Introduction
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recognises conflict-related sexual violenceFootnote 1 (CRSV) as a tool of war and a matter of international peace and security.Footnote 2 Most UN-led agency responses to CRSV, whether peacekeeping, peacebuilding, or humanitarian, must engage with a state to secure access to sites where prevention, protection, response, and recovery can be provided to survivors. In 2009, under UNSC Resolution 1888, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (referred to as OSRSG-SVC and ‘the Office’) was created with a dual purpose – to bring the attention of the UN Security Council to CRSV situations and promote state-level responsibility to prevent and punish these crimes through advocacy and country-level agreements.Footnote 3 For over a decade, the OSRSG-SVC has increasingly promoted state-level responsibility to prevent through formal agreements called the Joint Communiqué (JC). The JC has become one of the primary tools for the Office to strengthen its efforts in preventing CRSV by engaging directly with the state and its institutions, primarily its security forces. Each JC broadly outlines the actions to be taken by the state with the assistance of the UN to effectively prevent and respond to CRSV. The JC is one of the few internationally led mechanisms derived from the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda that directly engages the state and its institutions, particularly the security and justice institutions, to commit to time-bound actions to prevent and respond to CRSV and end impunity for CRSV crimes.
Feminist scholars contend that including women in the peacebuilding and peace negotiation process not only recognises the various forms of violence experienced by women but also may lead to gender-responsive policy outcomes.Footnote 4 However, women remain marginalised in transitional justice processes and procedures addressing accountability and the causes of conflict-related violence.Footnote 5 In the absence of local and national institutions fulfilling their responsibility to prevent and protect populations, especially from CRSV crimes,Footnote 6 international frameworks such as the JC have been introduced as a normative and practical tool to guide domestic institutional reform at the highest level given it is a commitment made by the state executive.Footnote 7
Research to date has identified militaries – with their hierarchical organisations, their economies, and gendered conditions – as playing a key role in enabling environments where CRSV occurs.Footnote 8 It has been found that armed groups often use sexual violence to conscript and create unified social cohesion,Footnote 9 it can be an effective weapon deployed against populations to drive displacement and quickly gain large amounts of territory,Footnote 10 and the acts can be effectively carried out by combatants who are driven by ideology.Footnote 11 Therefore, as an enabling institution, it makes sense that the OSRSG-SVC has introduced a prevention tool that seeks to first target state militaries to change conflict behaviour.Footnote 12 On the other hand, militaries are not siloed institutions. Militaries are determined by social norms and political interests. The mechanisms necessary to prevent CRSV and achieve protection from CRSV require addressing the gendered drivers and conditions that fuel this violence and the targeting of populations.Footnote 13 Does the JC offer opportunities for CRSV prevention by states and militaries that encourage transformative gender reform? This paper charts the rise of JCs as a preventative approach and examines under what conditions JCs have included gender-inclusive language, action, and approach to address the gendered environment and structural violence within each conflict context.
This paper progresses in three parts. First, we present the causal mechanisms of CRSV identified in the literature, with a particular focus on research that views the state as an actor with the capacity and responsibility to prevent CRSV. We demonstrate how the emergence of the ‘prevention’ narrative of CRSV informing the JC design, which included time-bound commitments from state institutions, and implementation measures to prevent and respond to CRSV, even if the signatory actors were state militaries that had been involved in, permitted, or failed to prevent the perpetration of CRSV.
In the second section, we trace how the JC became one of the most prominent tools that the OSRSG-SVC sought to implement in cooperation with the responsible state to prevent and respond to CRSV, with a primary focus on military behaviour. We present the development and adoption of JCs across eight countries over a decade between 2011 and 2019. We examine the content of the 10 JCs signed across the eight countries in order to establish the degree to which each JC reflected adaptation to individual conflict contexts. We trace the actions required of states and militaries, the consistency of prevention and protection language used, and references to gender inclusion, especially the inclusion of local women-led civil society organisations in the JCs.
In the third section, we conduct a deep dive into Myanmar’s JC to consider its unique features linked to the domestic political context and the signatory state’s role. Until 2018, JCs had been signed in countries where UN peacekeeping forces and/or UN special observer missions were stationed. There was a departure with the signing of a JC between the OSRSG-SVC and Myanmar in 2018. The JC between the Myanmar government and the OSRSG-SVC represented the first attempt to introduce a JC outside a UN peacekeeping and/or UN special political mission. While the language within this JC continued to promote previous JC language, Myanmar’s JC’s prevention and protection language was muted compared to the JCs signed with other countries, and gender inclusion was absent.
Our study of the JCs finds that it provides an opportunity to explore reform of state-level institutional norms and practices in an environment where there is heavy dependence on the military state sector to cooperate in preventing CRSV. However, there needs to be more caution in promoting JC in situations where they cannot secure survivor-centred, gender-inclusive prevention, protection, and transformative reforms from the signatory state.
