Devrim Adam Yavuz’s Democracy and Capitalism in Turkey examines the relationship between the Turkish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği, TÜSİAD) – the representative organization of Turkey’s established, secular large-scale capital – and the country’s democratization process. Taking Turkey as its primary case study, the book advances broader theoretical claims about the conditions under which the capitalist class supports democratic transitions, engaging directly with debates in political sociology, political economy, and historical sociology. By conceptualizing TÜSİAD as a “political class organization”, Yavuz situates business actors not merely as economic stakeholders but as collective political agents operating at the intersection of economic power and political influence. This analytical framing is supported by extensive original research based on in-depth interviews with TÜSİAD members and executives – an inherently difficult group to access. Conducted at critical junctures (2001–2002, 2008–2012, and 2021–2022), these interviews offer a rare opportunity to observe change over time, enabling Yavuz to trace how TÜSİAD’s positions and strategies evolved across two decades of political transformation.
The study focuses particularly on TÜSİAD’s efforts towards democratization and its struggle for autonomy from the state during the 1990s, while also examining the organization’s evolution over time. Acknowledging TÜSİAD’s earlier efforts towards democratization, Yavuz identifies the 1997 “Democratization Report” as a decisive turning point. Controversial and radical for its time, the report advocated a holistic democratic framework encompassing civil rights and institutional reforms. The author argues that this bold shift emerged from the convergence of changing ideological orientations and material interests. This transformation is especially striking in the context of Turkey’s late industrialization, the state’s heavy economic presence, and a long-standing pattern of informal, particularistic ties between business and state elites.
The book consists of seven chapters, in addition to an introduction and conclusion. The first and third chapters set out the historical and economic background and rest on a similar analytical framework. In the first chapter, Yavuz approaches Turkey’s political history through procedural democracy and formal institutions, drawing on Şerif Mardin’s centre–periphery paradigm to underscore the top-down character of modernization and the configuration of state–society relations. Within this account, the Kurdish question and the secular–religious divide emerge as the principal political cleavages, particularly after 1980. The third chapter turns to economic history, bringing into focus the absence of feudal constraints in the Ottoman Empire, the formation of a strong, interventionist state tradition, strategies of capital accumulation, efforts to build a national bourgeoisie, and the consolidation of informal ties between state elites and business actors – dynamics that extended into the multiparty era.
These chapters offer a coherent contextual framework for the study. Since the mid-2000s, however, a growing body of scholarship has reassessed the “strong state” thesis and the narrative of reforms imposed solely from above, while also questioning binary frameworks such as centre–periphery and secular–religious polarization. Recent studies emphasize the social coalitions behind reform processes, the agency of provincial actors, and the negotiated character of institutional change. Likewise, new historical research on state–capital relations moves beyond a state-dominance model to highlight bargaining, reciprocity, and shifting alliances between bureaucratic and business elites. Engaging more directly with this literature might have produced a more differentiated account of Turkish modernization.
Chapter Two constitutes the book’s core theoretical section and advances a sustained discussion of how capitalism and democracy intersect. Yavuz argues that there is no simple or uniform connection between capitalist development and regime type. He therefore moves beyond pluralist and structuralist approaches and builds his framework around Michael Mann’s concepts of state autonomy and sources of power, suggesting that this formulation should be reconsidered in light of late-industrializing experiences. The chapter then turns to a broader historical account of the relationship between state formation, capitalism, and democratization across different contexts, highlighting the varied and historically contingent ways in which these processes have intersected. His discussion of bureaucratic authoritarianism and the third wave of democratization illustrates this fluidity by situating state–capital relations within broader shifts in political authority.
Chapter Four outlines the trajectory of large capital groups towards increasing autonomy from the state beginning in the 1960s, leading up to the foundation of TÜSİAD. Yavuz highlights how the organization differentiated itself from the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB) and the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, TİSK) in line with diverging economic interests – avoiding the former’s routine political involvement and the latter’s confrontational stance towards labour. Amid the political and economic instability of the 1970s, TÜSİAD published various reports to repair its public image and propose a new, long-term framework for state–business relations. Although the author references these documents, the analysis could have been further enriched by including specific excerpts from these early reports. Such primary evidence would have provided a deeper understanding of TÜSİAD’s pre-1980 positioning and the specific language it used to frame its demands.
