From preventive war to preventive nuclearization: The strategic logic

The literature on “preventive war” offers a compelling framework for understanding the South Korean public’s puzzling support for nuclear armament. Preventive motivations for war arise from shifts in relative power capabilities driven by differing national growth rates, which create anxiety in a dominant but declining power about its future position. As a rising adversary grows stronger, the dominant power perceives its own military strength and bargaining power diminishing, leading to concerns about the long-term consequences of this shift (Levy Reference Levy1987, 87).

This dynamic generates a commitment problem between declining and rising powers. The dominant power fears that once it is surpassed, the rising power will seek to revise existing agreements or act aggressively, moves that cannot be reliably deterred or prevented through diplomacy (Powell Reference Powell2006). In response to this anticipated future threat, the declining power becomes increasingly sensitive to the timing of action. As its strategic advantage narrows, it perceives both a shrinking window of opportunity and a widening window of vulnerability. The former refers to a fading offensive advantage, while the latter reflects a growing defensive weakness (Van Evera Reference Van Evera1999, 75).

To avoid future disadvantage, the dominant power prefers to act before its position deteriorates further, initiating war while it can still shape power dynamics from a position of relative strength. Delaying action would allow the rising power to exploit its growing advantage, increasing the risk that any future conflict will be more costly or unwinnable (Van Evera Reference Van Evera1999, 74–76). While classical preventive war theories focus on major, rapid power shifts as a key trigger for preventive behavior, more recent works argue that it is not material shifts per se, but expectations of future decline that generate preventive motivations (Copeland Reference Copeland2000; Levy Reference Levy2008). In this context, the logic of “better-now-than-later” compels the declining power to initiate war before losing its strategic edge (Levy Reference Levy1987, Reference Levy2008).

We argue that this core logic—fearing future decline and preferring to act now rather than later—is not limited to interactions between states. It can also operate at the level of public opinion. Prospect theory demonstrates that individuals become more willing to take risks when facing potential losses (Kahneman and Tversky Reference Kahneman and Tversky1979). Similarly, South Korean citizens who anticipate a worsening security landscape, whether due to North Korea’s nuclear advances or concerns about long-term US reliability, may support high-risk options like indigenous nuclear armament.

This extension is further supported by research on “folk realism,” which demonstrates that ordinary citizens can engage in strategic thinking similar to state actors when facing security dilemmas. Citizens tend to adopt realist assumptions about international politics, emphasizing self-reliance, supporting anticipatory action against potential threats, and showing preference for policies that prioritize national interests over international cooperation (Kertzer and McGraw Reference Kertzer and McGraw2012; Drezner Reference Drezner2008; Rathbun Reference Rathbun2009). While this application of preventive logic moves beyond its original focus on great power decision-making, it is consistent with broader psychological tendencies that shape how both individuals and states respond to the prospect of strategic decline.

This preventive logic helps explain South Koreans’ support for nuclear armament despite high confidence in current US extended deterrence. South Koreans are not reacting only to present security conditions; they are extrapolating from system-level shifts, including doubts about the future US commitment and concerns about North Korea’s growing capabilities, and they are anticipating a less favorable security environment. The following sections examine how this preventive logic is reflected in public opinion, focusing on three interrelated concerns: fear of shifting power dynamics both at the systemic level and within the Korean Peninsula; commitment problems involving an uncertain ally and a rising adversary; and perceptions of a closing strategic window. This analysis focuses on developments and public perceptions up to August 2023, the period covered by our survey data.

Fear of shifting power dynamics

A core driver of preventive motivations is the fear that shifts in the balance of power will undermine one’s future security. This concern is rooted in two key developments in South Korean public opinion: perceptions of the United States’ relative decline and North Korea’s advancing military capabilities. Together, these developments shape public perceptions of South Korea’s growing strategic vulnerability within a shifting regional order. At the systemic level, the anticipated decline of US power is visible in South Korean public perceptions. Recent survey data from 2023 reveal that 61.4 percent of South Koreans believe China is likely to overtake the United States as the world’s leading power—about 23 percentage points higher than those who said it was unlikely. Notably, 20.1 percent predicted this would occur within the next 10 years, 28 percent within 30 years, and 13.4 percent within 50 years (Lee et al. Reference Lee2023, 74).Footnote ¹ Although 30 to 50 years may seem distant, the fact that a clear majority expects such a shift reflects widespread public awareness of potential systemic change. This perception aligns with Copeland’s (Reference Copeland2000, 20) refinement of classical preventive war theories, which emphasizes that preventive motivations stem not merely from observable power transitions, but from leaders’ expectations of future relative decline. Crucially, even gradual shifts can trigger preventive behavior if a state perceives an inevitable loss of its strategic position, especially as that decline is expected to threaten vital national interests.