CRSV and the ‘responsible’ state
Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is a prevalent feature of historical and contemporary conflicts. Studies have highlighted that state armed groups are far more likely to be reported as perpetrators of sexual violence incidents in conflict.Footnote 14 Cohen introduced the concept of ‘combatant socialization’, suggesting that the leadership of an armed group or the state may tolerate sexual violence committed by its armed forces if the resulting social bonds provide a strategic advantage to the armed group in conflict.Footnote 15 In 2024, the United Nations Secretary-General’s annual report on CRSV listed multiple armed groups as perpetrators of the crimes in nine countries. Out of these, state armed groups are recorded in seven countries.Footnote 16 CRSV can be a form of state-perpetrated or state-condoned violence that is political in nature and motivated by various reasons, including weakening the opponents, targeting specific populations for forced displacement and ethnic cleansing, and interrogation.Footnote 17 The state may permit or direct militaries to employ sexual violence on a small to a large scale, as either a deliberate strategy or a tactic of war against their population or other populations, as documented in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Myanmar, Sudan, Syria, and the Russia–Ukraine war.Footnote 18 Alternatively, the state may fail to investigate and prosecute acts of widespread sexual violence committed by its combatants or, in some cases, sponsor proxy militias to carry out CRSV to terrorise populations.Footnote 19
CRSV can also result from the state’s failure to protect civilians leading to large displacement of populations who become increasingly vulnerable to a heightened climate of violence. CRSV that does not appear to be tactical in its patterns or targeting is often attributed to state institutional failure – the disruption of social structures, the collapse of law enforcement mechanisms, and the lack of stringent enforcement policies, laws, and codes of conduct that typically exist in peacetime.Footnote 20 Such forms of violence are described as opportunistic violence and can be perpetrated by both armed actors and civilians. Swaine argues that conflict-related violence against women reflects a society’s existing gendered order and is closely linked to systematic factors such as socio-cultural, political, legal, and economic systems that regulate power distribution and structural violence.Footnote 21 In their study of the DRC, Baaz and Stern demonstrate how rape is perceived and normalised in some local conflict-affected situations where surveyed men and women make the distinction between ‘acceptable’ (lust-driven and normal) rapes and ‘unacceptable’ (evil and brutal) rapes, which informs soldiers’ perception of their sexual needs and militarised masculinity.Footnote 22 The belief that men not only need sex but are also entitled to it is deeply rooted in the prevailing gender ideology of peacetime.Footnote 23 It is important to note at this stage that while the majority of studies tend to focus on women and girls as survivors-victims, men, boys and non-binary persons are also targeted for sexual violence in conflict.Footnote 24 The use of sexual violence in conflict, whether tactical or opportunistic, and against any gender is ultimately rooted in pre-existing ‘uneven gender power relations within that group and society’.Footnote 25
In these societies, the state and its institutions that systematically target and harm individuals during wartime had in place peacetime practices that discriminated against individuals based on their gender, ethnicity, and other intersecting identities.Footnote 26 In the case of Peru, Boesten demonstrated that state-endorsed violence is ‘linked to and embedded in structural inequalities,’ subsequently neglecting and deprioritising the security of women during and after the war.Footnote 27 The state’s pre-existing impunity and discrimination against women and ethnic minorities within society continue to normalise and/or tolerate sexual violence, consequently failing to effectively prosecute the perpetrators of wartime sexual violence.Footnote 28 These arguments are best understood in a continuum concept in which patriarchal society and structural norms and practices of social institutions accept and normalise the rape culture and drive it to an extreme escalation of the everyday violence that women experience in peacetime.Footnote 29
Widespread and/or systematic sexual violence is the most obviously gendered and sexualised feature of conflict, underpinned by the state’s structural violence.Footnote 30 Johan Galtung defined structural violence as violence that is built into ‘the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances’ impacting on a larger number of individuals in the society.Footnote 31 Structural violence operates within a ‘complex web of societal hierarchies,’ power dynamics, and privileges, perpetuating social injustice against specific groups and reinforcing gender inequality, which, in turn, conditions women’s insecurity in such contexts.Footnote 32 Structural violence is often shaped by the economic, political, and social structures and institutions within a community, manifesting as poverty, marginalisation, and a widespread lack of opportunities, particularly among marginalised groups, that give rise to instability.Footnote 33
The post-conflict peacebuilding process is viewed as an institution-building process that tackles direct violence and the underlying structural violence rooted in socio-economic and political discrimination and inequality.Footnote 34 In that sense, engaging with the state during ceasefire and post-conflict transitional moments to advance feminist agendas and transform rooted gendered norms and practices across state institutions may directly benefit women and marginalised groups.Footnote 35 However, some argue that post-conflict contexts can become a site to reproduce gendered norms and power relations that can disadvantage women and other marginalised groups.Footnote 36 Promoting transformative change depends on the type of peace secured and the democratic institutions designed in the post-conflict period.Footnote 37 There is a recognition that individuals who have experienced violence and are affected by conflicts hold a crucial role in contributing to the resilience and transformation of continuous violence.Footnote 38 In this context, including women affected by conflicts and promoting gender-responsive approaches in ceasefire and peace processes can serve as a transformative force. However, these efforts may also provoke resistance and hostility, particularly when they challenge entrenched male privilege and disrupt dominant gender norms associated with power-holding institutions.Footnote 39
