Informal Diplomacy, Multi-Track Diplomacy and New Diplomatic History: A Brief Review of the Literature

Since the earliest recorded narratives of the Greek and Classical periods, historical accounts have often included informal elements concerning diplomatic interactions. It was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that leading figures, primarily statesmen and diplomats, began to reflect more systematically on the significance of unofficial contacts in the development of inter-state relations. This awareness reached a peak during the Cold War, a period in which parallel narratives proliferated, particularly those concerning espionage and informal diplomacy. The long and relatively silent conflict encouraged the use of alternative communication channels, as diplomatic and cultural penetration (Cultural Cold War) often replaced official dialogue.

Among those who contributed to the theorisation of informal diplomacy were Henry Kissinger and, later, Richard Haass.Footnote ⁵ Their insights were further developed by scholars such as G.R. Berridge and Helen Leigh–Phippard, who highlighted how states increasingly recognised the value of informal contacts in the post-war era.Footnote ⁶ The first major scholarly work to address these issues directly was Unofficial Diplomats by Maureen Berman and Joseph Johnson. This collective volume explored a ‘range of private international relations’, involving ‘individuals and groups who have contact with private citizens or government officials’.Footnote ⁷ Following this publication, William Davidson and Joseph Montville introduced the influential concepts of track-one and track-two diplomacy. The former referred to official diplomatic efforts conducted by states, while the latter encompassed non-governmental actors, such as civil society and religious organisations.Footnote ⁸ This binary framework was soon regarded as overly simplistic, leading John McDonald and Louise Diamond in 1991 to propose the notion of multi-track diplomacy. Their model expanded the ‘second track’ into multiple channels, including conflict resolution professionals, businesses, private citizens and the media. By 1996, the model had evolved to identify nine distinct tracks.Footnote ⁹

The late Cold War and post–Cold War periods also witnessed the emergence of new historiographical currents, including international history and the cultural history of diplomacy and international relations. In the same years, Joseph Nye theorised ‘soft power’ as the ability of states to achieve desired outcomes through cultural and ideological attraction rather than coercion.Footnote ¹⁰ These intellectual developments laid the groundwork for the emergence of new diplomatic history around 2010. According to Carlos Sanz, its main contributions include a sharper focus on agents, networks and cultures; a response to the internationalisation of historical studies in an era of globalisation; and a refinement of the thematic and methodological density of diplomatic history.Footnote ¹¹

The origins of new diplomatic history are often traced to Kenneth Weisbrode’s 2008 open letter to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR).Footnote ¹² Other leading figures include Giles Scott–Smith, Houssine Alloul and the members of the Network for New Diplomatic History.Footnote ¹³ Although not all works explicitly align with this school, a broader scholarly sensitivity to informal diplomacy and non-state actors has become increasingly evident.Footnote ¹⁴

An example of these dynamics can be found in the activities of German political foundations such as the FES and the Konrad–Adenauer–Stiftung. These organisations, although institutionally linked to the federal state and political parties, operated as instruments of soft power through mechanisms of informal diplomacy.Footnote ¹⁵ In Francoist Spain, for instance, the FES directed its clandestine support towards the PSOE and the PSI. The resulting tensions highlight the complexity and inherent informality of these operations, which aimed to foster democratic forces while advancing broader state and party interests.Footnote ¹⁶ Within this theoretical perspective, the PSI–PSP’s network can be read as an instance of multi-track diplomacy, in which political parties, foundations, academics and private individuals functioned as parallel yet complementary channels of communication.

The SI and the PSI

A brief overview about the period of maximum interaction between our key actors – the 1970s – is essential. The SI, a global coalition of socialist, labourist and social democratic parties, was established in 1951 in response to the geopolitical context of the Cold War. By the 1960s and 1970s, the organisation had reached the zenith of its influence, particularly following the inclusion of significant European and Latin American parties. Central figures such as Willy Brandt and Olof Palme championed policies of détente between East and West and the advancement of civil and social rights. Yet, throughout this period, the primary concern of the SI remained counteracting the communist advance, particularly in Southern Europe.Footnote ¹⁷

The SI’s engagement with Spain predates its official formation. In 1946, a Congress held in Paris led to the creation of the first Commission for supporting Spanish socialism. In August 1960, the secretary general of the PSOE, Rodolfo Llopis, succeeded in convincing the SI members of the need to provide financial and diplomatic support to the party. This led to the establishment of the third Commission on Spain. In the following years, the SI’s support was reaffirmed, notably through the formation of a diplomatic ostracism bloc against the Francoist regime.

The 1970 trial of Spanish socialist militants marked a new phase in SI–Spain relations. Several observers from the International witnessed the event, including German deputy Hans Matthöfer. At the initiative of the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano; PSIt), a fourth Commission for Spain was created. In this context, the idea of accepting the PSI as an observer member was formally presented, but Llopis’s resistance led to its failure.