In parallel, South Koreans are increasingly alarmed by a shifting balance of power on the Korean Peninsula itself, driven by North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities. While South Korea retains superiority in conventional forces, this advantage is widely seen as eroding due to Pyongyang’s expanding nuclear capabilities. According to the 2023 KINU survey, 57.2 percent of respondents viewed South Korea as militarily superior when explicitly considering only conventional capabilities, compared to just 17.7 percent who viewed North Korea as stronger. However, when nuclear weapons were implicitly included, these perceptions shifted significantly: 40.6 percent believed North Korea held overall military superiority, while only 33.1 percent still viewed South Korea as stronger (Lee et al. Reference Lee2023, 56–58). These assessments suggest that nuclear asymmetry is directly shaping public perceptions of South Korea’s vulnerability.

North Korea’s military trajectory further amplifies these concerns. Since declaring its nuclear program complete in 2017, Pyongyang has steadily advanced its arsenal, developing tactical nuclear weapons and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Ministry of National Defense 2022). In 2022 alone, North Korea conducted more than 50 provocations (CSIS Beyond Parallel 2025) and formalized its readiness to use nuclear weapons through the adoption of a new Nuclear Forces Policy Law, which incorporated preemptive nuclear use into its national security doctrine (Ha and Kim Reference Ha and Kim2024). These actions signal Pyongyang’s intent to normalize and retain its nuclear capabilities, reinforcing South Korean fears about the shifting military balance. Taken together, perceptions of US relative decline and North Korea’s rise have contributed to a broader sense that the strategic balance is shifting against South Korea.

Commitment problems on two fronts: A declining ally and a rising adversary

Concerns about the shifting distribution of power, particularly the relative decline of US dominance and the changing balance between South and North Korea, create commitment problems for South Korea in two distinct ways. While the original commitment problem in preventive war theory involves rival powers, similar dynamics can emerge within alliances when a partner’s future reliability is in doubt (Cha Reference Cha1999; Lanoszka Reference Lanoszka2018; Snyder Reference Snyder1997). In the context of the US–South Korea alliance, public fears about the enduring credibility of US security guarantees reflect a preventive logic rooted in concerns over shifting power dynamics and narrowing strategic options. Although South Koreans continue to express confidence in US security commitments today, many anticipate that ongoing systemic shifts could weaken Washington’s willingness or capacity to fulfill those commitments over time. This concern stems not from immediate doubts about US credibility, but from forward-looking anxiety that evolving global power dynamics will heighten the risk of abandonment over time.

Over the past decade, the United States has shown signs of reorienting its foreign policy by prioritizing practical national interests over shared interests with its allies, responding to budgetary constraints, and focusing on strategic competition with China. These developments have periodically prompted uncertainty among allies regarding the future trajectory of US global engagement, concerns that have been reflected in South Korean public opinion. This anxiety was particularly evident from 2018 to 2020, when then-President Trump publicly questioned the value of the US–South Korea alliance and reportedly considered using the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea as leverage in trade and defense negotiations (Baker and Rich Reference Baker and Rich2018; Brunnstrom and Stewart Reference Brunnstrom and Stewart2020; Reuters 2019; Washington Post Editorial Board 2020).

The following year, disputes over defense cost-sharing further strained the alliance, as the Trump administration demanded a fivefold increase in South Korea’s financial contributions, raising concerns about the durability of US security commitments (Shin Reference Shin2021). Although these tensions were eventually resolved with the signing of a new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) in March 2021 (Lee and Lamothe 2021), public memories of these episodes have continued to fuel skepticism about the reliability of US commitments. In this context, public support for nuclear armament in South Korea may reflect a preventive motivation. Rather than indicating an imminent collapse of the alliance, this sentiment reflects a broader fear that US credibility will gradually erode over time.

