This corrigendum corrects errors in the reflection essay “Rethinking the Deterrence–Disarmament Dichotomy: The Complex Landscape of Global Nuclear Weapons Preferences” (Sukin, Rodriguez, and Herzog Reference Sukin, Rodriguez and Herzog2026). In the authors’ post-publication review of their replication code, they identified errors that affected figures appearing in the published version. The authors take full responsibility and apologize to the readers and editors of Perspectives on Politics.
The content of the principal contribution, the underlying dataset, remains unchanged. And the main theoretical finding is substantively unaltered, although attenuated: that public views on nuclear weapons are complex and not fully captured by binary, categorical thinking favoring either deterrence or disarmament.
The authors would like to issue four corrections to transparently update the scientific record.
Correction 1: There were errors in the code used to produce Figure 1. The theoretical analysis holds, but the results are attenuated. We have updated the figure, replaced the accompanying supplementary table (Appendix C), and made the following revisions to the text.
An updated Figure 1 follows.
Public Entanglement on Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Disarmament Views
Figure 1 Long description
A stacked bar chart with the y-axis representing percentage from 0 to 100 and the x-axis listing 22 countries. A legend on the right defines four levels of contradiction: High (dark red), Moderate (orange-red), Mild (blue), and None (light gray).
From left to right, the countries and their stacked values from bottom to top are:
* Australia: High 11.08, Moderate 21.09, Mild 8.36, None 59.48.
* Belgium: High 12.15, Moderate 30.43, Mild 10.06, None 47.36.
* Brazil: High 21.04, Moderate 29.83, Mild 10.93, None 38.2.
* Czech Republic: High 7.69, Moderate 27.72, Mild 10.74, None 53.85.
* Egypt: High 29.87, Moderate 43.82, Mild 10.3, None 16.01.
* France: High 10.48, Moderate 27.29, Mild 14.35, None 47.89.
* Germany: High 11.13, Moderate 23.29, Mild 8.98, None 56.59.
* India: High 30.3, Moderate 34.18, Mild 10.92, None 24.59.
* Indonesia: High 16.26, Moderate 31.96, Mild 15.38, None 36.39.
* Italy: High 10.84, Moderate 24.96, Mild 7.7, None 56.49.
* Japan: High 12.84, Moderate 23.85, Mild 6.34, None 56.96.
* Mexico: High 20.96, Moderate 30.87, Mild 7.6, None 40.58.
* Nigeria: High 20.29, Moderate 35.94, Mild 13.2, None 30.56.
* Poland: High 15.44, Moderate 36.88, Mild 11.99, None 35.69.
* Saudi Arabia: High 22.04, Moderate 36.27, Mild 14.63, None 27.05.
* Slovakia: High 9.5, Moderate 23.17, Mild 6.6, None 60.72.
* South Africa: High 15.9, Moderate 28.93, Mild 10.6, None 44.57.
* South Korea: High 18.64, Moderate 40.18, Mild 10.67, None 30.51.
* Sweden: High 13.16, Moderate 26.94, Mild 11.07, None 48.83.
* Taiwan: High 18.02, Moderate 34.69, Mild 12.47, None 34.81.
* Turkey: High 29.69, Moderate 32.44, Mild 10.29, None 27.57.
* United Kingdom: High 13.57, Moderate 27.07, Mild 10.96, None 48.4.
* United States: High 10.44, Moderate 26.06, Mild 12.28, None 51.22.
To reflect this change, the abstract should read: “our data confirm that publics do not subscribe to categorical views of nuclear weapons,” instead of “strongly confirm.”
On pg. 8, read: “Most respondents do not categorically support nuclear deterrence or nuclear disarmament,” instead of “Our respondents.”
In the discussion of Figure 1 on pg. 9, read: “In every case, we find significant evidence of competing views. The average respondent scores a 2.2 on the scale, indicating between mild and moderate support for both deterrence and disarmament…Many respondents across the globe demonstrate very similar levels of support for both deterrence and disarmament.” This replaces “that the majority of the public holds competing views,” “the modal respondent scores a 3 on the scale, indicating moderate support,” and “Overall, respondents.” Footnote 13 should also be updated to replace the subgroup scores, which are now 2.2, 2.4., 2.3, 2.5, and 2.3 instead of 2.7, 2.9. 2.8., 2.7, and 2.8.
On pg. 10, read: “Most publics in our sample, across geographies and geopolitical contexts, do not have a categorical preference for deterrence or disarmament,” instead of “The publics.” Also read: “This provides support for the idea that individuals do not make categorical distinctions between deterrence and disarmament,” instead of “strong support.”
On pg. 12, read: “In our data, we find limited evidence of categorical decisions about using nuclear arms. Instead, many individuals can imagine both rejecting and accepting nuclear weapon use,” instead of “no evidence” and “Instead, individuals.”
In fn. 14, read: “While the coefficients are significant, they are substantively small. For example, female respondents score 0.180 points lower than nonfemale respondents,” instead of “0.117 points higher.”