The situation was further complicated by the PSOE’s split into the ‘renewed’ (PSOE renovado; PSOE-r) and ‘historical’ (PSOE histórico; PSOE-h) factions. The division in 1972 resulted from growing tensions between the older exile leadership – based in Toulouse and led by Llopis – and the younger interior militants inside Spain, who argued that the party’s decades-long external structure urgently required organisational renewal and the relocation of its operative base to the domestic terrain.Footnote ¹⁸ This problem was part of a broader dynamic within the anti-Franco world, which, initially dominated by exiled structures and leaders, had progressively built alternatives within the country since the mid-1950s, posing a question of legitimacy.Footnote ¹⁹ The case of PSOE also included a generational, strategical and ideological component. The interior faction, leaded by the young ‘Seville group’ and buoyed by renewed trade union links, had deployed an international network plan to assert its dominance over the exile apparatus.Footnote ²⁰

Furthermore, the excellent relations that European social democracies traditionally enjoyed with the old PSOE leadership hadn’t prevented them, since the 1960s, from seeking new interlocutors capable of ideologically renewing socialism. In this sense, contact with PSI had only partially convinced their leaders – especially Brandt and the SPD – also because Tierno Galván had never ruled out an agreement or alliance with communism.Footnote ²¹ Actually, the PSI–PSP’s initiatives unfolded within the broader Cold War geopolitics, where Western social democracy operated simultaneously as a vehicle of democratic solidarity and as a strategic instrument in the West’s anti-communist agenda. The tense framework of those years must be considered: the difficult management of three transitions to democracy in Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain and Greece) posed the risk of revolutionary radicalisation, incompatible with the balance of power within the Western bloc.Footnote ²² Consequently, the whole situation was followed with deep interest by both the United States of America and the social democracies that wanted to ‘export’ the Central and Northern European model to the South. From this perspective, the new ‘Seville group’ offered greater guarantees of receiving this political capital and anti-communist guidelines.Footnote ²³

The split forced the SI into a delicate decision, in order to protect the legitimacy of the party deemed most likely to play a pivotal role in the restoration of democracy in Spain. The search for a resolution initially consisted of the gathering of information through the investigative efforts of English politician Rodney Balcomb – who directly addressed the party leaders – followed by the establishment of a special commission. The appearance of a plural form of Spanish socialism also legitimised the inclusion of the third faction, represented by Tierno and Morodo, which was explicitly mentioned in Balcomb’s reports and subsequent discussions. In the meantime, Tierno had entered an alliance with Llopis, aiming for the reunification of PSI and PSOE-h under the SI’s acceptance.Footnote ²⁴ However, this strategy ultimately failed. Despite presenting itself as an authoritative alliance uniting internal and external factions, it actually projected an image of an ‘old’ socialism.

The final resolution, in January 1974, recognised the ‘renewed’ faction as the sole legitimate representative of Spanish socialism in the eyes of the SI. The PSI then made a further application in February for observer or consultative membership, which was rejected in March, though the possibility of future unification between Spanish socialists remained open.Footnote ²⁵ This was a particularly valuable proposition for the Central European leaders within the SI. Meanwhile, the SI’s role was focused on supporting only the PSOE-r. The SI’s influence was decisive in the party’s rise, offering media, political and financial support, which ultimately contributed to the PSOE’s victory in the 1977 elections.Footnote ²⁶

It is also appropriate to introduce our other protagonist.Footnote ²⁷ The PSI–PSP is a little-known political actor, yet extremely important for understanding the history of anti-Francoism and Spanish socialism. Until the transition to democracy, in fact, Tierno Galván was the most prominent member of the socialist opposition in Spain. Many foreign newspapers, especially French (le Monde, le Figaro . . .) and Italian (Avanti!, Corriere della Sera, l’Unità . . .), used to call him ‘chief of the Spanish socialists’. Even inside the country, given the party’s connections within the bureaucratic, diplomatic, academic, journalistic and political apparatus, it was assumed that he would become the leader of Spanish socialism once democracy was established. The press and political magazines dedicated extensive articles and entire issues to Tierno and Morodo (los Líderes, Políticos para el future . . .), while the youth group of the PSOE-r and the historical ones had little representation. Finally, when the PSP finally merged with the PSOE in 1978, it brought with it invaluable political capital. If the PSOE, victorious in the elections, was able to absorb the huge debt of the tiernists, the latter reciprocated by injecting into the reunified party an impressive apparatus of cadres, ideologists, political professionals, bureaucrats and diplomats, who played a pivotal role in the history of the new PSOE and, above all, in its foreign policy.

The future PSI emerged in 1953 in Salamanca, from a group of university students around Professor Enrique Tierno Galván. At the time, the ‘Old professor’ (Viejo profesor) was still a little-known figure of cultural dissidence against the regime. His past was marked by participation in the civil war under the Republican army and several episodes of repression. His political career would be linked to the groups he created, projecting him as one of the most prominent figures of the anti-Franco opposition and, in democracy, mayor of Madrid. Through the implementation of initiatives, such as political-intellectual journals, the group blended Europeanism and anti-Francoism. A second leader, Morodo, emerged from among the professor’s former disciples, becoming the group’s operational head and, later, secretary general of the party. Its international trajectory and network were a defining feature of the ‘Tierno group’ and were reinforced by connections with political parties and institutions, diplomats, scholars and political figures of the Spanish exile in Europe and America. Initially Tierno cooperated with the PSOE, but tensions over personal leadership and doctrinal differences led to his expulsion from the party in 1965. The founding of the PSI in 1968 marked its push for a renewed socialism, seeking international support, particularly within the SPD–FES and the SI. Despite initial invitations to its congresses, the relationship soured due to competition with the PSOE: the official recognition of PSOE-r, in January 1974, left the PSI in crisis, which was further compounded by the withdrawal of support from the SPD–FES. Finally, the 1977 elections led to its electoral defeat, followed in 1978 by the reunification with the majority socialist party.

