Introduction
In his first radio message following Germany’s surrender, Pope Pius XII (1939–58) emphasised that rebuilding the ‘entire chaos of ruins – material ruins and moral ruins’ left by the war was considered essential in order to forge ‘a new and better Europe’.Footnote 1 Central to this reconstruction, he stressed, was ‘the prompt and rapid return . . . of prisoners, internees, combatants and civilians to their domestic hearths, to their wives, to their children and to their noble labours’.Footnote 2 The approximately sixty million Europeans who had been forcibly displaced during the Second World War as a result of persecution, violence and deportations reshaped the material, moral and psychological reconstruction of post-war Europe.Footnote 3
As the conflict drew to a close, the Vatican encouraged both Church officials and lay activists to foster transnational networks of solidarity among Catholic aid organisations, targeting in particular the War Relief Services (WRS) of the US National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC). The WRS emerged as a key humanitarian actor, not only due to the substantial material and spiritual aid that it distributed across Europe but also because of its close ties with US governmental and military authorities, as well as with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Established in 1943 as part of Allied plans for likely post-war scenarios, UNRRA was the ‘biggest, boldest, best-funded international organisation working on refugee matters the world had seen’.Footnote 4 It served as the main humanitarian agency responsible for coordinating the provision of food, medicine, clothing and shelter to those classified as ‘displaced persons’ (DPs), while also overseeing their registration, administration and repatriation.Footnote 5 However, excluded from its mandate were refugees who were deemed to be collectively responsible for Nazi crimes, including Volksdeutsche (‘ethnic Germans’) who had been expelled from East-Central and south-eastern Europe following the Potsdam agreement.Footnote 6
This article argues that both Vatican and Catholic humanitarian assistance to European displaced victims of war and their resettlement in the aftermath of the Second World War served as catalysts for the involvement of the Catholic Church in post-war reconstruction efforts and the Early Cold War. It focuses on the evolving relations between the Vatican, national Catholic aid agencies, Allied authorities and intergovernmental bodies such as UNRRA and IRO. By exploring their complex dynamics of collaboration and competition, the article not only demonstrates the central role of Catholic humanitarianism in constructing the emerging international order but also shows the different approaches, methods and visions of humanitarianism in the field of refugee relief. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Vatican and Catholic aid agencies identified a convergence of objectives with UNRRA, which was tasked with the provision of emergency relief supplies to liberated populations and the return of the displaced to their homelands. UNRRA’s modern techniques for managing mass displacement prompted Catholics to develop more professionalised humanitarian strategies, moving beyond traditional, parish-based charitable practices.Footnote 7 However, this collaboration also exposed underlying ideological tensions, which became particularly pronounced in debates over the concept of rehabilitation – a key element of UNRRA’s mandate. Rehabilitation was understood as not only the ‘establishment of long-term systems and structures that aim to promote peace and international security’ but also the physical, psychological and moral ‘renewal’ of individuals.Footnote 8 In this sense, UNRRA’s mantra of ‘helping people to help themselves’ challenged Pius XII’s 1944 call for a ‘Charity Crusade’, through which the Vatican sought to mobilise the faithful in a concerted effort to ‘re-Christianise’ post-war society – in order both to shape reconstruction plans and to assert papal moral authority on the international stage.Footnote 9
As the Cold War unfolded, the interest of the Vatican and the Catholic Church in refugee relief and resettlement was increasingly motivated by anti-communist sentiments.Footnote 10 By providing material and spiritual aid, Catholic humanitarians sought not only to alleviate the suffering of victims of war but also to counter the threat of Soviet communism.Footnote 11 Beyond the theological concept of caritas, understood as the ‘love of Christ’, the Church’s post-war assistance programmes were shaped by the fear that poverty and misery would drive populations to align with communism, which the Church saw as a direct threat to religious freedom, one that promoted atheism, materialism and social upheaval.Footnote 12 As the Cold War intensified, the resettlement of what Gerard Daniel Cohen has defined as ‘the last million’ of DPs, those who refused to be repatriated, rose to the forefront of the Catholic humanitarian agenda.Footnote 13 While the repatriation of DPs to Western Europe was neither simple nor universally achievable, the majority of the ‘last million’ group was comprised of displaced persons who were unwilling to return to their homeland and who instead hoped to be resettled beyond the Soviet Union and its satellite states within Central and Eastern Europe.Footnote 14 As is well known, they became the principal beneficiaries of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) – the intergovernmental body established in 1947 to succeed UNRRA, which placed the resettlement of refugees at the core of the post-war world order.Footnote 15 The Soviet Union’s exclusion from the IRO, along with its overt hostility towards resettlement initiatives, led the organisation to rely heavily on partnerships with non-governmental actors. Among these, Catholic and Vatican-affiliated agencies played a particularly prominent role, notably in facilitating the resettlement of Catholic Eastern European DPs in South America.