Correction 2: On pg. 11, read: “the three states in our sample that had ratified the TPNW when surveyed,” instead of “the three states in our sample that ratified.” This clarification accounts for the fact that Indonesia is included in the sample but had not ratified the TPNW at the time the survey was fielded.
Correction 3: Errors have been identified in the code used to produce the labels for Figure 2. The updated figure follows. The results fully hold, such that no changes to the text are needed.
Global Views on the TPNW
Figure 2 Long description
A stacked bar chart with the y-axis representing percentage from 0 to 100 and the x-axis listing 25 countries. A legend on the right identifies three categories: Support in blue, Neither Support Nor Oppose in light gray, and Oppose in orange.
From left to right, the data points for Support, Neutral, and Oppose are:
* Australia: 75.22, 18.76, 6.03
* Belgium: 74.11, 19.26, 6.63
* Brazil: 81.1, 11.7, 7.2
* China: 75.1, 15.1, 9.8
* Czech Republic: 79, 16.48, 4.52
* Egypt: 80.24, 13.11, 6.65
* France: 69.45, 22.36, 8.19
* Germany: 76.89, 18.33, 4.77
* India: 75.55, 16.56, 7.89
* Indonesia: 74.32, 22.06, 3.62
* Italy: 77.39, 18.12, 4.49
* Japan: 75.9, 19.35, 4.75
* Mexico: 84.9, 9.9, 5.19
* Nigeria: 75.06, 11.61, 13.33
* Poland: 73.57, 20.98, 5.45
* Saudi Arabia: 68.24, 23.65, 8.12
* Slovakia: 82.39, 12.51, 5.1
* South Africa: 71.16, 16.77, 12.08
* South Korea: 76.57, 17.25, 6.18
* Sweden: 74.54, 20.17, 5.29
* Taiwan: 80.12, 16.42, 3.46
* Turkey: 76.75, 15.81, 7.44
* United Kingdom: 71.19, 22.42, 6.39
* United States: 67.63, 24.81, 7.56
Support is highest in Mexico at 84.9 percent and lowest in United States at 67.63 percent.
Correction 4: Errors have been identified in the code used to produce Figure 5. The overall analysis holds, but the results are attenuated. The figure has been updated, and the following revisions should be made to the text.
An updated Figure 5 follows.
Global Approval of US Nuclear Weapon Use
Figure 5 Long description
The Y-axis represents the percentage of respondents approving, ranging from 0 to 60. The X-axis lists 20 countries. Each country has two bars: a red bar for Nuclear and a blue bar for Conventional.
Data points from left to right:
* Australia: Nuclear 36, Conventional 21.
* Belgium: Nuclear 48, Conventional 23.
* Brazil: Nuclear 45, Conventional 30.
* Czech Republic: Nuclear 40, Conventional 15.
* Egypt: Nuclear 53, Conventional 37.
* France: Nuclear 48, Conventional 24.
* Germany: Nuclear 35, Conventional 18.
* Italy: Nuclear 35, Conventional 22.
* Mexico: Nuclear 39, Conventional 25.
* Nigeria: Nuclear 70, Conventional 38.
* Poland: Nuclear 57, Conventional 35.
* Saudi Arabia: Nuclear 47, Conventional 31.
* Slovakia: Nuclear 33, Conventional 13.
* South Africa: Nuclear 51, Conventional 31.
* South Korea: Nuclear 48, Conventional 26.
* Sweden: Nuclear 47, Conventional 22.
* Taiwan: Nuclear 54, Conventional 26.
* Turkey: Nuclear 43, Conventional 28.
* United Kingdom: Nuclear 51, Conventional 28.
* United States: Nuclear 51, Conventional 27.
Nigeria shows the highest approval for both categories, while Slovakia shows the lowest approval for conventional use.
On pg. 14, read: “But in over one-third of cases, a majority of respondents would support the United States engaging in nuclear retaliation after a nuclear attack on one of its allies… It suggests a meaningful degree of belief in the legitimacy of extended nuclear deterrence,” instead of “all cases,” and “strong degree.”
In the discussion of Figure 5 on pg. 14, read: “Many respondents are” instead of “Respondents are.” Also read: “Figure 5 shows that 27% of respondents across the full sample would approve of U.S. nuclear use against a conventional attack on a U.S. ally,” instead of 53%, and add “compared to 47% that would approve of U.S. nuclear use against a nuclear attack on a U.S. ally.” Also read: “This relatively high global willingness to support nuclear strikes…suggests that publics often prioritize what they deem the appropriate way to resolve their immediate security concerns,” instead of “This high” and “publics prioritize.” Also read: “These results suggest that some individuals,” instead of “that individuals.”
Footnote 20 should be updated to read as: “many approved of U.S. nuclear weapon use” instead of “majorities,” and the percentages should be updated to “57%, 46%, and 41%” for the nuclear scenario and “46%, 24%, and 23%” for the conventional scenario, instead of “54%, 76%, and 77%” and “43%, 54%, and 59%.”
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