In the case of CRSV, state security institutions have long been targeted for reform as a necessity in post-conflict peacebuilding.Footnote 40 Security sector reform (SSR) engages a broad range of stakeholders, including the military, police, justice institutions, and sometimes non-statutory security forces, such as paramilitaries and rebel groups, all of whom are encouraged to participate in the reform.Footnote 41 The term ‘gender-responsive SSR’ is often proposed as a process to encourage security institutions to consider how they can be inclusive within their own ranks and responsive to the needs of civilians, including women, men, and people of diverse gender identities.Footnote 42 A gender-responsive SSR approach seeks to broaden community involvement, placing less emphasis on elite voices and influence.Footnote 43 It also encourages greater inclusion of civilian women in the design and implementation of peacemaking and transitional justice processes.Footnote 44 Gender inclusion measures are not the panacea for ending a militarised culture, but they are meaningful changes to identifying who is legitimate, who can speak, and who holds the security and the state accountable.
Research has identified that the state’s role in the perpetration and/or tolerance of conflict-related sexual violence can be actioned as a preventative and protective role. It is not inevitable in conflict that the state is unable to take action to prevent this violence, nor that the state is unable to protect populations from this violence. The use of this violence is informed by the absence of state institutions that will investigate and prosecute for this violence, a militarised culture, and gendered norms in that society that accept gendered violence. Prevention and protection by state institutions, including the military, requires reform that addresses CRSV behaviour and crimes but also addresses gendered norms that condone this violence in existing legal and social frameworks of state institutions. Effectively addressing CRSV necessitates engaging with the state as a responsible party. What type of institutional reform is possible in such a context?
In the remainder of this paper, we closely examine the Joint Communiqués (JCs) as a rare example of an international-led SSR concerning CRSV, which seeks to commit states to implementing reforms and practices to prevent CRSV. Our interest is in the degree to which the JCs signed, to date, have also been capable of progressing gender-inclusive reforms into the agreement.
Research approach
In the second half of the 20th century, the conduct of combatants in war has increasingly been shaped by global norms operating at both the international level (between states) and the broader global level (involving international organisations and transnational actors).Footnote 45 Increasingly, there have been attempts to extend normative expectations of combatant conduct in war to different areas of concern, including CRSV. These norms exist in various forms: formal legal standards and informal or principled norms.Footnote 46 Formal norms typically specify the rights and obligations of specific actors, such as those articulated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), the Geneva Conventions (1949), and key UN Security Council Resolutions, including 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), and 2467 (2019). Principled but informal norms relating to the prevention of and response to CRSV have also increasingly appeared as policy frameworks or initiatives, such as the United Kingdom’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) launched in 2012,Footnote 47 which led to the adoption of a UN General Assembly Declaration on PSVI, and the creation of an International Alliance on PSVI that includes states, multilateral partners, civil society organisations, and survivors that promote and coordinate action on CRSV. Informal norms and socially accepted standards and principles are not legally binding but increasingly play a crucial role in shaping expectations around CRSV prevention and response. The prevention norms underpin ‘best practice’ approaches, such as the adoption of survivor-centred responses and gender-sensitive training for security forces, or the Murad Code on gathering and using information about CRSV.Footnote 48
Furthermore, the CRSV prevention and response norms have informed behaviour and policy towards perpetrators, specifically the introduction of reforms and training that can influence the behaviour of armed actors in conflict settings.Footnote 49 In this paper, we examine the emergence of one such prevention framework – the emergence of a bilateral instrument that aims to hold governments and armed groups accountable to the UN for preventing acts of sexual violence in war: Joint Communiqué (JC) between signatory states and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC). We explore the development and design of this memorandum of understanding, the JC, between each signatory state and the United Nations. Through examining the emergence and content of JCs, this paper seeks to contribute a deeper understanding of the benefits and limits of emerging bilateral agreements between states and a multilateral organisation (UN) that seek to institutionalise CRSV prevention and response through state accountability. We are particularly interested in how the JCs address the domestic institutional context that fuelled this violence in the first place, and to what extent the JCs create opportunities for survivor-centred, gender-inclusive reform.Footnote 50 This paper examines 10 JCs signed by eight states between 2011 and 2019. The first JC was signed in 2011 by the government of Angola. The remaining seven countries include the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, South Sudan, Iraq, Mali, and Myanmar. Among these, the DRC and CAR signed two JCs each. In three of the eight signatory countries (DRC, South Sudan, and Myanmar), state military actors were reported to have perpetrated CRSV at the time their JCs were signed.Footnote 51 The study then specifically examines how the JC model accommodates the dual role of the state as both a prevention actor and a reported perpetrator of CRSV in Myanmar.