Informal Action and Transnational Networks: Strategies and First Advances

‘Reference and obligatory pilgrimage’: thus did Morodo characterise the SI headquarters in London – an emblematic and strategic hub for every European socialist party,Footnote ²⁸ especially those who were lost in the Spanish ‘socialist labyrinth’.Footnote ²⁹ The first contacts between representatives of the SI and members of the PSI occurred in Italy in February 1969. By then, the PSI’s core leadership had gained an aptitude for building transnational networks – an ability sustained by both its academic affiliations and, crucially, a dense diplomatic network rooted in the long-standing ties between Tierno Galván and former students of the Spanish Diplomatic School.

The presence of a vibrant federalist current in the Italian political landscape meant that PSI efforts to build alliances gravitated towards this milieu, which partially overlapped with segments of the socialist movement.Footnote ³⁰ Tierno’s journey to Italy was marked by substantial media attention.Footnote ³¹ The visit, which was formally framed as an academic initiative, had both a political and diplomatic intent. The revival of federalist contacts had probably been orchestrated by José Luis Daneo and Vicente Girbau, two PSI militants residing in Italy, who arranged meetings between Tierno and figures such as Andrea Chiti-Batelli and Giacinto Lentini.Footnote ³² These contacts would prove instrumental in founding the Spanish section of the European Federalist Movement. Lentini also acted as a bridge between the PSI and elements of the PSIt, facilitating informal meetings between Tierno and members of its leadership.Footnote ³³

In June, Tierno wrote to the Italian socialist Gianni Finocchiaro requesting an invitation to the upcoming SI Congress in Eastbourne. The letter explicitly stated the PSI’s wish to participate merely as observers, ‘ensuring that no challenge to the PSOE’s legitimacy would arise’.Footnote ³⁴ The matter, however, was far from trivial. Within the PSI itself, views diverged over the advisability of pursuing entry into the SI, given that the organisation recognised only one socialist party per country. While exceptions to this rule existed (notably in Italy), the SI adhered as a rule to a single-party representation model, which also accorded to the SPD’s ‘German mentality’.Footnote ³⁵ Tierno advocated for a dual recognition strategy, while Morodo favoured a more cautious approach, seeking merely observer status. The latter strategy prevailed on the operational level. Though it did not yield immediate success, it ensured sustained dialogue between the PSI and the SI, aided by Morodo’s personal affinity with the social democratic vision promoted within the International.Footnote ³⁶

Two additional nodes of the PSI’s international network proved particularly important in these early efforts: Portugal and the German SPD–FES. In May 1969, Morodo attended the Republican Congress in Aveiro, convened by the socialist group surrounding Soares.Footnote ³⁷ In that occasion, Morodo presented to Elke Sabiel, the FES delegate for Spain and Portugal, a plan for PSI observer status within the SI.Footnote ³⁸ Meanwhile, he had entered into correspondence with Kreisky and other Austrian social democrats, with the assistance of his close collaborator Miguel Ángel Martínez.Footnote ³⁹

Eventually, an invitation to Eastbourne did arrive – though not as an ‘observer’, but as a ‘listener’. The ambiguity of this status led Llopis to expel the PSI delegate from the plenary floor.Footnote ⁴⁰ The envoy was Carlos Zayas, a young cosmopolitan aristocratic, fluent in several languages and closely associated with Morodo both personally and politically.Footnote ⁴¹ Between the late 1960s and his eventual alignment with the PSOE in 1972, Zayas would serve as a discreet yet vital conduit between the PSI and several foreign institutions. Some even mistakenly referred to him as the party’s international secretary. Among his most frequented venues was the SI headquarters in London, which he was said to visit ‘every other week’.Footnote ⁴² His connections also extended to the Dutch Labour Party and the West German embassy in Madrid, where he repeatedly pressured the diplomats to prevent a German minister from making an official visit to Spain. According to Spanish intelligence, he even threatened them.Footnote ⁴³

