Introduction
In an era of scarcity and polarization, the question of who deserves support from the state has become topical (Häusermann and Kriesi, Reference Häusermann, Kriesi, Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi2015). Group-related considerations increasingly shape campaigns, policy support, and voting behavior (Huber, Reference Huber2022; Stuckelberger and Tresch, Reference Stuckelberger and Tresch2022; Thau, Reference Thau2019), incentivizing policymakers to anticipate voters’ reactions when distributing policy benefits (Ellis and Faricy, Reference Ellis and Faricy2020). A growing body of research shows that deservingness perceptions—that is, perceptions of the extent to which groups have a legitimate claim to beneficial policies (Appelbaum, Reference Appelbaum2001; Petersen et al., Reference Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager and Togeby2011)—affect electoral choices (Attewell, Reference Attewell2022a), voters’ responses to parties’ group appeals (Dassonneville et al., Reference Dassonneville, Stubager and Thau2025), policy preferences (Goerres et al., Reference Goerres, Karlsen and Kumlin2021; Kreitzer et al., Reference Kreitzer, Maltby and Watts Smith2022; Limberg, Reference Limberg2020), and policy acceptance (Cavaillé and Trump, Reference Cavaillé and Trump2015; Magni, Reference Magni2024). While representatives may gain electorally by appealing to groups perceived as deserving, they also risk backlash when addressing groups viewed as undeserving. The electoral and policy consequences of deservingness perceptions thus have far-reaching implications for political representation. Understanding these substantive implications requires analyzing the distribution and determinants of deservingness perceptions. Who is seen as deserving, and why?
As of yet, most insights come from welfare state research in which scholars examine perceptions of the most typical groups of welfare recipients. The crucial insight gained from this literature is that there tends to be a societal consensus regarding the level of deservingness of groups, demarcating those widely perceived to be deserving from others seen as undeserving, such as the unemployed or immigrants (Coughlin, Reference Coughlin1980; van Oorschot, Reference van Oorschot2000). In one of the most influential contributions, van Oorschot (Reference van Oorschot2006, p. 24), for example, observes: “All over modern, Western welfare states, in various decades, the public was found to be most in favor of social protection for old people, closely followed by protection for sick and disabled people, while the public supports schemes for needy families with children less, schemes for unemployed people less still, and supports social assistance schemes least of all.” Explanations point to social constructions (Schneider and Ingram, Reference Schneider and Ingram1993, Reference Schneider and Ingram2019), stereotypes (Fiske et al., Reference Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu2002) and universal heuristics (Meuleman et al., Reference Meuleman, Roosma and Abts2020; Petersen et al., Reference Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager and Togeby2011; van Oorschot, Reference van Oorschot2000). These insights raise concerns that policymakers, in anticipating public preferences, may disadvantage disliked minorities (Kreitzer et al., Reference Kreitzer, Maltby and Watts Smith2022; Reeskens and van der Meer, Reference Reeskens and van der Meer2019). If gaps in perceived deservingness extend beyond welfare recipients, they could create powerful incentives to prioritize groups widely seen as deserving (Kreitzer and Smith, Reference Kreitzer and Smith2018), reinforcing inequalities—especially if policy feeds back into social perceptions (Mettler and Soss, Reference Mettler and Soss2004; Schneider and Ingram, Reference Schneider and Ingram1993).
However, these concerns warrant caution in view of three recent strands of research. The first has started to question the homogeneity of deservingness perceptions, pointing to geographical, temporal, and individual variations in the ranking of single groups (Attewell, Reference Attewell2022b; Bullock, Reference Bullock1999; Buss, Reference Buss2019; Jensen and Petersen, Reference Jensen and Petersen2017; Laenen and Meuleman, Reference Laenen, Meuleman, van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman and Reeskens2017; van Oorschot and Roosma, Reference van Oorschot, Roosma, van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman and Reeskens2017). Taking these results into account gives rise to different implications from those just outlined: policymakers’ incentives derive at least as much from average support as from the level of cohesion and, if there are divisions, from which constituents judge the respective target group as deserving or not. Groups whose deservingness is contentious in the broader public may still give representatives incentives to allocate benefits if these groups are strongly supported within their own electorate (Huber, Reference Huber2022). Second, a rapidly expanding literature on political polarization documents deepening ideological and affective divides among both elites and citizens (Iyengar et al., Reference Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra and Westwood2019). These divides structure how people interpret social differences, making it increasingly likely that citizens’ deservingness perceptions reflect diverging partisan views about effort, need, and entitlement (Mason, Reference Mason2018). A third research strand developed on targeting in electoral programs (Horn et al., Reference Horn, Kevins, Jensen and van Kersbergen2021; Huber, Reference Huber2022; Thau, Reference Thau2019) and policy (Koski and Manson, Reference Koski and Manson2024; Kreitzer et al., Reference Kreitzer, Maltby and Watts Smith2022) highlights that the “needy” groups typically examined in the deservingness literature are not the exclusive target of public policy. Government policies affect a much wider range of groups, including some with higher levels of status and material conditions, such as entrepreneurs, employers, employees, and even the rich. Apart from a small number of exceptions (Koski and Manson, Reference Koski and Manson2024; Kreitzer and Smith, Reference Kreitzer and Smith2018), studies of the deservingness of groups beyond traditional welfare recipients focus on single specific groupsFootnote 1 and therefore cannot identify whether the observed patterns reflect broader determinants that generalize across groups.
We argue that deservingness perceptions are neither merely consensual nor idiosyncratic to specific groups, but systematically patterned by ideological orientations in ways that bear important implications in times of growing polarization. Our contribution is to advance the study of deservingness perceptions conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, we propose that left-wing and right-wing citizens’ divergent views on the origins of inequality, deservingness criteria, and group-related cues shape their judgments about which groups deserve policy benefits. This perspective shifts the focus from isolated target groups to a broader, cross-group framework that treats ideological orientations as an organizing structure for understanding variation in deservingness evaluations. Empirically, we extend existing research beyond fragmented single-group studies by examining ideological divisions toward a diverse set of groups that are representative of those involved in the distributional conflicts of advanced capitalist democracies. This comparative mapping allows us to assess whether ideological cleavages generalize or remain group-specific, to identify which groups are politically consensual and which are contested, and to gauge the potential for partisan competition over “who gets what”.
We test this argument based on multilevel analyses of how different ideological segments perceive the deservingness of various groups. We then examine the perceptions of their deservingness in two different institutional settings—one majoritarian system, France, and one consensual system, Germany. Using multilevel analyses of survey data from Germany (5,541 respondents, 2021) and France (6,020 respondents, 2022), we show that deservingness perceptions are far from homogeneous and vary by ideological orientation, particularly for groups with lower average deservingness ratings.