South Korean public opinion data illustrates this pattern. First, a large body of evidence shows that the current US extended deterrence commitment is widely regarded as credible. According to the 2023 EAI survey, a vast majority (90.2%) believe that the United States would respond to a North Korean nuclear attack, either by employing its own nuclear weapons (34.4%) or through non-nuclear military measures (55.8%) (EAI 2023b). Additionally, 57.7 percent of respondents view the Washington Declaration as an adequate response to the North Korean nuclear threat and South Korea’s security concerns (EAI 2023b). The 2023 KINU Unification Survey reports comparable findings, despite some variation in question wording and figures. According to the KINU data, 72.1 percent of respondents trust the US nuclear umbrella policy, and 68.5 percent believe that it is effective in deterring a North Korean nuclear attack (Lee et al. Reference Lee2023, 40). Taken together, these results indicate that South Koreans perceive US extended deterrence as credible at present.

However, this prevailing confidence is accompanied by growing concerns about the sustained reliability of the US–South Korea alliance. Although a majority still affirms the alliance’s importance, recent surveys reveal subtle but meaningful signs of declining confidence. In 2023, support for the necessity of the ROK–US alliance declined compared to previous years, with the EAI survey reporting 88.9 percent. While this figure remains high, it marks a notable drop from earlier levels, which consistently ranged between 96 and 98 percent (EAI 2023b). Moreover, 33.3 percent of respondents agreed that the alliance is losing significance due to the relative decline of the United States compared to China (EAI 2023b). These patterns suggest latent concerns about the durability of US commitments. Even under more reassuring administrations, the lingering effects of past volatility continue to shape public perceptions.

This has left a lingering sense of vulnerability among South Koreans, even after the leadership change in 2020 that signaled a return to more predictable alliance engagement through 2023.Footnote ² These patterns suggest the presence of a latent concern regarding the enduring credibility of US commitments. While a majority of South Koreans continue to express confidence in the alliance today, there is a gradual erosion of certainty. This is evident in declining confidence levels and growing perceptions of the United States’ relative decline, both of which reflect dynamics typically associated with the commitment problem.

The gradual erosion of public confidence reflects a deeper commitment problem rooted primarily in structural dynamics. While both structural and domestic factors can undermine alliance credibility, our argument highlights the systemic level—particularly how the South Korean public perceives US relative decline vis-à-vis China and growing doubts about the long-term viability of the ROK–US alliance. These concerns reflect a preventive logic: a desire to act early to avoid strategic disadvantage, grounded in broader assessments of shifting global power.

Domestic-level developments in the US—such as the Trump administration’s “America First” rhetoric or its transactional approach to alliances—can sharpen these fears. They translate abstract concerns about long-term decline into more immediate and emotionally resonant terms. However, they are not the root cause of public support for nuclear armament. Instead, they serve as catalysts that make an existing sense of strategic vulnerability more vivid. In this way, structural and domestic factors interact. But the core preventive impulse stems primarily from perceptions of long-term decline rather than short-term political turbulence in Washington.

In addition to concerns regarding US commitments, a second commitment problem stems from the shifting balance of power between North and South Korea. North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities, coupled with broader regional dynamics, raise concerns that Pyongyang may eventually gain political acceptance as a nuclear-armed state. The international community continues to reject any formal recognition of its nuclear status. This stance was reaffirmed by the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference (2023), which declared that “the DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT.” However, historical precedents, including India and Pakistan, illustrate how political realities can override formal prohibitions, leading to the normalization of their nuclear status. Should a similar outcome emerge in the case of North Korea, its bargaining position would be significantly strengthened, diminishing Seoul’s leverage both in international diplomacy and inter-Korean affairs. This would reinforce the perception that South Korea’s influence over inter-Korean relations is steadily eroding, leaving it more exposed to North Korean threats.

South Korean public opinion echoes this strategic concern: as North Korea’s power grows, so too does skepticism about its intentions and the future of inter-Korean relations. According to data from the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University (IPUS), skepticism about North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize has grown since 2018. The proportion of respondents who believe that North Korea would not give up its nuclear weapons dropped from 87.4 percent in 2017 to 79.1 percent in 2018—likely due to optimism surrounding the inter-Korean summit—but began to rise again after the collapse of denuclearization talks in 2019. By 2022, the figure had reached a record high of 92.5 percent, the highest since IPUS began the survey in 2007. Although slightly lower in 2023, it remained elevated at 88.3 percent, nearly returning to pre-summit levels (Kim et al. Reference Kim, Kim, Kim, Kim, Lee, Cho, Cho and Kim2023, 68).