While the management and repatriation of DPs under the auspices of the UNRRA and their subsequent resettlement by the IRO have received considerable scholarly attention, the role of the Vatican and Catholic actors in the shaping of the post-war international refugee regime remains a relatively neglected area, in both ecclesiastical historiography and the broader field of refugee history.Footnote 16 For the former, scholarly inquiry has traditionally focused on the Vatican’s role in helping war criminals and Nazi collaborators to escape from Europe.Footnote 17 These studies have been closely tied to the enduring historiographical vexata quaestio about ‘the silences and dilemmas of Pius XII’ in relation to the Holocaust, and they tend to engage with the controversial portrayal of Pius XII as ‘Hitler’s Pope’.Footnote 18
For their part, refugee historians have also tended to overlook the influence of the Catholic Church in shaping post-war international refugee assistance. Recent developments in the fields of refugee history and humanitarian studies have largely centred on recovering ‘refugee voices’ by exploring their experiences, personal narratives and ways of negotiating their relief.Footnote 19 Furthermore, these approaches have increasingly adopted a global perspective to refugee history, as evidenced by the growing interest in the so-called global refugee resettlement regime.Footnote 20 The religious dimension has remained largely marginal, yet it constitutes a crucial lens through which to explore the experiences of both refugees and humanitarian personnel. Only recently, scholarship has begun to examine the intricate relationship between humanitarianism, religion and international politics, predominantly focusing on the central role of faith-based organisations and Christian missionaries in humanitarian crises.Footnote 21 More specifically, historians have primarily focused on the contributions of Jewish and Protestant aid associations, above all, Evangelicals and Quakers.Footnote 22 Within this framework, however, there is a noticeable absence of studies on Catholic humanitarianism, which remains largely underexplored except in the context of missionary activities.Footnote 23 Yet, as historians examining the notion of ‘Vatican humanitarian diplomacy’ have suggested, it played a pivotal role in shaping international humanitarianism, especially in the realm of refugee assistance.Footnote 24
From this perspective, this article aims to shed new light on the intersection between faith and humanitarianism. As outlined in the seminal work of Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein, this intertwining was often marked by interconnections, mutual influence and the exchange of ideas, structures and practices, particularly between religious activists and secular relief organisations.Footnote 25 Consequently, the field of religious studies and the history of humanitarianism have much to offer one another. While the language and principles of so-called modern humanitarianism has been largely shaped by spiritual and transcendent notions, religious relief associations were not as apolitical as they often claimed to be.Footnote 26 The interplay of these two fields shows the importance of considering the broader political, cultural and social context within which religious actors operated. The response of the Vatican and Catholic relief agencies to the mass refugee crisis in the aftermath of the Second World War provides valuable insights into these dynamics.
In many ways, the Vatican’s engagement drew upon earlier Catholic involvement in addressing war-related humanitarian emergencies during the inter-war period. For instance, during and after the First World War, the Holy See pursued diplomatic efforts in countries both with and without pontifical representation to advance humanitarian operations in favour of prisoners of war and refugees.Footnote 27 Particularly in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, papal aid initially relied on non-Catholic charitable organisations before encouraging the establishment of specifically Catholic agencies to fight the 1922–4 famine and assist with emigration.Footnote 28 The Spanish Civil War marked another important juncture in the development of Catholic humanitarianism prior to the Second World War. Over the course of the conflict, Catholics – particularly in the United States – were involved in international humanitarian mobilisation in favour of the rebel side, often driven by anti-communist sentiments. Although on a smaller scale than other humanitarian organisations, such as the Quakers and the Rockefeller Foundation, US Catholics organised food and clothing donations to alleviate hunger and support Spanish refugees fleeing to France.Footnote 29 However, it was the post-1945 period that witnessed a significantly broader and more influential Catholic engagement with international humanitarianism. I argue that close interactions between Catholic aid organisations, Vatican officials, national governments and intergovernmental agencies such as UNRRA and IRO were central to this process, as well as their engagement with other NGOs that were involved in refugee assistance.
The different strategies adopted by the organisations engaged in refugee relief and resettlement plans represent another crucial vantage point for reconsidering the importance of religion in the post-war period, and particularly in Europe and North America.Footnote 30 As a number of historians have emphasised, the years following the Second World War were marked by ‘a period of extraordinary – and unexpected – popularity’ for the Church of Pius XII.Footnote 31 The role played by the Holy See and Catholics has been approached from various perspectives, from studies on the rise of popular piety in the Early Cold War to analyses of the political influence exerted by the newly founded Christian Democratic parties.Footnote 32 However, these studies have a tendency to overlook the cultural and ideological vision that was championed by Catholic activists and relief workers. Their humanitarian action was strongly endorsed by Pius XII as a crucial means of securing a lasting peace and advancing a post-war order anchored to Christian values.Footnote 33
In this context, the plight of European refugees emerged as a critical concern, prompting Catholic aid agencies to engage more actively within the broader framework of international humanitarianism and post-war reconstruction.Footnote 34 Catholic activists frequently worked alongside UNRRA and IRO personnel to provide both material and spiritual assistance in DP camps, as well as to facilitate resettlement operations. The intertwining between different methods and visions of aid fostered a dynamic process marked by mutual influence, convergence and tension. On the one hand, UNRRA and IRO officers seemed keen on partnering with Catholic relief agencies to support displaced Europeans who refused repatriation. Compared to other Christian humanitarian organisations supporting refugees – including the World Council of Churches or World Lutheran Federation – the Catholic Church was regarded as a particularly influential actor in post-war resettlement, especially in Catholic-majority countries outside Europe.Footnote 35 This was especially evident in South America, where Catholic aid agencies benefited from stronger networks of people and institutions. On the other hand, interactions with non-state actors and intergovernmental agencies affected the ideology and techniques of Catholic humanitarianism, enabling the transition from traditional charitable practices towards more professionalised and internationally coordinated forms of aid.