Awareness of ideological divides over deservingness paves the way for connecting deservingness research and electoral studies. Party competition will help in understanding deservingness perceptions while these perceptions have the potential to shed light on changing voter-party linkages. Our findings also have important implications for representation and political divides in advanced capitalist democracies. Electoral incentives to respond to the deservingness perceptions of their respective constituencies encourage officials to promote policies matching their voters’ ideological views of social groups. While concerns persist about biases favoring certain groups, these divisions create opportunities for political contestation and broader representation, even for groups with contentious public images.
Ideology and the perceived deservingness of social groups
Studies of deservingness have long focused on aggregate comparisons across groups and countries, concluding that deservingness attributions are similar within and across societies (Arts and Gelissen, Reference Arts and Gelissen2001; Bean and Papadakis, Reference Bean and Papadakis1998; Coughlin, Reference Coughlin1980; van Oorschot, Reference van Oorschot2000). This similarity is typically attributed to dominant constructions and policy feedback (Schneider and Ingram, Reference Schneider and Ingram1993), social stereotypes (Fiske et al., Reference Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu2002), evolutionary psychology (Petersen, Reference Petersen2012; Petersen et al., Reference Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager and Togeby2011), and ethnocentrism (Magni, Reference Magni2024; Reeskens and van der Meer, Reference Reeskens and van der Meer2019). Scholars interpret deservingness gaps based on criteria such as neediness, control, attitude, identity, and reciprocity (Appelbaum, Reference Appelbaum2001; Cook, Reference Cook1979; Reeskens and van der Meer, Reference Reeskens and van der Meer2019; van Oorschot, Reference van Oorschot2000). The extent to which groups are perceived to comply with these criteria is reflected in significantly different levels of average deservingness (Kootstra, Reference Kootstra2016; Reeskens and van der Meer, Reference Reeskens and van der Meer2019). These gaps raise concerns about entrenching inequality by directing benefits on groups perceived as deserving while placing burdens on those perceived as undeserving (Kreitzer and Smith, Reference Kreitzer and Smith2018; Reeskens and van der Meer, Reference Reeskens and van der Meer2019; Schneider and Ingram, Reference Schneider and Ingram1993).
Yet, high or low average deservingness may obscure substantial variability. Several scholars challenge the notion of homogeneous perceptions, pointing instead to variations across geography, time, and individuals (Bell and Lui, Reference Bell and Lui2023; Kreitzer and Smith, Reference Kreitzer and Smith2018; Laenen and Meuleman, Reference Laenen, Meuleman, van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman and Reeskens2017). Research shows, for example, that perceptions of welfare recipients vary by socio-structural factors such as education or social class (Attewell, Reference Attewell2022b; Bullock, Reference Bullock1999; Buss, Reference Buss2019). Building on these insights, we argue that political ideology acts as a general organizing principle for how individuals evaluate the deservingness of social groups.
Erikson and Tedin (Reference Erikson and Tedin2003, p. 64) define ideology as a “[shared] set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved”. While the substance of left-wing and right-wing ideologies varies across time and countries (Bauer et al., Reference Bauer, Barberá, Ackermann and Venetz2017; Inglehart, Reference Inglehart1990), scholars tend to converge on two core oppositions: advocating versus resisting social change and rejecting versus accepting inequality (Jost et al., Reference Jost, Federico and Napier2009). Historically, these are left-right divisions centered on class conflict, with right-wing parties favoring employers and the affluent, and left-wing parties representing lower-income employees (Lipset, Reference Lipset1960; Oesch and Rennwald, Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018). In post-industrial societies, cultural issues—immigration, gender equality, generational justice—have gained prominence. The left advocates for marginalized groups, while the (far) right emphasizes national cohesion and welfare chauvinism (Abou-Chadi et al., Reference Abou-Chadi, Cohen and Wagner2022; Bornschier, Reference Bornschier2010; Franklin, Reference Franklin, Mark, Mackie and Henry1992; Kriesi et al., Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008). This has led to a tripolar ideological space: a left pole (interventionist, culturally liberal, universalist), a center-right pole (fiscally conservative), and a far-right pole (sociocultural and nativist) (Oesch and Rennwald, Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018). These ideological beliefs act as cognitive shortcuts in information processing, opinion-formation, and decision-making. They therefore shape a multitude of political attitudes, including attitudes toward specific groups such as asylum seekers (Bansak et al., Reference Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner2016), welfare policies and redistribution (Feldman and Zaller, Reference Feldman and Zaller1992; Häusermann and Kriesi, Reference Häusermann, Kriesi, Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi2015; Zucker and Weiner, Reference Zucker and Weiner1993), and political actors (van der Eijk et al., 2005; Wagner and Kritzinger, Reference Wagner and Kritzinger2012), often without the person being aware of it (Jost et al., Reference Jost, Federico and Napier2009). It is thus likely that ideology also structures how people assess which groups deserve state support.
Existing research offers several indications in this direction, although these insights remain dispersed: ideological divides have been observed in studies focusing on single groups or specific policy areas, such as unemployment (Buss, Reference Buss2019; Jensen and Petersen, Reference Jensen and Petersen2017) or affirmative action (Bell, Reference Bell2021). Related work in the neighboring field of public administration similarly finds ideological differences in tolerance for administrative burdens among both citizens (Halling et al., Reference Halling, Herd and Moynihan2023) and bureaucrats (Baekgaard et al., Reference Baekgaard, Moynihan and Kjærgaard Thomsen2021; Bell et al., Reference Bell, Ter-Mkrtchyan, Wehde and Smith2020). However, we still lack a systematic understanding of which types of groups are viewed as deserving or undeserving on the left, the center-right, and the far right. Understanding these ideological patterns is substantively important. In increasingly polarized contexts (Iyengar et al., Reference Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra and Westwood2019; Mason, Reference Mason2018), policymakers respond not only to aggregate public opinion but also to the preferences of their own constituencies (De Sio and Weber, Reference De Sio and Weber2014; Riker, Reference Riker1996). Even when the public is divided overall, elites may find it electorally rational to support groups that are valued within their camp (Huber, Reference Huber2022). This applies beyond welfare recipients to groups such as the wealthy, employers, and rural residents (Huber, Reference Huber2022; Stuckelberger and Tresch, Reference Stuckelberger and Tresch2022; Thau, Reference Thau2019).
Against this backdrop, we develop a theoretical account outlining how deservingness perceptions vary along ideological lines across a broad range of groups. Drawing on existing literatures, we identify three mechanisms through which political ideology is expected to correlate with deservingness perceptions: (1) cognitive perceptions of social groups, (2) differences in how deservingness criteria are weighted,Footnote 2 and (3) elite cues.
