Recognition

Recognition is a core concept in both International Law (IL) and International Relations (IR). This section articulates my contribution to the concept: the importance of understanding thick and thin recognition multidirectionally. In IR, recognition is also a foundational puzzle piece for other concepts, including identity, status, and hierarchy.Footnote ¹ Recognition is the process of being seen and acknowledged by others. It is through recognition that identity is validated, and it is through social interaction that recognition takes place: ‘only as recognized can we conclusively come to establish an identity … yet recognition is rarely automatic and before we gain it we are often required to prove that our interpretations of ourselves indeed do fit’.Footnote ² Recognition has two forms: thick and thin. Thin recognition is generally the acknowledgement that a state is or is not a stateFootnote ³ and frequently includes legal, diplomatic recognition. This often focuses on whether a state is ‘sovereign or not’.Footnote ⁴ Thick recognition goes beyond the existential questions and involves a deeper validation of identity.Footnote ⁵

Importantly, I conceptualize UN membership as thin recognition. UN membership is not synonymous with or the same as formal legal recognitionFootnote ⁶ in IL, though legal recognition would be thin recognition in IR.Footnote ⁷ This difference is affirmed in IL scholarship, wherein there is a practical separation between membership or participation in treaty procedures and the ‘substantive law of statehood’.Footnote ⁸ Outside the bounds of IL, UN membership is a form of thin recognition that acknowledges a state as a member of the UN community: ‘admission as a member has been very important as a sign of recognized statehood’.Footnote ⁹ It follows legal recognition, which often follows various claims to and struggles for statehood. This can sometimes lead to a recognition limbo in periods of decolonial struggle,Footnote ¹⁰ where thin recognition through membership is not clear but there may be larger debates about identity of decolonial actors or their validity as subjects of international action – this is where thick recognition often becomes salient. Caspersen also identifies similar fuzzy spaces with interim agreements on self-determination for independence movements, pointing out that ‘international recognition does not depend on empirical sovereignty’.Footnote ¹¹

As thin recognition, UN membership grants specific privileges and responsibilities to a member that may make it subject to specific legal frameworks and obligations, but it is not equal to legal recognition. Notably, it is also different from collective recognition, where an organization or regional parliament recognizes a state. However, organizations can influence the intra-organizational politics of recognition.Footnote ¹² UN membership requires affirmative recommendation at the Security Council (UNSC) (at least 9/15 members voting yes with no vetoes) for a vote at the General Assembly, which then requires a 2/3 majority to grant membership.Footnote ¹³ As thin, political recognition, UN membership shares a characteristic with legal recognition, in that such recognition is shared with a community of equals as a basic sense of subjectivity.Footnote ¹⁴

Bartelson notes the difficulty in separating political and legal recognition,Footnote ¹⁵ which is indeed true, and echoed by Gustafsson who offers insight on ‘recognizing’ recognition for empirical purposes.Footnote ¹⁶ Importantly, the voting process for UN membership is an observable form of thin, political recognition where states cast a vote to recognize membership. Since it is clearly observable, it is ripe to operationalize theoretically and to compare to thick recognition.

I take a relational approach where actors are co-constituted through relations. Ontologically, I focus on processes and mechanisms and do not see actors as fixed or delineated;Footnote ¹⁷ rather the struggles for recognition are part of their constant constitutive and reproductive process over time. I argue that the constitution of identity and the struggle for – and claims to – recognition, both thick and thin, are built out of social interactions over time, and are co-constitutive with international order. This builds on Kessler and Herborth’s claim that recognition is intersubjective and that the struggle for subjectivity relies on interaction with others.Footnote ¹⁸ In fact, the process of decolonization is indeed a process of interaction by which actors come to be through the struggle for recognition. Therefore, I see recognition not as a box to check, even in its thin form, but rather a processFootnote ¹⁹ of interaction and identity. In this case, although it is thin, UN membership is built through a process inscribed in the Charter that requires diplomacy and voting.

This bears similarity to the claim that declarations of independence are ritualistic, as performances of statehood and claims to recognition.Footnote ²⁰ Like applications for UN membership, they have a communicative purpose in the pursuit of a form of thin recognition that can be granted or denied. Similarly, in an intersubjective perspective, thick recognition may be built on competing narratives of self and other, where narrative histories shape claims to statehood.Footnote ²¹ Narrative is essential to recognition through its relationship to identity, as identity is changed through both recognition and misrecognition.Footnote ²²

Thick recognition concerns ‘inter-subjective human negotiations and struggles over identity’.Footnote ²³ It can encompass diplomatic negotiation and demands, active, protracted conflicts, and/or ‘frozen’ conflicts. For Algeria, seeking recognition in the UN context was not simply about the end point of statehood and UN membership. The independence movement first sought inscription on the General Assembly’s agenda as a legitimate issue of international concern – it sought to be collectively recognized in UN debate as one of two actors (Algeria and France) in an international conflict rather than to be declared a French domestic conflict outside the UN’s mandate. The former recognized a narrative of the Algerian independence movement as the efforts of a legitimate actor seeking statehood and the other erased it, doubling down on Algeria’s subjugation. There was thus a two-part political negotiation for recognition, through both armed and diplomatic struggle simultaneously. Unlike the process for states who sought recognition in the UN after their independence (thin recognition), the Algerian recognition process took place in multiple locales over time and included multiple demands for the recognition of Algeria’s identity in the diplomatic space during that process.

Thick recognition demands that an identity be recognized and can encompass ‘multiple social-relational and non-dualistic forms of recognition that result from the actors’ aggregation of inter/transnational interactions and dealings’.Footnote ²⁴ Fernández-Molina’s argument that recognition includes Honneth’s dimensions of love, respect, and self-esteem is essential to understanding thick recognition.Footnote ²⁵ Both the work of Allan and Keller and that of Greenhill also identify esteem specifically as a central part of thick recognitionFootnote ²⁶ – it is esteem that corresponds to the idea of an equivalence between how an actor views itself and how it is treated.Footnote ²⁷ This is a core, affective component of recognition. It is inherently relational and precisely the core of Algerian question – whether UN members could acknowledge it as a narrative of political struggle for statehood rather than simply a matter of domestic French politics.

Honneth’s seminal book builds on Hegel, forming what Fernández-Molina notes is one of two streams at the foundation of recognition theories.Footnote ²⁸ The second is Taylor’s ‘politics of recognition’.Footnote ²⁹ In her intellectual genealogy, Fernández-Molina notes that these two views have commonalities, including on the ability of collectives to seek recognition and the consequences of misrecognition.Footnote ³⁰ Honneth’s recognition theory is especially valuable for this context because it allows for a multidimensional and rich view of thick recognition that captures ‘the subjectivity of the state and the social procedures that constitute it’.Footnote ³¹ Applying it to the case of Algeria allows one to view the long, intersubjective process of constituting statehood.

