Deliberative mini-publics are increasingly embraced by policymakers, marking their integration into the mainstream of contemporary democracy. However, their rising importance also makes them more attractive targets for elite capture. Surprisingly, existing scholarship has mostly neglected the threat of elite capture to deliberative mini-publics. This article fills this gap by proposing a framework to examine capture during the input, throughput, and output phases of mini-publics. The framework is consequently applied to a pioneering case: the Permanenter Bürgerdialog (PBD) in the German-speaking Community of Belgium. The PBD is a randomly selected assembly collaborating with the regional parliament on a permanent basis, rendering it an attractive target for elite capture. Drawing on original interview data, a qualitative analysis examining threats and resilience in the PBD yields three main findings. First, due to its complex procedures, there is considerable leeway for capture in the PBD. Second, the PBD is barely covered in the media, which renders its more vulnerable for elite capture. Finally, the PBD demonstrates how checks and balances through a separation of powers can significantly mitigate capture threats.

Diversity policies have become a common element of public policy-making in Europe. At the European, national, regional and local levels, efforts are made to meet demands arising from a growing socio-cultural diversity and to ensure more equal participation of disadvantaged groups. And yet, little is known about the reception of such policies among the general public. This article addresses this gap. Based on an original and representative survey conducted in German cities, we examine the extent and structure of popular support for a range of diversity policies. Our results demonstrate that the German urban population altogether supports diversity policies, although unevenly across policy items. Somewhat surprisingly, it is not membership in groups expected to benefit from a diversity policy that mainly drives supportive attitudes, but general views on social equality and intergroup contact.

In exploring deliberative dynamics within mini-publics, it has been observed that initial group-building activities play a crucial role in enhancing deliberative reasoning. However, the influence of liberal democratic practices such as voting mechanisms and the inclusion of strategic or representative stakeholders, on deliberative processes is not well understood. This study undertakes a comparative configurational meta-analysis (CCMA) of 22 minipublics to investigate how these liberal democratic elements influence deliberative reasoning. Results indicate that participants’ deliberative reasoning is significantly enhanced in contexts where initial group activities are coupled with prolonged periods of deliberation and where voting is minimised or absent. In contrast, the presence of voting mechanisms, strategic stakeholder involvement, and a high impact of minipublics on decision-making processes are associated with weaker, negative, or stable participant deliberative reasoning. These findings contribute to the broader discourse on the integration of deliberative and non-deliberative components within minipublics, highlighting the potential negative impact of strategic behaviour on the quality of deliberation.

The literature on the Council of the EU has proliferated over the past twenty years thanks to the publication of voting records and an increased proportion of official documents. However, these sources continue to be affected by significant limitations, and researchers have therefore had to turn to expert interviews in order to understand decision-making within the institution. This research note aims to assess the progress enabled by this method, by identifying the main datasets produced with it and their contributions. What kind of data have been explored? Are they sufficient for deciphering the explanatory mechanisms behind EU negotiations? What are the practical advantages and disadvantages of this method? Will it continue to hold such an important place in the EU studies literature in the foreseeable future? This review explores these questions, identifying five widely-used interview-based datasets and the findings they have led to, then introducing a debate about the future of this type of research in an ever-evolving technological landscape.

Existing research has shown that there is considerable diversity when it comes to populist radical right party (PRRP) organization, but it is unclear why this is the case. The Netherlands provides an ideal laboratory to examine this question. Within two decades, the country witnessed the rise of several PRRPs, including the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), the Party for Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD). Despite ideological similarities, there are clear differences between these parties in terms of party organization. We argue that the organizational model of the FvD is a synthesis of the LPF and the PVV. To avoid internal dissension that brought about the demise of the LPF, the FvD adopted organizational elements of Geert Wilders’s ‘personal party’. The FvD also drew lessons from the financial limitations of the PVV by creating a large membership base. The findings show clear evidence of institutional learning. By learning from the experiences of others, PRRPs are becoming much better equipped to endure setbacks, which suggests that they are less likely to subside in the near future.

