¹ T. C. Schelling, “The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack,” RAND P-1342 (16 April 1958; revised 28 May 1958). The paper was reprinted as chap. 9 of Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA, 1960), 207–29Google Scholar.

² Schelling, Thomas C., “The Future of Arms Control,” Operations Research 9/5 (1961), 722–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 723.

³ Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York, 2003; first published 1981), 171CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ One finds this narrative, for example, in Luce, R. Duncan and Raiffa, Howard, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (New York, 1957), 94–5Google Scholar.

⁵ Mirowski, Philip, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science (New York, 2002)Google Scholar; Amadae, S. M., Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago, 2003)Google Scholar; Erickson, Paul, Klein, Judy L., Daston, Lorraine, Lemov, Rebecca, Sturm, Thomas, and Gordin, Michael D., How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality (Chicago, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thomas, William, Rational Action: The Sciences of Policy in Britain and America, 1940–1960 (Cambridge, MA, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Erickson, Paul, The World the Game Theorists Made (Chicago, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Amadae, S. M., Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy (New York, 2016)Google Scholar.

⁶ The range of Schelling's interests is displayed in Schelling, Thomas C., Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York, 2007; first published 1978)Google Scholar, and Schelling, , Choice and Consequence (Cambridge, MA, 1984)Google Scholar.

⁷ Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” RAND P-1472 (6 Nov. 1958; revised Dec. 1958).

⁸ In an insightful review essay, Joel Isaac describes “the stable, but mutually harmful, solution of the PD: defection instead of cooperation.” As strategic analysts used the term “stability,” they meant the opposite condition, in which nuclear war was unlikely. Isaac, Joel, “Strategy as Intellectual History,” Modern Intellectual History (2018), 1–15Google Scholar, at 3, at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244318000094.

⁹ Horowitz, Irving Louis, The War Game: Studies of the New Civilian Militarists (New York, 1963), 3.Google Scholar See also Blackett, P. M. S., “Critique of Some Contemporary Defense Thinking,” Encounter 16/4 (1961), 9–17Google Scholar; and Rapoport, Anatol, Strategy and Conscience (New York, 1964)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Nobelprize.org, “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2005,” at www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005.

¹¹ The quotations are drawn from Schelling, Thomas C., “Review of Strategy and Conscience by Anatol Rapoport,” American Economic Review 54/6 (1964), 1082–8Google Scholar, at 1083, 1086; Schelling, , “Academics, Decision Makers, and Security Policy during the Cold War: A Comment on Jervis,” in Mansfield, Edward and Sisson, Richard, eds., The Evolution of Political Knowledge: Democracy, Autonomy, and Conflict in Comparative and International Politics (Columbus, 2004), 137–9Google Scholar, at 139; Hendricks, Vincent F. and Hansen, Pelle G., Game Theory: 5 Questions (Copenhagen, 2007), 186Google Scholar; Schelling, Thomas C., “Game Theory: A Practitioner's Approach,” Economics and Philosophy 26 (2010), 27–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 28; and Schelling, “What Is Game Theory?”, Thomas Schelling Papers, RAND Corporation Archives, Santa Monica, CA. In still another interview, Schelling said he had learned more about strategic behavior “from reading ancient Greek history and by looking at salesmanship than by studying game theory.” See Carvalho, Jean-Paul, “An Interview with Thomas Schelling,” Oxonomics 2 (2007), 1–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 7.

¹² Shubik, Martin, “Review of The Strategy of Conflict by T. C. Schelling and Fights, Games and Debates by Anatol Rapoport,” Journal of Political Economy 69/5 (1961), 501–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 502; Barry O'Neill, “A Survey of Game Theory Models on Peace and War,” York Centre for International and Strategic Studies Occasional Paper Number 9 (March 1990), 2. More recently, Paul Erickson has written that Schelling's attempt to “reorient” game theory in another paper from 1958 “meant stripping game theory down to the point that it had almost no content at all.” Erickson, Game Theorists, 193. Lawrence Freedman has since modulated his view, calling Schelling's relation to game theory “equivocal.” Freedman, Lawrence, Strategy: A History (New York, 2013), 160Google Scholar.

¹³ See, for example, Harsanyi, John C. and Selten, Reinhard, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (Cambridge, MA, 1988)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Schelling, “Game Theory,” 27.