First, an individual’s political ideology influences their cognitive perceptions of social groups, shaping stereotypes and judgments about compliance with deservingness criteria such as personal responsibility and control. Right-leaning individuals tend to attribute poverty, unemployment, or minority status to individual choices, whereas left-leaning individuals emphasize structural causes (Bullock, Reference Bullock1999; Weiner et al., Reference Weiner, Osborne and Rudolph2011; Zucker and Weiner, Reference Zucker and Weiner1993). Numerous studies on welfare deservingness suggest that whether or not a person is considered to be responsible for their own situation is then a crucial heuristic for informing deservingness judgments and support for redistribution (Alesina and Angeletos, Reference Alesina and Angeletos2005; Swaan, Reference Swaan1988; van Oorschot, Reference van Oorschot2000; Witko and Heinrich, Reference Witko and Heinrich2024). Thus, ideological differences in attributions of responsibility likely translate into differing perceptions of group deservingness.
Second, ideology is related to attitudes toward (in)equality, moral values, and fairness conceptions (Cavaillé, Reference Cavaillé2023), influencing how deservingness criteria are weighted (Bullock, Reference Bullock1999; Furnham, Reference Furnham1982; Laenen and Roosma, Reference Laenen, Roosma, Mara and Bal2022). Given their egalitarian attitudes, we expect left-wing citizens to focus on a group’s neediness (Attewell, Reference Attewell2022a; Jeene et al., Reference Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk2014) and therefore grant more deservingness to dependent, underprivileged or minority groups (such as the poor, the unemployed, immigrants, women, and young people) and less to groups with more resources (such as the rich or employers). Right-wing individuals, by contrast, are expected to condition deservingness to the groups not being responsible for requiring support (in contrast to “free riders”), having contributed (Cavaillé, Reference Cavaillé2023; Magni, Reference Magni2024), and being native born rather than immigrants (Magni, Reference Magni2020, Reference Magni2024; Mewes and Mau, Reference Mewes and Mau2013). They may even be willing to support policies for groups that are not particularly needy but meet these criteria (Cavaillé, Reference Cavaillé2023; Haidt, Reference Haidt2012). There is evidence that framing a group as high achieving increases conservatives’ support for affirmative action policies (Bell, Reference Bell2021), consistent with their stronger emphasis on reciprocity. This pattern mirrors findings on administrative burdens, where conservatives show greater acceptance of burdens that restrict access to welfare benefits (Baekgaard et al., Reference Baekgaard, Moynihan and Kjærgaard Thomsen2021; Halling et al., Reference Halling, Herd and Moynihan2023) or financial aid (Bell et al., Reference Bell, Ter-Mkrtchyan, Wehde and Smith2020). Against this backdrop, we expect conservative people to be more likely to favor members of high-status groups and hold more negative attitudes toward low-status groups (Duckitt, Reference Duckitt2006). Along the same lines, while left-leaning people are more likely to see the need for policies supporting young people given their neediness at the beginning of starting their adult lives, right-leaning people might have the perspective that young people have not (yet) contributed much to society—in the same way as the unemployed (Bell, Reference Bell2021). Moreover, while minority groups (such as women) are likely to be approached on the left as a historically discriminated group deserving of government support, compensatory measures will probably be seen by right-leaning citizens as clashing with meritocratic values.
Building on the argument that differing attitudes toward (in)equality and moral values lead to varied perceptions of deservingness, we anticipate that far-right voters will oppose left-wing universalism, but for different reasons than center-right voters. While the latter values market liberalism and rewards enterprise and job creation, far-right ideology prioritizes national identity and cohesion, favoring those seen as the “losers” of modernization and globalization (Abou-Chadi, Reference Abou-Chadi2016; Kriesi et al., Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008) We expect individuals in this ideological segment to condition deservingness upon descent, excluding immigrants (Abou-Chadi et al., Reference Abou-Chadi, Cohen and Wagner2022; Magni, Reference Magni2020, Reference Magni2024; Mewes and Mau, Reference Mewes and Mau2013), while being more indifferent to groups’ socioeconomic status. Furthermore, people on the far right could sympathize with categories perceived as losers in structural transformation, such as rural populations (Bornschier et al., Reference Bornschier, Häusermann, Zollinger and Colombo2021; Cramer, Reference Cramer2016; Zollinger, Reference Zollinger2024) and accordingly attribute high levels of deservingness to them.
Third, ideology may correlate with deservingness perceptions via elite cues. Parties strategically frame certain groups as deserving, reinforcing partisan divides in an increasingly polarized environment. For example, the US Democratic Party frequently criticizes the wealthy (Rhodes and Johnson, Reference Rhodes and Johnson2017), while the British Labour Party disproportionately appeals to workers (Thau, Reference Thau2019). These cues shape voter perceptions, aligning partisan and ideological divides in deservingness judgments.
This leads us to the following expectations:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Left-leaning individuals are more likely than right-leaning individuals to perceive needy or dependent groups, such as the poor, the unemployed, immigrants, and minorities as deserving.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Right-leaning individuals are more likely than left-leaning individuals to perceive high-status groups, such as employers and the affluent as deserving.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Far-right-leaning individuals are more likely than center-right and left-leaning individuals to perceive modernization losers (rural residents) as deserving and immigrants and other minorities as less deserving.
While the perceived deservingness of most groups may divide along ideological or partisan lines, single other groups may benefit from consistently positive framing. Pensioners, for instance, are seen as needy (due to old age), contributive (having worked their whole lives), and socially non-deviant, making them widely perceived as deserving (Petersen et al., Reference Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager and Togeby2011; Schneider and Ingram, Reference Schneider and Ingram1993, Reference Schneider and Ingram2019; van Oorschot, Reference van Oorschot2000, Reference van Oorschot2006). Parents, a broad category of people who require support to raise children and contribute to demographic renewal, and the middle class, which is both needy (relative to the wealthy) and economically productive, may also enjoy broad cross-ideological support. The same applies for employees, for whom no clear ideological pattern is expected, leading them to be widely regarded as deserving across ideological segments. Traditionally, the advancement and protection of employee rights have been a core left-wing policy. This traditional alignment stems from the ‘work vs. capital’ cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, Reference Lipset and Rokkan1967). Consequently, employees have historically been a left-wing electoral stronghold (Oesch and Rennwald, Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018). However, this traditional pattern has changed in recent years, transforming the employee group into a contested demographic. In particular, there is a growing trend of far-right parties actively seeking to attract support from employees and union workers (Mosimann et al., Reference Mosimann, Rennwald and Zimmermann2019). These shifts on the supply side of party competition have likewise influenced voting behavior (Spies, Reference Spies2013), contributing to the blurring of traditional class- and occupation-based voting patterns (Houtman et al., Reference Houtman, Achterberg and Derks2008). This political versatility ties directly back to deservingness criteria: employees are a group that can be seen favorably from multiple ideological perspectives. For the political right, they represent hard-working individuals (Wagner, Reference Wagner2022; Zollinger, Reference Zollinger2024), aligning with the deservingness criteria of reciprocity and attitude; for the political left, employees embody groups that are structurally exposed to market risks and power asymmetries vis-à-vis employers, aligning with concerns about not only contribution through work, but also neediness (exposure to risks) and lack of control over structural disadvantages.