Since the 1980s, the study of opinions towards immigration has grown exponentially throughout European scholarship. Most existing studies, however, are limited in their scope and do not specifically refer to an aggregate phenomenon, but rather an individual one. This study seeks to establish empirically whether aggregate public immigration preferences across 13 European democracies relate systematically to national socio-political indicators or other underlying societal mechanics. Particularly, we analyze four mechanisms more in-depth, namely the predictive values of economic deprivation, immigration policy, immigration flows and the political environment. To do so we rely on country-level level data and update a unique dataset of immigration opinions. We find that (ii) economic deprivation is an important correlate of more restrictive immigration opinions, (ii) immigration opinions respond thermostatically to immigration policy, (iii) the non-asylum inflow of foreigners further restricts immigration opinions, and (iv) the immigration positions of government and opposition parties have antithetical effects on immigration opinions.

Most scholars agree that candidates’ use of negative campaigning is based on rational considerations, i.e., weighing likely benefits against potential costs. We argue that this perspective is far too narrow and outline the elements of a comprehensive model on the use of negative campaign communication that builds on personality traits, values, social norms, and attitudes toward negative campaigning as complementary mechanisms to classical rational choice theory. We test our theoretical assumptions using candidate surveys for twelve state elections in Germany with more than 3,100 candidates. Our results strongly suggest that negative campaigning goes beyond rational considerations. Although benefit–cost calculations are the primary driver of the decision to attack the opponent, other factors are also important and enhance our understanding of why candidates choose to engage in negative campaign communication. Our findings have important implications for research on candidate attack behavior.

The higher-educated were long supposed to be winners of technological change, but recent evidence indicates that they feel (and are) increasingly exposed to the risk of technological redundancy. Based on what is known about how lower- to medium-skilled workers respond to technological exposure, this new sense of vulnerability among the higher-educated could have significant political effects – specifically increased support for right-wing populist parties – but empirical evidence on this is still lacking. I address this gap and investigate the effects of technological vulnerability on the party preferences of the higher-educated using survey data from the 2022 Risks that Matter survey. I find that feeling technologically vulnerable does indeed increase support for populist right-wing parties and reduce support for left parties among the higher-educated. I also conduct mediation analyses to explore the mechanisms behind these patterns and find evidence for a significant but substantively small mediation effect of social policy preferences.

Comeback prime ministers (CBPMs), who return to office after a break, have been a notable, but conspicuously understudied, feature of several parliamentary democracies. This article provides the first ever comparative study of CBPMs. To make sense of the varying frequency of CBPMs in 18 established democracies from 1945 to 2024, we refer to competing party rationales of (re-)selecting prime ministers in different contexts, with the latter shaping the former. Apart from powerful presidents in semi-presidential regimes, the frequency of early replacements of prime ministers, the scope of alternations of the prime minister’s party, and the degree of intraparty personalization offer plausible explanations for the cross-national and temporal variation of prime-ministerial returns. While CBPMs have become less common since 1990, the remaining cases include some particularly powerful party leaders, underscoring the continuing importance of this neglected feature for understanding chief executive selection in established parliamentary democracies and beyond.

Recent studies suggest that value orientations, both pro-environmental values and concerns and left–right ideology, strongly predict climate policy support in some settings, but not in others, and that institutional quality determines the strength of these associations. These studies are based on a limited number of countries and do not investigate the mechanisms at work nor what aspects of quality of government (QoG) matter more specifically. Analyzing data from 135 European regions across 15 countries, this paper finds that QoG moderates the relationships of pro-environmental values and left–right ideology with climate tax support and suggests that political trust is an underlying individual-level mechanism. Moreover, corruption seems to be the most important aspect of QoG for policy support. In regions where corruption is prevalent and trust in state institutions is low, support for climate taxes is low even among those who are generally concerned about the environment and climate change and who favor state intervention. The study suggests additional analyses, adopting quantitative and qualitative approaches, to inform policymakers on how to increase public support for climate taxation and improve policy designs to mitigate policy concerns across various segments of the population.