In addition to the state military signing JCs with the OSRSG-SVC, there are unilateral Communiqués signed by the non-state armed groups.Footnote 52 This paper is interested in understanding the degree to which the state can be mobilised as a prevention actor, and to what extent the JCs create opportunities to introduce gender-inclusive state institutions. Therefore, the discrete focus is on the 10 JCs signed between the UN and the signatory states.Footnote 53
JCs are usually two to five pages long. Four out of 10 JCs have been signed in French and were translated into English with the assistance of a fluent French-speaking colleague.Footnote 54 Each JC was systematically reviewed, and data were extracted using a template that captured key details such as the date, signatories, and listed action points. Both authors were involved in the review process: the first author conducted the initial data extraction, and the second author subsequently assessed and validated the extracted data.
We conducted a summative content analysisFootnote 55 of the JCs, given that our interest was in establishing the pattern associated with JC signatory processes – the context, the focus and substance of the language, the use of keywords, and the actors involved. Unlike content analysis, through summative analysis we do not attempt to infer meaning but instead explore the frequent use of (dis)similar reform language across the JCs. We wanted to explore the degree to which JCs are unique or adaptive to each context, and to what extent each JC promotes similar CRSV prevention reforms and mechanisms at the state level. Reliance was on textual analysis alone because of the difficulty of securing interviews with individuals associated with the JCs at the OSRSG-SVC or country levels.
First, we established the context. We established whether the JC signatory country was hosting a UN peacekeeping and/or special observer mission (hereinafter referred to as a UN mission). We also examined the timing of the signed JC with the UN missions’ establishment dates. We note the actors who sign the JC and chart how the establishment of the JC in each country is referred to in the context of a UN mission being present or not to assist with JC performance.
Second, we documented the agreed actions of each JC across eight countries. We then tabled all the actions into a table under each JC. We grouped the actions under four categories (using the language and grouping often provided in the JCs) to facilitate comparison of the similarities and differences of actions agreed to in each country. The four categories that capture the primary focus and substance of the 10 JCs are 1) capacity building and training for security actors, 2) reinforcing military codes of conduct and strengthening punitive measures, 3) justice sector reform, and 4) ensuring effective service delivery.
Finally, we examined how the actions included under each theme, and the association of theme/action with each actor that signed the JC. In addition, we read each JC with the intention of documenting when gender inclusion language appeared.Footnote 56 We interpreted gender inclusion language quite broadly to mean: any reference to gender representation (men, women, non-binary) or gender agency (representation of civil society organisation or other groups representing gender issues, gender discrimination, or gender reform). We were particularly interested in references to the inclusion of women-led organisations in decision-making processes and SSR training.
In the penultimate section of the paper, we present Myanmar as a JC outlier due to the absence of a UN mission associated with JC implementation and the absence of gender-inclusive language in the JC. We consider the implications of this agreement and suggest that it should remain an outlier. When there are significant challenges to implement transformative reforms under constrained circumstances, coupled with a failure to secure any reference to gender inclusion in CRSV prevention and protection actions, a JC should be reconsidered.
The Joint Communiqué as a prevention tool
Adopting UNSC Resolution 1325 in 2000 was a significant step in mandating state obligations to protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence in conflict. Over time, the WPS Resolutions have broadened to recognise the structural inequalities and the continuum of violence as fuelling CRSV and the importance of engaging with the state.Footnote 57 However, there remain pronounced concerns regarding the lack of meaningful accountability mechanisms for operationalising UNSC Resolutions at the domestic level, particularly for addressing CRSV.Footnote 58 The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflicts (OSRGS-SVC) was created through UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009) in April 2010 to stress the state’s accountability in preventing CRSV. Following Margot Wallström of Sweden and Zainab Hawa Bangura of Sierra Leone, in April 2017, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed Ms. Pramila Patten of Mauritius as the Special Representative of the Office.
While the OSRSG-SVC’s function is multifaceted, its primary role is ‘to provide coherent and strategic leadership, to work effectively to strengthen existing United Nations coordination mechanisms, and to engage in advocacy efforts, inter alia with governments, including military and judicial representatives’.Footnote 59 To fulfil the tasks of state-level coordination, the OSRSG-SVC took the lead for the deployment of women protection advisers (WPAs) in a domestic context, setting up monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements (MARA) at the country level and establishing JCs with the national governments to implement institutional reform to effectively prevent and respond to CRSV. The JC was amongst a suite of tools the OSRSG-SVC introduced, but this one was particularly identified, with the cooperation of the OSRSG-SVC, to be the ‘responsibility of the state’ to implement.Footnote 60
The JC, as emerged from the WPS architecture, is a bilateral agreement between the individual state and the OSRSG-SVC with detailed commitments, specific to each context, for the prevention of and response to CRSV. It is one of the primary tools for the OSRSG-SVC to strengthen its efforts in preventing CRSV by engaging directly with the state and its institutions. The JC aims to operationalise the mandate of ‘joint Government–United Nations action’, as stated in UNSC Resolution 1888 adopted in 2009.