Therefore, we expect:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Groups like employees, pensioners, parents, or the middle class, which can be favorably framed in terms of neediness, contribution, and identity, are perceived as highly deserving across all ideological segments.
We do not investigate the causal direction between ideology and deservingness perceptions. Instead, consistent with established practices (Appelbaum, Reference Appelbaum2001; Jeene et al., Reference Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk2014; Zucker and Weiner, Reference Zucker and Weiner1993) and with research treating ideology as relatively stable predispositions rooted in deeper psychological or personality traits (Jost et al., Reference Jost, Federico, Napier, Freeden and Stears2013), we examine how ideological divides correlate with deservingness evaluations. We acknowledge that deservingness perceptions may also inform broader ideological orientations and that both constructs may overlap conceptually—for example in beliefs about merit or responsibility (Weiner et al., Reference Weiner, Osborne and Rudolph2011). We therefore avoid causal claims and focus on documenting systematic associations between ideological positions and patterns of deservingness evaluations.
Empirical strategy
We investigate individual variations in perceptions of social groups’ deservingness based on two original online surveys (CAWI) conducted in Germany during the two weeks leading up to the federal elections in September 2021 and in France during the three weeks leading up to the first round of the presidential election in April 2022. In both countries, the respondents were recruited and incentivizedFootnote 3 by the polling institute Psyma from their proprietary online panel, based on quota sampling (age, gender, region, education, and socio-professional category in France). The sample consists of 5,541 German citizens and 6,020 French citizens of eligible voting age (18 and older). Online Appendix Tables A1 and A2 provide sample and population characteristics.
Case selection
France and Germany
To enhance the generalizability of our findings, we study the deservingness of various social groups across two different contexts—representative of the majoritarian and consensual types of political systems. France and Germany share many characteristics, such as their prosperous economies and Bismarckian welfare systems. Nevertheless, they differ strongly in several domains that are highly relevant for our research question. First, they diverge significantly in their institutional arrangements. The French Fifth Republic stands out with a strong majoritarian logic, while Germany falls into consensual systems involving proportional rule and multiple veto points. These institutional differences translate into markedly different patterns of party competition and shape both the intensity and structure of ideological conflict (Dalton, Reference Dalton2021; Emanuele and Marino, Reference Emanuele and Marino2024). Such divergences are likely relevant for ideological divides, the variability of deservingness perceptions, and the relationship between them. Proportional, multiparty systems and coalition constraints associated with them could leave more latitude for the representation of diverse interests and the articulation of competing representations of social groups. By contrast, majoritarian electoral systems as in France tend to reduce the number of parties and to induce them to cultivate a broader social base, which could lead to more homogeneous deservingness perceptions than in proportional systems. However, the effects could also be opposite if majoritarian systems fold social groups into zero-sum two-party competition, which could produce a stronger polarization than in countries with broad multiparty coalitions.
Moreover, historical trajectories of issue politicization further differentiate the two contexts. France has experienced a long-standing and recurrent politicization of immigration since the 1980s—driven largely by the rise of the Front National/Rassemblement National—which has embedded immigration-related group cues deeply into the ideological space (Ivaldi, Reference Ivaldi2018; Mayer, Reference Mayer2013). In contrast, immigration was politicized only much more recently in Germany, with the rise of the far-right AfD (Mudde, Reference Mudde, Brinkmann and Reuband2022). As a result, ideological divides over the deservingness of immigrants and other minority groups are likely structured by different discursive legacies in each country. A further contrast concerns the experience of social policy retrenchment. Germany’s far-reaching ‘Agenda 2010’ labor market reforms were implemented by a left-wing government and reframed deservingness around activation, responsibility, and contribution—narratives that continue to structure public discourse (Bandelow and Hornung, Reference Bandelow and Hornung2019). France did not undergo a comparable left-led reform episode, leading to a less consolidated discourse of activation and thus potentially different ideological heuristics for evaluating groups such as the unemployed or the poor.
Together, these institutional, partisan, and discursive contrasts create substantially different environments in which deservingness cues are produced, diffused, and interpreted. If similar ideological divides over deservingness perceptions emerge across such divergent settings, this would provide stronger evidence that these divides reflect generalizable ideological mechanisms rather than country-specific dynamics (Seawright and Gerring, Reference Seawright and Gerring2008).
Target groups
We have chosen twelve target populations for analysis that are both commonly addressed in public policy and pertinent to test our hypotheses:
Group selection was informed by election pledge data from governing parties’ manifestos since the mid-1990s.Footnote 4 Given that pledges are frequently fulfilled (Thomson et al., Reference Thomson, Royed, Naurin, Artés, Costello, Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, Kostadinova, Moury, Petry and Praprotnik2017), they are relevant to actual policymaking and therefore useful material to detect the actual target populations of public policy. Eleven of our twelve selected groups are among the most commonly addressed in election pledges (see Figures B1 and B2 in the Appendix), ensuring alignment with political actors’ priorities.Footnote 5 Employers and entrepreneurs receive the most attention (over 15% of pledges in France, 12% in Germany), with both positive and negative targeting. Parents, young people, and employees also rank highly. In France, rural populations are frequently targeted (mostly positively), while in Germany, immigrants receive significant attention (mostly positively).
Beyond empirical justification, theoretical considerations guided our group selection. This framework allows us to test our hypotheses on ideological assessments of deservingness based on disadvantaged status, merit, and contributions. It encompasses high-achieving class-based groups, such as employers and wealthy individuals, as well as dependent class-based groups, including the poor and the unemployed. We also include minority and underprivileged groups such as women, immigrants, and young people. This is essential for testing H1 and H2. Additionally, we include the rural population, as a group that is affected by modernization (H3). Finally, we incorporate groups such as employees, pensioners, parents, and the middle class, which are likely to elicit more uniform deservingness perceptions due to the generally positive criteria discussed in the literature (H4).