In those years, the PSI’s international profile expanded rapidly. Among the most notable moments were a meeting with German foreign minister Walter Scheel – Zayas served as interpreter – and an attempted appointment with US Secretary of State William Rogers, both in 1970. Following the modest inroads secured at Eastbourne, the tiernists could now claim to have taken a first step towards entry into the International. The creation of the SI’s Fourth Commission on Spain provided a crucial lever. On 24 July, during preliminary discussions of the Commission, Italian deputy Maria Vittoria Mezza – responsible for the international relations of the social democratic Partito Socialista Unitario (PSU) – proposed formally that a PSI representative should be included.Footnote ⁴⁴ In subsequent years, the PSU would often provide more consistent support to the PSI than the PSIt itself.Footnote ⁴⁵ Mezza’s argument anticipated what would become the central concern of the SI’s Spanish Commissions through to 1974: namely, the question of whether the PSOE in exile could still claim to represent Spanish socialism as a whole.Footnote ⁴⁶ Her proposal alarmed Llopis, who sought to convince SI secretary general Hans Janitschek of its invalidity.Footnote ⁴⁷ In October, at a meeting between the PSOE and the SI bureau, the party reiterated its firm opposition to the admission of new Spanish groups.Footnote ⁴⁸

By that point, Tierno and Morodo had already initiated direct contact with both Balcomb and Janitschek. Their campaign was further encouraged by the SI’s May resolution of the following year, which took a firm stance against European fascisms.Footnote ⁴⁹ At its second Congress, held in July 1971, the PSI formally endorsed a request for observer status, while also proposing the creation of a coordinating platform between socialists inside and outside Spain.Footnote ⁵⁰ Meanwhile, in Madrid Tierno managed to reach an understanding with a few historic socialist figures.Footnote ⁵¹ Their position was unequivocal: ‘our thesis was that, until unification [of Spanish socialism] could be achieved, the SI ought to engage with all operating groups within Spain’.Footnote ⁵² This principle would guide the PSI’s formal membership request, submitted in June 1972.Footnote ⁵³ Janitschek consulted the PSOE, which remained deeply divided. In the end, the party’s executive committee opposed any opening to the PSI.Footnote ⁵⁴

The strategies mentioned in this chapter correspond to an informal and multi-track configuration, where track one (official party-to-party diplomacy) intertwined with track two (non-governmental organisations), three (foundations) and five (academia), notably through academic contacts and organisations such as the FES and European federalists.

Influencing the Leaders: Targeting the Secretariat

The informal strategy of the PSI was mainly focused on members of the secretariat: in particular, undersecretary Balcomb and Janitschek, who had been secretary since 1969. In 1965, Tierno – recently expelled from the PSOE – reached out to the United Kingdom’s Labour Party (LP) to garner support for interior Spanish socialism. Shortly thereafter, following the visit to Spain by the Spanish Democrats’ Defence Committee (SDDC) – sponsored by the LP – he sent emissary Ramón Ridruejo to London. In 1968, the LP granted aid requested by Tierno, aimed at organising a seminar for students and workers. That same year, Morodo also travelled to London, where he visited the LP’s Foreign Affairs Department.Footnote ⁵⁵

Contact with Balcomb – a member of the LP, the SDDC and the SI – was a constant throughout these occasions. Following Morodo’s confinement at the beginning of 1969, Balcomb wrote to Tierno, who was spending his weeks in Italy. The aim of the letter was to encourage him to return to Spain and continue the anti-Franco struggle from there. Tierno took the opportunity to lobby for an official LP protest against Morodo’s confinement. The result was ‘a strong protest telegram’ from the LP’s general secretary.Footnote ⁵⁶ Moreover, Balcomb proposed again that Tierno recommend two students for the Labour summer schools. In a handwritten note, he invited Tierno to his home during the holidays to discuss these matters.Footnote ⁵⁷ These were the weeks following the SI meeting in Eastbourne, which had clearly confirmed Balcomb’s sympathies for Tierno. The main intermediaries during these months were Zayas and a man named Santiago, whom Balcomb especially trusted.Footnote ⁵⁸

Balcomb visited Spain in April 1970, as part of the SI delegation.Footnote ⁵⁹ In the report he wrote upon returning, the Labour politician proposed reunification between the PSOE, the PSI and the Catalan movement.Footnote ⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the political exchange was evolving into what seemed to be a true friendship. Balcomb, Morodo and Tierno met in Madrid on 18 April. On that occasion, PSI leaders handed the English comrade a memorandum with four proposals addressed to the Labour Party: pressure to halt the sale of Panzer tanks to Spain, support for a statement of solidarity with Spanish democrats and – regarding the SI – ‘a [Spanish] socialist roundtable convened and chaired by the International’, along with the submission of ‘a PSI report on the different socialist groups existing in Spain’.Footnote ⁶¹

Balcomb’s return to London coincided with Scheel’s visit. Correspondence with Morodo intensified: among other propositions – including an invitation to spend the holidays in Madrid – the Spanish leader asked Balcomb to stress the importance of the meeting with Scheel to the SI secretary.Footnote ⁶² Balcomb responded very positively, reaffirmed Janitschek’s support and passed Morodo the contact details of the new PSIt secretary. A personal note also congratulated the friend on his upcoming wedding and invited the couple to visit him and his wife in England.Footnote ⁶³ The wedding invitation, just as the bids for spending holidays together, represent perfect examples of the blend of friendship and political strategy we are analysing. This interplay was enriched by small gestures and details – such as the gift of two bottles of cognac to Balcomb from Morodo’s future wife – which illustrate how ‘mastery of informality’Footnote ⁶⁴ was a widely employed instrument by PSI leaders, particularly the secretary general.