¹⁵ Definitive works include Pickering, Andrew, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Galison, Peter, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago, 1997)Google Scholar; Warwick, Andrew, Masters of Theory: Cambridge and the Rise of Mathematical Physics (Chicago, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kaiser, David, Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in Postwar Physics (Chicago, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kaiser, , ed., Pedagogy and the Practice of Science: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Cambridge, MA, 2005)Google Scholar. On modeling practice in economics see Morgan, Mary S., The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think (New York, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A call for a practice-centered approach to the history of theory in the human sciences is found in Isaac, Joel, “Tangled Loops: Theory, History, and the Human Sciences in Modern America,” Modern Intellectual History 6/2 (2009), 397–424CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ According to Kaplan, Fred's classic The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, 1991; first published 1983), 10–11Google Scholar, RAND strategic analysts “condition[ed] an entire generation of political and military leaders to think about the bomb the way the intellectual leaders of RAND thought about it.” For more skeptical views on the influence of nuclear-deterrence theory on nuclear politics see Kucklick, Bruce J., Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton, 2006)Google Scholar; Gavin, Francis J., Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age (Ithaca, 2012)Google Scholar; and Cameron, James, The Double Game: The Demise of America's First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation (New York, 2018)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Robert Jervis, “Security Studies: Ideas, Policy, and Politics,” in Mansfield and Sisson, The Evolution of Political Knowledge, 100–26, at 110; Trachtenberg, Marc, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991), 24–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Ayson, Robert has explored Schelling's ongoing fascination with stability in Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science (New York, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Ayson is interested in different questions than the ones animating this article, and he employs a very different methodology. His book does not develop a historical interpretation of Schelling's thought, does not situate Schelling's economic work in the context of the larger profession, and seems to imply that Schelling's interest in stability was preternatural, rather than learned.

¹⁸ It should be said that a few nuclear analysts aside from Schelling also began to talk about “stability” in the second half of the 1950s. They too worked by analogy, familiar with stability from their own training (as physicists), but they advanced policy proposals at variance with the definition of stability worked out at RAND in 1958–9. See, for example, Sherwin, C. W., “Securing Peace through Military Technology,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12 (1956), 159–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 162, according to which a “truly stable state” obtains when one's nuclear forces and cities are invulnerable while the adversary's cities and forces both are vulnerable. Stability's flexible and varied application to nuclear strategy warrants a more detailed treatment. Here I focus on the most influential formulation, by Schelling in dialogue with Wohlstetter.

¹⁹ William W. Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence,” Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Memorandum No 7 (15 Nov. 1954), 3.

²⁰ Address by Mr Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 8 Dec. 1953, at www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech.

²¹ Walter H. Waggoner, “Eisenhower Backs Quick Retaliation,” New York Times, 14 Jan. 1954, 17.

²² Albert Wohlstetter, Fred S. Hoffman, and Henry S. Rowen, “Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950's and 1960's,” RAND R-290 (1 Sept. 1956). On Wohlstetter and the RAND basing studies see Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 86–124. Wohlstetter's views on surprise attack were influenced heavily by his wife Roberta Wohlstetter's study of the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor. See Robin, Ron, The Cold World They Made: The Strategic Legacy of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter (Cambridge, MA, 2016), esp. 49–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age” (7 Nov. 1957), 6.

²⁴ Anon., “Strategic Air Chief Puts Third of Force on Alert,” New York Times, 9 Nov. 1957, 10; Richard Witkin, “S.A.C. Operating New Alert Plan,” New York Times, 11 Nov. 1957, 12.

²⁵ Wohlstetter, Hoffman, and Rowen, R-290, 60, emphasis in original.

²⁶ United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS): 1958–1960, vol. III, document 16.

²⁷ “I-73 Soviet Propaganda on the Nature of the Nuclear War Threat, CIA/DI/FBIS Radio Propaganda Report, 25 June 1958,” CIA FOIA Reading Room, Document 5166d4f999326091c6a60920, at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1958-06-25.pdf.

²⁸ Anon., “This Is Article Cited by Soviet in Its Criticism of U.S. Flights,” New York Times, 19 April 1958, 4.