Measurement
Deservingness perceptions
Our dependent variable, deservingness perceptions, has been operationalized in various ways (Meuleman et al., Reference Meuleman, Roosma, van Oorschot, van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman and Reeskens2017). Our approach differs from measures of group affinity (Bornschier et al., Reference Bornschier, Häusermann, Zollinger and Colombo2021; Robison and Moskowitz, Reference Robison and Moskowitz2019; Wilcox et al., Reference Wilcox, Sigelman and Cook1989), which, although related, capture a distinct construct from deservingness. Likewise, we do not equate deservingness with policy support (Bell, Reference Bell2021; Jeene et al., Reference Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk2014; Kootstra, Reference Kootstra2016), as such attitudes may be shaped by policy design rather than group-related considerations. Given that political debates increasingly center on social group representations, we focus on a more abstract attitude related to people’s disposition to support beneficial policy for a given group . This is in the tradition pioneered by van Oorschot (Reference van Oorschot2000), who does not measure deservingness as support for a specific targeted scheme but based on an item from the European Values Study asking respondents about the extent to which they “feel concerned” about the living conditions for various groups. However, this item was developed in the specific context of welfare research implicitly placing the emphasis on the criterion of neediness, which we expect to be weighted against other criteria to a different extent. Our measure of deservingness perceptions is based on the following questionFootnote 6 : “To what extent do you think the government should take the needs of the following groups more or less into consideration? Please use the scale from –5 to +5, where –5 means that the needs of the group should be considered much less and +5 much more.” This operationalization is similar to Jensen and Petersen (Reference Jensen and Petersen2017), who use vignettes to assess deservingness by asking respondents to judge whether hypothetical individuals “deserve to be helped by the government” (p. 74). However, rather than assessing absolute deservingness, we measure whether respondents believe government attention to a group should increase or decrease. This distinction is crucial, as individuals may recognize a group’s legitimacy but feel it already receives sufficient support.
For the analyses that follow, we make use of a recoded scale ranging from much less (1) to much more (11). High values indicate that the government should pay more attention to the needs of the respective group, meaning that this group is perceived as (highly) deserving.
Ideology
The independent variable, ideology, is assessed based on two items. First, we draw on the traditional indicator of respondents’ self-placement on a left–right continuum, measured as a metric variable, to assess H1 and H2. Respondents were asked, “In politics, one sometimes speaks of ‘left’ and ‘right’. On this scale, where 0 represents left and 10 represents right, where would you place yourself?” The mean score is 5.9 (SD = 2.1) in Germany and 6.7 (SD = 2.8) in France.
Second, we complement this measure with an account of ideology based on vote-choice. This approach is underpinned by the rich evidence of a growing multidimensionality of the ideological space in many countries (Converse, Reference Converse and David1964; Feldman and Johnston, Reference Feldman and Johnston2014; Kitschelt, Reference Kitschelt1994). Socioeconomic attitudes toward redistribution and state intervention do not necessarily correlate with attitudes toward minority groups such as women or immigrants, thus the sociocultural dimension of ideology (Kitschelt, Reference Kitschelt1994). As a result, some voters may struggle to position themselves meaningfully on a single left–right axis. While a two-dimensional ideological measurement would be ideal, measuring the sociocultural dimension is challenging, as it often involves attitudes toward specific groups, such as LGBTQIA+ rights or attitudes toward immigrants or refugees (Lancaster, Reference Lancaster2022; Oesch and Rennwald, Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018)—the dependent variable in our study. To address this, we identify ideological positioning based on declared voting intention, distinguishing between left, center-right, and far-right voters. This classification aligns with prior studies (Bornschier et al., Reference Bornschier, Häusermann, Zollinger and Colombo2021; Oesch and Rennwald, Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018) and fits our theoretical framework, particularly for testing H3, which requires identifying far-right voters.Footnote 7 The item wording reads as follows: In Germany, respondents were asked, “Which party would you vote for if the Bundestag elections were held next Sunday, or would you abstain?” In France, they were asked, “If the first round of the presidential election were held next Sunday, which candidate would you most likely vote for?” Table C2 in the Appendix details the ideological classification of parties and candidates.
Control variables
To account for potential confounding effects and isolate the correlation of main interest (ideological effects on deservingness perceptions), we include several controls. First, we account for group membership, as self-interest may bias deservingness judgments to the benefit of one’s ingroup (Jensen and Petersen, Reference Jensen and Petersen2017). Moreover, group membership might bias deservingness perceptions because citizens are more aware of the needs of that group, as has been shown for poor people (Appelbaum, Reference Appelbaum2001; Singh, Reference Singh1989), and/or identify with that group, which may potentially bias their perceptions (Bell and Lui, Reference Bell and Lui2023; Tajfel and Turner, Reference Tajfel, Turner, Worchel and William1979). Group membership is determined based on respondents’ occupation, income, birthplace, parenthood, age, and gender.Footnote 8
We also control for gender, as women generally attribute higher deservingness to disadvantaged groups (Gugushvili and van Oorschot, Reference Gugushvili and van Oorschot2021), and education level, which correlates with more sympathetic attitudes toward welfare recipients (McArthur, Reference McArthur2023).Footnote 9
Statistical specification
We analyze a stacked dataset with twelve observations per respondent (one for each target population). We estimate crossed random effects models (run separately for each country) to reflect the structure of our data, with observations cross-classified by both respondents and target groups (Gelman and Hill, Reference Gelman and Hill2006). Each respondent evaluates all twelve groups, and each group is evaluated by all respondents, creating interdependencies that violate the independence assumption of simpler models. Our models thus include random intercepts for both respondents and groups, thereby clustering standard errors appropriately and modeling unobserved heterogeneity at both levels.
The appropriateness of a crossed random effects specification is supported by the null model’s variance structure: likelihood-ratio tests show that including random intercepts for both respondents and groups significantly improves model fit (Germany:
${\chi ^2}$
(2) = 16047.98,
$p{\rm{ \lt }}0.001$
; France:
${\chi ^2}$
(2) = 29805.71,
$p{\rm{ \lt }}0.001$
, see Model 1 in Appendix Tables D1 and D3). As a first step, we added fixed effects for ideology, measured both as a continuous left–right self-placement (see Tables D1 and D3) and as a categorical variable based on voting intention (left, center-right, far-right, see Tables D2 and D4).Footnote
10
This further improved model fit (Germany:
${\chi ^2}$
(5) = 250.23,
$p{\rm{ \lt }}0.001$
; France:
${\chi ^2}$
(5) = 493.95,
$p{\rm{ \lt }}0.001$
), confirming that deservingness perceptions, on average, vary along ideological lines. To test whether the effect of ideology varies across groups as hypothesized, we then added a random slope for ideology by group. This again improved model fit considerably (Germany:
${\chi ^2}$
(2) = 343.11,
$p{\rm{\lt }}0.001$
; France:
${\chi ^2}$
(2) = 2016.55,
$p{\rm{ \lt }}0.001$
). This final model—Model 3 in Appendix Tables D1–D4—is used for the predictions and random effects visualized in the main text.