Catholic involvement in addressing the post-1945 refugee crisis fostered and shaped the rise of lay Catholic internationalism within the humanitarian sphere, as exemplified by the establishment of the Vatican Migration Bureau (VMB) in 1947.Footnote 36 This engagement enabled coordinated efforts, primarily between the VMB and the US War Relief Services, that were focused on the resettlement of Eastern European DPs outside Europe. Simultaneously, it generated increasing interactions between Catholic humanitarian actors and representatives of international organisations. Drawing upon materials from ecclesiastical archives, intergovernmental documents and contemporary publications, this article highlights the complex entanglements between the Vatican and wider Catholic humanitarian actors and international officials and experts, especially those within the UN system (UNRRA and IRO). In doing so, it explores religious and secular visions of aid in the management of displacement and resettlement policies in Europe. By combining sources from the Vatican, UN and NCWC archives, this article helps to reframe our understanding of international humanitarianism in illuminating the interplay of competition and cooperation that shaped the evolution of post-war refugee relief and resettlement regimes within the emerging international order, increasingly during the outbreak of Cold War tensions. I argue that Catholic humanitarianism emerged as a key factor through which Catholics contributed to the construction of what David Brydan has termed the ‘Cold War West’.Footnote 37
Towards Resettlement: Catholic–UNRRA Engagements
‘The problem of displaced persons in Europe aroused the particular interest of the Holy See and [its] cooperation’ with international bodies entrusted with refugee relief operations.Footnote 38 With these words, delivered in 1947, Walter Carroll, a US priest attached to the Vatican Secretariat of State, recalled one of the most pressing humanitarian emergencies of the immediate post-war period. Indeed, the gravity and urgency of the refugee relief question had been recognised by Allied forces even prior to the end of hostilities. In June 1944, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) created the category of displaced persons to designate individuals ‘outside the national boundaries of their country by reason of war (1) desirous but unable to return home or find homes without assistance; (2) to be repatriated to enemy or former enemy territory’.Footnote 39 Driven by fears about the potentially catastrophic destabilisation of Europe in the wake of the war’s widespread destruction, violence and suffering, the Allied forces entrusted UNRRA with the task of overseeing relief and rehabilitation operations for DPs, while also collaborating with the agency to ensure their repatriation.Footnote 40 UNRRA thus emerged as the principal organisation managing the so-called DP camps – the assembly centres established in Germany, Austria and Italy where millions of displaced persons were relocated pending their repatriation. For that reason, the Vatican and Catholic aid organisations increasingly sought to strengthen their ties with UNRRA officials and personnel and, in doing so, foster closer cooperation in order to enhance their humanitarian efforts.
At the same time, UNRRA officials actively welcomed and facilitated the engagement of religious humanitarian organisations in DP camps, believing that spiritual support could encourage morally upright behaviour among refugees. As stated in an IRO pamphlet from 1951, ‘it was the voluntary agencies who initially pointed out the role that governments jointly had to play as the refugee problem became so overwhelming that voluntary efforts alone were not alone. Voluntary agencies quickly fitted into this new intergovernmental role as partners providing supplementary assistance.’Footnote 41 Alongside other churches and Christian NGOs active in DP camps, UNRRA was keen to partner with Vatican missions and WRS because UNRRA officials saw value in their global influence, moral authority and local parish networks, the latter of which could be used to distribute additional material aid, such as food, clothing, personal hygiene products, medicines, medical equipment and first aid kits targeted at ‘those in particular need’.Footnote 42 Moreover, WRS proved willing to cooperate with UNRRA, despite the fact that the intergovernmental organisation promoted a vision of secular and institutionalised humanitarianism.Footnote 43 WRS themselves began to adopt the professional language and methods of UNRRA, which reflected the broader post-war shift towards more structured humanitarian practices and ideologies. For instance, a report on WRS activities between 1945 and 1946 explicitly acknowledged this transformation, stating their commitment to organising ‘relief and rehabilitation programmes’ that encompassed ‘spiritual, recreational, educational and occupational assistance for all displaced persons, regardless of their faith, race, nationality or political affiliation’.Footnote 44
However, relations between Catholic humanitarian actors and UNRRA were not without tensions and ambiguities. One of the most contentious issues was UNRRA’s massive repatriation policy. As early as October 1944, an UNRRA pamphlet described the return of displaced persons to their homes as a ‘a job that must be done rapidly, . . . as soon as possible’.Footnote 45 Similarly, SHAEF viewed repatriation as the most desirable and effective solution to resolve the displacement crisis.Footnote 46 In the immediate aftermath of the war, the huge quantity of DPs and the complex mix of nationalities within DP camps became a growing concern for the occupying forces. They feared that this unprecedented mass of refugees could become a source of instability that had the potential to spark new conflicts and undermine post-war reconstruction efforts. As a result, in the months following the end of hostilities, UNRRA was charged with overseeing population processing and implementing large-scale repatriation programmes. Between spring and autumn 1945, an estimated six to seven million displaced persons were repatriated to their countries of origin, with the majority heading to Western Europe. However, repatriations to Central and Eastern Europe soon encountered major obstacles: logistical challenges, harsh winter conditions and widespread resistance among DPs – especially Eastern Europeans – who feared political persecution, religious repression or punishment as alleged collaborators under Stalin’s harsh policies.Footnote 47 The post-war expansion of Soviet borders further compounded these fears, as it led to the automatic imposition of Soviet citizenship on millions of individuals. Although many DPs returned to Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1947, over a million remained in UNRRA assembly centres in Germany, either unable or unwilling to repatriate.