Windows of opportunity and vulnerability

South Korea’s preventive motivations for nuclearization stem from both a narrowing window of opportunity and a widening window of vulnerability, reflecting the same logic that drives preventive motivations for war. The shifting balance of power at the system level, along with anticipated adjustments in US foreign policy priorities, has raised concerns about the erosion of South Korea’s strategic advantages over North Korea. At the same time, North Korea’s continued advancement in nuclear capabilities, combined with a deteriorating inter-Korean relationship, has fueled fears of increasing vulnerability.

South Koreans have grown more doubtful about prospects for improved inter-Korean relations. As shown in Figure 1, the share of respondents expecting relations to worsen over the next five years rose sharply—from 6.2 percent in 2018 to 34.4 percent in 2023, according to a KINU survey (Lee et al. Reference Lee, Min, Yoon and Koo2021, 64; 2023, 331; Park et al. Reference Park2023, 347). This trend reflects declining optimism since 2018, when hopes for peaceful denuclearization were high. After the failure of the US–North Korea summit in 2019 and North Korea’s renewed provocations, expectations for improved relations deteriorated rapidly. Moreover, South Koreans’ evaluation of the likelihood of a nuclear war outbreak has continued to rise, from 3.38 in 2021 to 4.05 in 2023, although it still remains below 5 on a 0-to-10 scale (Lee et al. Reference Lee2023, 68). This evolving strategic environment creates a sense of urgency: a perceived imperative for South Korea to act before it is too late.

Figure 1.

South Korean Expectations of Inter-Korean Relations (2018–2023).

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Lee et al. (Reference Lee, Min, Yoon and Koo2021, 64; 2023, 331) and Park et al. (Reference Park2023, 347).

This imperative becomes even more pressing when considering the time required to develop nuclear weapons—a factor that intensifies the preventive motivation for nuclearization. Given the timeline for nuclear armament, it may no longer be premature to pursue such capabilities before South Korea is left unprotected. On average, developing a nuclear weapons program takes around ten years, though this varies depending on a state’s technological capacity (Miller Reference Miller2014). Technologically advanced states such as Japan, with extensive plutonium stockpiles and technical expertise, could potentially acquire nuclear weapons within a few months to two years (Windrem 2014). In contrast, South Korea would likely face a longer timeline. Even to achieve a premature or minimal level of nuclear armament, it would require two to three years (Kim Reference Kim2024; Lee Reference Lee2024).

The time required for nuclear development has been a key factor in the success of US nonproliferation policy toward its client states. It allows the United States to use the threat of abandonment as a tool to punish nuclear ambitions. Even if a US client aspires to develop nuclear weapons, it cannot afford the window of vulnerability that would emerge if it lost US protection before achieving its own nuclear capability (Gerzhoy Reference Gerzhoy2015; Lanoszka, Reference Lanoszka2018; Miller Reference Miller2014). The critical element here is that abandonment is conditional on the client’s behavior: punishment for pursuing nuclear weapons, continued protection for restraint. The US has thus been able to deter proliferation by threatening conditional abandonment.

However, when a client begins to expect unconditional abandonment—regardless of its compliance with nonproliferation norms—it may come to believe that the widening of its window of vulnerability is inevitable. In this situation, it may be too late to find an alternative to US security guarantees once they have already eroded. This perception can activate a preventive motivation for nuclearization, even when the client state still assesses US security commitments as credible in the present.

In sum, South Koreans’ seemingly puzzling support for nuclearization, despite their high levels of trust in US extended deterrence, can be understood as a reflection of preventive motivations. Rather than reacting to immediate threats or doubting current US security guarantees, we argue that a significant portion of South Koreans are motivated by pessimism about the future, particularly concerns over the sustained reliability of US commitments amid shifting global dynamics and South Korea’s weakening strategic position vis-à-vis North Korea. As the United States adjusts its global security posture and North Korea continues to advance its nuclear capabilities while maintaining an aggressive stance, this forward-looking pessimism drives public support for nuclear armament as a hedge against anticipated strategic decline.