From this distinction of thick and thin recognition, I argue that recognition is multidirectional. States emerge through the pursuit of self-determination and the struggle for recognition amongst multiple audiences. Multiple relations are implicated in the processes of UN membership and struggles for statehood. Moreover, these pursuits of recognition are not created equally. Some states become states through social interaction of conquest, domination, and colonialism. Others struggle for independence, self-determination, and sovereign equality in resistance to domination. These struggles are essential to their core identity and are dependent on the other party, as colonizer or colonized. Bartelson argues that should recognition ‘become reciprocal between two or more parties, this is believed to transform both the identities of the actors as well as the terms of the interaction in significant ways’.Footnote ³²

This paper asserts that recognition is not only reciprocal, it is multidirectional: the process of recognizing another actor can be part of one’s own struggle for recognition. Therefore, it is not just that the actor recognizing and the actor seeking recognition are transformed; it is that multiple audiences become implicated in multiple struggles for recognition simultaneously. If granting recognition is part of one’s own pursuit of recognition, then many dimensions of the identity of both actors are implicated. As I demonstrate, Canada’s enthusiasm for increased UN membership emerged from its own desire to be credibly seen as constructive. In adopting this position , it was not just considering its political relationship with the majority of members and balancing that with important individual relationships. Its decision to grant thin recognition hinged on how its own identity would be perceived by different communities of UN member states. On Algeria, the question of granting thick recognition hinged on Canada’s challenges with its own identity, both looking inwards and outwards to multiple relationships. Pursuits of recognition are actively interconnected; the granting of recognition implies multiple dimensions of identity, which may be more or less salient for different audiences. This view of recognition as having multiple dimensions and areas of uniqueness is consistent with both Honneth’s ‘esteem’ (in this case, recognition based on specific attributes or characteristics) and Taylor’s politics of differences.Footnote ³³

Within international order, states are continuously struggling for recognition, a process which is never fully complete.Footnote ³⁴ In this continuous struggle, misrecognition is frequent; states are always in the process of seeking recognition, especially thick recognition.Footnote ³⁵ This is important for the argument that recognition is multidirectional – if misrecognition by others is constant, then states are continuously struggling to remedy that, including granting recognition to others. If both recognition and misrecognition are fundamental conditions of international life, then it is important to understand them as relational concepts, continually emerging from interlinked struggles. The act of granting recognition is inextricably tied to the granting state’s own pursuit of it, and these struggles shape order. Two issues emerge from this. The first is that not all audiences of multidirectional recognition are equal. States may prioritize different audiences based on different material, political, or social aspirations. They cannot treat all other actors as equally important; as Michelle Murray argues, attempts to achieve recognition are not perceived in the same way across actors.Footnote ³⁶ Similarly, the social context of the international system and relationships with others can hinder the granting of recognition.Footnote ³⁷ As such, multidirectional recognition is hierarchical – states make choices about priorities. As will be demonstrated later in this article, Canada prioritized different recognition audiences at different times in the period from 1955 to 1962.

The second issue is that international order is hierarchical. Although both legal recognition and UN membership are employed as tools to achieve sovereign equality, that equality does not emerge in practice.Footnote ³⁸ Consequently, hierarchy is a fundamental feature of international order. Indeed, international organizations are built on such inequality, despite their best efforts. It is outside the scope of this paper to review the hierarchy literature in detail, but some points are crucial.

Many argue that the international system has become more democratic, inclusive, and cooperative as membership in international organizations has increased. However, Viola argues that as membership increases, new forms of hierarchy and exclusion – including sovereign inequality – also increase.Footnote ³⁹ Moreover, recognition is self-reinforcing; states that have more recognition are likely to get more, exacerbating hierarchy and inequality of recognition.Footnote ⁴⁰ Sovereign inequality – often rooted in colonialism – is therefore a frequent feature of international organizations.

It is through decolonization that ‘territories and peoples previously deprived of legal recognition’ have slowly come to be recognized as sovereign, albeit often only on European terms.Footnote ⁴¹ Yet despite these gains in legal recognition, hierarchy and inequality continue. It is no coincidence that this inequality exists in the UN, despite its membership increasing due to decolonization in the 20th century. Even in 2025, the struggle against colonialism has not yet succeeded in achieving equal recognition for all. So, whereas many see UN membership and the struggle for thin recognition as historical matters, many struggles for freedom, independence, and decolonization still involve claims for legal recognition that remain contested.

What made Algeria uniquely a case of thick recognition in the UN context is that it was a question of whether the war of independence should be on the UN agenda and as a result, who Algeria was – it was about recognizing Algeria as Algerian or as French. Its struggle for thick recognition was integral to the practice of multilateral diplomacy and the question of sovereign equality itself. As Connelly argues, the Algerian victory was not necessarily a military one but a diplomatic one: its most effective tactics were applied in a diplomatic context , especially at the UN.Footnote ⁴² By 1962, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) was a Cairo-based government-in-exile that had been negotiating in the Evian peace process with its French colonizers. The GPRA (Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne) effectively used the efforts of human rights and youth organizations, the international press, the Non-Aligned Movement, and its Afro-Asian allies to build an internationalist struggle for recognition.Footnote ⁴³ Its campaign would shape the future direction of Third WorldismFootnote ⁴⁴ and change the ways that both colonizers and independence movements fought.Footnote ⁴⁵

Saeed identifies two narratives at the foundation of Algeria’s struggle for thick recognition in the UN setting. One was an internationalist discourse that drew upon the growing anti-colonial consciousness of the time and centred Algeria as part of an global movement.Footnote ⁴⁶ The other was a ‘metrocentric civilizational’ discourse, which the French used to focus on the so-called benefits of colonialism and claim Algeria as the domestic sovereign territory of France, unlike its other colonies.Footnote ⁴⁷ As such, UN debates about Algeria were about larger questions of how self-determination was changing in the postcolonial moment. A central question was whether Algeria was a ‘domestic’ issue for France or whether it was an issue of international peace and security that belonged on the UN agenda, which at its core was a debate about what Algeria was. Was Algeria a legitimate international subject for the UN? Or was its subjectivity subsumed by France? It also included the question of whether the GPRA could legitimately claim to control Algeria and who could represent the Algerian people if not France. These two narratives consistuted competing claims about thick recognition.