Morodo’s reply contained a draft PSI programme and Balcomb informed Tierno of the arrival in Madrid of two Times journalists.Footnote ⁶⁵ In May 1972, Tierno accepted an invitation from his English friend and travelled to London: it was the perfect occasion to discuss PSI matters, including the presence of Secretary Janitschek.Footnote ⁶⁶ This tendency to combine informal tone, friendly gestures – holiday greetings, personal invitations and so on – and political content persisted in the following years.

The most interesting case in this sense is a letter written by Morodo on 5 July 1973. This communication reported two pivotal events: his participation in the SI Bureau meeting in Chile and a trip to London by Tierno and Llopis. The idea of inviting Morodo to the meeting originated during an academic seminar. At the same time, SI leaders considered it wise not to shut the door on any faction.Footnote ⁶⁷ This event was an ideal venue for networking and building friendships. Helped by the presence of old friends Allende and Mario Soares – his travel companion from Europe – as well as Janitschek, the Spanish leader had ‘the opportunity to speak with leaders of many parties’, insisting on the PSI’s long-standing proposal: recognition of all factions of Spanish socialism, their coordination under SI monitoring and postponement of the issue of socialist unity, understood as a long-term goal.Footnote ⁶⁸ Recalling these meetings, Morodo explicitly states that he had two goals: ‘to gather information’ and ‘to obtain observer status for the PSI’.Footnote ⁶⁹

The second event mentioned in the 5 July letter was the trip of Tierno and Llopis to London, following the unification agreement of 19 May 1973 between PSI and PSOE-h. According to Tierno’s account, this visit took place in a cold and discouraging atmosphere, marked by director Bruno Pittermann and the ‘silent men who watched us with evident hostility’.Footnote ⁷⁰ Morodo’s reply was sent two months later and was very firm. The PSI secretary asserted that this attitude ‘would launch an all-out war between the different sectors of Spanish socialism’, which ‘would benefit the dictatorship’. Morodo also highlighted the great respect between his group and Llopis and especially how the Toulouse PSOE was the undisputed bearer of legitimacy of that name. The keywords of the letter, repeated and underlined, were ‘unification’ and ‘general coordination’: ‘with or without the SI’, it reads, ‘we will continue to fight and if the SI … takes a stance favouring only one side, it will bear the responsibility of having contributed to the internal strife of Spanish socialism’. The message closed with a personal appeal, trusting in Balcomb’s ‘common sense’ and his ‘sincere concern’.Footnote ⁷¹

These tones were perhaps unnecessary. In August 1973, a letter from a party sympathiser using a pseudonym – likely Manuel Mella – explained that after a four-hour ‘dialectical marathon’ with Balcomb, he could confirm the following: that the undersecretary was most likely favourable to the PSI ‘or at least to multiple recognition’; that he was aware that Pablo Castellano, leader of the ‘renewed’ faction, had to be stopped; that one of the main reasons was the belief that Castellano was a communist and collaborator with major police sectors; and that Balcomb needed evidence in order to offer explicit help.Footnote ⁷² Shortly thereafter, Mella wrote: ‘B. [Balcomb] shows great appetite for all kinds of information on Spain. He seems at least as interested as we are in exposing C. [Castellano].’Footnote ⁷³ In the following months, relations with Balcomb in London were mainly cultivated by Mella and Ramón Cotarelo García, a PSI sympathiser and Morodo’s collaborator.Footnote ⁷⁴ Personal connections thus operated as informal diplomatic tools, shaping access, credibility and information flow across political boundaries.

After the final SI decision was announced in January 1974, the PSI secretary tried to buy time by announcing a resolution from the party.Footnote ⁷⁵ Likewise, Balcomb suggested submitting a new formal request, updating the one from the previous December.Footnote ⁷⁶ This new proposal was shelved at the end of March, although no letter was sent until August. In any case, maintaining SI–PSI communication channels was useful for both organisations, considering possible future developments and their shared goal: the democratisation of Spain.

To sum up, the interactions between Morodo and Balcomb suggest a hybridisation of formal and informal practices. A similar case was the relationship with Janitschek, SI secretary general in 1969. The protagonist was essentially Morodo, with the initial ‘conspiracy’ giving way to a sincere friendship.Footnote ⁷⁷ The first letter received, in February 1970, discreetly renewed the proposal for PSI’s entry into the SI, reaffirming the favourable opinion of the SPD–FES from Aveiro.Footnote ⁷⁸ In the following years, the letters sent to the SI secretary included information and documents regarding PSI members or political news. On one hand, these letters had an informative aim, sometimes accompanied by requests for material help or visibility. On the other, they had a meta-communicative purpose: to demonstrate the party’s rootedness in Spanish reality and to project the image of an international party. These exchanges reveal diplomacy as a social practice, embedded in personal trust and everyday interaction. Both approaches proved effective: the SI secretary asked Morodo for information about events in Spain and referred journalists to him.Footnote ⁷⁹ Janitschek viewed with sympathy the ties his Spanish friend was building with him and Balcomb.Footnote ⁸⁰