With the intensifying Cold War, Western governments and humanitarian organisations increasingly focused their attention on this group of DPs, commonly referred to as the ‘last million’.Footnote 48 The stagnation of flows towards Eastern Europe prompted military forces to urge UNRRA officials to accelerate their repatriation operations because they were considered as ‘a matter of internationally agreed policy’.Footnote 49 Even Soviet authorities urged UNRRA to proceed as quickly as possible with the repatriation of Soviet citizens, demanding UNRRA personnel to make conditions in the assembly centres particularly harsh and unpleasant for those who refused to return. For its part, UNRRA staff sought to expedite repatriation efforts through alternative means. For instance, it introduced incentive-based programmes that offered larger food rations to those who voluntarily opted for repatriation, such as the so-called Operation Carrot, which aimed to encourage Polish DPs to return home.Footnote 50
UNRRA’s use of persuasive tactics to encourage repatriation ‘without panic or uproar’, as denounced in the Lithuanian Bulletin in 1947, drew considerable concern from the Holy See.Footnote 51 The issue of forced return emerged as a significant source of diplomatic tension. One striking example is a note submitted in December 1946 to Domenico Tardini, Substitute Secretary of State, by an anonymous clerk from the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs.Footnote 52 The document responded to a confidential UNRRA report recently acquired by the Vatican and specifically referred to Administrative Order no. 199, issued by John H. Whiting, UNRRA Director for the American zone. This Order instructed UNRRA personnel in Germany to promote the ‘speedy return of the greatest possible number of displaced persons to their homelands as quickly as possible’.Footnote 53 It specifically targeted ‘persons who lived within the boundaries of the Soviet Union prior to 1 September 1939 and persons from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and the Ukraine’.Footnote 54 The document further outlined the main guidelines of this repatriation programme, which focused on persuading DPs of the advantages of repatriation. For example, it encouraged the distribution of ‘Soviet proclamations, literature, films and newspapers’, as well as the organisation of ‘meetings with small groups (of DPs) and (Soviet Liaison) officers . . . to answer questions, provide information and discuss the mechanics of actual repatriation’.Footnote 55
As the note submitted to Tardini emphasised, the Holy See was particularly alarmed by attempts to ‘force refugees into repatriation’ through a pervasive campaign of pro-Soviet and pro-Communist propaganda within UNRRA-administered DP camps.Footnote 56In this document, the Vatican thus accused UNRRA staff of exploiting the ‘miserable moral and material conditions’ of DPs to ‘persuade them that resettlement in Western Europe or in countries outside Europe was almost impossible’, thereby presenting repatriation to the East as ‘their only means of escape and survival’.Footnote 57 These words underscored the Vatican’s anti-communist attitude in relation to managing refugee relief. Support for Eastern European DPs was not only a means of highlighting ‘the inadequacy of the Soviet social system’ but also a way to assert the Catholic Church’s political and moral influence across national borders at a time when the Eastern Bloc was consolidating under Soviet leadership.Footnote 58 In response to these concerns, Tardini forwarded the text of the Administrative Order to the Apostolic Delegate in the United States, Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, urging him to bring the matter to the attention of the US administration. He emphasised that the directive brought ‘great shame upon UNRRA and all governments that wielded any authority within this organisation’.Footnote 59
Similar criticisms were raised by US Catholics who had also intercepted the confidential UNRRA Administrative Order. In early December 1946, Francis X. Mayers, acting field director of the WRS in Heidelberg, submitted a note of protest to John Whiting, UNRRA director in the American zone in Germany. Mayers reaffirmed the firm opposition of the NCWC to ‘any programme or “drive”, or any policy deriving therefrom which tends to create in the minds of the Displaced Persons the feeling or the fear that enforced repatriation is taking place, about to take place, or is being acquiesced in by UNRRA’.Footnote 60 He further contended that UNRRA possessed neither the moral nor legal authority to pressure DPs into returning home through the dissemination of Soviet propaganda or the invitation of pro-repatriation spokesmen as officials into the camps. Mayers also objected to coercive measures being directed against camp leaders and UNRRA staff who opposed repatriation policies, as well as the use of material incentives to encourage return, namely in the form of additional clothing and food rations.
From mid-1946, the Vatican and NCWC began to align more closely in seeking alternatives to the forced repatriation of the so-called hard core displaced persons - those deemed by UNRRA and military authorities to be categorically unwilling to return. One of the primary goals for the Vatican and Catholic humanitarians was to mobilise international support for the ‘last million’ who continued to refuse repatriation. Calls for United Nations agencies to promote resettlement plans intensified from the autumn of 1946, as the end of UNRRA’s mandate and the anticipated closure of DP camps drew closer.Footnote 61 Once it became evident that, despite the strong opposition of the Soviets and their allies, resettlement would be placed at the core of the newly established IRO responsibilities, the Vatican and US Catholics emerged among the earliest and most active supporters of the overseas resettlement of DPs and other groups of refugees. Among the various international religious agencies cooperating with the IRO – such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the Church World Service, the Lutheran World Federation and the World Young Men’s Christian Association – WRS played a leading role in direct resettlement to the United States, securing 47,000 of the 125,000 assurances obtained by the DP Commission and all other agencies.Footnote 62
In September 1946, Giovanni Battista Montini, Vatican Substitute Secretary of State and future Pope Paul VI, addressed a confidential letter to Amleto Cicognani, urging him to encourage the US episcopate to ‘support the efforts of the Holy See’ in facilitating the resettlement of Eastern European DPs.Footnote 63 Montini articulated a twofold strategy: first, he called upon the WRS to assist Vatican relief agencies in identifying suitable destinations for the ‘hard core’ DPs. In particular, he emphasised the importance of involving clergy and WRS personnel in international resettlement operations, reflecting the broader strategy of the Holy See to proselytise among the displaced and reassert Christian values on a global scale.Footnote 64 Second, the NCWC was encouraged to exert pressure on the US government to implement immigration quotas for European refugees and advance anti-communist arguments to support resettlement plans. For the Vatican, migration policies became an important part of the Pope’s struggle against the perceived Soviet threat and served to foster closer cooperation with US Catholics. To this end, Montini proposed the establishment of a ‘Catholic Office for Immigrant Assistance’, intended to maintain direct contact with the competent public authorities and to provide practical support in meeting both the material and spiritual needs of incoming migrants.
