The concept of ‘overload’ was introduced into the vocabulary of political science in 1975, in two publications which appeared almost simultaneously in the United States and Britain. One was by Michel Crozier in a ‘report on the governability of democracies’ entitled The Crisis of Democracy; the other by Anthony King in Political Studies. Both authors took the same general line: that there had been a rapid growth in public expectations about what benefits could be provided by government in Western democracies, that many of these expectations had inevitably been disappointed, and that the result was a serious decline of public confidence in government. King summarized the development in an aphorism so striking that it deserves quotation once again: ‘Once upon a time man looked to God to order the world. Then he looked to the market. Now he looks to government’. And when things go wrong people blame ‘not “Him” or “it” but “them”.’ It was suggested by King that this development had made Britain more difficult to govern and by Crozier, more generally, that Western democracies might be moving towards a condition of ungovernability.

President Carter will perhaps be remembered most for his perceived incompetence, an impression produced largely by his inability to forge coalitions in Congress, and by his failure as an ‘outsider’ to intervene effectively in the established policy-making processes in Washington. In his farewell address, Carter alluded to what he believed to be the source of his troubles – the fragmentation of power and decision-making exploited by influential special interests. Carter believed that he was trapped in a web of organized groups allied with well-placed congressional and bureaucratic sympathizers seeking to protect their narrowly defined interests and frustrating his own broader vision of the public good.

Declining trust in politicians and political institutions is one of the most dramatic and well-documented trends in American public opinion. Confidence in religious, educational and other institutions has also waned, but emphasis has focused on diminished political trust, both because it may summarize a wide range of diffuse grievances and because it might indicate an increased potential for disruptive action, political violence and instability. In the decade from 1968 to 1978, the level of political trust (measured by the conventional five-item CPS/NES index) was halved, the proportion of the public expressing moderate or high levels of trust falling from 64 to 33 per cent. The greatest decline in the index level (a drop of 14 points) occurred between 1972 and 1974.

Every political system must secure compliance with its commands on the part of the ruled; the methods applied to achieve this vary from society to society and within societies over time. One way of gaining compliance is for political elites to establish the legitimacy of the political system, of their position within it, and of the commands that are issued. Political power can be said to be legitimate when, in the words of Sternberger, it is exercised both with a consciousness on the part of the elite that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the ruled of that right. Both this consciousness of the right to govern and its acknowledgement by the ruled is derived from some source of authorization which may change over time. This paper will focus on the conscious attempts of Soviet political elites from the early sixties onwards to change their strategy of gaining compliance by reducing reliance on coercion and strengthening political legitimacy. It will draw attention to their efforts to develop a new source of authorization and to employ a new legitimation procedure. In developing the theoretical argument the Weberian typology of legitimate rule will be employed, and this approach to the topic will be contrasted with that adopted by T. H. Rigby in two recent publications.

Perhaps we political scientists and sociologists should have left ‘legitimacy’ to the constitutional and international lawyers. Such a view is certainly suggested by the present cacophany of our definitions, taxonomies and applications of the term. When the contributors to a book on political legitimation in communist states, representing by no means the full range of scholarly views on the social and political systems of these countries, can variously characterize the political legitimation of the USSR today as dominated by ‘goal-rational’, ‘traditional’ or ‘paternalistic’ legitimation, or as a combination of ‘heteronomous-teleological’ and ‘autonomous-consensual’ or of ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ modes of legitimation, we evidently have a long way to go before our shared understandings of political legitmation could be adequate for the comparative study of political systems or for analysing political change.

Most research on voting behaviour and elections has focused on cross-sectional analysis of particular elections. This technique is very useful in telling us about the influences on individual voter decision making. Less commonly research has focused on short-term electoral change, and has tried to explain specific election results with respect to one another, or in relation to long-term trends.

Since 1945, industrial societies have experienced rapid socio-economic change. Occupational structures have altered to accommodate the new technological skills demanded by many new industries. These newer, smaller and more flexible industries have, in their turn, fostered unparalleled economic growth. Concomitantly, access to education has risen dramatically for all social groups, while the development of mass communications has enabled large amounts of information to be disseminated more rapidly to ever-increasing numbers of people. There is now persuasive and cumulative evidence to show that these profound changes have had two significant consequences for Western societies. Firstly, the values of Western mass publics have altered to place less emphasis on the material aspects of life and a greater priority on aesthetic and intellectual goals. Secondly, there has been a widespread upsurge in popular support for minority nationalist movements advocating some degree of territorial autonomy within their host state or separation from it.

It has already been demonstrated that part of the success of the Liverpool Liberals in local elections can be attributed to split-ticket voting by Liverpool electors. In May 1979, when city council and Westminster elections took place simultaneously, substantial proportions of voters went into a polling booth and voted for different parties at local and national level. This note attempts a further investigation of the basis of Liberal support in Liverpool local elections. Its main purpose is to test two hypotheses.

1. ‘Liberal voting displays a weaker causal linkage to the socio-economic structure of Liverpool wards than does voting for the other two parties.’

2. ‘Liberal voting is much more directly related to ward turnout than is voting for the other two parties.’

One point of interest about the period of the Labour government from October 1974 to May 1979 is the short-term surge and subsequent decline between these dates of electoral support for the National Front (NF). This episode of NF voting raises a number of questions. Some of these are simple empirical ones. What, for example, were the political origins, in terms of voting behaviour in the October 1974 general election, of this body of NF voters? What were their political destinations in May 1979? What characterized the various groups of voters who between 1974 and 1979 had different voting trajectories, all of which none the less included at least a period of support for the NF? This research note presents data on the numerical size of these different groups and it analyses some of their aggregate social and attitudinal characteristics.