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On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Leonard D. Katz
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139. lkatz@athena.mit.edu

Abstract

One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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