This struggle took place in the context of new UN members entering and the UN General Assembly passing numerous resolutions about self-determination. Building from this, my argument demonstrates that these issues of recognition were multidirectional. Canada’s resistance to recognizing the Algerian issue at the UN was bound up in its own struggle, wherein it was balancing an audience of actors – and relationships – with differing priorities vis-à-vis decolonization. For many years, Canada chose to support France’s recognition narrative, whereby Algeria was part of metropolitan France. This was contrary to the case of the new UN members that joined in 1955 and 1960, when Canada recognized members (even former French colonies) enthusiastically, at the expense of its relationship with the USA (and to a lesser degree, the UK and France). I now turn to a discussion of the UN, decolonization, and Canada.

The UN, Canada, and decolonization

The UN has historically been seen in binaristic terms as either entirely liberatory or completely colonial.Footnote ⁴⁸ However, many now understand ‘the multifaceted roles that international organizations have played in decolonizing countries and how the dissolution of European empires has in turn affected the development of international organizations’.Footnote ⁴⁹ As Tudor argues, UN practices such as peacekeeping during the Cold War reconstituted and recreated tools of colonialism via the bureaucrats and offices that undertook these tasks.Footnote ⁵⁰ Like the UN itself, peacekeeping personnel embodied anti-communism, liberalism, and specific views of modernization. Webster echoes this in discussing the UN Technical Assistance Administration’s efforts to shield new states from communism.Footnote ⁵¹ Anti-communism in the UN was not only the product of American influence; rather, it emerged organically alongside decolonization through the power and politics – and bureaucracy – of the organization and its foundation in liberal internationalism.Footnote ⁵²

Concurrently, the Global South used the UN for anti-colonial ends: ‘the liberal world order was largely predicated on an exclusionary system of politics and economics but … within it, Global South actors constantly sought to reconstitute this order to make it more equitable’.Footnote ⁵³ This reflected the UN’s role both as an arena in which marginalized subjects could speakFootnote ⁵⁴ and as playing a part in decolonization. As Getachew argues, this was not just about individual self-determination but a broader project of worldmaking by anglophone Black intellectuals using the UN’s tools to subvert it.Footnote ⁵⁵ Moreover, despite the UN’s structural inequality, postcolonial states found many uses for the forum, establishing ‘foundational pillars of postcolonial internationalism’ and creating spaces to ‘[promote] anticolonial causes from within the structure of the UN’.Footnote ⁵⁶ It was both an institution with its own pathologies and bureaucratic cultures, and a site of resistance, valued by the Third World as a means of pursuing independence, sovereignty, and recognition. The multidirectionality of the recognition process is demonstrated by the UN, as a site in which states’ struggles for recognition take place before multiple audiences and their self-determination is contested.

Canada’s position on decolonization was that the process was acceptable if it was non-violent, anti-communist, and could ‘proceed at a slow, Canadian pace’.Footnote ⁵⁷ This paternalistic view was consistent with liberal internationalism’s global hierarchy and exclusionary approach to decolonization in that period, built on the idea that not all colonies were ready for independence yet.Footnote ⁵⁸ Canada’s anti-communism was central in its approach to decolonization. It was indeed less staunch than American anti-communism, as Canada was much more open to non-alignment than the USA and had limited interest in supporting American-led regime change. However, it was strongly committed to keeping the Global South firmly out of the Soviet orbit.

Canada’s relations with newly independent states followed the policies of colonial powers. As Spooner notes, Britain even pressured Canada to ‘assist and recognize newly independent African states as part of a strategy to secure allegiance to the West’Footnote ⁵⁹ following decolonization. Some Canadian officials saw this as disingenuous, but their commitment to anti-communism remained strong.Footnote ⁶⁰ Canada was reluctant to take unilateral or autonomous action around recognition or decolonization processes without considering the positions of Britain and France. This extended to its relationship with the Netherlands when it came to Indonesian independence in the late 1940s.Footnote ⁶¹

In the UN, Canada’s view on decolonization was represented by its commitment to funding and staffing the organization, which it saw as an important tool for insulating the world against communism, preventing war, and encouraging economic prosperity and modernization. While many may have seen Canadian leadership – especially Lester B. Pearson’s – as naïve, Pearson saw a functional UN and effective multilateralism as being in Canada’s interest.Footnote ⁶² Liberal internationalism was central not only to the UN but also to Canadian identity at that time, which functionally meant that the Canadian diplomatic sense of self became increasingly bound up with the question of the UN’s effectiveness. Of course, liberal internationalism overlapped with imperialism and racial hierarchy, which ‘shaped debates within both the Commonwealth and the UN after 1945’,Footnote ⁶³ as well as in Canada.

Canada’s responses to decolonization were, on the surface, mixed, despite its desire to be seen as constructive on the issue. Moreover, its attachment to the UN became increasingly connected to how it saw itself within international order. I now turn to Canada’s work on UN membership as a form of thin recognition. This case demonstrates both the multidirectional nature of recognition politics and how Canada’s granting of thin recognition was part of its own pursuit of thick recognition.

UN membership: 1955 and 1960

In 1955, 16 new members joined the UN, which was the first increase of that magnitude; they were followed by 17 more in 1960.Footnote ⁶⁴ In this process, Canada sought recognition as a reliable multilateral partner, constructive on decolonization, a cooperative liberal internationalist, and an independent bridge between its allies, and the rest of the world. Yet Canada struggled to balance its relationship between the USA and the growing majority in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), amongst whom the USA was unpopular. Subsequently, in its pursuit of recognition as a cooperative leader, Canada was willing to risk rifts with the Americans. In 1955, Louis St. Laurent was Prime Minister (PM) and Lester B. Pearson was Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA). By 1960, John Diefenbaker was PM. Diefenbaker’s foreign policy was relatively similar to St. Laurent’s; he retained similar principles and senior diplomats. Both governments saw the UN as ‘the cornerstone’Footnote ⁶⁵ of Canadian foreign policy, as an effective multilateral system was at the core of Canada’s interest.

By 1955, some states had had active applications since 1946.Footnote ⁶⁶ Prior to 1955, the majority of Security Council members had voted against the applications of seven states. Another 14 were subject to Soviet veto (Table 1).Footnote ⁶⁷ For those states that were newly independent, the Bandung Conference in 1955 was a push for Third World recognition, including UN membership.

Table 1.

Membership Applications to the UN.

