Economic interventionism in the form of subsidization and operation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is today among the main frontlines of international trade conflicts. Along with trade restrictions and new legislation designed to impact cross-border investment, mergers, and acquisitions, the use of subsidies and countervailing measures by governments and trade-distorting effects of SOEs have lately caused harsh controversies within and outside the World Trade Organization (WTO) between its members. Going forward, there are reasons to expect these tensions to intensify rather than diminish in number and importance. This Special Issue aims at examining the development of international trade rules regulating state interventionism against the background of the Covid-19 global pandemic and present shifts in global geopolitics and the economy. This introduction, in presenting the state of the art on the questions tackled by this Special Issue and highlighting its contribution to existing literature on the topic, offers different considerations aimed at bringing together various trends emerging from the Articles contained in this Special Issue. It also explores avenues for further research and reflection.

This Article contributes to the discussion about the development of international trade regulation of state interventionism by situating the tensions that exist about the future design of subsidies and state enterprises treaty regulation in the broader context of current systemic challenges to the multilateral trading system. While recent studies have explored the issues of subsidies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as one of the most significant in impact among the contemporary challenges to the WTO, there is certainly scope to discuss further such a problem from the broader point of view of the crisis of the multilateral trading system, its systemic challenges and the concomitant increasing politicization of international trade relations. To this end, this Article analyzes the interactions between the lasting decline of the WTO, growing political interferences with international trade flows and the prospects of reforming multilateral trade rules to address its systemic challenges and manage/mitigate newly central problems of the 21st century such as the Covid-19 Pandemic, climate change and the greening of economic production and international trade. The Article argues that existing WTO rules are not adequate to address these challenges and problems. It concludes that, like in the GATT era, it is only the spirit of pragmatism that may provide chances to find alternatives to growing frustration with negotiating inaction and, hence, to reform the system. However, the question remains whether it is possible to find an approach to imagine, remodel and craft multilateral rules that are sensitive to different economic, political, and social choices and able to rebalance the position of all members, large and small, rich and poor.

International trade law has long been the site of a battle over who or what the state can represent. Today, that battle is taking a new form. While for decades the WTO was considered a centerpiece of the international economic order, the policy landscape is now awash with claims that the US should abandon WTO disciplines, critiques of the WTO as the vehicle for a coherent neoliberalism, and concerns about the implications of trade law for domestic industry, democratic participation, climate action, and national security. While I am a long-standing critic of trade law’s excesses, I don’t see that sudden shift as a cause for celebration. In order to understand why, I argue that it is necessary to pay careful attention to the different forms the battle for the state at the WTO has taken. This article explores the conditions and stakes of three key moments in that battle – the negotiation of the GATT and the era of decolonization, the end of the Cold War and the creation of the WTO, and the recent transformations caused by the decline of US power, the rise of China, and the systemic shock of climate change. I conclude that we cannot automatically apply critiques developed in earlier eras to the current situation.

This Article discusses existing WTO rules on subsidies and state enterprises, relevant caselaw and reform prospects in light of key geopolitical developments and changes in the global economy emerging in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Following a general introduction, the Article critically analyzes present WTO rules on industrial subsidies, focusing inter alia on the new problems raised by activist industrial policies pursued by global trading powers, foreign subsidization, the climate change shock and environmental exigencies. It then shifts attention to the application of WTO rules on subsidies to the state sector and the increasing demands for new international trade rules on non-subsidies measures to address the negative spillover effects on trade from government influence on state-owned enterprises (SOEs). With respect to each of these matters, the Article first clarifies the terms of the problem in relation to existing WTO rules and caselaw, and next examines the question of how, and to what extent, “deeper” free trade agreements (FTAs)—those that experts designate as models for WTO reforms on the matter—establish new rules that permit to adequately address the trade concerns raised by SOEs’ commercial and financial activities. Based on this multi-layered analysis, the article concludes by examining prospects of reform of WTO rules on state interventionism.