In July 1971, the PSI’s Second Congress approved a visit by two party delegates to the SI secretariat in London.Footnote ⁸¹ Morodo and Manuel Medina – who had been a PSI ‘agent’ in the United States – travelled there in September, receiving a favourable response to their proposals. This meeting also allowed the SI and PSI secretaries to appreciate each other’s personal qualities,Footnote ⁸² which were further cemented in a subsequent trip by Morodo to London in October.Footnote ⁸³ In May 1972, Tierno visited the SI secretariat too, reiterating his party’s line to Janitschek and proposing removing the word ‘interior’ from the party’s name.Footnote ⁸⁴

Contacts resumed at the 1973 summit in Chile. Once again, informal moments outside of the sessions – cocktails and dinners – proved useful.Footnote ⁸⁵ Morodo and Janitschek were able to prepare a joint strategy during the flight. It included pressure on Soares and the Chilean Carlos Parra, members of the SI Commission for Spain and friends of Morodo.Footnote ⁸⁶ Despite coordination between them in view of the Commission’s next meetings – scheduled for 13 and 16 MarchFootnote ⁸⁷ – the outcome was the rejection of the PSI’s proposal,Footnote ⁸⁸ which was partially supported even by the SI secretariat and the SPD. The failed meeting with Pittermann prompted Morodo to write to Janitschek as well. The letter was brief but thunderous: ‘my friends are very angry’; ‘this would be a war of all against all’; and ‘I trust you and Rodney to find a way to resolve the problem without serious conflicts’.Footnote ⁸⁹ Janitschek could only express deep regret and invite him to meet in London or Madrid.Footnote ⁹⁰

In August 1974, the SI secretary had to sign the letter of rejection addressed to the PSP leadership.Footnote ⁹¹ The timing was curious: on the one hand, more than four months had passed since the decision had been made on 31 March. On the other, just a few weeks earlier, he and Morodo – sent by the FES – had coincided in Chile, as members of the Legal Commission overseeing human rights during the Pinochet dictatorship; and earlier still, in May, the two and Tierno had met in Lisbon to celebrate the Carnation Revolution.Footnote ⁹² Moreover, less than a week after signing that letter, Janitschek finally accepted Morodo’s invitation for an informal vacation.Footnote ⁹³ The summer stay took place at his private family villa in Sitges, Catalonia. The trip was framed as ‘private’, and the social democratic leader brought along his wife and son.Footnote ⁹⁴

Rather than mere anecdote, these exchanges reveal the mechanisms of horizontal diplomacy among individuals representing non-state actors. It was a very different situation from the meeting organised during the same days between Tierno and the Swede Bernt Carlsson, future SI secretary general, which was of a primarily political nature.Footnote ⁹⁵ Janitschek’s trip drew criticism from the PSOE and some SI members. Some Spanish media reported that politics had indeed been discussed, spurred by a PSI note.Footnote ⁹⁶ In any case, the SI secretary general was compelled to apologise for the lack of contact with the PSOE.Footnote ⁹⁷ The communication channel between the SI and Morodo would continue to be used in the years to come and culminated in Morodo’s participation in the SI summit in Caracas in May 1976.

Ultimately, we have analysed hybrid relationships of semi-institutional interaction between officials and informal actors, which, as such, are central to multi-track diplomacy. Such practices exemplify the dynamics of informal diplomacy, where authority and legitimacy are derived from not only institutional mandates but also credibility, interpersonal trust and, especially in our case, access.

Parallel Networks, Actors and Collaborators

Beyond cultivating its relationship with the SI secretariat, the PSI exercised its informal influence through other channels as well. First and foremost, this was done via a few individuals within the organisation who were personally connected to party leaders. One such example is Parra, who was linked to Morodo by language – he served as interpreter during the meeting in ChileFootnote ⁹⁸ – and by personal affinities, given the PSI secretary’s ties to his country. The correspondence between them reveals a mutual exchange of information and favours, both political and familial. Following the Pinochet coup, their relationship intensified, as Parra found in his Spanish friend a conduit for correspondence with fellow party members in the homeland.Footnote ⁹⁹ By autumn 1973, as the SI was preparing its final decisions, he had already become an explicit supporter of a dual recognition.Footnote ¹⁰⁰

Another noteworthy case is Miguel Ángel Martínez, previously mentioned. When the PSI began its rapprochement with the SI in 1969, finding an old friend at the head of the International Falcon Movement – the SI’s educational branch – was undoubtedly a relief. Despite his closeness to the PSOE, some of his statements reflect concrete support for the PSI: ‘never forget that I am absolutely willing to use my contacts and experience in the service of our ideas. The problem is that sometimes you all make too little use of me.’Footnote ¹⁰¹

Secondly, we must consider PSI’s relationships with individuals belonging to parties already integrated into the SI. Beyond Balcomb, the most significant cases are found in the German and Portuguese spheres. The SPD and the FES were particularly important from both a strategic and structural perspective. In the first case, notable figures include Fritz Erler, Willy Brandt, Dingels and Veronika Isenberg; in the second, Robert Lamberg and Sabiel. In some cases, the relationship began as one of friendship and personal esteem: Erler, for instance, whose friendship with Tierno opened the door to initial SPD support.Footnote ¹⁰² Lamberg, whose personal and political regard for Morodo facilitated FES assistance to his group, is another clear example.Footnote ¹⁰³ Both individuals are fondly remembered in the memoirs of the two Spanish politicians.Footnote ¹⁰⁴