The final model is specified as follows:
$\eqalign{ {{y_{ig}}}\ &{ = {\beta _{0,ig}} + {\beta _{1g}}{x_{1ig}} + {\beta _2}{x_{2ig}} + {\beta _3}{x_{3ig}} + {\beta _4}{x_{4ig}} + {\epsilon _{ig}}} \cr {{\rm{with}}\;\;\;\;{\beta _{0,ig}}}\ &{ = {\gamma _{00}} + {\gamma _{01g}} + {\gamma _{02i}}} \cr {{\beta _{1g}}}\ &{ = {\gamma _{10}} + {\gamma _{11g}}} \cr } $
${y_{ig}}$
observed deservingness rating by respondent
$i$
for group
$g$
.
${\beta _{0,ig}}$
intercept that varies across groups and individuals.
${{\beta _{1g}}}$
slope of ideology that varies across groups.
${x_{1ig}},{\rm{\;}}{x_{2ig,}\ {x_{3ig}}},{\rm{\;}}{x_{4ig}}$
observed values for ideology, group membership, gender, and education of respondent
$i$
and group
$g$
.
${\beta _2},{\beta _3},{\beta _4}$
fixed effects for the control variables.
${\epsilon _{ig}}$
residual error term, assumed to be normally distributed.
The intercept
${\beta _{0,ig}}$
is composed of:
${\gamma _{00}}$
: the fixed (grand mean) intercept,
${\gamma _{01g}}$
: group-level random intercept for group
$g$
,
${\gamma _{02i}}$
: individual-level random intercept for respondent
$i$
.
Findings
Who deserves? The variability of deservingness perceptions
Figure 1 displays the distribution of deservingness perceptions by group and country. As expected, the violin plots show substantial variation.
Distribution of deservingness perceptions in Germany and France.
Note: The distributions of deservingness perceptions for twelve groups (1 = much less,… 6 = not less, not more,… 11 = much more) are shown. Dots represent the average deservingness level for each group (mean). Colored areas represent a kernel density estimation showing the distribution shape of the data. Wider sections of the violin plot represent a higher probability that members of the population will take on the given value; the skinnier sections represent a lower probability. Dashed lines indicate the status quo meaning neither more, nor less should be done for this group. Means and number of observations (n) for each group’s perceived deservingness are displayed in Table C5 in the Appendix.
Echoing prior work on welfare deservingness (van Oorschot, Reference van Oorschot2000, Reference van Oorschot2006), we observe disparities in median deservingness across certain groups. In particular, the pensioners and the poor score highest in both countries. The mean for pensioners is 8.02 in Germany and 9.21 in France, and 8.04 (Germany) and 9.2 (France) for the poor, on a scale from 1—meaning that the needs of the group should be considered much less by the government—to 11—meaning that, according to a vast majority of respondents, the needs of the group should be considered much more. In contrast, immigrants, the unemployed (again in line with past findings, see e.g., Reeskens and van der Meer, Reference Reeskens and van der Meer2019; van Oorschot, Reference van Oorschot2006), but also rich people, and employers are rated notably lower. The gap between pensioners (the second-highest rated group) and rich people (lowest) is 2.8 in Germany and 4.7 in France. The other groups fall within a narrower band, with scores ranging from 7.5 to 7.8 in Germany and 8.1 to 9.1 in France.
Crucially, Figure 1 also reveals wide variance around group medians. Standard deviations range from 2.09 (employers) to 2.78 (rich people) in Germany, and from 1.82 (employees) to 3.08 (immigrants) in France (see Table C5 in the Appendix). This supports our theoretical expectation: ideological divides may push many groups into the category of groups with moderate average levels of deservingness—though with notable variations around these averages.
A null multilevel model with only fixed intercepts and individual/group-level random effects shows how much variance stems from individual versus group differences. In Germany, 23% of the variance is due to individual differences, and 11% to group differences; in France, these figures are 21% and 29%, respectively.Footnote 11 These results confirm the importance of individual-level variation—especially in Germany—while also highlighting stronger contrasts across groups in France.
Our data demonstrates that deservingness perceptions are clearly heterogeneous. This matters for representation: polarization may shape policymakers’ incentives as much as average levels do. A higher or lower average level of deservingness is likely to have very different implications depending on whether citizens’ views are polarized or rather homogeneous (Huber, Reference Huber2022). More precisely, incentives to enact beneficial policy for a given group will depend on who supports/opposes benefits for this group. Ideological variations could induce policymakers to be attentive to deservingness perceptions in their ideological segment. Policymakers may focus on the views of their ideological base. In what follows, we examine in detail whether and how ideology correlates with the perceived deservingness of different groups.
Ideological divides over deservingness perceptions
In the main text, we focus on discussing the random slope of ideology across groups, which is central to our hypotheses: left-leaning respondents are expected to prioritize needy groups (H1), right-leaning respondents to favor high-status groups (H2), and far-right respondents to support modernization losers and view immigrants and minorities as less deserving (H3). Fixed effects are, however, reported in the Appendix (Tables D1–D4) and indicate that left-leaning citizens generally assign higher levels of deservingness overall (see Figure D1 and Tables D1–D4 in the Appendix). Moreover, controls for group membership show respondents favor their own groups. The results also support earlier findings that women assign higher deservingness levels than men (Blekesaune and Quadagno, Reference Blekesaune and Quadagno2003; Gugushvili and van Oorschot, Reference Gugushvili and van Oorschot2021), but unlike prior research (Attewell, Reference Attewell2022a; McArthur, Reference McArthur2023), we find no significant education effect—likely due to our inclusion of a more diverse range of target groups beyond the needy.
Figure 2 displays the group-specific random slopes for ideology, measured via the left—right self-placement, for Germany (left panel) and for France (right panel). These slopes indicate how the effect of ideology on perceived deservingness varies across groups. Values near zero indicate a weak relationship between ideology and perceived deservingness of a given group. Positive values suggest that as an individual leans more to the right politically, they perceive a group as more deserving (or at least less undeserving); negative values suggest the opposite.
Random effects of left–right self-placement by target population.
Note: Estimates on the x-axis show how strongly left–right ideology predicts the perceived deservingness of each group. They are the group-specific random slopes for left–right self-placement from our mixed-effects linear models, where positive values indicate that right-leaning respondents view the group as more deserving, and negative values indicate the opposite. The full models are reported in the Appendix in Table D1 (Germany, column 3) and Table D3 (France, column 3). The horizontal lines show the 95% confidence intervals. The measure of ideology as left–right self-placement is range standardized from –0.5 to 0.5.
