Hostname: page-component-6b88cc9666-zbq8r Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-02-18T12:11:43.781Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
Accepted manuscript

The Method of Hypotheses in Early Modern Natural Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2026

Alireza Fatollahi*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, Ankara, Türkiye. Email: alirezafatollahi@bilkent.edu.tr.
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Newton famously rejected the use of hypotheses in natural philosophy, in stark contrast to many of his contemporaries, such as Descartes, Huygens, and Leibniz, who employed hypothetical methods. This disagreement is often framed as one concerning the Hypothetico-Deductive (HD) method, but I argue that this is mistaken. The relevant hypothesis-based methods at issue were what I call inference to the best hypothesis and its stronger version, inference to the only plausible hypothesis. These methods were far more nuanced and plausible than HD, and they enjoyed widespread popularity among early modern thinkers, even among prominent experimental philosophers. Newton rejected them nonetheless.

Information

Type
Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Philosophy of Science Association

Footnotes

*

Acknowledgment: I am grateful to Domenica Romagni, Curtis Haaga, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Funding Statement: None to declare. Declarations: None to declare.