Montini’s proposals received an immediate and enthusiastic response from US Church dignitaries. Already in March 1946, following allegations of the forthcoming termination of UNRRA’s activities, the NCWC had recognised the urgency of resettling the predominantly Catholic ‘hard core’ DPs – then estimated to be primarily Poles and Lithuanians and around 70–75 per cent of the 400,000 DPs still in Germany and Austria – and began drafting plans for a ‘Catholic Commission for the Resettlement’ of DPs.Footnote 65 This body, intended to operate in coordination with the Holy See, would be tasked with overseeing both the relocation and integration of Catholic DPs beyond Europe. Among the potential destinations for resettlement, the NCWC was nearly unanimous in prioritising Canada, the United States and South America. As noted in an internal WRS report, ‘clearly, the future redistribution of European population will be primarily focused upon the Western Hemisphere, even though substantial settlements may also be effected in Africa and Australasia’.Footnote 66 To this end, the NCWC also deemed it ‘urgently necessary’ to establish close collaboration with all the major stakeholders who were involved in resettlement operations, including the military authorities, the US Department of State, host-country governments, UNRRA and the new international agency that was set to replace it.Footnote 67
The proposal for such a Commission was formally introduced by Cardinal Samuel Alphonsius Stritch, Archbishop of Chicago, in a letter sent on 30 March 1946 to the bishops of the most prominent US dioceses, inviting their opinions on the matter. The initiative was generally well received, with archival sources reflecting a shared consensus within the NCWC on relocating displaced persons outside Europe. Particularly striking was the response of Cardinal Francis Spellman, Archbishop of New York:
We are all fully aware of our Holy Father’s deep and abiding interest in the matter, and of the fact that he looks primarily to America for help in this as in all the other problems involved in the chaotic situation abroad. . . . It seems to me that a Commission should be set up . . . to marshal assistance of people here in the United States and Canada and in some of the South American countries which might be willing to receive these people.Footnote 68
These views were broadly echoed throughout the US episcopate. As Richard James Cushing, Archbishop of Boston, also stated, resettlement was ‘a matter to which the National Catholic Welfare Conference, for reasons of humanitarianism and of religion, should devote its best efforts’.Footnote 69 Simultaneously, the creation of the ‘Catholic Committee on the Resettlement of Displaced Persons’ was received ‘with great interest’ by Pope Pius XII himself, as reported by Monsignor Tardini in a letter to Cicognani dated 9 January 1947.Footnote 70 The high proportion of Catholic DPs, coupled with the pressing need to prevent their forced repatriation to Eastern Europe, prompted the Holy See to actively support WRS initiatives in the field of resettlement. According to Tardini:
The American continent, more than any other part of the world, can offer these unfortunate people a hospitable and generous welcome, a future of prosperity and peace. . . . It is both consoling and moving that the most noble Episcopate of the United States, faithfully followed by the clergy and the Catholic faithful, is making every effort . . . to procure for them (the victims of the war) a stable and secure refuge both in North America and in the other countries of the continent.Footnote 71
With these words, Tardini sought to enhance collaboration with US Catholics in the field of resettlement, fully aware of their pivotal role in not only organising the initial overseas movement of DPs but also facilitating their integration within host countries. Beyond the long-standing tradition of Christian charity and the evangelical imperative to assist all those in need regardless of nationality, faith or political affiliation, anti-communism constituted a significant driving force behind resettlement efforts. Among the ‘last million’ still housed in assembly centres, both the Vatican and Catholic humanitarian actors prioritised support for DPs from Central and Eastern Europe who were able to demonstrate their anti-communist stance and allegiance to the Catholic Church. The stories of ‘hard core’ DPs were seen as a potent means of reinforcing the Vatican’s crusade against communism through the dissemination of information about their sufferings and sacrifice in fleeing a Soviet-led East, as well as the religious persecution endured under communist regimes.Footnote 72
In this context, it was deemed essential to raise awareness among the Catholic faithful regarding the issue of displacement - not merely through donations and prayers but also through their active mobilisation in support of the reception and integration of incoming DPs. The WRS emerged as the most active Catholic aid organisation in this sphere. In November 1947, it promoted the establishment of the ‘National Catholic Resettlement Council’, which was conceived as ‘an advisory body which (was) representative of the leading Catholic organisations and laymen in the United States in the problem presented by the Displaced Persons’.Footnote 73 One of the Council’s first major initiatives, launched in March 1948, was the ‘US Catholic Resettlement Program’, an ambitious propaganda campaign designed to serve a dual purpose:
1. To inform our Catholic people concerning their moral responsibilities as Americans and as Catholics to the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons residing in and out of the camps in Germany, Austria and Italy.
2. To conduct a survey throughout parishes to determine exactly how many of them can assist in resettling displaced persons either as a family or as individuals.Footnote 74
As a result, the Council distributed over 15,000 ‘Parish Publicity Kits’ to priests across major US dioceses. These kits included detailed information regarding the DPs scheduled to emigrate, as well as practical guidelines for raising parishioners’ awareness of and encouraging their active participation in resettlement efforts. Priests, for instance, were provided with a model sermon and urged to stress in their Sunday homilies that the inability of many DPs to return to their homelands was ‘fundamentally a Catholic issue’ that largely stemmed from their religious convictions.Footnote 75 Following mass, parishioners were also invited to complete questionnaires indicating whether they had relatives or acquaintances among the DPs still interned in Europe, as well as whether they would be willing to offer housing or employment. In addition to highlighting the potential socio-economic benefits of DP resettlement, particularly in alleviating labour shortages in agriculture and other low-skilled sectors, the Parish Publicity Kits also underscored the broader political and moral imperatives of Catholic engagement. As one document from the kit pointed out: ‘America’s position of world preeminence requires us as believers in democracy and basic freedoms to give refuge to a number of these Displaced Persons’.Footnote 76
The initiatives undertaken by US Catholics were not confined to facilitating the resettlement of displaced persons within the United States. Rather, they sought to support the migration of European DPs to other destinations, especially in Latin America. In this framework, the Holy See resolved to support the work of the WRS by establishing an organisation under the direct authority of the Vatican Secretariat of State: the Vatican Migration Bureau (VMB). Founded in 1947, it played a central role in coordinating Catholic resettlement operations on a global scale, seeking to integrate Catholic humanitarians into the emerging international humanitarian landscape and to articulate their interests within the developing framework of UN agencies – most notably, the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organisation (PCIRO). The intensifying Cold War enhanced these interactions, as the issue of refugee resettlement became a focal point of the ideological conflict between Soviet and pro-Western delegates. The former strongly advocated for the continuation of repatriation policies – including, at times, forced return – while the latter expressed greater support for the resettlement of so-called hard core DPs. In this contested arena, the Vatican and Catholic activists redoubled their efforts not merely to facilitate their ongoing relief activities but also to influence the institutional architecture of post-war international humanitarian governance, advocating for coordinated resettlement schemes that would afford particular protection to Catholic DPs from Eastern Europe.