²⁹ Anon., “Soviet Statement,” New York Times, 19 April 1958, 2. On the SAC alert and Soviet reactions see also Schlosser, Eric, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York, 2013), 188–90Google Scholar.

³⁰ Schelling, Thomas C., “An Essay on Bargaining,” American Economic Review 46/4 (1956), 281–306Google Scholar; , Schelling, “Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War,” Conflict Resolution 1/1 (1957), 19–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schelling, email to the author, 25 June 2016.

³¹ Schelling later remarked that surprise attack simply “seemed a problem to understand.” Schelling, email to the author, 25 June 2016.

³² Anon., “Fire Destroys A-Bomber,” Manchester Guardian, 1 March 1958, 1; Anon., “Fuel Tank Falls From Plane,” Manchester Guardian, 4 March 1958, 1; Anon., “A-Bomb Incident Disturbs MPs,” Manchester Guardian, 13 March 1958, 1. See also Schlosser, Command and Control, 185–8; and Young, Ken, The American Bomb in Britain: US Air Forces’ Strategic Presence, 1946–64 (Manchester, 2016)Google Scholar.

³³ Schelling, Thomas C., “Meteors, Mischief, and War,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 16 (1960), 292–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 293, emphasis in original.

³⁴ von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, trans. Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter (New York, 2007), 13Google Scholar.

³⁵ Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 1, emphasis in original.

³⁶ Ibid., 1. Schelling had explored similar processes of interacting expectations in his “Essay on Bargaining” from 1956, where he introduced an early version of the classic line from “Reciprocal Fear.” Two bargainers reach a bargain, Schelling argued, when their expectations jointly converge on an outcome. Why one outcome rather than another? “A bargain is struck when somebody makes a final, sufficient concession,” Schelling wrote. “Why does he concede? Because he thinks the other will not. ‘I must concede because he won't. He won't because he thinks I will. He thinks I will because he thinks I think he thinks so.” Schelling, “Essay on Bargaining,” 281.

³⁷ Schelling, email to the author, 21 July 2015.

³⁸ Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 7, emphasis in original.

³⁹ Several scholars, including Jervis, Ayson, and Amadae, summarize “Reciprocal Fear” as a study of the PD game. Strangely, none mention that halfway through the paper, Schelling dropped the game in favor of a second, explicitly dynamic model. See Jervis, “Security Studies,” 110; Ayson, Thomas Schelling, 142–59; Amadae, Prisoners of Reason, 87–90.

⁴⁰ Schelling did not cite the speech in “Reciprocal Fear,” but he did in a paper written later that same year. See T. C. Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” RAND P-1574 (10 Dec. 1958), reprinted as chap. 10 in Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 230–54, at 248.

⁴¹ Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 17.

⁴² Ibid., 17, emphasis in original.

⁴³ See Meyerson, Roger B., Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 4Google Scholar, where game-theoretic models are distinguished from non-game-theoretic models of, for example, general price equilibrium, in which “individuals only perceive and respond to some intermediating price signals,” and do not rationally anticipate their counterparts’ strategies or behaviors.

⁴⁴ Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 21.

⁴⁵ Schelling also described, in his first model, the matrix leading to joint withholding as “stable.” He was at pains, however, to distinguish this “stability” from the stability of the dynamic-adjustment model. “Stability of the matrix game, as distinct from stability of a parametric-behavior equilibrium [i.e. in the second model],” he wrote, “is not a relevant concept for the [second model].” Ibid., 23.

⁴⁶ The labels “R” and “C” were holdovers from the previous game model, where Schelling had assigned one adversary the rows of the payoff matrix, and the other the columns.

⁴⁷ Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 22–3.

⁴⁸ Schelling, email to the author, 25 June 2016.

⁴⁹ Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 24.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 27.

⁵¹ Raiffa quoted in Zeckhauser, Richard, “Distinguished Fellow: Reflections on Thomas Schelling,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3/2 (1989), 153–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 156–7.

⁵² I take this to be the underlying premise of Ayson, Thomas Schelling.

