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Original sin, control, and divine blame: some critical reflections on the moderate doctrine of original sin

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2024

Aku Visala Open the ORCID record for Aku Visala [Opens in a new window]  and
Olli-Pekka Vainio Open the ORCID record for Olli-Pekka Vainio [Opens in a new window]
Aku Visala*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki, Yliopistonkatu 3, Helsinki, Finland
Olli-Pekka Vainio
Affiliation:
Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki, Yliopistonkatu 3, Helsinki, Finland
*
Corresponding author: Aku Visala; Email: aku.visala@helsinki.fi
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Abstract

This article examines a construal of the doctrine of original sin which affirms the cognitive corruption of human faculties but denies that humans carry original guilt for Adam's fall or for cognitive corruption. All humans require Christ's atonement, because they either inevitably commit at least one sin or are rejected by God for other reasons. We go on to identify three problems with this account. The first problem is the ‘inevitability’ of sinning. Here, the defender is forced either to accept a compatibilist analysis of responsibility or provide a libertarian-friendly analysis of ‘inevitability’. The latter option contradicts the Augustinian contention that it is impossible for sinners to lead a life of virtue and holiness. The second problem has to do with the mechanics of the cognitive effects of sin. The cognitive effects of original sin make it very difficult or inevitable for humans to perform meritorious actions and very easy or inevitable for them to commit sinful actions. If the sinner's degree of control over her sinful actions is so low, it seems that she does not deserve divine blame and punishment for failing to commit meritorious actions. Finally, we raised some problems regarding the fate of the non-culpable sinners.

Keywords

original sinmoral responsibilitycompatibilismlibertarianismfree will

Information

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 61 , Special Issue 1: Featuring articles on The Existence and Nature of God: Contributions from Latin America , March 2025 , pp. 78 - 92
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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