Public Opinion in a Democratic System

From the 1990s to the present, we have been observing a process of increasing democratization of life in Central and Eastern European countries and, simultaneously, in other parts of the world, a deepening crisis of democratic ideals. The media often is blamed as the main culprits in this process, suggesting that it significantly contributes to the decline of active civic attitudes. In other words, it weakens the processes of political participation and leads to a regression of democratic institutions (Huntington Reference Huntington1968). A critical approach to this issue has been developed in the social sciences—including political science, political sociology, and communication theory—in discussions about broadly understood participatory democracy (Dalton Reference Dalton2004).

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which continues to this day, and it is difficult to expect a resolution to this armed conflict in the near future. The topic of the war between Russia and Ukraine is at the center of media attention, and citizens gather information from the media regarding how the armed conflict is unfolding and what forms it takes. Poland shares a border with both Russia and Ukraine, as well as Belarus, which actively supports Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. Therefore, the fear and concerns, as well as the reactions of Polish society regarding the ongoing war, are currently at the forefront of research concerning public opinion in Poland. From the Polish perspective, the nuclear threat is perceived as closer and more immediate and direct (Research Report No. 67, 2024).

Celiński (Reference Celiński2013) and Szpunar (Reference Szpunar2017) analyze how the media reconstruct and deconstruct culturally established ways of understanding and explaining the changes occurring in the media and, more broadly, how they engage in these transformations. Beyond the media’s internal evolution, a major external factor revealing shifts in Polish social awareness since 2022—and intensifying the sense of military threat reported by the media—is Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.

Mediocrity of War

Mediocentricity—as indicated by researchers including the prominent German media scholar Siegfried Zielinski (Reference Zielinski2011a)—has become a social fact, which is clearly confirmed by the war in Ukraine. This means that the autonomy and strength of media communication are greater than social factors. By focusing on the media sphere, it is accepted that the media is a fundamental factor of social change.

The media plays an autonomous and external role relative to the social system, and it shapes this social system (i.e., the theory of technological determinism). Although it focuses on the media sphere, by informing public opinion about the war, it increasingly demonstrates that this issue is broadly outlined in an informational sense—including misinformation—and without any limitations. Zielinski believes that “through media one can create a state….The media has taken on the function of supporting systemic weight and power” (Szydłowski Reference Szydłowski2014, 237).

This change in approach signifies for researchers the need to adopt a broad analytical perspective and an interdisciplinary approach. This is especially important when it comes to the search for new dependencies and connections related to warfare and its impact on public opinion. This is particularly true concerning the mental well-being of a society threatened by war that is occurring in an era of digital communication between the political and the media systems (Koc-Michalska et al. Reference Koc-Michalska, Lilleker, Baden, Guzek, Bene, Doroshenko, Gregor and Scoric2024). These mutual dependencies are subject to significant strengthening, for which the increasingly effective potential of digital technologies is being utilized. What should citizens expect?

There is a long-standing debate regarding the subjectivity and objectivity of the media that highlights the connections related to both institutional and individual instability of those involved in the changes brought about by the media. Research on media-induced changes indicates that it is impossible to define the homogeneity of what is media related (Zielinski Reference Zielinski2002). Conversely, the media operating in the conditions of late modernity exists in a state of continuous tension and precarious balance because it operates in the dimension of a parallel presence and activity of many competing media outlets. This state of imbalance, elusiveness, and instability in which contemporary public and commercial media outlets operate is communicatively mediated for consumers. However, it also presents a specific media rationality and—in parallel—media expansion, which stimulates the relationality of the media. Moreover, this dimension of relationality is particularly significant in the context of creating a sense of threat from Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in the war with Ukraine and the supporting bloc of NATO countries.

The media is undergoing constant change, yet it seems to be the key to understanding contemporary reality. The challenge for researchers is to keep pace with the speed of change. This dimension of change, reinforced by the mediocentric nature of social attention (Zielinski Reference Zielinski2011b), also pertains to the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the threat to citizens from neighboring countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

The observance of the increasing power of the media signifies a change that is understood as the pursuit of achieving a certain form of dominance or even hegemony, thereby entering into relationships that will enable this to be realized. As the media system gains increasing importance, it becomes a system of power stimulating various new forms of media-related activities heretofore not practiced. Activities that previously had a clearly defined social sphere shift to the media sphere, creating a new media landscape (Zielinski Reference Zielinski2011a).

The feeling of the threat of war observed in the Polish media space has been changing its dimensions in recent years. There has been a gradual intensification of the narrative conducted in the media in the time frame defined by Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the NATO Summit in Washington, DC (July 9–11, 2024) culminated in actions aimed at ending the war from late January 2025 to the present by the US Trump administration. During Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, the threat to Poland was positioned in the media discourse as a military conflict that—albeit not directly involving the Polish state—drew public attention because of the proximity of events. Therefore, the threat of war was perceived by Polish people in terms of “generalized danger.”

Russia’s military attack on Ukraine changed the way the narrative about the war is conducted in Polish media. Since 2022, it appears to citizens as a conflict taking place at our immediate borders and posing a “direct threat” to Poland (Research Report No. 40, 2023). In this case, the threat is considered a “border threat.” The NATO Summit in Washington, DC, reinforced the public narrative in the media about the potential threat of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons—which is a new development—even within Polish borders. Moreover, in recent public discourse, citizens have expressed concern about being mobilized into the army. The threat in this case takes on the dimension of a direct threat.

Against this background, the narrative regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons also resonates. It is noteworthy that—in the broader picture—this threat since Russia’s annexation of Crimea has been presented in the Polish media not in terms of a real threat (as in the media discourse during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis). Rather, it has been presented as an attempt at blackmailing and world intimidation by Russia, which is reverting to the strategy of using nuclear weapons in crisis situations through one of two modes of action: deterrence or compellence.

As indicated by public opinion polls conducted in Poland since Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine, the attentive media audience feels threatened by the information coming from the Russian side regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons (Research Report No. 67, 2024). It is precisely in this type of operation that the media’s mediocentrism in the war between Russia and Ukraine is expressed. It is in this tone that numerous reports by the mainstream media about the threat of nuclear weapons since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly indicates that it has a significant impact on the public discourse regarding the ongoing war and society’s emotions.

Final Reflections

The change in narrative currently emerging in public discourse refers to the outcomes established during the NATO Summit in Washington, DC, in July 2024. Those agreements indicate that NATO’s commitment to defending the Eastern flank is a priority for allied countries; however, Russia has begun to publicly threaten the deployment of new nuclear warheads near Poland as repercussion. This situation again brings the nuclear threat closer—also in public discourse—from a “general danger” to “a threat at the border.” This is the situation that we are facing in the summer of 2025. Unfortunately, the media does not explain this change of narrative to Polish citizens; unfortunately, their knowledge about the threat of a nuclear attack by Russia is limited.

Recent research conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (Research Report No. 27, 2025) reveals that 61% of respondents believe that Poland can be confident in NATO’s allies in the potential defense of our borders. However, 28% of respondents do not believe in this confidence. Compared to February 2024, the perceived confidence in NATO’s assistance has decreased significantly by 18%, whereas those stating that it cannot be ensured has increased by 12% (Research Report No. 27, 2025).

Time will tell in which of two directions the wide-scale changes will unfold: (1) the threat of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons will be an exclusive component of the narrative of the state authorities aimed at deterring aid efforts by NATO countries toward Ukraine; or (2) an attack by Russian military forces using nuclear weapons in the war with Ukraine will become a reality. It is also possible that the repercussions of certain strategic decisions could lead to a nuclear confrontation involving the NATO bloc itself.