Canadian officials understood that not all states could be recognized as members but believed that compromise was possible. Moreover, while they did not believe that membership should be automatic, their position was that the West did not have to agree with a state’s politics to grant recognition. They believed that just because a state was communist, this did not mean it should not be a member;Footnote ⁶⁸ recognizing a state was more likely to be productive than isolation.Footnote ⁶⁹ Leading resistance to such isolation was central to Canada’s desire for influence at the UN. Canada was willing to stand in opposition to the USA.Footnote ⁷⁰

After studying the issue in early 1955, Canadian officials prepared for the 10th annual session of the General Assembly (UNGA). Minister of Health Paul Martin led the delegation, as SSEA Pearson was on his inaugural visit to the Soviet Union.Footnote ⁷¹ Martin sought to “‘make a difference [by] … securing … national recognition’ of Canada”.Footnote ⁷² The delegation’s initial focus was on pushing the Permanent 5 towards compromise behind the scenes. Instructions to the delegation indicated that Canada supported the admission of all the applicants except the Koreas and Vietnams, hoping that the other applications could succeed.Footnote ⁷³ Canadian officials became aware that the Soviet Union would support the admission of the main 17, based on insight they received from the Indian delegation in August 1955. The challenge would be convincing the USA, the UK, and France that a ‘package deal’ for all 17 was a politically advantageous solution.Footnote ⁷⁴

American officials insisted that membership applications should be voted on individually. This stemmed from their bias towards legal interpretations of the Charter’s use of the phrase ‘peace-loving’ in Article 4. Therefore, they viewed Soviet satellite states as legally ineligible based on their own interpretation of the phrase. Canadian officials believed that since the world had changed since 1945, the Charter could be interpreted differently without violating it.Footnote ⁷⁵ For them, a politically realistic move towards universality would be more productive for the functioning of the organization and global representation. This also reflected a Canadian judge’s dissent on a 1948 International Court of Justice advisory opinion surrounding Article 4 and membership.Footnote ⁷⁶ Initially, Jules Léger, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (USS), suggested a compromise to SSEA Pearson wherein the Canadian delegation could propose an informal gentleman’s agreement. In the gentleman’s agreement, the P5 would agree to admit all 17. Following that, individual voting for recognition of all 17 states would take place.Footnote ⁷⁷ Spain later submitted its application, bringing the number to 18.

In September 1955, Léger indicated that the USA was hesitant to move on the issue. Léger advised Pearson that when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Ottawa, Pearson should broach the strategy of a gentleman’s agreement. Léger later provided advice for Pearson’s conversation with Dulles, informing him that if a Western-supported group of 17 were not put forward at UNGA, then Asian states might push the membership case for the seven newly independent states (the Bandung 7) alone, which would ‘upset the delicate balance between colonial and anti-colonial powers in several UN organs’.Footnote ⁷⁸ Similarly, continued deadlock and a failure to recognize new members could ‘detract[…] from the prestige and importance of the UN as a world organization’.Footnote ⁷⁹ This was an important matter for Canada, as its credibility and interests depended on the UN – for Canada to be seen as an effective multilateral state, the UN had to function.

In New York, Martin began meeting P5 delegations. By October 1955, he had begun drafting a resolution for the General Assembly to request the UNSC to act, as it was clear the P5 would not take action on their own. This resolution would pressure the UNSC to go through the Charter’s provisions. Like the Soviet Union, the UK was more amenable to new membership, whereas France resisted. Pearson explicitly expressed concern about France’s resistance, and anger that Afro-Asian members had put the issue of Algerian independence on the UNGA agenda.Footnote ⁸⁰ Pearson and Martin agreed that while newly decolonized states would soon outnumber Western states in the UNGA, it was important that the UN ‘reflect the real world’.Footnote ⁸¹ In this context, it was important for Canada that the growing majority of new member states should view it positively.

On Martin’s draft resolution, Pearson insisted that the language around universality and qualification of membership be left vague in order to gather widespread support.Footnote ⁸² While drafting, officials discussed the choice of co-sponsors, which mattered for the substance of the resolution and the related perception of Canada. They adopted a careful approach to this process, and began by sharing the draft resolution with Commonwealth allies early. During October 1955, it became clear that most UNGA members would be in favour of admitting new states and that this could exert influence on UNSC members.Footnote ⁸³ Recognition as a leader of this majority was important to Canada; however, there was still concern about P5 reactions.

Initially, Martin’s conversations with the Americans in New York were productive, despite American reservations. Pearson worried about approaching the French, insisting that it would be important ‘not to embarrass or isolate’ themFootnote ⁸⁴ as they were sensitive about Algeria. British/Soviet support and French/American resistance would persist for some time, with some additional complications.Footnote ⁸⁵ These included sensitivity around Spain’s application (due both to its history of neutrality and the authoritarian Franco regime) and Outer Mongolia’s (as the Republic of China claimed its territory while the Soviet Union recognized its independence).

Managing the P5 was consuming Martin and the delegation, who were calculating every step carefully, especially with the Americans. Most importantly, the delegation was bringing states onside who recognized the value of Canadian diplomacy on the issue. On 11 November 1955, the delegation wrote to Pearson indicating that ‘responsible delegations like the Scandinavians, the Australians, the Indians and Pakistanis and the Brazilians have agreed with us that the opportunity should not be lost’.Footnote ⁸⁶ While Britain agreed,Footnote ⁸⁷ France insisted that Algeria be removed from the UN agenda if they were to support the draft resolution, in response to which Martin made it clear that France could potentially find itself alone amongst the other P5.Footnote ⁸⁸ While France and the US remained hesitant, it was clear that pressure was ramping up on the P5, as 22 members met as co-sponsors on 15 November 1955.Footnote ⁸⁹ Intending to complete the draft resolution soon, Canada continued discussions with the P5 delegations.Footnote ⁹⁰ Meanwhile, other states, including India and the Soviet Union, suggested collaborative amendments.Footnote ⁹¹

On 23 November 1955, progress faltered. Dulles ‘expressed with some vigour’ that Canada had not ‘adequately consulted’Footnote ⁹² the USA on the draft resolution, and felt that Canada was uncooperative. He insisted that he had only become aware of the resolution via General Franco. The Canadian embassy in Washington reminded Dulles that this was false, citing Martin’s consultations. Further, the Canadians were aware that Dulles had written to Harold Macmillan about the resolution.Footnote ⁹³ However, Dulles admonished Canada,Footnote ⁹⁴ as did his Ambassador in New York, suggesting that Canada was anti-American and that the relationship between the two countries could easily be harmed by American retaliation. Canadian officials had the choice of appeasing the Americans or continuing onwards. Martin and Pearson sought to continue, given the cross-UNGA support for the resolution and the goodwill that had developed across the Cold War divide. A diverse group of co-sponsors was growing, and many were new potential partners for Canada, relations with whom could help broaden Canadian engagement and visibility.Footnote ⁹⁵