Even though the term ‘joint Government–United Nations action’ was introduced in UNSC 1888 and adopted in 2009, the concept was more strongly advocated in the Secretary-General’s report on WPS to the Security Council in July 2009.Footnote 61 The report informed the operative actions of UNSC Resolution 1888. In the report, the term ‘joint’ appears nine times (excluding those referring to names or places). Three of the sentences with the ‘joint’ focus explicitly on the idea of ‘joint Government–United Nations actions’.
The idea of ‘joint Government–United Nations actions’ originated from the conflict in the DRC, where a UN special political mission, including a peacekeeping mission, was operating at the time.Footnote 62 A comprehensive strategy for preventing and responding to CRSV was developed by the MONUCFootnote 63 and endorsed by the DRC government, which is committed to its implementation. The strategy aims to provide a platform and framework for action to strengthen the prevention and protection of sexual violence while complementing ongoing initiatives such as SSR and the United Nations Security and Stabilization Support Strategy.Footnote 64
The experience of the joint initiative in DRC and then in the UN Liberia mission was presented as ‘good practice’ in the first UNSG report to the UNSC on CRSV situations.Footnote 65 Following this report, the concept of joint Government–United Nations action was adopted in UNSC Resolution 1888. UNSC Resolution 1888 calls for UN entities to work closely with the state government and relevant stakeholders in the country context to develop a joint strategy and enhance advocacy efforts. Operative paragraph 23 of the Resolution calls for the responsible parties ‘to work with the Member States to develop joint Government–United Nations Comprehensive Strategies to Combat Sexual Violence’.Footnote 66 The adoption of UNSC Resolution 1888 led to the JC becoming a formal operational tool for the OSRSG-SVC.
In 2010, UNSC Resolution 1960 called for ‘time-bound’ commitments of states, particularly targeting their military institutions, to effectively prevent CRSV. For example, Operative paragraph 5 of Resolution 1960 (2010) states that:
Calls upon parties to armed conflict to make and implement specific and time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence, which should include, inter alia, issuance of clear orders through chains of command prohibiting sexual violence and the prohibition of sexual violence in Codes of Conduct, military field manuals, or equivalent; and further calls upon those parties to make and implement specific commitments on timely investigation of alleged abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable.Footnote 67
In the language of the OSRSG-SVC, JCs fulfil UNSC Resolution 1960 with ‘specific, timebound commitments that promote national ownership and engagement of States’ responsibility in line with their international obligations’.Footnote 68 The JC’s architecture was intended to create joint responsibility. Formalising the ‘joint’ concept permits the relevant UN Office to initiate dialogue, monitor progress, and stress the responsibility of state actors to implement measures to prevent CRSV. In practice, as will be discussed below, most JC agreements could be more effectively negotiated and operationalised in the presence of a UN peacekeeping and/or political mission to support the state’s implementation of the JC.
The JC: conditions and actions
Studies have identified the importance of UN peacekeeping and/or political missions in preventing CRSV in the domestic context.Footnote 69 While the nature of UN peacekeeping and UN political missions differ, both missions can be mandated to prevent and respond to CRSV through their field operations.Footnote 70 The UN missions are important drivers in preventing CRSV at the domestic level due to their role in engaging with the domestic initiatives of conflict prevention, protection of civilians, conflict mediation, peacebuilding, peace agreement implementation, and national reconciliation.Footnote 71 Logistically, the UN missions support domestic investigations and prosecutions of conflict-related crimes, including CRSV, offering technical and operational assistance to domestic justice institutions.Footnote 72 Women Protection Advisers (WPAs) have been increasingly designated to each mission with the OSRSG-SVC to enhance support in addressing CRSV issues, specifically for JCs implementation.Footnote 73
The effectiveness of UN missions in preventing and responding to CRSV depends on numerous factors.Footnote 74 Key factors identified in research to date have been the involvement of peacekeepers during the state’s security sector reform process as a stabilising presence that can prevent CRSV escalation, and the strengthening of formal justice mechanisms to deter the reoccurrence of CRSV in post-conflict settings.Footnote 75 To what extent does the JC depend on the presence of UN missions to facilitate these conditions and enhance coordination? Table 1 outlines the establishment dates of UN peacekeeping and/or political missions alongside the dates each state signed the JC. No JC, with the exception of Myanmar, has been signed without a UN mission already in place.Footnote 76
Established dates of UN missions and signing dates of JCs in eight countries.