⁵³ Leine, Remco I., “The Historical Development of Classical Stability Concepts: Lagrange, Poisson and Lyapunov Stability,” Nonlinear Dynamics 59 (2010), 173–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Darrigol, Olivier, “Stability and Instability in Nineteenth-Century Fluid Mechanics,” Revue d'histoire des mathématiques 8/1 (2002), 5–65Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ On Marshall, see Weintraub, E. Roy, How Economics Became a Mathematical Science (Durham, NC, 2002), 9–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On analogies between physics and economics see Mirowski, Philip, More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics: Physics as Nature's Economics (New York, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On other analogical uses of stability see Kingsland, Sharon, Modeling Nature: Episodes in the History of Population Ecology, 2nd edn (Chicago, 1995; first published 1985)Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Schelling, email to the author, 21 July 2015. See also Keynes, John Maynard, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London, 1973; first published 1936)Google Scholar; Backhouse, Roger E. and Bateman, Bradley W., Capitalist Revolutionary: John Maynard Keynes (Cambridge, MA, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wapshott, Nicholas, Keynes Hayek: The Clash That Defined Modern Economics (New York, 2011)Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Schelling, Thomas C., National Income Behavior: An Introduction to Algebraic Analysis (New York, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ On the national income as an invention of econometrics in the early twentieth century see Coyle, Diane, GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History (Princeton, 2014)Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Schelling, National Income Behavior, 44.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 36. Marc Trachtenberg notes that among Keynesians “there seems to have been a certain preference for two-equation models … which could be analyzed by drawing graphs.” See Trachtenberg, Marc, “Keynes Triumphant: A Study in the Social History of Economic Ideas,” Knowledge and Society 7 (1983), 17–86Google Scholar, at 54.

⁶⁰ Schelling, email to the author, 21 July 2015. On Hansen see chap. 8 in Breit, William, Ransom, Roger L., and Solow, Robert M., The Academic Scribblers, 3rd edn (Princeton, 1998), 81–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶¹ Schelling, email to the author, 21 July 2015. And see Samuelson, Paul Anthony, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, MA, 1947), esp. 257–83Google Scholar. On Samuelson see Backhouse, Roger E., Founder of Modern Economics: Paul A. Samuelson, vol. 1 (New York, 2017)Google Scholar.

⁶² Schelling cited the following published graphs as influential for his own work: Fellner, William, “Period Analysis and Timeless Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 58/2 (1944), 315–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hansen, Alvin H., “Three Methods of Expansion through Fiscal Policy,” American Economic Review 35/3 (1945), 382–7Google Scholar; and Samuelson, Paul A., “A Synthesis of the Principle of Acceleration and the Multiplier,” Journal of Political Economy 47/6 (1939), 786–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶³ Schelling, National Income Behavior, 47.

⁶⁴ Schelling, T. C., “Capital Growth and Equilibrium,” American Economic Review 37/5 (1947), 864–76Google Scholar, at 870.

⁶⁵ Schelling, Thomas C., “Income Determination: A Graphic Solution,” Review of Economics and Statistics 30/3 (1948), 227–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ Keynes, The General Theory, 251. See also Backhouse and Bateman, Capitalist Revolutionary, 44. On the importance of the multiplier in Keynesian theory see Wapshott, Keynes Hayek, 129–35.

⁶⁷ As Schelling wrote in 1947, “Any equilibrium which is unable to survive disturbances could only enjoy ephemeral existence and would never have opportunity to exercise its functions.” Schelling, “Capital Growth and Equilibrium,” 870.

⁶⁸ Fellner, William, Competition among the Few: Oligopoly and Similar Market Structures (New York, 1949)Google Scholar. Schelling cited Fellner's duopoly discussion in his 1956 “Essay on Bargaining,” at 289.

⁶⁹ Fellner, Competition among the Few, 66, 89–90. As Robert J. Leonard points out, in the 1950s, game theorists identified the Nash equilibrium with the Cournot equilibrium—not because Cournot had anticipated game theory in the 1830s, nor because Nash had ever read Cournot (he had not), but mainly because they sought a distinguished ancestor for Nash. Doing so required that they ignore Fellner's “damning indictment of the inconsistency of Cournot's reaction curve story.” See Leonard, Robert J., “Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium,” Economic Journal 104/424 (1994), 492–511CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 504.

