The essay challenges Karl Polanyi's position—that ancient Near Eastern economies knew state and temple administration but not price-making markets. It is found that the prerequisite functions of a market economy listed by Polanyi—the allocation of consumer goods, land, and labor through the supply-demand-price mechanism; risk-bearing organized as a market function; and loan markets—were all present in the ancient Near East. Although Polanyi criticized stage theories with their “predilection for continuity” he imposed his own version of continuity on history in lumping together many thousands of years under the rubric of “archaic society.” This perspective prevented him from recognizing that ancient Mesopotamia experienced lengthy and significant periods of unfettered market activity as well as periods of pervasive state regulation.

Prevailing theory regards subsistence or pastoral agriculture as a prerequisite for the spread of proto-industry. Commercial agriculture and proto-industrialization are viewed as incompatible. The expansion of the cotton industry in the pays de Caux, a fertile cereal-producing region in Normandy, contradicts the theory and indicates that seasonal unemployment and landleness, not subsistence agriculture, were the distinguishing features of proto-industrial regions. When these regions were located near market towns, the peasants' need for off-season work complemented the growing demand of eighteenth-century merchants for a large labor supply and determined the location of proto-industries.

Data from the manuscript census of Social Statistics and the Parker-Gallman sample are used to investigate (1) the role of yield fluctuations (the crop year) in both the growth of cotton and corn output from 1849 to 1859 and (2) the observed relative agricultural total factor productivity relationships in the antebellum South in 1859. The major conclusions are: (1) More than 20 percent of the growth in cotton output from 1849 to 1859 can be attributed to differences in the relative crop years; (2) The 1859 cotton crop year for the New South was much better than that in 1849, but the cotton crop year in the Old South was relatively poor; (3) Adjusting for the relative crop year eliminates much of the observed productivity advantage for slave agriculture; (4) The issue of whether the crop-year-adjusted or crop-year-unadjusted results are more representative of antebellum southern agriculture remains unresolved.

My archival studies in Egyptian banks reveal that nominal interest rates charged by foreign financial capital in Egypt fell strongly as compared with European rates throughout the period 1882–1914. Interest differentials declined by 2 to 2 ½ percent. This is explained by the increasing confidence of European investors with British occupation and policies. To explain the large inflow of financial capital after 1900 a sharp decline in real interest rates, related to the upsurge of agricultural prices, is posited. The case offers interesting parallels to present-day problems of excessive indebtedness in Third World countries.

Farm foreclosures in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s reached heights never previously or since exceeded. In this paper hypotheses are proposed and tested to account for the cross-state variation in farm foreclosures during the interwar period. Foreclosures are modeled to depend on depressed farm earnings throughout the 1920s and 1930s, optimistic agricultural expansion brought on by World War I, and cross-state variation in mortgage debt structure. The empirical results are consistent with the proposed multiple causal model.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s southern landlords began to replace sharetenants and mules with wage laborers and large-scale preharvest machinery. Informed observers in the 1920s did not expect this to happen until the advent of the mechanical cotton picker, which came after World War I. This paper presents evidence supporting the claim that the AAA policies of the 1930s, and the economic depression they were designed to cure, induced this tenant displacement by increasing the asset value of land rights without securing tenants a share right, and by relaxing the harvest labor constraint that had previously impeded mechanization.

Developments in industrial organization contributed to the lack of diversification in Britain's older industrial areas during the interwar period. The large-scale firm had not yet developed in appropriate industries to the point where large numbers of branch plants could be sent to the depressed areas (as they were after World War II), even if interwar macroeconomic policy had been more expansionary. At the industry level, barriers to new entrants and restrictive practices were high in the 1930s, precisely the period when the need for structural change in the depressed areas was most apparent.

The literature on the development of American industrial research suggests that during the twentieth century large firms “dominated” industrial research, and reaped the majority of the benefits from such activity. This paper utilizes new data to analyze both the relationship between firm size and research employment and the impact of research activity on firm growth and survival during 1921–1946. The results suggest that large firms were no more research-intensive than were small firms during the 1921–1946 period. Research activity significantly enhanced the probability of firms' survival among the ranks of the 200 largest manufacturing firms during 1921–1946. Research employment also improved the growth performance of both large and small firms during 1933–1946.