Brandt’s case, however, is more complex due to his central role within both party and country. His relations with Tierno began in the late 1960s, grounded in generational and charismatic affinity, as well as their shared experience of the Spanish Civil War. Nevertheless, the PSI leader’s Marxist sympathies precluded any explicit support from Brandt. Their correspondence was cordial and politically protocolary, with no reference to the SI.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ In Brandt’s memoirs, Tierno is not even mentioned – unlike González, with whom he shared a deep personal bond.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Morodo would speak with the SPD president during the Caracas meeting in 1976, at which Brandt confirmed that as long as the PSP continued cooperating with the Communist Party, neither the SPD, nor the FES, nor the SI would formally support them.Footnote ¹⁰⁷

Among the prominent figures within the German party, Dingels – SPD International secretary since 1961 – and Veronika Isenberg – deputy International secretary since 1970 – should also be mentioned. Both dedicated significant attention to Tierno and Morodo, though without developing personal bonds. Dingels repeatedly defended the PSI’s open and collaborative stance, even after the PSOE-r’s official recognition.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Several letters reveal his deep suspicions towards González’s group and Castellano and even towards the ‘personal interests’ thought to motivate Max Diamant’s support of them.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ The SPD International secretary also appreciated the PSI leaders’ informal strategy and praised initiatives such as Janitschek’s visit to Morodo’s villa, Tierno’s meeting with Carlsson and similar episodes.Footnote ¹¹⁰

Elke Sabiel, the FES delegate for Iberian affairs, was clearly a key figure in coordinating and supporting Spanish comrades. Oral history allows us to gain insights into this connection, which combines formality and informality. In the interview, Sabiel recounts with irony Tierno’s obsession with typewriters, which cost her countless hours at customs.Footnote ¹¹¹ Morodo, in turn, recalls that Mrs. Esters was accustomed to request signatures for every check and document, while PSI members could not produce any written proof.Footnote ¹¹² In lieu of anecdotal, these interactions reveal the complex exchanges in the hybrid political relationships. They also disclose how informal diplomacy operated through affective and relational mechanisms that blurred the boundaries between friendship, ideology and strategy.

Regarding the Portuguese connection, the most significant figure was Soares. His organisation was recognised by the SI only in 1972 and transformed into a party the following year at SPD headquarters. The outbreak of the Carnation Revolution in 1974 marked the beginning of his path to the presidency. Throughout these personal and political developments, Soares consistently worked to foster dialogue between the PSI–PSP, the SI and the broader Spanish socialist movement. This was evident during the meetings in Santiago de Chile and Caracas, as well as in various reconciliation initiatives he promoted and hosted. It is highly likely that Soares’s inclusive stance was deeply influenced by his long-standing relationship with Morodo, born in 1964 through anti-dictatorial solidarity. Among many episodes, it was Morodo who introduced Soares to Lamberg.Footnote ¹¹³ Moreover, for German and European social democrats, support for Iberian socialists under their respective dictatorships was often seen as a mutually reinforcing cause, like we noted in the Aveiro Congress.

Finally, a third and final category played a fundamental role in the PSI’s informal diplomacy. This was the network of students of Tierno or Morodo, or former collaborators from academia or editorial boards, who maintained personal and political ties with them. These kinds of relationships were crucial in building the structure of this ‘professorial’ party.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Abroad, these individuals often acted as external agents, engaging in information-gathering, coordination and persuasion on behalf of the group-party. In addition, there were sympathisers – PSOE militants interested in tiernism, or simple admirers. Two particularly important cases were the trade unionists Carlos Pardo, based in Frankfurt and closely tied to Matthöfer and IG–Metall/SPD, and Miguel Sánchez-Mazas, a member of the International Labour Organization’s Workers’ Group in Geneva, representing PSOE-aligned unions.Footnote ¹¹⁵

As for ‘agents’ or party collaborators, we have already encountered the examples of Daneo and Girbau. Regarding SI relations, several others have already been discussed, especially Carlos Zayas, Santiago Rodríguez and Miguel Ángel Martínez. Manuel Mella and Ramón Cotarelo García were also pivotal in SI matters. Mella, a former student of Morodo and recipient of an FES scholarship – selected by his professorFootnote ¹¹⁶ – had participated in the PSI’s founding. His extended stay in London made him the ideal candidate for managing communication with the SI secretariat between 1973 and 1974. The August 1973 letter, already mentioned, displayed a remarkable familiarity with negotiation, espionage and personal and political pressure tactics for the party’s ‘mission’.Footnote ¹¹⁷ The ensuing correspondence resembles the work of an agent, with a precise communicative code including initials, detailed information, analytical clarity and a structure akin to a police report.Footnote ¹¹⁸