Furthermore, while each JC had variations in specificity and phrasing, all of the JCs despite their different contexts and time periods shared common intervention language. The interventions listed within the 10 JCs were itemised and thematically categorised under four main intervention measures identified across the eight countries. The aim of this analysis is not to compare variation for its own sake but rather to examine how such variations can be interpreted in relation to broader SSR and survivor-centred processes in each context. The four main interventions identified in the signed JCs are 1) security sector reform – including capacity building and (re)training for all state-level security actors, 2) introduction and/or reinforcing of military codes of conduct with explicit punitive measures concerning CRSV crimes, 3) law and justice sector reform with a particular focus on investigation and prosecution of CRSV crimes, and 4) ensuring access to services for survivors. These four interventions engage a wide range of state institutions, including security, justice, and health (at a minimum). However, as Table 2 reveals, not all interventions are present in every JC.
Comparison of JCs interventions across eight countries.
JC intervention to support the capacity building of security actors is entirely missing in Angola and Iraq. One reason for this exclusion could be that UN reports on CRSV did not record state forces as perpetrators in both countries at the time their JCs were signed.Footnote 77 All other JCs, except for Angola, include commitments to strengthen the legal sector and deliver access to services for victims of sexual violence. It should be noted that Angola was the first state to sign a JC, and it was the first attempt by the OSRSG-SVC to design a JC, which may explain why the requirements in Angola’s JC were especially minimal compared to those that followed.
While most JCs included some mention of the four interventions, the specific number of controls or mechanisms to implement each intervention within each country differed.Footnote 78 For example, the CAR included three mechanisms for the military code of conduct in its JC, requiring the nation to implement a ‘zero-tolerance policy on sexual violence’, ‘exclude the perpetrators from security sectors and all government structures’, and ‘issue clear instructions on the dissemination of a code of conduct prohibiting sexual violence’.Footnote 79 Angola, Somalia, and South Sudan agreed to issue a clear chain of command prohibiting CRSV, while Angola and Somalia also committed to implementing a zero-tolerance policy in the army code of conduct, sending a clear signal to its armed forces that impunity will not be tolerated and ensuring the punishment of perpetrators. Somalia also committed to excluding the perpetrators from government leadership and responsibility. The DRC and Mali stated in their JCs that they would exclude perpetrators from amnesty and serving in the government and military services. Myanmar’s JC included the ‘exclusion of perpetrators of sexual violence from amnesty’.Footnote 80 Given that the JC is a bilateral agreement between the OSRSG-SVC and the state, the differences across states can be understood as terms negotiated and agreed upon by each state. However, Table 2 signals the importance of looking beyond the mere presence of intervention themes. Myanmar, for example, seems to be a successful JC with intervention coverage across all four themes. Yet, with the exception of Iraq (more below), Myanmar’s JC agreement is one of the weakest if the actions within each intervention are studied. For example, the only provision in the Myanmar JC that falls under the military code of conduct is that there will be ‘exclusion of perpetrators of sexual violence from amnesty’. No commitment to or reinforcement of zero-tolerance or a clear chain of command prohibiting CRSV was made in the agreement, even though the agreement was signed after an independent UN investigation found that state armed actors had committed acts of genocide and crimes against humanity, including CRSV, against the Rohingya fleeing violence and persecution in Rakhine state in 2017.Footnote 81 The absence of a UN mission in Myanmar may help explain less emphasis on state responsibility in the JC. While the presence of a UN mission may not necessarily eliminate CRSV, the research above indicates that a UNSC mandate may facilitate the conditions for more state reforms within a JC.
We will return to this point in our discussion of Myanmar further below. In the case of Iraq, while the number of interventions covered in the JC was minimal, the actions under law and justice reforms, as well as ensuring access to services for victims, included specific measures.
Finally, in examining the JCs from eight countries, we found that the inclusion approach towards women’s agency across the 10 JCs was inconsistent in the actions required, and sometimes entirely omitted.Footnote 82 In the JCs for DRC, CAR, and Mali, women’s agency is recognised in the broader context of their meaningful participation in conflict prevention, while in Somalia, Iraq, and South Sudan, women’s agency is defined with specific reference to preventing the occurrence of sexual violence. Any reference to gender inclusion and women-led organisations is entirely omitted in the cases of Angola and Myanmar. Weak inclusion language in a high-level formal agreement such as the JC, which functionality can be traced back to the WPS agenda, critically questions its efficacy as a gender-inclusive tool to prevent CRSV.
