1. Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1972), provides the classic expression of this; see p. 31.Google Scholar Others include Stephen Krasner, D., Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Robert, Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic, 1975).Google Scholar

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13. Holsti, , “Cognitive Dynamics”, pp. 31–36.Google Scholar More recently Holsti summarized the history of attempts to include the cognitive element in foreign policy making and noted the concern about the relevance of psychology developed in the laboratory to the real world of politics. See his “Foreign Policy Viewed Cognitively”, in Robert, Axelrod, ed., Structure of Decision(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 24–29.Google Scholar The use of cognitive analysis proposed here accords more with his recommendation for a conceptual model (ibid., p. 34) that focuses on the perceptions, analyses, and prescriptions for decision making. The cognitive mapping technique Axelrod advocates in that volume relapses into leader–specific belief structures (ibid., chap. 3).

14. Jervis, Perception and Misperception and The Logic of Images; George, Alexander L. and George, Juliette, “the ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making”, International Studies Quarterly 13 (06 1969), pp. 190–222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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