During this two-year period, his objectives as PSI ‘agent’ in London developed along four main lines: first, conducting personal and political pressure on Balcomb to take a stance against Castellano and in favour of the PSI, by exploiting their closeness and raising doubts about his reliability – it was a common practice in the struggle between factions; second, reinforcing all contacts with other SI figures in London, such as Carlos Parra; third, discrediting individuals opposed to the PSI;Footnote ¹¹⁹ and fourth, providing logistical support in London for party members – such as during Morodo’s visit to the United Kingdom’s capital in November 1973.Footnote ¹²⁰ Finally, after the SI’s definitive rejection of the PSI, Mella was tasked with the following: meeting with Janitschek – recently in Sitges and ‘very friendly and willing to assist through parallel and unofficial channels’ – and inviting him to dinner with Fernando Morán; during this meeting, reinforcing ‘the social democratic line – which is his’; avoiding mention of the PSI’s incorporation into the Junta Democrática association (which included the Communist Party); and, finally, asking once again for the list of SI member parties.Footnote ¹²¹

Cotarelo was also a former student of Tierno and Morodo and an FES scholarship recipient. Again, the personal bond was crucial. It is striking that this student offered support to a party he himself, by his own admission, ‘was never a member of’.Footnote ¹²² Yet his role proved relatively important. Cotarelo had a privileged vantage point due to his deep integration into the emigrant communities in Frankfurt and Munich. The seminars and events organised by the FES fostered his collaboration with IG–Metall – through which he frequently worked alongside Pardo – and brought him into contact with SPD members like Matthöfer. As director of Exprés español, a German-funded newspaper targeting Spanish émigrés, he had privileged access to political and trade union information. This facilitated his collaboration with the PSI. His role was primarily that of informer and delegate, which meant he often travelled to London to deliver party messages or assist Zayas and other ‘agents’ in their work.Footnote ¹²³

Due to his FES ties, Cotarelo initially aided Tierno and Morodo in their communications with the foundation. For instance, he intervened during an early crisis in their relationship between 1970 and 1971.Footnote ¹²⁴ He was also instrumental in dealings with the International Labour Organization in Geneva, thanks in part to mediation with Sánchez-Mazas, to whom he had been referred by his friend Morodo. These were the instructions Morodo gave Cotarelo, to prepare himself for his meeting with Sánchez-Mazas a few weeks after the SI’s recognition of the PSOE-r in January 1974: ‘warm cordiality. [Tell him] that things are very complicated, that we must act in fragmented fashion, but with a future awareness of coordination. [Show] great confidence and optimism.’Footnote ¹²⁵ Indeed, over time, his actions extended to SI relations. A lengthy stay in London starting in February further enabled his mission. Once there, Cotarelo reconnected with old friends of his and of the party, such as Mella, Morán and Parra.Footnote ¹²⁶ As in Mella’s case, being supported by a Consulate official – Morán – carried logistical, moral and institutional respectability.

During the difficult months from January to August 1974, Cotarelo worked intensely on networking, primarily handling communications with Balcomb: ‘you will be in charge of everything concerning “balconcito”’. Morodo had written to him in January.Footnote ¹²⁷ Upon arriving in the city, his mission was to inform the SI undersecretary about the party’s forthcoming formal admission letter.Footnote ¹²⁸ His meeting with Balcomb led to extensive strategic analysis regarding the likely behaviour of the SI Bureau and the newly recognised PSOE-r, now a full member with veto power. A key issue was how to structure the document to the SI, down to the smallest detail. Nevertheless, the outlook appeared bleak.Footnote ¹²⁹

In the days leading up to the Bureau meeting on 31 March, their encounters intensified. Cotarelo reported that Balcomb, still supportive of the PSI but likely unnerved, ‘flooded him with questions’ about the organisation.Footnote ¹³⁰ When the Bureau meeting definitively closed the door to the PSI, Balcomb lost all hope: ‘B. doesn’t believe we stand a chance in a second round; B. believes in nothing; in the end, B. is not an omnipotent Zeus’. After the Bureau meeting, the SI undersecretary was so weakened that he did not even request an official rejection document to send to the PSI, settling instead for a private letter.Footnote ¹³¹

The delay in the document, which only arrived in late August, was justified ‘for security reasons, though we [Mella and Cotarelo] believe summer vacations at the beach also played a part’.Footnote ¹³² During those months, Morodo and his ‘agents’ acted as though the outcome was still undecided. Meetings between Cotarelo and Parra, Balcomb and Janitschek multiplied. They were instructed to repeat that the party was undergoing expansion and restructuring, while the PSOE ‘had exhausted itself in the struggle for international recognition’Footnote ¹³³ – but none of this altered the final decision. Unlike Janitschek, whose friendship was evidenced by his stay in Sitges, lingering doubts about Balcomb remained: ‘was it a trap or a mistake by Balcomb?’Footnote ¹³⁴ The answer is perhaps irrelevant: it is the question itself that reveals the deeply human nature of such relationships.

The interactions we have analysed in this chapter show the interplay of diplomatic, academic, journalistic and foundation-based actors that exemplifies the multi-track system envisaged by Diamond and McDonald. They also exemplify how informal diplomacy relied on human networks rather than institutional authority.