From Geneva to South America: The Transnational Network of the Vatican Migration Bureau
The establishment of the IRO marked a significant shift in the involvement of private associations in refugee relief, as they were increasingly encouraged to collaborate with the new UN agency in shaping and delivering resettlement programmes. At the same time, the IRO itself demonstrated a willingness to partner with non-state actors, notably churches and Christian NGOs. Their involvement in assisting DPs was explicitly acknowledged in an IRO report, which observed that ‘most refugees are more conscious of their Church affiliation than their national origin’ and underscored the role of faith-based organisations in distributing supplies and performing resettlement services.Footnote 77 In 1948, for instance, the Lutheran World Federation launched a resettlement programme in cooperation with the IRO, which, by the end of 1951, successfully relocated nearly all Lutheran DPs from Central Europe. Similarly, the World Council of Churches, during its first assembly in 1948, urged UN agencies to ‘relieve the plight of DPs’, initiating operations that by 1951 had supported the resettlement of over 85,000 displaced persons to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South America and the United States.Footnote 78 The most significant efforts in the resettlement field, however, were undertaken by the NCWC. Between 1946 and 1951, working in partnership with local Caritas branches and Catholic charities, WRS helped resettle 115,000 DPs in the United States and supported the emigration of a further 5,000 to other countries.
Alongside these organisations, many of which had previously worked with the UNRRA, the IRO also sought to strengthen its relationship with the Holy See. This collaboration was considered vital, not only because approximately two-thirds of the last million DPs were Catholics but also due to the increasingly prominent role the Vatican was assuming in coordinating Catholic aid agencies in supporting the migration of those unwilling to be repatriated. Although the Holy See had launched humanitarian missions in assembly centres across Italy, Germany and Austria as early as the immediate post-war period, it was only in early 1947 that a more structured intervention strategy took shape, with resettlement emerging as the principal objective.Footnote 79 In the spring of that year, shortly before the launch of the IRO’s Preparatory Commission, the Secretariat of State initiated plans for the creation of a Vatican body intended to serve as ‘the sole administrative and directing centre of the Church’s interest in this project of resettlement and migration’.Footnote 80 As Montini explained to Cicognani in September 1947, the intention was to establish an organisation charged, on the one hand, with ‘assisting and encouraging, by all possible means, those efforts by the (IRO) aimed at finding a just and satisfactory solution’ to the displacement crisis; and, on the other, with ‘stimulating the active interest of ecclesiastical authorities, Nuncios and Apostolic Delegates throughout the world in this programme’, thereby promoting the formation of national Catholic immigration committees working in close coordination with the Holy See.Footnote 81
The establishment of the Vatican Migration Bureau, officially inaugurated in Geneva in October 1947, reflected this dual mandate. Operating under the Secretariat of State, the VMB did not provide direct assistance but functioned as ‘a liaison and coordinating body’.Footnote 82 Its primary aim was to facilitate ‘communication between Rome and Geneva and between Geneva and Vatican missions in the occupied zones of Austria and Germany’, thereby fostering information flows and links among Catholic organisations involved in refugee relief.Footnote 83 This was intended not only to reinforce the Catholic presence within the IRO but also to enhance the overall coherence and effectiveness of Catholic humanitarian efforts. While maintaining their operational autonomy, Catholic aid agencies were required to inform the VMB of their activities, thus enabling the Bureau to coordinate their operations on a global scale. Moreover, VMB expected that each organisation would recognise it as the sole intermediary with the IRO, asserting that the influence of Catholic humanitarians depended upon their unity. As an internal report from 1947 noted: ‘the objective is immense; a dispersion of energies due to lack of coordination cannot be risked’.Footnote 84
The appointment of Edward J. Killion as director of the new organisation was emblematic of these ambitions. As a US priest of Irish descent belonging to the Redemptorist congregation, Killion had studied in Poland for several years and served as a military chaplain with US forces, first in the Pacific and later in Casablanca during the war.Footnote 85 His nomination was considered strategically advantageous for several reasons: in primis, his military experience and US citizenship were seen as assets in facilitating contacts with the occupying authorities and officials at the IRO – especially given that, as a 1948 VMB report noted, ‘the United States (contributed) approximately 60% of the IRO’s budget and under such circumstances, liaison was more easily conducted by an American’.Footnote 86 Killion’s linguistic proficiency and ‘sociable character’, attested to by Nuncio Bernardini in a 1952 letter to Montini, were also viewed as valuable in navigating the diplomatic environment of Geneva.Footnote 87
As early as May 1947, Montini had dispatched Killion to Geneva with the explicit task of acting as the ‘Vatican’s spokesman’ to the IRO, overseeing the preparatory work of the new intergovernmental body and ‘negotiating and intervening in all matters concerning the protection of Catholic refugees as a whole’.Footnote 88 The resettlement of Catholic DPs quickly became a central objective of the VMB. Alongside its lobbying efforts in Geneva, the Bureau developed an extensive network of liaison and coordination among Catholic aid agencies that were engaged in refugee relief. Regional committees were established across key destination continents – Europe, the Americas and Oceania – although the bulk of operations focused on the first two.Footnote 89 In Europe, the VMB itself oversaw the transfer of hard core DPs to Western countries such as Belgium, France, Ireland, Portugal, the UK, Spain and Switzerland. In the Americas, two regional committees were formed: one under the direction of Edward Swanstrom, responsible for overseeing migration to Canada and the United States; the other led by Paolo Bertoli, who coordinated the National Catholic Committees for Migration across Latin America. The overarching aim was to forge a robust network of relations enabling the VMB, through its representatives, ‘to negotiate more effectively with the officials of IRO . . . in regard to the selection and resettlement of all displaced persons’.Footnote 90