The substantive content of the JCs across eight countries over ten years reveals inconsistencies despite the appearance of expanding reference to all four interventions: security sector reform, military code of conduct, law and justice reform, and ensuring access to services for survivors. First, the JCs are signed with states even if state armed forces have been reported as perpetrators of these crimes. Second, even though JCs aim for transformative reform attached to the principle of SSR, there are few references to gender-inclusive reforms, including survivor-centred practices, as called for under the WPS agenda.Footnote 83 The focus on institutional policies and technical procedures, such as training of soldiers and developing guidelines, is at risk of missing the bigger picture of gendered power being sustained through the process.Footnote 84 Finally, most JC agreements assign the states full control over the prevention and response mechanisms of CRSV but also refer to the joint support of UN actors, which seems to mitigate the risk that the JC could become a platform for the reproduction of gendered social injustices. Given the spectrum of JC actions across the four intervention areas, we further explore the case of Myanmar to consider the substance of a JC in the absence of strong and inclusive reform language.
The outlier: no ‘joint’ in the Myanmar JC
Myanmar is a militarised state with ongoing armed conflicts for more than seven decades. Conflicts across the country with minor ethnic communities have never ceased since independence from the British in 1948. In 2011, Tatmadaw held elections for a civilian government, and the military-backed party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won over 75 per cent of the non-military seats available. Arguably, 2011 marked the beginning of the transition from military to civilian government; the election outcome has been criticised for its lack of transparency.Footnote 85 As Crouch states, Myanmar transformed from military rule to a ‘military-state’ when the state proceeded with the democratic transition in 2011 because state power was held by an unelected military and elected civilian legislators.Footnote 86 In 2015, Myanmar held a more transparent election, which led to the country experiencing a brief period of democratic transition led by the National League for Democracy (NLD). In February 2021, the military overthrew the NLD government and reverted the state to control under the military regime. The country’s political history suggests the concentration of the military’s power within the institutions and the military’s intention to maintain a powerful role in state affairs. Nonetheless, conflicts with ethnic minority communities have persisted across Myanmar, even during the short-lived democratic transition.
Myanmar’s armed forces, Tatmadaw, have a long history of perpetrating CRSV in ethnic armed conflicts for several decades. Following the systematic and widespread rape against Rohingya Muslims by Tatmadaw, along with many other human rights violations in the 2017 clearance operation, the UN Human Rights Council claimed these crimes amounted to ethnic cleansing.Footnote 87 However, efforts to combat CRSV in Myanmar face significant challenges, including limited access to conflict zones, a lack of accountability for perpetrators due to entrenched institutional impunity, and, insufficient protection mechanisms and support for survivors.Footnote 88 The ongoing conflict and political instability, particularly following the military coup in February 2021, have further exacerbated the situation of CRSV, which continued to be reported in the current political context.Footnote 89
The OSRSG-SVC signed the JC with the democratic government, NLD, in December 2018. Unlike the JCs signed in other countries, Myanmar did not have a UN peacekeeping or political mission in the field at the time of signing the JC. The fact that Myanmar had been governed by a military regime for several decades and still retained 25 per cent of seats in the national parliament was a signal of the military’s continued strong influence over state administration. Although the signed JC states that it will promote institutional reform within Myanmar’s security and justice sectors, there is no mention of addressing the marginalisation of ethnic minorities, including women, in the state’s laws, norms, and practices.Footnote 90 Recall, the acts of genocide and crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya Muslim population in 2017 were primarily committed by the state military during the democratic government’s reign. The NLD government’s failure and refusal to investigate the allegations at the time illustrated the powerful influence of the military and the government’s inability to introduce any meaningful reform within Myanmar’s armed forces.
The JC provided no pathway to transform the power imbalance by introducing a list of actions to support state reform. The existing state laws on sexual violence do not align with international standards.Footnote 91 The Myanmar Constitution exempts military personnel from legal process in civilian courts, adding to a culture of impunity.Footnote 92 In such an environment, there is a complete lack of commitment to break the cycle of crimes, including sexual violence, committed by the military.Footnote 93 In March 2024, the United Nations Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) noted that no soldier or police officer has yet been charged or prosecuted for sexual and gender-based crimes, nor any commander dismissed, demoted, or sanctioned for failing to stop or punish those committing these crimes.
The absence of transformative language in the Myanmar JC has implications, especially in the absence of a UN mission to monitor and co-implement the JC. For example, the Myanmar JC has no pathway to reform the security sector, contrary to previous JCs, which implies a high degree of military influence during the negotiation process. One of the key inclusions of JCs to prevent CRSV is to integrate CRSV prevention norms into national security dialogues, inform policy and legislative development, and strengthen management and oversight mechanisms within security institutions. There are no such measures or oversight mechanisms in the Myanmar JC.
The JC in Myanmar notably lacks any WPS language promoting gender inclusion, particularly regarding the participation of women and marginalised groups in the (faltering) peace process. Even though democratic transition appeared to enhance opportunities for women CSOs’ participation in the peace process, the evidence suggests that there was insufficient autonomy for women to organise and present reforms concerning conflict-related women’s issues, especially CRSV.Footnote 94 This was an opportunity for the UN to introduce inclusion language specifying CRSV in Myanmar’s peace process. Women’s representation in the policy-making process and local women’s movements are key resources for a transformative agenda.Footnote 95 The absence of gender inclusion language in Myanmar’s JC blocked women’s meaningful participation in JC implementation.