How should a democratic assembly be designed to attract large and diverse groups of citizens? We addressed this question by conducting a population survey in three communities with institutionalized participatory deliberative democracy in Switzerland. To examine participatory disposition in light of both individual characteristics and design features of the assembly that citizens contemplate joining, the survey comprised a conjoint experiment in which each respondent was asked to indicate his or her likelihood of participating in democratic assemblies with varying design features. The main result is that design features emphasizing the communitarian character of the assembly increase citizens’ willingness to participate, especially among disengaged citizens. Moreover, citizens were found to be less attracted by both very consensual and very adversarial meeting styles. Rather, we found meeting styles combining both controversy and consensus to be most favorable to assembly turnout. The implication is that practitioners of participatory or deliberative democracy must engage in community-building to foster turnout and inclusiveness in democratic assemblies.

In Europe, the integration process has domesticated international relations, safeguarded member-states’ democracies, and enabled collective action and supranational problem-solving. It has brought about the European Union (EU) and a democratic ‘surplus’. How has this been possible when the binding effect of EU law is grounded neither in the sovereign’s monopoly on power at the European level nor in the final decision-making authority of the EU? An answer to this puzzle is found in the fact that a public coercive framework has been established, which aims at solving the indeterminacy and assurance problems facing international cooperation. The enabling condition of sovereignty is replaced by those of co-legislation and a binding judicial process. The latter creates reasons for deference to legitimate authority and hence a compliance condition. However, since the Union falls short of meeting certain democratic standards, oversteps competences, and is plagued with inertia, there is a call for constitutional reform.

Societies are experiencing deep and intertwined structural changes that may unsettle perceptions European citizens have of their economic and employment security. In turn, such perceptions likely alter people’s political positions. For instance, those worried by labour market competition may prefer greater social protection to compensate for the accrued risk, or prefer more closed economies where external borders provide protection (or perceived protection). We develop expectations about how such distinct reactions can emerge from distinct labour-market risks of globalization, or automation, or migration. We test these expectations using a conjoint experiment in 13 European countries on European-level social policy. Results broadly corroborate our expectations on how different concerns about sources of labour market competition yield support for different features of European-level social policy.

The rise of populist parties in Europe has generated an enormous amount of academic literature. Previous research has thoroughly examined the factors contributing to the electoral success of populist parties. Surprisingly, very little attention has been paid to the role of decentralization, one of the most widespread forms of governance in the world. This paper aims to fill this gap by presenting a theoretical and empirical account of the effect of decentralization on the electoral fortunes of populist parties in Europe. Using aggregated data from election results in 30 European countries, this paper puts competing hypotheses to the test. I argue that the mechanism linking decentralization and populist parties’ national election results is, in fact, indirect and depends on the existence of a regional tier of government. Results suggest that having representation in subnational parliaments plays a significant role in the national success of populist parties, and this effect is contingent on the degree of regional authority.

This study uses a rational choice approach to argue that an under-theorized and rarely tested cause of governmental discrimination against religious minorities is its popularity. Specifically, we argue that self-interested politicians are more likely to enact discriminatory policies when they believe said discrimination will be popular. These policies, in turn, have payoffs via increased public perceptions of governmental legitimacy. Using the Religion and State project, round 3 and World Values Survey data for members of the majority religion between 1990 and 2014 in 58 Christian-majority countries, we demonstrate that prejudice against members of other religions predicts increased governmental religious discrimination, which is, in turn, associated with higher confidence in government, legislatures, and political parties. While our results are specific to discrimination against religious minorities, this suggests that when discrimination against minorities in general is popular, politicians are likely to oblige.