In late November 1955, the Americans remained hostile but agreed not to veto the entire package.Footnote ⁹⁶ Canada–USA relations were weakened, with the Americans making economic threats.Footnote ⁹⁷ Canada’s calculation was that it was a worthwhile policy decision to stick with the majority, however. As the UNSC debate developed, New Zealand held the Council presidency in December and began advocating on Canada’s behalf. On 8 December 1955, the UNGA passed the resolution urging the UNSC to consider membership for 18 countries. Fifty-two members voted in favour and two against.Footnote ⁹⁸ It was the first time that the USA had been ‘so overtly forced to alter its policy’ in the face of clear, united opposition from nearly the entire General Assembly.Footnote ⁹⁹ The UNSC convened and eventually, applicants were voted on individually. A full resolution passed. Per the Charter, the UNGA later approved a resolution submitted by Canada and its co-sponsors.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Sixteen states became UN members. The floodgates opened for further changes in the composition of the organization.Footnote ¹⁰¹

Martin’s determination was praised around the world. With ‘one of the most remarkable feats in the history of the General Assembly’,Footnote ¹⁰² Canada had achieved a victory through cooperation and compromise, and the result would become a key touchstone for its recognition as an effective and productive partner in the coming decades. Martin’s speech to the General Assembly portrayed Canada as an effective partner for all states, emphasizing the geographically diverse support for the resolution and arguing that the admission of new states would make the UN more representative.Footnote ¹⁰³

The new membership would change the organization drastically. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold took immediate action, as the accession of 16 new members affected the machinery of the UN in more ways than just votes in the General Assembly. Requirements concerning office space, personnel and staffing, the leadership and capacity of UN bodies, workload, and information management would begin to increase immediately and would continue to do so in the future.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ Equally important, questions about representation from a more inclusive UN would grow, leading to expansion of the Security Council and Charter reform in 1963.

At the UNGA 1960, 17 new members joined (Table 2).Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Canada did not lead this process as it had in 1955, but it was involved in ‘a series of wider ranging discussions’ on decolonization questions in Africa led by the USA and the UK.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Canada was publicly proud to support the recognition of new members, with its statements demonstrating a similar sentiment to 1955. It sought to be recognized by a broad majority of members and on the forefront of change as a cooperative, liberal, reliable, leader in the UN. While it was still a close ally of imperial powers, it was interested in recognition by the majority for its contributions to that organization.

Table 2.

New Members 1960.

* Independence from France

Thirteen states had recently achieved independence from France in 1960, during a critical period of French politics. The war in Algeria led to political changes and referendums, including the end of the Fourth Republic and the return of PM Charles de Gaulle. This sped up the independence process for other French colonies in Africa. Canada’s reluctance to break with France on Algeria contrasted with its speedy and enthusiastic recognition of other French African states.

These new members were also unique compared to previous new members. Rather than being admitted late in the session (i.e. as they had been in December 1955), 14 states were admitted on 20 September 1960, allowing them to participate in that year’s debates. Two more were admitted on 28 September, and the last one on 7 October 1960.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ This meant that these new members had the privileges of UN membership immediately, which gave them a platform for anti-colonial activism.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ This empowered the Afro-Asian bloc, allowing it a ‘critical margin’ to triumph over the ‘Western states’Footnote ¹⁰⁹ on many issues. While it was ‘Africa’s year’,Footnote ¹¹⁰ this did not mean that all these states necessarily agreed with one another on the major UN agenda items – they were not a political monolith.Footnote ¹¹¹ However, they did share a commitment to increasing their influence in the UN.Footnote ¹¹²

From the outset, the Canadian delegation was instructed to support the membership applicationsof all 17.Footnote ¹¹³ Canadian officials were fully aware of the change in the UN’s makeup; some thought that it could be a ‘problem’ for Western powers since non-Western states would now be the majority in the General Assembly. They also expressed concern that colonial powers would therefore pull away from the UN. In response, Canada’s Permanent Representative to the UN Charles Ritchie wrote to then-SSEA Howard Green that this could open up opportunities for Canada to cooperate with new members who may take non-aligned or independent positions. Ritchie argued against simply trying to convince the new members to take on the positions of their former colonial masters and the Americans.Footnote ¹¹⁴

Canada was interested in coalition-building, whereby it could be seen as a leader. PM Diefenbaker insisted that the UN would be better off moving in the direction of liberal equality. Thus, it was ‘better, then, to curry favour with new countries’Footnote ¹¹⁵ in order for them to recognize Canada as an effective partner, both for themselves and for the UN.

On 26 September 1960, Diefenbaker addressed the UNGA, following the admittance of 14 new UN members just days before. He welcomed the new members and indicated that existing members had a ‘responsibility’ to help the new ones.Footnote ¹¹⁶ Diefenbaker’s speech both commended new members and European colonial powers for granting independence and criticized the Soviet Union for holding onto its colonial territories.Footnote ¹¹⁷ He critiqued Soviet dominance as a growing form of imperialism in comparison to that of the Western powers, for whom he declared it was winding down. He also discussed Canada’s slow approach to decolonization, citing the importance of former British colonies staying within the ‘Commonwealth family’.Footnote ¹¹⁸

Diefenbaker made clear that in supporting new members, Canada supported expanding both the UNSC and the Economic and Social Council to make them more representative of the membership.Footnote ¹¹⁹ Canadian delegate Arthur R. Smith made similar remarks in November 1960, highlighting the inadequate representation of Afro-Asian members.Footnote ¹²⁰ Canada’s efforts were strategic – by welcoming new members and describing itself as collaborative, liberal, and supportive of independence, Canada was both attempting to keep the new member states out of the sphere of communist influence and treading the fine line of collaborating with both the Global North and Global South. Moreover, as Canada participated in debates on expanding the Councils, the Soviet Union was incredibly resistant to the idea. Therefore, Canada could achieve recognition as a great Cold War ally and an advocate for Afro-Asian members.Footnote ¹²¹ Canada’s ‘wholehearted’ support of new membership and increased universality were representative of its larger vision for its relations with the Global South.Footnote ¹²² In working for thin recognition of new members, it was navigating its own place in the changing world, with the hope that others would share its view.