This strategy proved especially relevant in South America – a region that, since 1946, both US officials and the Catholic Church had regarded as ‘the best hope’ for the resettlement of DPs.Footnote 91 Compared to the United States’ restrictive quotas, Latin America’s more open immigration policies and predominantly Catholic populations fostered expectations that the Church could influence governments, shape favourable public opinion towards the reception of European DPs and establish local organisations for their care and welfare. Negotiations over South American resettlement operations began after the fourth session of the UNRRA General Council in Atlantic City, where Colonel Tyler Wood, representing the US government, proposed the closure of most assembly centres in the American zones of Germany and Austria by 31 August 1946.Footnote 92 To avert this outcome, Edward Swanstrom and Samuel A. Stritch arranged a meeting with President Truman in April 1946. Besides advocating to keep the assembly centres open, they argued that South America offered ‘the greatest opportunity’ for post-war resettlement, with the Catholic Church deemed ‘in the best position to bring help’.Footnote 93 This stance also resonated among some US officials. In early 1946, Joseph Chamberlain and George Warren – chairman of the National Refugee Services and US representative to the PCIRO respectively – urged John O’Grady, General Secretary of the US National Conference of Catholic Charities, to press the WRS to consider the possibilities for the resettlement of DPs in South America.Footnote 94
This issue became central to the emergence of a complex interplay of actors, both religious and institutional, and to the intensification of competitive and collaborative dynamics involving Catholic humanitarians, the Holy See, national governments and intergovernmental agencies. Following the meeting with Truman and US officials, WRS requested that the Vatican Secretariat of State issue ‘a special communication’ to the Apostolic Nuncios in South America, urging them ‘to solicit the interest of the Church authorities in various South American countries in this problem’.Footnote 95 At the same time, the Holy See was informed of a WRS plan to dispatch a special mission to Latin America with a dual objective: first, to develop a long-term resettlement programme for European displaced persons; and second, ‘to work with the Catholic authorities in the Latin-American countries for the immediate reception and placement of displaced persons arriving’.
This initiative aroused considerable interest within the Holy See. On 27 September 1946, the Vatican Secretariat of State formally instructed the Nuncios of South American countries ‘in regard to the responsibility of the Church throughout the world to assist in finding new homes for the very large number of displaced persons who had been forced to leave their own countries by governments hostile to their Catholic faith’.Footnote 96 Motivated by a strong anti-communist stance, Montini subsequently welcomed the Anglo-American proposal to cooperate in the resettlement of DPs in South America with ‘great readiness’. In November of that year, he wrote to the Apostolic Delegate Cicognani encouraging him to foster closer cooperation with the WRS on this issue. Accordingly, in the same month, WRS officials James Norris and Andrew Landi – serving as Director of WRS European operations and WRS Representative in Italy respectively – held consultations in London with representatives of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), the first international refugee agency responsible for the resettlement of DPs who were unwilling or unable to repatriate.Footnote 97 These meetings resulted in a formal agreement regarding the maritime relocation of approximately 500 European displaced persons to Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay, with the transfer scheduled for early 1947.Footnote 98 According to IGCR officials, WRS ‘could render a real service by sending representatives to all Latin American countries’ to prepare a long-term resettlement programme. Thanks to its far-reaching network of clergy and missionaries, coupled with the Vatican’s global power of influence, IGCR officials considered that the Catholic Church held a unique capacity to facilitate the reception and integration of European DPs into Latin American societies.
Launched in January 1947 under the leadership of John O’Grady, the WRS mission operated in several South American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay. Its primary focus was, in O’Grady’s words, ‘the effort to find new homes for the displaced persons of Europe’.Footnote 99 To this end, the mission not only facilitated the reception and placement of approximately 1,000 displaced persons in Argentina and 500 in Brazil but also worked closely with both government and local Church authorities ‘for the opening of channels for the acceptance of larger number (of DPs) in the future’. While the WRS was recognised as being able to make ‘a very essential contribution to this movement’ – particularly due to its technical experience in refugee relief and access to US-based material resources – it was nonetheless acknowledged that the leadership of the Holy See would be indispensable to the overall success of the programme. As O’Grady himself observed:
The mission of WRS believed that it was part of a world-wide movement operating under the guidance of the Holy See in a great work of international charity. In its efforts in Latin America . . . it emphasised that the work in which it was engaged was very close to the heart of the Holy Father: that it was a work that involved the whole position of the Holy See and the Church throughout the world.Footnote 100
The WRS mission in South America played a pivotal role in prompting the Holy See to establish an international Catholic relief organisation under the direct oversight of the Vatican Secretariat of State, as evidenced in the correspondence exchanged in mid-1947 between Montini, Archbishop Cicognani and WRS officials.Footnote 101 In July, for example, John O’Grady travelled to Rome to present Montini with a report on his mission and to discuss ways of enhancing the Catholic Church’s involvement in broader resettlement efforts.Footnote 102 On the one hand, O’Grady considered the proposed establishment of the VMB as essential for coordinating ‘contact with all Catholic organisations throughout the world for the purpose of stimulating the interest of the Universal Church in promoting the resettlement of displaced persons’.Footnote 103 On the other hand, he regarded the VMB as a crucial instrument for engaging with the IRO, which in 1947 formally assumed the responsibilities previously held by the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. One of the Holy See’s initial priorities, therefore, was to reach ‘an understanding with IRO in regard to the continued responsibility of the VMB in working with the Church and with governments in Latin America in regard to the resettlement of displaced persons’.Footnote 104 Within this framework, the WRS emerged as a key interlocutor, recognised for its operational experience and established networks across both ecclesiastical and diplomatic channels.
