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On a retrial queue with negative customers, passive breakdown, and delayed repairs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 October 2023

Yunna Han
Affiliation:
School of Science, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, China
Ruiling Tian*
Affiliation:
School of Science, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, China
Xinyu Wu
Affiliation:
School of Science, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, China
Liuqing He
Affiliation:
School of Science, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, China
*
Corresponding author: Ruiling Tian; Email: tianrl@ysu.edu.cn
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Abstract

This paper studies an M/M/1 retrial queue with negative customers, passive breakdown, and delayed repairs. Assume that the breakdown behavior of the server during idle periods is different from that during busy periods. Passive breakdowns may occur when the server is idle, due to the lack of monitoring of the server during idle periods. When the passive breakdown occurs, the server does not get repaired immediately and enters a delayed repair phase. Negative customers arrive during the busy period, which will cause the server to break down and remove the serving customers. Under steady-state conditions, we obtain explicit expressions of the probability generating functions for the steady-state distribution, together with some important performance measures for the system. In addition, we present some numerical examples to illustrate the effects of some system parameters on important performance measures and the cost function. Finally, based on the reward-cost structure, we discuss Nash equilibrium and socially optimal strategy and numerically analyze the influence of system parameters on optimal strategies and optimal social benefits.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press.
Figure 0

Figure 1. Transition rate diagram of the Markov chain.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Average system length E(L) versus θ for different values of $\eta {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} (q = 0.65,\lambda = 2.2,\mu = 8,\beta = 1.4,\varphi = 0.5,\delta = 3,\nu = 3)$.

Figure 2

Figure 3. Expected waiting time T(q) versus ν for different values of $\delta {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} (q = 0.6,\lambda = 3,\mu = 8,\beta = 3.5,\varphi = 1.5,\theta = 6,\eta = 2)$.

Figure 3

Figure 4. Average orbit length E(N) versus µ for different values of $\nu~ (q = 0.4,\lambda = 4,\beta = 1.4,\varphi = 0.5,\delta = 3,\theta = 1.5,\eta = 0.1)$.

Figure 4

Figure 5. The busy cycle E(T) versus λ for different values of $\mu {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} (q = 0.2,\beta = 2,\varphi = 0.7,\theta = 1.8,\delta = 3,\eta = 0.3,\nu = 3)$.

Figure 5

Figure 6. Server breakdown/repair probability ${P_R}$ versus φ for different values of $\beta {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} (q = 0.6,\lambda = 4.3,\mu = 8,\theta = 1.8,\delta = 4,\eta = 0.1,\nu = 5.5)$.

Figure 6

Figure 7. The probabilities of each state ${P_i}$ versus $\lambda {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} (q = 0.4,\beta = 4.2,\varphi = 3.4,\theta = 4,\eta = 1.1,\mu = 12,\delta = 4,\nu = 8)$.

Figure 7

Figure 8. The cost variation with δ and µ$ {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} {\kern 1pt} (q = 0.42,\varphi = 0.5,\eta = 0.4,\lambda = 3,\beta = 2,\theta = 1.7,\nu = 1.5)$.

Figure 8

Table 1. Optimal solutions $({\delta ^*},{\mu ^*})$ and the corresponding costs $(q = 0.42,\eta = 0.4,\nu = 1.5,\theta = 1.7)$.

Figure 9

Figure 9. Pareto-front solution found by genetic algorithm.

Figure 10

Table 2. The Pareto optimal solutions for various values of λ.

Figure 11

Figure 10. Histogram and K-S normality test for the regression residuals.

Figure 12

Figure 11. ${q_e}$ and ${q_{s}}$ versus λ$(\mu = 4.5,\beta = 0.3,\varphi = 0.1,\theta = 0.8,\eta = 0.1,\delta = 5,\nu = 10,R = 9,C = 1)$.

Figure 13

Figure 12. ${q_e}$ and ${q_{s}}$ versus η$(\lambda = 1.8,\mu = 5,\beta = 1.2,\varphi = 0.8,\theta = 1.5,\delta = 4,\nu = 5,R = 9,C = 1)$.

Figure 14

Figure 13. ${q_e}$ and ${q_{s}}$ versus β$(\lambda = 1.8,\mu = 4.5,\varphi = 0.8,\theta = 1.5,\delta = 2,\eta = 1,\nu = 7,R = 9,C = 1)$.

Figure 15

Figure 14. ${q_e}$ and ${q_{s}}$ versus δ$(\lambda = 1.8,\mu = 4.4,\beta = 2,\varphi = 0.5,\theta = 4.5,\eta = 1.3,\nu = 6,R = 9,C = 1)$.

Figure 16

Figure 15. ${q_e}$ and ${q_{s}}$ versus C$(\lambda = 2.5,\mu = 5,\beta = 0.3,,\varphi = 0.1,\theta = 0.7,,\eta = 0.1,\delta = 5,\nu = 10,R = 9)$.

Figure 17

Figure 16. Maximum of social welfare versus λ for different values of µ$(\beta = 0.3,\varphi = 0.1,\theta = 0.8,\eta = 0.1,\delta = 5,\nu = 10,R = 9,C = 1)$ .

Figure 18

Figure 17. Maximum of social welfare versus θ for different values of η$(\lambda = 1.8,\mu = 5,\beta = 1.2,\varphi = 0.8,\delta = 4,\nu = 5,R = 9,C = 1)$ .

Figure 19

Figure 18. Maximum of social welfare versus β for different values of φ$(\lambda = 1.8,\mu = 4.5,\theta = 1.5,\eta = 1,\delta = 5,\nu = 7,R = 9,C = 1)$ .

Figure 20

Figure 19. Maximum of social welfare versus R for different values of C $(\lambda = 2.5,\mu = 5,\beta = 0.3,\varphi = 0.1,\theta = 0.7,\eta = 0.1,\delta = 4,\nu = 10)$ .