⁷⁰ Schelling said that he had first encountered the Keynesian graphing technique in Fellner's 1944 paper. See Fellner, “Period Analysis”; and Schelling, “Income Determination,” 227. It is worth noting that Schelling was not alone in applying crossed curves to models of conflict. In 1957 Anatol Rapoport, a mathematical biologist turned peace researcher, published an article on earlier work by Lewis Fry Richardson, a physicist who had developed a model of arms racing. Rapoport represented rival nations’ arms levels on a graph whose crossing lines indicated states of stable or unstable equilibrium. Had Schelling seen Rapoport's article? It is possible (he did not cite it in “Reciprocal Fear”)—but Schelling did not need to learn the intersection condition from Rapoport, having used it repeatedly in his earlier research. And Schelling's model, which lacked explicit time-dependence but permitted a wider range of implicit dynamic behavior, was mathematically very different from the Richardson–Rapoport model. See Rapoport, Anatol, “Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War,” Conflict Resolution 1/3 (1957), 249–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 275–9.

⁷¹ Schelling, Thomas C., “Raise Profits by Raising Wages?”, Econometrica 14/3 (1946), 227–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 233; Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 21.

⁷² Jervis, Robert, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, 1989), 138Google Scholar.

⁷³ For example, Schelling produced a vague definition of “vulnerability” in his paper that appeared inconsistent with a common understanding of that term among strategic experts. He drew no distinction between first and second strikes; he said nothing about whether to target the enemy's cities or nuclear forces, or both. He recommended that both sides should eliminate their warning systems altogether, jointly lowering their probabilities of inadvertent attack. This was a logical proposal in the scheme of Schelling's model, but one completely at odds with accepted wisdom among RAND's strategists. Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 27.

⁷⁴ On the surprise-attack conference see Suri, Jeremi, “America's Search for a Technological Solution to the Arms Race: The Surprise Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for ‘Eisenhower Revisionists’,” Diplomatic History 21/3 (1997), 417–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁵ The paper included so many details, in fact, that Wohlstetter warned RAND's associate director, Lawrence Henderson, that it might encounter difficulty in declassification review. See the undated cover note addressed to “Larry” in Box 149, Folder 7, Albert J. and Roberta Wohlstetter Papers, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford (hereafter ARWP).

⁷⁶ “Strategic Deterrence Discussion (MAG),” 20 Nov. 1957, Box 130, Folder 4, ARWP. Actually, Churchill never used the phrase “balance of terror.” In 1955 Churchill mentioned the possibility that, in the thermonuclear age, “safety shall be the study child of terror.” Lester B. Pearson, speaking later that year at the United Nations, adjusted Churchill's words: “The balance of power,” he said, “has been replaced by a balance of terror.” Wohlstetter's exact source for the phrase is uncertain. See Bullock, Alan and Trombley, Stephen, eds., The Norton Dictionary of Modern Thought (New York, 1999), 65Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ “Deterrence after 1960,” 26 May 1958, Box 130, Folder 6, ARWP, emphasis added.

⁷⁸ See the draft of “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” 25 Sept. 1958, Box 130, Folder 8, ARWP.

⁷⁹ The final version of the key sentence ran, “It takes great ingenuity and realism at any given level of nuclear technology to devise a stable equilibrium.” Wohlstetter, Albert, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37/2 (1959), 211–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 222.

⁸⁰ Schelling was on the initial recipient list when the first version of Wohlstetter's “Delicate Balance” was circulated at RAND in October, and he participated in a special meeting on surprise attack in Washington, DC that same month. Schelling interview with the author, 18 Oct. 2014, Bethesda, MD; and see “Internal Distribution,” 9 Oct. 1958, Box 149, Folder 1, ARWP.

⁸¹ Thomas C. Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” 4, emphasis in original. Schelling's paper had been slated for publication alongside Wohlstetter's as companion pieces in the Jan. 1959 issue of Foreign Affairs. For reasons that were never explained to Schelling, his article was sidelined while Wohlstetter's was published. Schelling instead published a version of his piece in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Schelling, email to author, 26 June 2016. And see Schelling, Thomas C., “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 15/10 (1959), 413–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸² See, for example, Schelling, Thomas C., “What Went Wrong with Arms Control?”, Foreign Affairs 64/2 (1985), 219–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 221, where Schelling writes that “secure, survivable forces were identified with what came to be called ‘strategic stability’.” See also Schelling, Thomas C., “Foreword,” in Colby, Elbridge A. and Gerson, Michael S., eds., Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle, PA, 2013), v–viiiGoogle Scholar, where Schelling actually suggests that stability is a mechanical metaphor but makes no connection to economics or Keynesianism.