The WRS’s intricate web of connections with international humanitarian agencies significantly enhanced the VMB’s capacity to function as a coordinating intermediary with the newly formed IRO. A notable example of this dynamic was the mediating role played by O’Grady following the second session of the Preparatory Commission of the IRO in July 1947. Faced with Killion’s marked pessimism regarding the prospects for formal recognition of the VMB by the new intergovernmental agency, O’Grady succeeded in arranging an extended private audience with Arthur Altmeyer, Executive Secretary of the PCIRO. Following this meeting, O’Grady believed he had made ‘meaningful progress in advancing Killion’s cause’.Footnote 105 His assessment was later substantiated during an exchange between Killion and two senior PCIRO officials – William Hallam Tuck and Arthur Rucker, the latter serving as Altmeyer’s assistant. Both acknowledged that the IRO was acutely aware of its need for what they termed ‘moral prestige’, particularly in the South American context.Footnote 106 For that reason, IRO officials did not exclude the possibility of drawing upon the authority of the Holy See to reinforce its diplomatic relations with governments such as those of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela. In light of this, they expressed a clear willingness to explore closer collaboration with the VMB.
Although Killion never secured formal accreditation, by 1948 his position within the IRO had come to resemble that of an ‘official observer representing a non-member government’ – a status that permitted attendance at private hearings.Footnote 107 While, on the advice of Killion and Bernardini, as well as certain senior IRO officials such as Pierre Jacobsen, the Holy See refrained from pressing the issue of formal representation, this did not preclude a gradual process of rapprochement with the IRO.Footnote 108 As Rucker affirmed to Killion, the Holy See was regarded as ‘a global religious institution, whose cooperation was essential and whose assistance (IRO officials were) profoundly grateful for’.Footnote 109 These statements were received with evident approval by the Vatican Secretariat of State, which sought to assume a more prominent and influential role within the international humanitarian landscape. As O’Grady had already observed in a letter to Swanstrom following a three-day visit to Rome in July 1947, ‘the Vatican (was) eager to be involved in as many international organisations as possible’.Footnote 110 In this context, refugee relief was characterised as a valuable opportunity to enhance the Catholic Church’s international standing.
Conclusion
‘A great challenge for the Catholic church’.Footnote 111 These words, employed by John O’Grady in a report entitled The Holy See and Displaced Persons, were emblematic of the efforts undertaken by US Catholic humanitarians in the field of refugee relief and resettlement following the Second World War. As demonstrated, their intervention was underpinned by two primary objectives: first, to foster transnational Catholic aid networks that were capable of addressing post-war displacement in alignment with the Vatican’s political, diplomatic and humanitarian agenda; and second, to strengthen the position of Catholic humanitarianism in relation to both secular and other faith-based non-governmental organisations, thereby ensuring that Catholic ideology and interests were embedded within the emerging international refugee regime. Simultaneously, the onset of the Cold War compelled both the Holy See and the broader Catholic humanitarian network to focus their attention on Eastern European DPs fleeing the Soviet Union or refusing repatriation. Rather than solely addressing the immediate needs of the ‘last million’ remaining in DP camps, the establishment of the VMB was particularly directed towards the configuration of long-term resettlement schemes. These initiatives sought to involve not only local and regional clergy but also national authorities and IRO officials. As evidenced by the complex constellation of actors engaged in resettlement programmes in Latin America and by the WRS’s domestic propaganda campaigns in the United States, it became crucial not only to coordinate the activities of various Catholic aid agencies but also to lobby national and intergovernmental institutions to expand immigration quotas, prioritise Catholic DPs, provide adequate spiritual support and ensure their effective integration through housing, employment and social acceptance.
This article suggests that the hitherto neglected role of the Vatican and Catholic humanitarians in assisting and resettling European DPs offers a valuable lens through which to nuance our understanding of international humanitarianism in the post-war period. Existing scholarship has extensively examined the ways in which refugee relief served as one of many channels through which Cold War ideologies were disseminated by institutions and experienced by ordinary individuals. Yet, the management of mass displacement and the development of the international refugee regime were not solely the purview of states or intergovernmental bodies. Alongside other NGOs and voluntary agencies – both secular and religious – I argue that Catholic humanitarians had an impact upon this process and helped to shape the Early Cold War context. Beyond addressing the immediate suffering of the displaced and offering them material and spiritual support, Catholic humanitarian efforts also aimed to promote a particular vision of the post-war order that was rooted in Christian principles and anti-communism. A similar objective persisted as new crises erupted beyond Europe in the early 1950s. As the issue of European DPs was no longer at the centre stage of international refugee relief, Catholic humanitarians began to turn their attention to Christian refugees fleeing from communism in Hong Kong, Korea and Vietnam. As David Brydan has pointed out, this humanitarian effort was explicitly linked to Cold War dynamics and reinforced the nexus between refugee relief and the defence of the ‘Christian West’ that was threatened by the materialism and anti-religious policies of communist regimes.Footnote 112
Another implication of this analysis is that understanding Catholic involvement in international refugee relief and resettlement requires close attention to the interplay of actors. The Catholic Church did not operate as a monolithic or isolated body but engaged in a complex relationship of both collaboration and competition with intergovernmental institutions. In turn, organisations such as UNRRA and IRO influenced Vatican approaches, for instance encouraging the Holy See to complement traditional papal charity with a transnational structure and to deepen its ties with the WRS, which was the most aligned with UNRRA among the Catholic agencies and most receptive to a more modern, professional model of humanitarianism. Ultimately, this article sheds light on how the Vatican and Catholic humanitarians, while adapting to a US-dominated international humanitarian order, promoted a Christian vision of post-war reconstruction and, in doing so, established themselves as vital and multifaceted actors within the political and cultural making of contemporary Europe.
Acknowledgements
I would like to sincerely thank the editors of the journal and the anonymous reviewers, as well as Professor Adriano Roccucci, Professor Silvia Salvatici and Dr. Katarzyna Nowak for their valuable feedback on this article.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
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