Canada—a rich, federal state that is extensively immersed in international trade but less frequently studied than its larger southern neighbour—provides an interesting point of departure in this assessment of subfederal and transnational involvement in trade policy. While the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) are well-travelled territories for scholars immersed in the intricacies of subnational and transnational influences on trade policies, the extensive coverage of subfederal influences on Canadian trade negotiations and the inclusion of case studies on Mexico, Switzerland and Australia provide novel insights into the formal and informal influence that subfederal jurisdictions and organizations exert on national trade negotiations.
The primary purpose of this volume is to contribute to the “comparative scholarship on the multilevel architecture of trade policy” (6). Three main factors are presented as crucial to understanding trade policy governance, namely the changing nature of trade policy and trade agreements, institutional configurations in federal states, and state–society linkages. The editors differentiate between self-rule (separation of powers; a weak upper chamber at the national level) and shared-rule (power-sharing; a strong upper chamber) federalism and, drawing on Albert Hirschman's classic work, also introduce the concepts of voice (how subnational entities can influence trade negotiations) and exit (how subnational entities can prevent—or prevent implementation of—an agreement). This framework guides all contributions for the purpose of constructing a nascent theory of subfederal influence on trade policy.
Empirically rich chapters show how some subfederal entities can formally participate on the side of their own government in trade negotiations (Canada), or mostly consult (US, Belgium), ratify or reject agreements (Belgium), or lack formal say (Australia). In all cases, the partner and type of agreement also influences the extent of subfederal contestation (ch. 9; p. 355). Mexican regions have formal powers but limited financial and human resources to influence national trade negotiations; centralized federal systems such as Austria leave subfederal entities with few formal means of influencing trade; shared-jurisdiction federal systems (for example, Switzerland and Belgium) enable greater influence, especially when these entities have the capacity—a variable introduced in conjunction with institutions—to act. The contributions by Jorge A. Schiavon and Marcela López-Vallejo on Mexico and by Andreas R. Ziegler on Switzerland are also noteworthy because they explain subnational jurisdictions’ authority to sign bilateral agreements with other countries—something rarely covered in the trade literature. Most chapters also reveal a diverse array of formal rules and informal channels of engagement that show how political will and ingenuity play critical roles in navigating different federal structures in order to influence trade negotiations.
This is not a book for novices, with all contributors assuming the reader has a fundamental understanding of modern international trade and trade agreements. Political science graduate students and scholars will appreciate the comparative case studies and detailed empirical analyses, all contributing to a solid attempt at constructing a theoretical framework connecting vertical and horizontal linkages at the subfederal, domestic and regional levels. This should also appeal to researchers interested in the intersection of federalism and/or regionalism and foreign policy.
A good scholarly endeavour should not only provide new insights but also leave the reader with new questions and ideas; this book does not disappoint. Focusing primarily on state–society relations, Gabriel Siles-Brügge and Michael Strange draw attention to municipal contestation of EU trade policy and trade agreements, including in France during transatlantic trade negotiations (challenging the findings of Meunier and Roderer-Rynning [Reference Meunier and Roederer-Rynning2020]); no other chapter mentions unitary states. Yet there is no inherent reason why multilevel contestation should occur only in federal systems. One can think of subnational influences through civil society groups, trade unions and/or local parties and municipalities in countries with devolution (for example, the United Kingdom) or with strong local autonomy (for example, Sweden). Furthermore, a debatable assumption permeating many of the chapters is that contestation is primarily prompted by trade negotiations and the intrusive behind-the-border issues included in modern trade agreements. However, trade policy is more than trade agreements. Tariff wars, protectionist and data transfer legislation, and trade defence mechanisms have all been at the forefront of contentious government actions in recent years. Relatedly, when and to what extent is the changing nature of subnational activism on trade a response to local and regional constituency anxiety about globalization generally—from technology replacing workers to immigration—rather than a specific desire to influence trade policy? It's admittedly difficult to parse that relationship.
Encouragingly, in the concluding chapter of this well-written and engaging book, the editors acknowledge that disentangling multilevel influences on various aspects of trade negotiations and policy will be a long-term, multifaceted endeavour, and they invite research that can challenge, modify and/or strengthen their findings. With their geographical focus on North America and Europe (plus an intriguing chapter on Australia), there is ample opportunity for others to investigate whether the model of subfederal engagement offered herein holds up in non-Western socio-economic contexts—and in studies on specific trade issues.