As expected, most needy groups and minorities—immigrants, the poor, the unemployed, women, and young people—are perceived as more deserving by left-leaning respondents, consistent with H1. This pattern is strikingly similar across countries, though the ideological divide over immigrants is notably wider in France than in Germany. Supporting H2, right-leaning respondents are more likely to attribute deservingness to high-status groups such as rich people and employers, who emphasize merit and economic contribution rather than need. In line with H4, the deservingness of pensioners and parents appears largely unaffected by ideology, likely due to their favorable framing in terms of need, contribution, and identity. Unexpectedly, the middle class is slightly more supported by right-leaning—especially far-right—respondents, challenging our assumption that this group would be ideologically neutral (we return to this below).
Figure 3 displays the random effects of our second measure of ideology by target population for Germany (upper two panels) and France (lower two panels). Findings are in line with those based on ideological self-placement with regard to H1 and H2, but allow to add some nuance. Compared to left-wing voters, supporters of center-right as well as far-right parties attribute higher levels of deservingness to the rich and employers. Yet the bonus in deservingness is stronger among center-right citizens than far-right-leaning citizens for rich people (0.79 compared to 0.53 in Germany, 1.56 compared to 0.77 in France) as well as employers in Germany (0.49 vs. 0.39). This corroborates our previous finding that citizens on the right spectrum tend to consider high-status groups as deserving beneficial policy.
Voting intention: Random effects by target population.
Note: Estimates on the x-axis show how strongly left–right ideology predicts the perceived deservingness of each group. They are the group-specific random slopes for left–right self-placement from our mixed-effects linear models, where positive values indicate that right-leaning respondents view the group as more deserving, and negative values indicate the opposite. The full models are reported in the Appendix in Table D1 (Germany, column 3) and Table D3 (France, column 3). The horizontal lines show the 95% confidence intervals.
In contrast, voters of left-wing parties tend to see marginalized groups as more deserving. With regard to socioeconomic groups such as the poor or the unemployed, the gap is stronger with the center-right. The difference between left-wing and far-right voters is not even significant in Germany for the poor, in contrast to the unemployed.Footnote 12 This is consistent with research showing that socioeconomic conflict involving class-based groups continues to structure the opposition between the left and center-right, while the opposition to the far-right is driven by cultural conflicts involving the ’hard-working’ and rural populations, on the one hand, and minorities on the other hand (Bornschier et al., Reference Bornschier, Häusermann, Zollinger and Colombo2021; Kurer, Reference Kurer2020; Oesch and Rennwald, Reference Oesch and Rennwald2018).
Our third hypothesis, H3, precisely taps into these particularities on the far-right. The two panels showing the results for far-right-leaning individuals provide partial support for our expectations. Rural residents, who are often framed as modernization losers, are perceived as more deserving by far-right citizens compared to left-leaning citizens, while the latter and center-right-leaning individuals do not significantly differ in their perception of rural residents’ deservingness. This contributes to existing research linking rural context to heightened far-right appeal (Dvořák et al., Reference Dvořák, Zouhar and Treib2024; Huijsmans and Rodden, Reference Huijsmans and Rodden2025).
With regard to minorities, we find the expected deservingness gap between the left and far-right. This gap is particularly pronounced regarding immigrants: in Germany, far-right respondents rate their deservingness on average 1.5 points lower than left-wing respondents do; in France, the gap widens to 2.7 points. Immigrants also enjoy lower levels of deservingness among the center-right, but the widest gap, as expected, pits the voters of mainstream parties against those supporting far-right parties. The strong effect of far-right voting intention (as well as of ideology measured via left–right self-placement) on the perceived deservingness of immigrants aligns with previous findings highlighting the importance of anti-immigration attitudes for far-right voting (Rydgren, Reference Rydgren2008; Stockemer et al., Reference Stockemer, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas2021), but also, on the supply-side, the salience of immigration in far-right party agendas (Mudde, Reference Mudde2007). The more pronounced ideological gap in France reflects the country’s stronger polarization over immigration (Tiberj, Reference Tiberj2024), largely driven by anti-immigration attitudes in the far-right electorate (Stockemer and Barisione, Reference Stockemer and Barisione2016). We see some difference along the expected lines for the youth as well, who are seen as less deserving on the far-right, although in France their level of deservingness is even lower on the center-right. By contrast, ideological contrasts in the perceived deservingness of women are more limited than expected. In France, deservingness ratings for women do not vary significantly by ideology, and in Germany, we find only a modest gap between voters on the left and those on the center-right or far-right.
Lastly, we did not expect any ideological gap with regard to groups that lend themselves to a favorable framing in terms of neediness, contribution, and identity. We had identified employees, pensioners, parents, and the middle class as such groups. Contrary to our expectations, the middle class enjoys higher levels of deservingness among right-wing citizens. Unexpectedly, the same holds for pensioners in both countries, who enjoy higher levels of deservingness among far-right voters. Regarding employees, we observe a similar pattern: they are more likely to be perceived as deserving by far-right citizens than by those on the left. This effect is tentatively observed in Germany and more strongly in France. The comparatively high deservingness of those who are seen as having ’worked their whole life’—including employees, the middle class, and employers—corroborate the importance of ’hard work’ (Wagner, Reference Wagner2022; Zollinger, Reference Zollinger2024) as a potential cue used by far-right persons in gauging deservingness. Parents emerge as one of the only groups for which deservingness representations seem very homogeneous, although there is a slight bonus for them on the far-right in France as compared to other respondents. Overall, these findings suggest that ideology is correlated with deservingness beyond the most contentious target groups.
Implications: Room for political competition and balanced representation
The finding that deservingness perceptions diverge along ideological lines for some groups suggests that there may be room for partisan conflict over the distribution of policy benefits and burdens. To see their interests reflected in policy outcomes, groups may not need to be viewed as deserving by the entire electorate. It may suffice if particular constituencies perceive them as deserving and pressure their parties to represent the group. We explore this potential (results reported in Appendix E) by focusing on three groups—immigrants, the rich, and employers—who are, on average, perceived as the least deserving in both countries (see Figure 1). In short, our results (discussed in more detail in the Appendix) suggest that while there appears to be no electoral incentive for policymakers across the ideological spectrum to allocate additional policy benefits to the rich, such incentives exist for employers on the political right in Germany (and across the spectrum in France), and—though interestingly only in France—for immigrants on the left. These patterns illustrate how ideological divides in perceived deservingness can translate into differentiated partisan incentives for group representation.