To examine how these preventive motivations manifest in public attitudes, we focus on two key perceptions that shape support for nuclear acquisition. Our analysis focuses on how South Koreans interpret systemic power shifts through the lens of the US–ROK alliance. Specifically, we examine whether individuals who believe the alliance is becoming less important—given the United States’ relative decline—are more likely to support South Korea’s development of nuclear weapons.

In addition to concerns about systemic power shifts, public perceptions of inter-Korean dynamics play a critical role in shaping preventive motivations. As South Koreans consider the future trajectory of relations with North Korea, many anticipate a deterioration in ties. These expectations, particularly in light of Pyongyang’s advancing nuclear capabilities and continued hostility, may increase support for domestic nuclear development as a safeguard against perceived strategic vulnerability.

Dependent variable

We construct the dependent variable, Support for Nuclear Armament, based on respondents’ agreement with the statement that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons if the threat from North Korea’s nuclear arsenal persists. Among the 1,008 respondents, 590 (58.53%) expressed support, while 344 (34.12%) opposed the idea. The variable is coded as 1 for agreement and 0 for opposition. Respondents who selected “Don’t know” (n = 74, 7.34%) are treated as missing values. Table 1 presents the distribution of the dependent variable.

Table 1.

Distribution of the dependent variable: Support for nuclear armament

Note: In our data, “Support” is coded as 1, “Oppose” is coded as 0, and “Don’t know” is represented by missing values.

Independent variables

This study investigates how expectations about the evolving security environment influence South Koreans’ support for nuclear armament. Drawing on the theory of preventive motivations for war, we hypothesize that concerns about shifting power dynamics, particularly their perceived effects on the US–South Korea alliance and inter-Korean relations, influence support for nuclear weapons. To capture these future-oriented expectations, we include the following explanatory variables.

Control variables

Sociodemographic features

We include Political Ideology, Gender, Education, Income, and Age as control variables. Political Ideology is coded as a trichotomous variable: 1 for progressive, 2 for moderate, and 3 for conservative, with conservative serving as the baseline. We test whether conservatives show higher nuclear support than moderates or progressives (Lee et al. Reference Lee2023; Kim et al. Reference Kim, Kim, Kim, Kim, Lee, Cho, Cho and Kim2023; Dalton et al. Reference Dalton, Friedhoff and Kim2022). Gender is coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. Income ranges from 1 to 11, representing the lowest to highest income levels. Age is grouped into six categories, from twenties to seventy and above. Descriptive statistics appear in Table 2, full question wording in Appendix Table A2.

Table 2.

Descriptive statistics

Security tomorrow, nuclear today: Evidence of preventive motivations

We find empirical support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, which reflect preventive motivations rooted in concerns over power shifts at both the systemic and inter-Korean levels, as shown in Table 3. South Koreans’ forward-looking concerns about the declining relevance of the alliance, driven by perceptions of US decline, along with pessimism about future inter-Korean relations, are significantly associated with increased support for nuclear acquisition. However, current perceptions of extended deterrence and the North Korean threat diverge from conventional expectations: belief in the credibility of the US Nuclear Umbrella does not reduce support for nuclear armament, nor does viewing North Korea as a Current Military Threat increase it.

Table 4 presents the marginal effects of each variable, with percent changes shown in parentheses. First, future insecurity regarding the provider of extended deterrence is positively associated with support for nuclear acquisition. Agreement with the statement Alliance Relevance Decline due to US power shift increases the predicted probability of supporting nuclear armament by approximately 0.087 in Model 3. The effect of future concerns remains consistent, increasing the predicted probability by 0.084 in Model 4 and 0.075 in Model 5. These changes correspond to a 12.38–14.45 percent increase.

Table 4.

Change in predicted probability of supporting nuclear armament

Note: Percentage changes are presented in parentheses. “NA” denotes that the variable is not included in a model, while “-” indicates that the marginal effect of the variable is not statistically significant at the .05 level. Education, income, and age are excluded from the table due to limited space, as they lack statistical significance across all five models.

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

In contrast to future expectations, current assessments of the US security guarantee reveal a different pattern. US Nuclear Umbrella confidence positively increases nuclear weapons support, contrary to proliferation literature expectations. The predicted probability increases by 0.077–0.081 (12.73–13.41%). Similarly, confidence in the Washington Declaration raises probability by 0.159–0.169 (approximately 30%).