The Algerian War

The year 1954 was a critical one for French decolonization: key events included withdrawal from Indochina and the outbreak of war in Algeria. Algeria entered the UN’s purview at the 10th UNGA in 1955. It would remain contested there until 1962, as both sides in this conflict were highly attuned to UN politics and internationalized their fight diplomatically. States that allied themselves with the Front Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria

Both sides in this war had multiple factions. The FLN had a rival in the Algerian National Movement (Mouvement National Algérien, or MNA),Footnote ¹²⁴ and France had division between French settlers in Algeria and the mainland. What separated Algeria from other French colonies was that it was not simply part of the empire; it was a settler colony.Footnote ¹²⁵ French settlers had lived in Algeria since 1830, and many saw themselves as having their own distinct identity, as they had diverged from France politically over the generations. Nevertheless, they still saw it as the ‘duty of France to not abandon them’ and maintain its occupation of the territory on which they resided.Footnote ¹²⁶

Legally, Algeria was considered a part of metropolitan France, unlike the country’s other colonies. Its unique constitutional categorization led to its territorial inclusion as part of NATO in 1949, which irritated French allies. During NATO negotiations, France insisted that all its North African territories were to be included as protected territory under the treaty.Footnote ¹²⁷ Canada and others were sternly opposed. PM St. Laurent and SSEA Pearson saw extraterritorial colonialism as ‘anachronistic’Footnote ¹²⁸ and expressed concern about Canada’s ‘international image’Footnote ¹²⁹ as they did not want NATO to be perceived as perpetuating European empire. However, with the prospect of the alliance collapsing without France (and given the importance of North Atlantic solidarity), Canada and others conceded that Algeria could be territorially included.

This was the first indication of how deep French sensitivity was around Algeria. NATO solidarity – and its importance to Canadian transatlantic identity – would remain central to Canada’s position on Algeria. Combined with Canada’s brewing constitutional sensitivities around its French–English divide, its unwillingness to recognize Algerian self-determination stemmed from its own desire to remain recognized as a reliable NATO ally and as united domestically. This was contrary to its willingness to recognize new UN members in both 1955 and 1960, to the dismay of the Americans and in opposition to French colonialism.

Canada and France were bound by Atlanticism in the Cold War period, wherein they were committed to the transatlantic alliance both in terms of policy and identity.Footnote ¹³⁰ As the 1950s went on – and throughout the Algerian War – they diverged. Canadian policymakers were ‘oriented culturally toward the Anglo-American world and inclined ideologically to engage in the Cold War’, often finding themselves caught between the USA and France.Footnote ¹³¹ Atlanticism remained central to Canadian identity, as it was grounded in liberal internationalism and prioritized the special relationships it had with Britain and the United States. Meanwhile, France ‘resented the realities of an alliance increasingly perceived as a thorn in the side of French interests’.Footnote ¹³² which was pushing it towards nationalism and isolationism.

In its first public statement, the FLN mentioned the UN.Footnote ¹³³ From then on, and during 1955, the FLN built support at the UN and in Bandung. Internally, the Canadian leadership had begun to sympathize with the Algerian cause, viewing decolonization as inevitable, but were unwilling to criticize France.Footnote ¹³⁴ NATO solidarity was highly salient at this moment. In May 1955, France withdrew soldiers from Germany to support its effort in Algeria. This irritated other NATO members, especially Canada, where officials realized that France was willing to undermine broader Western solidarity in the name of colonialism and that this would ultimately weaken the transatlantic front and the West’s credibility.Footnote ¹³⁵ This move threatened NATO’s shared security and identity. Amidst this was the issue of NATO’s Mutual Aid programme. From 1955 to 1958, Canada supplied France with significant military supplies and funds, which increased the perception that it was complicit in France’s war.Footnote ¹³⁶ It was clear that France was not using such aid for Soviet deterrence, but rather to suppress Algerian resistance. While the St. Laurent government did pass an Order-in-Council to say that Mutual Aid recipient countries had to use it for NATO purposes, they continued to look the other way, even when the actual use was evident.Footnote ¹³⁷

The 1955 UNGA was the first time that the UN was faced with the question of whether Algeria should be on the agenda. This question was inherently one of recognition. France saw the situation as a domestic conflict to be settled within the bounds of French politics, and therefore outside UN jurisdiction, which is prohibited from interfering in domestic affairs under Article 2(7).Footnote ¹³⁸ Afro-Asian states advocating on behalf of the FLN saw it as an international issue threatening global peace and security, as well as an issue of self-determination, which would firmly put it in the mandate of the UN according to the Charter. Recognizing the war as a UN issue would internationalize it, giving the FLN subjectivity as an actor and reflecting its sense of self as a legitimate claimant to self-determination.

Some members believed that Algeria’s self-determination and nationhood should be recognized, while others recognized France’s claim to Algeria. This was not a question of membership but one that positioned thick recognition within the very purpose of the UN; it was the very question of which people, the colonizer or the colonized, represented Algeria territorially, politically, and internationally. At each stage, what the UN called the ‘question of Algeria’ was one of recognition. Canada’s treatment of the question invoked multiple audiences and the perception – and recognition – it would imply. This sense of self and struggle for recognition was bound up in Canadian domestic politics, Atlanticism, and its dependence on multilateralism.

In 1955, Canada planned to vote against inscription, recognizing Algeria as integral to France. SSEA Pearson specifically viewed it as domestic French jurisdiction. Yet behind the scenes, USS Jules Léger was concerned that French actions in Algeria were untenable and cruel, but thought Canada was powerless. Ultimately, despite Léger’s concern and sense that independence was ultimately inevitable ,Footnote ¹³⁹ Canadian officials agreed that it was not worth upsetting NATO or bilateral relations. It would be too risky for Canada to ‘annoy and embarrass’Footnote ¹⁴⁰ the French, and the coherence of that alliance was too essential to Canada’s own security and identity. While it was sympathetic to the interests of the Third World, ‘when confronted with conflicting policy interests, Canada placed greater importance on maintaining close ties with and between its principal Western partners’.Footnote ¹⁴¹ Ultimately, the General Assembly voted to inscribe the issue on the agenda; in response, France planned to boycott the remainder of the session.Footnote ¹⁴² Assisted by Canada, the other member states urged France to rejoin in the session on condition that the UN did not proceed with the debate on Algeria’s inscription.Footnote ¹⁴³