These insights shed light on deservingness perceptions beyond the specific realm of welfare policy and contribute to our understanding of how electoral incentives might shape substantive representation. Ideological divides over deservingness leave room for competition between political parties representing distinct interests and related policies. In this regard, our findings also connect to the growing literature on political polarization. As ideological and partisan identities increasingly structure how citizens assess social groups and their moral worth (Robison and Moskowitz, Reference Robison and Moskowitz2019; Zollinger, Reference Zollinger2024), polarization extends beyond policy preferences to encompass divergent judgments about who deserves government support (Iyengar et al., Reference Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra and Westwood2019; Mason, Reference Mason2018). This polarization over deservingness reinforces partisan alignment while offering parties distinct reservoirs of symbolic representation. Because parties cater to the preferences of their ideological constituencies, some of them will be incited to advocate for groups despite of their lower deservingness within the general public. Elections encourage incentives to broaden the focus of representation based on ideological linkages (Häusermann et al., Reference Häusermann, Picot and Geering2013). In this sense, our findings present good news for the prospects of balanced representation in a democratic regime in which policymakers are constrained by public opinion. Accordingly, even the groups deemed the least deserving on average, such as immigrants, have prospects for representation given the possibility that left-wing citizens support their claims.
As a matter of fact, left-wing or liberal parties do endorse proposals favoring immigrants. For example, the parties forming the previous German coalition—the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens, and the liberal FDP—all pledged to facilitate naturalization in the campaign for the 2021 general elections. This pledge was included in their coalition agreement and fulfilled in June 2024. Parts of this reform, however, were subsequently reversed by the coalition government of the conservative CDU/CSU and SPD (formed after the national election in 2025 with the SPD now as the junior partner), most notably the accelerated ’fast-track’ naturalization after three years, while other elements such as the introduction of dual citizenship remain in place. This development reinforces the implications of our findings. The translation of favorable attitudes into policy outcomes crucially depends on the prevailing political constellation: while the former coalition was responsive to the preferences of left-leaning voters, the current government is more constrained by segments of the electorate skeptical of extending rights to immigrants.
Conclusion
Who deserves what—and how much? This question becomes topical in times marked by scarcity, political polarization, and mounting concerns regarding material and political inequalities. Growing attention has been devoted to deservingness perceptions as a driver of policy outputs and outcomes. Research on welfare deservingness indicates that the public often ranks target groups similarly across different societies and suggests that policymakers aiming for reelection tend to focus policy benefits on those groups considered most deserving. This could generate political inequalities to the detriment of those on the bottom of the deservingness hierarchy. Yet, recent studies reveal substantial variation in deservingness perceptions across geography, time, and individuals, underscoring the need for a more nuanced understanding. Building on related literatures and evidence from studies focusing on single groups, we argue that ideological orientations are systematically associated with how citizens evaluate a wide range of social groups, consistent with mechanisms involving beliefs about inequality, the weighting of deservingness criteria, and group-related elite cues. The central contribution of our study is to provide a systematic analysis of ideological divides in deservingness perceptions from a cross-national, cross-group perspective that encompasses a broader set of politically salient groups than previous work. This broader perspective is crucial for understanding the substantive implications of ideological divides in deservingness perceptions for political representation.
Our findings confirm the expected ideological divides in the perceived deservingness of most of the twelve groups examined. These divides are not limited to class-based groups traditionally central to left–right opposition, such as the poor or unemployed, but also extend to several minority groups such as women and immigrants. Surprisingly, they even—at least slightly—affect groups typically considered ideologically uncontested such as the middle class and pensioners, who might be expected to garner support across all ideological segments. These findings are highly similar in the majoritarian context of France and in the more consensual context of Germany. Given that our measure of deservingness treats each group independently and allows respondents to attribute high levels of deservingness to as many groups as desired, our findings provide a lower bound for ideological gaps in the attribution of deservingness. Measures accounting for distributive tradeoffs are likely to observe stronger differences.
Our theoretical argument and empirical findings pave the way for an intriguing research agenda on the politics of deservingness perceptions. This agenda concerns both their determinants and consequences. First, while we discussed the plausibility of the mechanisms assumed to produce societal consensus on the deservingness level of social groups, we tested only the implication in terms of ideological variation. We leave it to further studies to measure how individuals perceive single groups in terms of criteria such as neediness, contribution, or identity, how far each of these criteria shape the deservingness level attributed to groups, and whether this varies depending on ideology. Second, the perception and salience of deservingness criteria might not only be susceptible to ideology, but also to framing and priming in political and media discourses (Culpepper et al., Reference Culpepper, Shandler, Jung and Lee2024). Our study is focused on two countries at a specific point in time. Future studies should consider the influence of media frames and party cues on deservingness perceptions in various contexts. Third, a comprehensive mapping of the distribution of the deservingness representations of target populations is needed. This will allow groups to be characterized both in terms of their average level of deservingness and in terms of their ideological variability and to demarcate groups that are more or less politicized in the sense that people with different ideologies diverge in the deservingness attributed to the group. This, in turn, would allow scholarship to investigate why the deservingness of some groups—such as immigrants in France and Germany—becomes deeply politicized, while others, such as women, remain comparatively consensual. Finally, our study points to a striking blind spot with regard to the empirical implications of (divided) deservingness perceptions. Elected policymakers may have fewer incentives to respond to average representations than to those prevailing in their constituency, particularly in a context of growing polarization. To what extent political actors do so, and how such responsiveness shapes policy outputs, remains an open empirical question.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773926100460.
Data availability statement
The data that support the findings of this study are openly available at GRO.data (Göttingen Research Online Data): Deiss-Helbig, Elisa; Guinaudeau, Isabelle; Matthieß, Theres, 2026, “Replication Data for: Who Deserves? Ideological Gaps in Citizens’ Deservingness Perceptions”, https://doi.org/10.25625/ZCZHR0, GRO.data, V1.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the participants of the publication seminar of the Institute of Political Science of the University of Zurich, in particular Bilyana Petrova, Simon Bornschier, Reto Bürgisser, Magdalena Breyer, Delia Zollinger, Reto Mitteregger, Karsten Donnay, Andrea De Angelis, Valerie Sticher, Philip Kerler, Catarina Pereira, Fabrizio Gilardi, Thomas Widmer, Jon Slapin. We are also grateful to Christian Breunig and to the participants to the workshop Deservingness perceptions as driver and effect of public policies. Recent advances in research on deservingness, Centre d‘Études Européennes, 3 April 2023, for very helpful remarks. We address special thanks to David Attewell, Silja Häusermann, and Benjamin Guinaudeau for their hugely useful feedback and for drawing our attention to important references.
Funding statement
This work was supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) [466129675] and the University of Konstanz (Publishing Fund for language editing).
Competing interests
The author declares no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Ethical statement
We conducted our survey in compliance with APSA’s Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research. The survey was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Stuttgart.
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