Unsurprisingly, there was little progress on JC implementation between its signing and the coup in February 2021. A National Committee, comprised of different ministries, including the Ministry of Defence appointed as co-chair, was set up in March 2019 to develop a national action plan. The National Committee entirely excluded the UN and independent women’s organisations from the process. Ultimately, the UN did not endorse the draft action plan for JC implementation developed by the National Committee, claiming that it lacked essential protection mechanisms for survivors.Footnote 96 The UN also expressed concern over the lack of inclusiveness and the absence of a survivor-centred approach in the national action plan, including a confidential complaint mechanism to protect complainants from retribution.Footnote 97
Following the military coup, the military regime continued with the implementation of the JC national action plan. The first National Committee meeting after the coup, chaired by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (MSWRR), was held in April 2021, two months after the coup. The Ministry of Defence has remained the Vice Chair of the Committee.Footnote 98 Since the coup, there have been increased reports of rape and sexual violence committed by soldiers and police.Footnote 99 Despite the mounting evidence of CRSV, the National Committee to implement the JC continues to defend the military and refute the allegations.Footnote 100
The JC in Myanmar was signed with the civilian government, but within an institutional environment where the military retained significant influence.Footnote 101 Unlike other contexts, there was no UN mission presence in Myanmar to help establish a shared platform that could facilitate or compel joint action. The JC was not used as an opportunity to introduce reform language to support the state over the military, to reform discriminatory and harmful state laws, norms, and practices, or to transform the military institution. Indeed, its adoption may have even been harmful. The JC served to position the military as a prevention actor, even though the institution itself had been responsible for perpetrating CRSV. Consequently, the UN was excluded from the process, and women-led organisations were, again, excluded from both the JC and its implementation. Ultimately, the UN rejected the national action plan designed for JC implementation, but the military has continued to engage with and refer to the JC following the coup, which is problematic for the normative ambition of JCs as a tool that promotes state responsibility to prevent CRSV.
Conclusion
The JC was designed based on the premise that a responsible state could prevent CRSV. The JC was designed as an opportunity to identify the reforms that the state and military actors could co-adopt, with UN support, to prevent CRSV. Based on our analysis of the JC design for eight countries affected by CRSV, we can draw two conclusions.
First, the relationship between the state and the UN at the country level influences the content of the JC. Particularly, the presence of a UN mission, whether peacekeeping or political, influences the bargaining position of the state and the UN in each context to omit or agree to certain actions. We suggest that the absence of a UN mission in the case of Myanmar explains the weak inclusions in this agreement compared to other JCs where the militaries were listed as perpetrators of CRSV. The Myanmar government had no independent oversight or dependence on the UN mission to bargain its position differently.
Second, the JC provides the opportunity for meaningful gender participation, but it is not universally included across JCs despite the OSRSG-SVC’s commitment to the full realisation of the WPS agenda. Substantive references to gender participation are essential for all JCs, but its absence is particularly egregious given the JC origins in Resolutions 1325 and 1820. Given that the military-led peace process had already restricted women’s participation in formal negotiation channels, the JC was the only remaining avenue available to create the space to include women’s voices from conflict-affected locations. The absence of an ‘inclusion approach’ in Myanmar’s JC meant that the JC was not a gender-inclusive agreement, nor a survivor-centred agreement that would secure CRSV prevention and response. The adoption of the JC in Myanmar gave the military institutional status as a CRSV prevention actor, despite being the main perpetrator of these crimes in the country.
The OSRSG-SVC has pursued and signed agreements with states, including where state military actors have been identified as permitting and/or perpetrating CRSV. The necessity for military actors to be part of the prevention and protection solution, and for states to take responsibility for CRSV, are laudable ambitions of the JC. These ambitions are outlined in the WPS Resolutions. Every JC will have to vary according to context. However, when is a JC harmful to the ideals of the JC and the WPS agenda? In the case of Myanmar, we contend that the contents of the JC, given the events in Myanmar, were a red flag. A JC was sought with a state with a recent track record of committing crimes against humanity and genocide (one year prior to signing the JC). The JC was pursued and signed despite weakened language under each thematic area and had no reference to an oversight role for the UN. The JC has been used by the Myanmar government and military to demonstrate their commitment to prevent CRSV, while avoiding any requirement to engage in institutional reform. It is important to identify opportunities for states to realise their responsibility to prevent CRSV, but whether the state has the capacity and intention to realise their responsibility needs to be factored into future JC approaches.
Video Abstract
To view the online video abstract, please visit: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210525101204.
Acknowledgements
We acknowledge funding support from the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (Project number CE230100004).
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