By 1956, French efforts to crush the FLN were becoming increasingly brutal. Canadian policy prioritized non-antagonization of France above all other concerns, even acceding to French requests that Canada oppose special sessions of the General Assembly on the Algerian question.Footnote ¹⁴⁴ Canada’s official view remained that ‘the Algerian conflict was essentially a matter of French domestic concern’.Footnote ¹⁴⁵ If France consented to a discussion, Canada would be willing to take part in it. However this did not mean that the UN could act, as that would amount to recognizing Algeria’s status as an international (non-domestic) issue that legitimized Algerian independence claims. The Department of External Affairs (DEA) produced two papers on the Algerian War. Both examined how the war could divide NATO and affect its prestige, and saw no role for NATO in the conflict.Footnote ¹⁴⁶ Canadian officials intended to speak to France privately about self-determination for Algeria, including at a NATO meeting in March.Footnote ¹⁴⁷ However, France withdrew another military division from its NATO commitments in Europe. Without that support, France was not open to further discussion of the war’s effect on NATO.Footnote ¹⁴⁸

Canada aimed to maintain relations across the Western/non-aligned divide, and its officials were aware that they were inconsistent on decolonization and self-determination.Footnote ¹⁴⁹ In June 1956, Canada recognized the independence Tunisia and Morocco, also supporting their UN membership. In October 1956, USS Léger noted ‘we believe that, in some cases we should be able, with the assistance of countries like New Zealand, Norway, Denmark, etc. to assist both sides in solving their problems and understanding each other’.Footnote ¹⁵⁰

Within three weeks, the Suez crisis had erupted, reshaping Canada’s engagement in the Middle East. Pre-Suez, Canada’s engagement with the region had been somewhat peripheral, treating it as the realm of great power allies.Footnote ¹⁵¹ Pearson disagreed with the UK/US that Soviet interest in the region was a significant threat. Notably, Egyptian President Nasser supported the FLN, angering France. At first, Canadian leadership saw Suez as something that the great powers should manage through the UNSC.Footnote ¹⁵² However, in the absence of such management, the Canadian leadership became increasingly upset with British and French aggression, pulling closer to the Americans.Footnote ¹⁵³ Canadian officials hoped for a multilateral solution but knew that France and Britain were ‘bent on humiliating Nasser’.Footnote ¹⁵⁴ The UK PM Anthony Eden assumed Canada would automatically support the UK, offending Canada’s PM St. Laurent.Footnote ¹⁵⁵ The French held a similar sentiment, attributing Canada’s betrayal to the isolationism and anti-colonialism that they associated with Québécois politics.Footnote ¹⁵⁶Arguably, France and the UK’s assumption of automatic support based on questions of Canadian identity amounted to misrecognition for Canada. This demonstrated that Canada’s Middle East policy was bound up in its concerns about its own recognition.Footnote ¹⁵⁷

Although the outcome of Suez permanently altered Canada’s alliance with Britain, it also affected Canada–France relations. France’s desire to humiliate Nasser stemmed from its anger that he had supported the FLN.Footnote ¹⁵⁸ France had interests in the Suez Canal, but it also sought to stop Nasser’s supply of weapons to the FLN.Footnote ¹⁵⁹ The British/French vs. American divide also involved Canada – the former two turned away from the USA and Canada became increasingly close to its southern neighbour, a trend that was already on an upwards trajectory.Footnote ¹⁶⁰ The Cold War divide widened, especially with France’s turn towards nationalism, which clashed with Canada’s Atlanticism.

Relatedly, PM St. Laurent was aware of what the politics of Suez – and relatedly Algeria – would do to its domestic politics, especially in the context of French/British misrecognition of Canada. While most Canadians supported the French,Footnote ¹⁶¹ the government was reliant on Québec Members of Parliament to hold power.Footnote ¹⁶² Popular opinion in Québec was becoming increasingly supportive of Arab nationalist movements (including that of Algeria) and increasingly anti-American,Footnote ¹⁶³ and this made Canadian officials sensitive to issues of Canadian unity.Footnote ¹⁶⁴

Additionally, Canadian officials disagreed as to whether newly independent Tunisia and Morocco, as well as Algeria, should be considered as countries in which to promote (especially French-speaking) immigration to Canada, and how that might affect France’s continued sensitivities.Footnote ¹⁶⁵ Even though immigration was in Canada’s interest, continued appeasement of France for the sake of NATO solidarity made it difficult.

It was not until 1957 that resolutions on the Algerian question faced the First Committee and the General Assembly again.Footnote ¹⁶⁶ Rather than opposing inscription entirely, France sought to inscribe it while insisting that it required a domestic solution. It hoped to present a plan that primarily protected its own interests, appeasing the Afro-Asian states but maintaining Algérie francaise. In the First Committee, the French argued that prior to their colonization of Algeria, ‘no state had imposed its law on Algerian soil’, and any solution must uphold Algeria’s status as part of France.Footnote ¹⁶⁷ Syria countered that Algeria had been a political and sovereign entity prior to French colonization.Footnote ¹⁶⁸ This contestation was central to the Algerian question, as it was about recognition for France and Algeria not just in the present, but as a contiguous historical entity with relations to authority over time. For France, their view of ‘empty’ Algerian territory looked like the North American concept of terra nullius; according to this view, the territory had been empty before they conquered it, a narrative which entirely erased centuries of Ottoman rule.Footnote ¹⁶⁹

While Canadian leadership disagreed in 1957 on the history of the Algerian question, Canada supported France’s position in the First Committee, arguing that the French had begun to make progress towards satisfying some Algerian demands and the decolonization of its other colonial possessions. Canada voted against resolutions supporting the FLN and in favour of some that were less critical of the French. Specifically, the Canadian delegation argued that perhaps a solution to the question of Algeria – a home to both a colonizer and a colonized people – could resemble French and English Canada:

Canada’s position reflected its own identity, on which its view of self-determination rested. It could not recognize an independent Algeria if the construction of that state delegitimized French colonialism, which was integral to Canada’s history. It was not just Canada’s bilateral relationship with France that mattered, but the liberal, bilingual, and bicultural cooperation that had constructed contemporary Canada.

On 15 February 1957, the UNGA adopted a resolution from the First Committee. Canada voted affirmatively; however, the resolution only contained three clauses, acknowledging that delegations had been heard and expressing hope that a solution of cooperation and peace could be found in alignment with the Charter. Self-determination and sovereignty were excluded.Footnote ¹⁷¹

Shortly after, French PM Guy Mollet visited Canada. Addressing Parliament, Mollet thanked Canada for its ‘unfailing support’ at the UN and outlinedFrench plans for ‘democratizing’ the Algerian ‘problem’.Footnote ¹⁷² Demonizing the FLN, he argued that they rejected ceasefires, would not renounce violence, and would not take the rights that France offered.Footnote ¹⁷³ Mollet’s government had indeed considered political reforms, though these were not at all what Algerians sought and had been thwarted by settlers unhappy with the French government. The visit was a recommitment to good relations between the two countries, but neither government would last.