Future-oriented concerns about North Korea corroborate our hypothesis, whereas current assessments do not show significant effects. Inter-Korean Pessimism is positively associated with support for nuclear acquisition. The predicted probability increases by 0.074 to 0.085 (12.44% to 14.43%). This result remains robust across all three models (Models 3–5). By contrast, perceiving North Korea as a Current Military Threat shows no positive association with support for nuclear armament (Models 1, 2, 4, and 5).

This finding is counterintuitive, given that North Korean threats occupy a central position in public discourse on South Korea’s security environment and nuclear policy. More than 62 percent identify North Korea as the primary military threat, but this perception alone does not appear to drive support for nuclear acquisition. Instead, consistent with our argument about preventive motivations, it is not the immediacy of the threat but the expectation of worsening conditions that compels support for nuclear armament. The public’s concern reflects an anticipatory logic—today’s preparations are necessary to address a more dangerous security environment in the future.

Figure 2 visualizes the marginal effects from Models 4 and 5. The figure highlights the consistent and significant effects of future-oriented concerns, in line with preventive motivation. In contrast, current assessments—including US nuclear umbrella, Washington Declaration, and North Korea Threat—do not follow conventional deterrence logic. This reinforces our core finding that public support for nuclear armament is shaped more by anticipatory concerns than by present-day threat perceptions.

Figure 2.

Marginal Effects of Key Variables on Support for Nuclear Armament (Models 4–5).

Note: Variables with statistically significant results (p < 0.05) are colored; others remain white.

Absence of evidence for “fear of entrapment” and “threats from china”

Fear of Entrapment does not receive empirical support in any of the five models. This finding stands in contrast to Sukin’s unwanted use theory. As discussed earlier, differences in sampling—particularly with respect to age representation—may help explain the discrepancy. Timing may also play a role, as the 2023 survey was conducted in a potentially different political and strategic context. In our data, South Koreans did not appear concerned about excessive US commitment. Rather, the predominant concern is insufficient future US commitment, suggesting that apprehension stems not from current alliance behavior but from uncertainty about its sustained reliability. This finding reinforces our broader argument about preventive motivations: support for nuclear armament is shaped less by immediate threats or alliance overreach and more by pessimism about future security dynamics.

Threats from China do not demonstrate a significant effect on public support for nuclear acquisition. Neither forecasts of China as a Future World Leader nor perceptions of China as a Current Military Threat are significantly associated with support for nuclear armament. Our multivariate logistic regression, which extends beyond preset response options similar to those used in the CCGA survey (Dalton et al. Reference Dalton, Friedhoff and Kim2022), shows that perceived threats from China are not significantly associated with support for nuclear acquisition.

Sensitivity to national prestige and economic repercussion

Our measure of National Prestige is positively associated with the likelihood that South Koreans support the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Respondents who endorse a greater role for South Korea in addressing global challenges are more likely to support nuclear armament. According to Table 4, the predicted probability increases by approximately 0.197 to 0.217, representing a change of 42.30 percent to 49.66 percent. This association should be interpreted with caution, as the survey item includes “nonproliferation” among the examples of global challenges.

Priority on Economic Diplomacy acts as a constraining factor in public endorsement of nuclear weapons. Individuals who prioritize economic diplomacy are less inclined to support South Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons. The predicted probability of supporting nuclear acquisition decreases by approximately 0.091 to 0.109 (a 14.09 to 16.82% decline). It is likely that when respondents are presented with more explicit information about potential costs, such as economic sanctions or harm to the domestic economy, support for nuclear acquisition would decline even further.

Sociodemographic features: Ideology and gender

Individuals with a Moderate political orientation are more likely to support nuclear possession than Conservatives (Models 2 and 5). While conservative South Koreans are typically viewed as more aligned with military strength and national security, our data present a different picture in the context of nuclear weapons in 2023. Notably, we find no significant difference between Conservative and Progressive respondents. Overall, there is little evidence of ideological polarization in nuclear attitudes, though this warrants further validation. Female respondents are less likely to support the possession of nuclear weapons compared to their male counterparts. The predicted probability of supporting nuclear acquisition decreases by 0.074 to 0.079 (a reduction of 11.09% to 11.79%). This result is robust across all five models at the 0.05 significance level.