Chapter Five stands out as one of the strongest sections of the book. It analyses how the post-1980 shift towards export-oriented growth and neoliberal policies altered the state–market balance in favour of the private sector, thereby increasing the confidence and legitimacy of the business world. However, as the author correctly points out, these structural transformations did not automatically translate into a pro-democracy perspective. Neoliberal policies often created new avenues for informal and particularistic relations with the state. Instead, Yavuz identifies both exogenous and endogenous factors that pressured large capital towards change, focusing specifically on material interests in this chapter.
As an exogenous factor, relations with Europe are treated as particularly significant. Since Europe is Turkey’s primary trade partner and its most significant source of foreign direct investment, capitalists were pushed to advocate EU membership and the democratic reforms it required. Internally, the transition towards a capital-intensive production model led the business world to demand more predictable and stable policies. From this economic standpoint, themes such as education, income distribution (necessary for a balanced domestic market), and the gender dimension of development emerged as strategic priorities rather than mere social concerns. This process was further reinforced by the expanding role of professional managers within family-owned holdings, which gradually reduced reliance on informal state connections and strengthened more institutionalized practices.
Chapter Six explores the political and ideological dimensions of TÜSİAD’s transformation, with particular attention to changes within its “inner circle” during the 1990s. In this period, leading business figures became more visible in the public sphere by establishing universities and museums, and supporting various NGOs. Although the founding members maintained control over the organization’s leadership and strategic direction through several mechanisms, TÜSİAD’s membership expanded to include actors from diverse sectors and, significantly, high-level professional managers. The increasing number of professional staff and the formation of relatively autonomous working groups within the organization reshaped its internal balance. As the reactions to the “Democratization Report” demonstrate, the business community was far from monolithic; liberal and conservative (Kemalist-Republican) factions coexisted within TÜSİAD, with the new structure gradually strengthening the liberal wing. The association also broadened its international presence by opening offices in Brussels and Washington. Yavuz opens an important theoretical debate on TÜSİAD’s expanding influence – rooted in its rising economic, political, and ideological power; nevertheless, the chapter would have been stronger with more concrete examples of the sectors or policy arenas in which this influence was most effectively exercised.
The final chapter addresses TÜSİAD’s relationship with the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) governments. In line with the book’s nuanced approach, Yavuz avoids treating the AKP period as homogeneous, emphasizing the party’s increasingly authoritarian turn after 2013. He conceptualizes this authoritarian shift largely as a continuation of Turkey’s long-standing state tradition. The chapter might, however, have gained further analytical depth through closer consideration of the substantial body of scholarship that interprets the AKP era as the construction of a “new regime” and a significant rupture in Republican history, as well as the literature on competitive authoritarianism, neither of which is incorporated into the analytical framework.
Nevertheless, the chapter provides valuable insights. Despite the initial alignment over EU and IMF-backed policies, an underlying tension between the AKP and large-scale capital was present from the outset. Within the AKP’s populist “national will” discourse, big business was often portrayed as a pillar of the “Old Turkey”. At the same time, the government employed tax penalties and administrative measures to discipline certain business actors while actively promoting a loyal, pro-government entrepreneurial class. According to the author, TÜSİAD did not entirely abandon its pro-democracy stance during this period. However, instead of intervening directly in macro-political arenas, the organization shifted towards “meso-level” issues such as environmental policy, gender equality, and education. By grounding its critiques in the language of institutional quality and meritocracy – a shift visible in the changing tone of its reports – TÜSİAD sought a more technocratic basis for dissent.
The tension between TÜSİAD and the government should also be situated within a broader global context marked by the rise of far-right populism, geopolitical rivalry, and trade wars. In this climate, renewed attention to “state capitalism” has emerged, emphasizing the state’s central role in capital accumulation through instruments such as sovereign wealth funds, state-owned enterprises, defence spending, and tighter control over monetary policy – developments that sit uneasily with, and potentially constrain, the liberal-democratic capitalism TÜSİAD embodies. While Yavuz provides a detailed account of domestic dynamics, the analysis of the post-2013 period might have been strengthened by a more explicit consideration of this global shift and its implications for TÜSİAD’s room for manoeuvre.
Ultimately, Democracy and Capitalism in Turkey is a valuable and sophisticated account of the evolving relationship between big capital and democracy. Devrim Adam Yavuz develops a compelling framework for understanding the political agency of the business class in Turkey, grounded in substantial empirical research. The book’s depth makes it essential reading for scholars of Turkish politics, political economy, and regime change.