With no change to official policy on Algeria, PM Diefenbaker would form a new government in June 1957, heading off to a new UNGA session that autumn. Morocco and Tunisia were supporting the Afro-Asian countries in their fight for Algeria, an effort which was succeeding diplomatically despite French military successes. While strongly supporting the FLN, Morocco and Tunisia offered (unsuccessfully) to broker peace talks between the French and the FLN.Footnote ¹⁷⁴

On a First Committee draft resolution, Canada, Norway, and Ireland submitted amendments removing the issue of self-determination, opting for language on democratic determination of outcomes.Footnote ¹⁷⁵ However, this amendment failed.Footnote ¹⁷⁶ Canada opposed the ‘predetermination’ of outcomes of peace negotiations. For Canadian officials, it was inappropriate for the UN to decide who had a right to sovereignty in a conflict such as this. Acknowledging self-determination explicitly for Algerians would not only be a predetermination of the end of the war, but would functionally be a recognition of Algerian identity.

In early 1958, as Canada struggled to continue supporting France, France opened the door to discussing solutions to the Algerian crisis with NATO allies.Footnote ¹⁷⁷ However, by May 1958, France was in crisis. The French Army sought to prevent a newly elected PM from giving up Algeria. French settlers were becoming increasingly radicalized against the French government. Riots involving French soldiers broke out in Algiers.Footnote ¹⁷⁸ French generals in Algeria began preparing for a coup in Paris.

The Fourth Republic collapsed. Charles de Gaulle, with the support of French settlers and the military, returned to power in June 1958.Footnote ¹⁷⁹ In the Fifth Republic, a new constitution emerged, but De Gaulle’s policy on resolving the war remained unclear. This new constitution and its referendums changed the structure of all other French colonies and began the independence process for the rest of the French empire in Africa.

In August 1958, the DEA was expecting a visit of the Conference of Independent African states to Ottawa and lobby for Algerian independence. While many officials opposed this visit, USS Léger felt that Canada should take the meeting to avoid harming its relations with the new states. This was not the first consideration of this type – PM Diefenbaker refused the French request to lobby Commonwealth Afro-Asian states against Algerian independence in January 1958.Footnote ¹⁸⁰ The French government reacted to the potential visit poorly,Footnote ¹⁸¹ even suggesting that Canadian interest in Algeria would amount to Paris ‘involving itself in the political destiny of part of Canada’.Footnote ¹⁸² The African states cancelled their meetng with Léger and their visit to Canada, yet it was obvious that French sensitivity remained on questions of recognition of the constitution of Canada and France.

In September 1958, the FLN formed the GPRA in Cairo. While many recognized the GPRA, Canada did not, based on the internal legal consensus that the FLN had neither de jure nor de facto control of territory.Footnote ¹⁸³ This was explicit denial of legal and political recognition, illustrating the complex, contradictory logics inherent (and often overlooked) in the process of recognition.Footnote ¹⁸⁴ It was a denial of recognition of both statehood and a claim to legitimate government, demonstrating a distinction between the two and advancing both states’ pursuit of thick recognition.

In the same week, Canadian officials became aware that journalist – and later Québec independence leader – René Lévesque was planning to travel to France and Algeria to cover the referendum for the new constitution. Lévesque had already covered Algeria on his programme, aiming to draw anti-colonial parallels between the cases of France and Algeria and Canada and Québec. At this time, many Québec media outlets sympathized heavily with the FLN.Footnote ¹⁸⁵ Lévesque aimed to produce a report on the referendum from the Algerian perspective for the Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC). Canadian officials expressed concern internally, believing that Lévesque was too sympathetic both to the FLN and to communists. They knew that they could not politically intervene in the CBC’s actions but could ensure that government contact with Lévesque was minimal, fearing that to do otherwise might impact Québec’s independence debate.

At UNGA 1958, Canada’s position remained the same – rejecting both independence and predetermination of the outcome of negotiations. Afro-Asian states brought up the question of whether Algeria should be ruled by France or by Algerians once again. France boycotted discussion. Canada voted against the resolution on the Algerian question of recognizing independence.Footnote ¹⁸⁶ French and American relations were becoming increasingly strained on the issue, with the USA abstaining on the resolution.Footnote ¹⁸⁷

One year later, in advance of the 1959 UNGA, French allies were weakening their support for France. Afro-Asian support for the GPRA was strengthening. Tensions remained around French nuclear testing in the Sahara. This became the major rift between the USA and France, pushing France further from NATO. De Gaulle’s visit to Canada was lukewarm in tone,Footnote ¹⁸⁸ neither improving nor harming relations.

Canada was willing to vote for inscription on the UNGA agenda, pending further decision-making, while remaining aware that De Gaulle’s plans on the war remained unknown.Footnote ¹⁸⁹ Indeed, after the issue was inscribed on the UN agenda in September 1959, De Gaulle announced a new policy:Footnote ¹⁹⁰ within four years and in the event of a ceasefire, the Algerian people could choose their own future on independence and association with France. To their benefit, French relations with allies would not get worse.Footnote ¹⁹¹

In 1959, ‘for the first time in four years, the Canadian government could publicly and sincerely say that it agreed with the overall direction of French policy towards Algeria’.Footnote ¹⁹² However, in 1959 and 1960, Canadian officials remained cautious at the UN.Footnote ¹⁹³ Canada’s policy was to intervene as little as possible to avoid upsetting either Afro-Asian states or France, aiming to maintain its reputation with both. The De Gaulle government, despite its new plan, did not want the UN to intervene or make any decisions on the future of Algeria. This continued to drive Canadian hesitance, as did continued debate over nuclear testing in Algeria.Footnote ¹⁹⁴

In 1960, Canada finally voted in favour of a UN resolution mentioning self-determination for Algeria, though its wording was extremely mild and did not mention independence.Footnote ¹⁹⁵ Simultaneously, the first negotiations between the GPRA and the French began. Many in France supported independence of Algeria, but they were increasingly divided from their settler counterparts, who were feeling betrayed and abandoned by De Gaulle. Violence from settlers against the French government continued in 1960 and 1961. In 1961, there was a failed coup d’état in Algiers, as those who sought to keep Algeria part of France turned on their former ally, De Gaulle. Hostilities ceased in March 1962, and that June, Algerians voted for independence. Canada recognized Algeria immediately and welcomed it to the UN shortly after.