This Article critically analyzes seven elements of the Biden administration trade policy: (1) buy American; (2) tariffs; (3) World Trade Organization; (4) free trade agreements; (5) China; (6) technology; and (7) Russia. Although President Biden has made a clean break from Trump policies in many areas, this is not the case when it comes to international trade. Regretfully, Biden has chosen to keep in place most of the failed trade policies of his predecessor—the Trump tariffs and the China trade war. It is not too late to shift ground, to negotiate mutual abolition of the Trump tariffs, to open free trade negotiations with the EU and UK, to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, to adopt a multilateral strategy with allies to check Chinese trade excesses, and to reengage with the World Trade Organization. Topping the list of needed reforms of the multilateral trading system are: (1) subsidies; (2) state-owned enterprises; and (3) forced technology transfer. These are best addressed through a WTO plurilateral agreement and/or preferential trade agreements. The Biden administration should prioritize these urgent reforms. Rather than promoting “free” trade and multilateral trade reforms, the Biden administration continues its predecessor’s nationalistic policies so that trade serves domestic political ends. Such state intervention in trade policy consists of the strategic use of tariffs, subsidies, “buy American” rules, and regional trade arrangements without regard to the rules of the multilateral trading system. These new policies represent a decisive retreat from globalization and openness to trade.

The Congress, directed by the Biden administration, has adopted a far-reaching industrial policy in the form of four laws that subsidize key sectors of the U.S. economy: American Rescue Plan Act ($40 billion); Infrastructure and Jobs Act ($1.2 trillion); Inflation Reduction Act ($369 billion); and Chips Act ($252.7 billion). This subsidization coupled with “buy American” protectionism constitute a departure from the free trade ideal that has characterized U.S. policy since the end of World War II.

Much ink has been splashed on the ideological, conceptual, and practical challenges that China’s state capitalism has posed to global trade rules. There is a growing perception that the current international trade rules are neither conceptually coherent nor practically effective in tackling China’s state capitalism. This perception has not only led to the emergence of new trade rules in regional trade agreements, but also culminated in the US-China trade war, only further aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic. This Article contributes to the debate of what trade rules may be needed to counteract China’s state capitalism by unpacking the black box of China’s state capitalism. Based on an analysis of the nature of China’s state capitalism, this Article provides a preliminary evaluation of current trade rules taken to counteract China’s state capitalism, in particular the new rules in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and explain why they are unlikely to be successful.

This Article critically analyzes the main legal and policy issues that are likely to determine the development of the EU’s trade policy concerning rules on State intervention in the market, specifically on subsidies and SOEs. The article assesses the aforementioned issue especially within the context of the new trade strategy entitled “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy” set out by the European Commission in February 2021, at the core of which stands the concept of strategic autonomy. The focus of our analysis is on key elements of the current EU competition and trade policies and normative initiatives, namely: the relaxation of the usual State aid regime under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU to give Member States more flexibility in supporting their economies and strengthen EU industrial policy; the likelihood of EU proposals resulting in any substantial change to international trade law on subsidies and SOEs at the multilateral (WTO) level; a systemic horizontal investigation into the relevant trade rules promoted by the EU in its most recent practice of PTAs; and, finally, the EU pursuing stronger protection of its companies with its recently announced new regulation on foreign subsidies, on the basis of which the European Commission can investigate foreign subsidies and impose remedies. Even though, at first sight, it may seem that the current evolution of the EU trade policy on these issues seems inconsistent, the Article argues that the unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral approaches are indeed strictly intertwined, and they reveal a significant shift in the most recent EU trade policy objective in relation to the role of State in the market.

The international economic order is undergoing significant change. Most recently, key countries have been seeking to increase their level of economic security, including through increased industrial subsidies. Regulating subsidies is controversial, but undisciplined subsidy payments could be harmful for the healthy functioning of markets and balanced development among nations. In this regard, the GATT-WTO has regulated subsidies, but it has not been fully functional in recent years, and reform efforts do not appear to be bearing fruit soon. Therefore, in parallel with WTO reform efforts, reliance on other approaches, such as discipline through free trade agreements (FTAs), should be considered. Disciplining subsidies through FTAs is inherently difficult, given the cross-border nature of subsidies on the one hand and the geographical limitations of the FTA’s scope of application on the other. In recent years, however, such disciplines in FTAs have begun to appear, starting with EU FTAs. Thus, this article explores the possibilities and limitations of the discipline of subsidies through FTAs, using Japan’s FTAs as a case study, to approach the path to international control of subsidies. Accordingly, this article first reviews the range of related issues and developments, including characteristics of subsidies, the rationale for subsidy discipline in trade agreements, recent challenges to multilateral subsidy discipline, the current status of subsidy discipline through FTAs, and the background of subsidy discipline in EU FTAs. The article then identifies the WTO-plus elements that are distinct to subsidy disciplines in EU FTAs and discusses their implications. Through these, it highlights the perspectives needed when considering subsidy discipline through FTAs, examines Japan’s FTAs in light of these perspectives, and presents the findings and implications thereof. Considerations are given to Japan’s FTA/trade policy as a background for its subsidy discipline through FTAs, the current status and characteristics of subsidy disciplines in Japan’s FTAs, the Agreement Between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership’s (JPN-EU) subsidy-related provisions as drastic change, the effects on the Asia-Pacific region, and future prospects.

