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Can children with autism integrate first and third person representations?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Simon Baron-Cohen
Affiliation:
Departments of Experimental Psychology and Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, England; sb205@cam.cus.ac.uk

Abstract

Barresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: (1) in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information (of any kind), and (2) in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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