conviction, when they serve as strategic tools, or how movements shift between the two.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the many activists and lawyers who participated in this research. I also thank Gözde Böcü, Esma Boztaş, Reyanna Bridge, Selin Kepenek, and Mher Mamajanyan for their research assistance. For their thoughtful feedback on earlier versions of this article, I thank Geoff Dancy, Diana Fu, Randall Hansen, Dan Kelemen, Tommaso Pavone, Zach Richer, Ed Schatz, and Lisa Vanhala.

This research was generously supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-1423855) and the Center for European and Eurasian Studies in the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto. The author declares no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Research ethics approval for this project was granted by the University of Washington (Decision No. 45129) and the University of Toronto (Decision No. 42443).

Footnotes

1 See Posner (Reference Posner2014) for an argument on how the ineffectiveness of human rights institutions have brought about the imminent decline of human rights.

2 This gap in the literature is acknowledged by Simmons (Reference Simmons2009), who theorizes several ways in which ratified human rights treaties can mobilize grassroots actors, but the empirical case studies she analyzes rely on secondary literature about NGO-led campaigns. See also Benhabib (Reference Benhabib2009, 692).

3 This is not to say that social movements exclusively rely on noninstitutional channels. Instead, they typically draw from a diverse set of tactics as part of their overall strategy (Armstrong and Bernstein Reference Armstrong and Bernstein2008; McCann Reference McCann1994; Tarrow Reference Tarrow[1994] 2011).

4 Eliasoph (Reference Eliasoph1998) also makes use of Goffman’s concepts in her analysis of volunteers in American civic groups. For Eliasoph, however, internal organizational settings are part of the frontstage where norms of civility discourage open disagreement and political conversations; the backstage is reserved for the narrow band of informal, unofficial discussions among confidants that often contradicted, rather than contributed to, the group’s collective identity. By contrast, the off-stage of human rights activism analyzed here encompasses all off-camera interactions, including planning meetings, where activists collectively deliberate, coordinate strategy, and articulate shared moral claims independent of their utility in influencing an external audience.

5 March and Olsen (Reference March and Olsen1998, 952) similarly note that “political action generally cannot be explained exclusively in terms of a logic of either consequences or appropriateness. Any particular action probably involves elements of each.”

6 Lovell (Reference Lovell2012), for example, demonstrates in his historical study that ordinary Americans strategically invoked rights claims to seek recognition and responsiveness, despite their doubts about actually attaining legal redress. Rights talk, in his account, functions as an expressive tool that does not necessarily generate rights consciousness.

7 As of 2024, the percentage of cases pending implementation by the British government is only 2%, placing the UK fourth among 47 countries (Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 2024)

8 The purpose of deviant cases is to “disconfirm a deterministic argument” and ensure that findings can be “representative of [a] new relationship” (Seawright and Gerring Reference Seawright and Gerring2008).

9 This article draws on fieldwork data collected as part of a larger research project on labor mobilization and international human rights litigation; related analyses appear in Kahraman (Reference Kahraman2026).

10 For a discussion of immersion as part of political ethnography, see Schatz (Reference Schatz2009).

11 One of the Guardian journalists even coauthored a book with a BSG leader (Smith and Chamberlain Reference Smith and Chamberlain2016).

12 My analysis included all debates that referenced “blacklisting” and “human rights” between 2009 and 2020.

13 For an abductive approach involving iterative movement between theory and empirics, see Meade and Walton (Reference Meade and Walton2025).

14 For more information about the Special Demonstration Squad, see the discussion below and Kahraman (Reference Kahraman2026).

15 See, for example, Hilton v. United Kingdom (app. no. 12015/86, 57 DR 108, 1988) on political vetting by MI5 at the BBC; for a broader account of these early, unsuccessful challenges before the ECtHR, see Hollingsworth and Norton-Taylor (Reference Hollingsworth and Norton-Taylor1988, 224–25).

16 Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, app. no. 67336/01 (ECtHR, July 30, 2009), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction).

17 Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 30668/96 et al. (ECtHR, July 2, 2002), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction). See Dorssemont, Lörcher, and Schömann (Reference Dorssemont, Lörcher and Schömann2013) and Ewing and Hendy (Reference Ewing and Hendy2010) for an overview of the court’s jurisprudence on trade union rights.

18 Brough v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 52962/11 (ECtHR, August 30, 2016), Decision.

19 Smith v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 54357/15 (ECtHR, March 28, 2017), Decision. This case and Brough were separate from the group litigation at the High Court.

20 Their role is similar to “cause lawyers” who commit themselves to advancing a movement’s social justice goals (Sarat and Scheingold Reference Sarat and Scheingold1998), as well as the “intermediaries” who make their expertise on human rights law accessible to local activists (Merry Reference Merry2006).

21 Interview with Dave Smith, October 2014.

22 Interview with Adrian Weir, October 2014.

23 During Blair’s tenure, the Labour Party increasingly distanced itself from the unions while union membership continued to decline (Daniels and McIlroy Reference Daniels and McIlroy2009; P. Smith Reference Smith2009).

24 Interview with Dave Smith, October 2014.

25 On the flexibility of human rights, see Dancy and Fariss (Reference Dancy and Fariss2018); McCann (Reference McCann2014); and Merry (Reference Merry2006).

26 Dave Smith, Facebook post, October 3, 2014; emphasis in the original.

27 Royston Bentham, Facebook post, December 17, 2014.

28 Greig McArthur, Facebook post, June 13, 2015.

29 The only exception is an article that made reference to a human rights lawyer who was appointed to prepare a report on union collusion with blacklisting.

30 Chris Stephens (Scottish National Party). Hansard HC Deb. September 5, 2017. Vol. 628, col. WH75. Emphasis added.

31 Michael Meacher (Labour). Hansard HC Deb. January 23, 2013. Vol. 557, col. 368. Emphasis added.

32 Hansard EDM 2186. March 14, 2019. Emphasis added.

33 See for example, discussions on the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill (Hansard HC Deb. October 5, 2020. Vol. 681; Hansard HC Deb. October 15, 2020. Vol. 682); and the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill (Hansard HC Deb. September 11, 2013. Vol. 567).

34 Quotes by blacklisted workers at a post–High Court hearing gathering on October 16, 2014, and a New Castle meeting on October 15, 2014.

35 Conversation with a blacklisted worker, December 17, 2014.

36 Conversations with two blacklisted workers, October 16, 2014, and December 17, 2014.

37 Out of a total of 294 entries, 178 were posted by Smith.

38 The remaining four prominent members posted 15, nine, seven, and six entries, respectively.

39 Some of these include posts by journalists or supporters of the BSG as well as blacklisted workers. It is not possible for me to verify which of these individuals are BSG members since they were posting in a public Facebook group.

40 Blacklisted worker, Facebook post, July 30, 2015; emphasis in the original.

41 Blacklisted worker, Facebook post, December 13, 2019.

42 Blacklisted worker, Facebook post, April 6, 2013.

43 Facebook posts by blacklisted workers, October 25, 2013.

44 Conversation with a blacklisted worker, September 2014.

45 Conversation with two blacklisted workers, October 2014.

46 Interview with Dave Smith, October 2014.

47 Bracketed ellipses indicate omissions from quoted material. Ellipses without brackets indicate pauses or breaks in speech.

48 Brough, app. no. 52962/11.

49 Smith, app. no. 54357/15.

50 Smith, app. no. 54357/15, paras. 40, 55.

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Figure 0

Table 1 Typology of Social Movements’ Engagement with International Human Rights