Recent years have seen a proliferation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in developed and developing countries. Developed in Europe in its modern shape, most SEZs are located outside the continent today, notably in the developing world, where SEZs form part of these countries’ export-oriented growth policy tools and overall economic development. At a period of growing unilateralism and the return of the State as an economic actor, this contribution seeks to tackle the rise of SEZ laws in the global south, with a particular focus on Africa. It will scrutinize the reasons for their establishment, the measures chosen to promote them, and the international ramifications in these respective regions and broadly on the global plane, notably at the WTO. With the entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement, African countries face challenges of multi-layered SEZ governance, which this contribution intends to address. These challenges also extend to the cross-regional trade agreements these countries conclude, individually and as a bloc. Since SEZs are often assimilated with a category of subsidies and are discriminatory trade measures, this contribution, in essence, investigates the extent to which current trade rules at multilateral and regional levels address these controversial aspects of SEZs.

China’s participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been a rollercoaster of milestones and frictions. China has emerged as a leading trading nation, which has contributed to the expansion of world trade. Some of its trading partners, however, and most vocally the United States, complain that China has reached its new status by eluding its WTO commitments. Under President Trump, the United States reacted strongly against China, almost bringing the WTO (but not China!) to its knees. These actions have been criticized in different ways: Some underline their unilateral character (and the ensuing legal issues they raise), whereas others focus on the regime-neutrality of the WTO, which should, in principle, be able to accommodate Western liberal democracies, developing countries, and socialist countries like China equally. In this short Article, we argue that staying idle is no solution to the China issue and that addressing it through unilateral actions is no solution either. Both approaches would only deepen the current WTO crisis. In our view, the only viable solution for the WTO system requires adding new disciplines to the existing multilateral rules.

State-Owned Enterprise (SOEs) are business entities owned by governments. Unlike private enterprises which operate on profit-motivation, SOEs often act on motives different from profit-making such as fulfilment of governmental or political purposes. Due to this peculiar feature, activities of SOEs sometime are disruptive of competitive market. In order to regulate activities of SOEs so that international market would not be unduly disturbed, GATT: Article XVII states that SOEs shall operate on a profit-motive in international trade. More recently, CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership) and other FTAs include chapters devoted to the regulation of SOEs which provide that Contracting Parties ensure that their SOEs act on profit-motive so as not to cause disruption to the international market. On the other hand, competition laws of trading nations provide rules for prohibiting abusive conducts of dominant enterprises and this includes the prohibition of abuses by SOEs. However, applications of those two sets of regulations (GATT and CPTPP on one hand and competition laws on the other) are made independently from each other without being coordinated. This article surveys details of regulation of SOEs under CPTPP as a representative example of FTAs regulation and of competition laws of nations and suggests ways in which those two sets of rules can be coordinated in order to increase the effectiveness of legal disciplines imposed on SOEs’ activities.

Trade law and competition law have grown up in their separate silos. This means that restraints by the states and restraints by private parties are treated in separate boxes, and with few exceptions, they have been treated so through the years. Yet, some of the worst restraints that do some of the greatest damage are best characterized by the synergy between the two. These trade-and-competition, or hybrid public/private, restraints fall under the radar screen, and defendants in litigation play one set of laws off against the other, hiding behind limits and immunities. This is the Blind Spot of the Article’s title – the space between the silos. This Article unearths the Blind Spot, gives examples of what we know and what we need to know, and proposes a methodology to illuminate and eliminate the Blind Spot.