⁸³ Kaufmann quoted in Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 24.

⁸⁴ Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age (Santa Monica, 1959), 303CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁵ Kissinger, Henry A., “Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack,” Foreign Affairs 38/4 (1960), 556–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 560.

⁸⁶ Schelling to Bernard Brodie, 22 Feb. 1965, Box 2, folder “Schelling, Tom,” Bernard Brodie Papers, University of California, Los Angeles Library Special Collections, Los Angeles, CA.

⁸⁷ Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 207; Jervis, Robert, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31/2 (1979), 289–324CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 291–2.

⁸⁸ O'Neill, “Game Theory Models,” 1.

⁸⁹ Lebow, Richard Ned, “Reason Divorced from Reality: Thomas Schelling and Strategic Bargaining,” International Politics 43 (2006), 429–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁰ T. C. Schelling, “Randomization of Threats and Promises,” RAND P-1716 (5 June 1959), printed as chap. 7 in Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 175–86.

⁹¹ Schelling, “Randomization,” 8–10.

⁹² See Thomas C. Schelling, “The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance,” printed as chap. 10 in Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 187–203, at 188–9. Nuclear security experts have typically emphasized calculable risk over uncertainty or blind luck, as pointed out in Pelopidas, Benoît, “The Unbearable Lightness of Luck: Three Sources of Overconfidence in the Manageability of Nuclear Crises,” European Journal of International Security 2/2 (2017), 240–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In an unpublished manuscript, Pelopidas criticizes Schelling's “The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance” on similar grounds.

⁹³ Schelling, Thomas C., “The Dynamics of Price Flexibility,” American Economic Review 39/5 (1949), 911–22Google Scholar, at 919, 913.

⁹⁴ Schelling had explained in “Reciprocal Fear” that the model's equilibrium was not “necessarily unique. If it is not, the … outcome depend[s] on initial conditions and ‘shocks’,” which move the system between equilibria. Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 24.

⁹⁵ On the nuclear dimension of the Berlin crisis see Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, 57–74.

⁹⁶ FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, document 56.

⁹⁷ Ibid. Schelling later published many of the same arguments in an unclassified article: Schelling, T. C., “Nuclear Strategy in Europe,” World Politics 14/3 (1962), 421–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁸ Craig, Campbell, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York, 1998), 152–9Google Scholar; Fred Kaplan, “JFK's First-Strike Plan,” The Atlantic, Oct. 2001, at www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/10/jfks-first-strike-plan/376432.

⁹⁹ In my discussions with him, Schelling produced numerous memories associated with his Keynesian training. In the two lengthiest post-Nobel autobiographical pieces he wrote, however, he mentioned Keynes and Keynesianism not a single time. See Thomas C. Schelling autobiographical essay, in Breit, William and Hirsch, Barry T., The Lives of the Laureates: Twenty-Three Nobel Economists, 5th edn (Cambridge, MA, 2009), 393–420Google Scholar; and Nobelprize.org, “Thomas C. Schelling – Biographical,” at www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005/schelling-bio.html.

¹⁰⁰ Solow quoted in Zeckhauser, “Distinguished Fellow,” 156.

¹⁰¹ Lucas, Robert E. Jr. and Sargent, Thomas J., “After Keynesian Macroeconomics,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 3/2 (1979), 1–16Google Scholar, at 6.

¹⁰² Eisner, Robert, “Divergences of Measurement and Theory and Some Implications,” American Economic Review 79/1 (1989), 1–13Google Scholar, at 2.

¹⁰³ Backhouse and Bateman, Capitalist Revolutionary, 37–8.

¹⁰⁴ Braithwaite's comment, delivered in a 1946 lecture, is reprinted in Braithwaite, R. B., Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science (New York, 1953), 93Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC, 2010), 5, 20.

¹⁰⁶ Lieber, Keir A. and Press, Daryl G., “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 41/4 (2017), 9–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 49.

¹⁰⁷ Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear,” 22–3.

¹⁰⁸ A classic treatment is Samuelson, Paul A., “A Fundamental Multiplier Identity,” Econometrica 11/3/4 (1943), 221–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰⁹ Fellner derives a similar expression in “Period Analysis.”