Many people around the globe, including in Europe, have been recently affected by various global crises. In the last 20 years, Europe has experienced the financial crisis, the refugee crisis, COVID-19, increasing extreme weather events associated with climate change, and the breakout of a new war between Russia and Ukraine. This exacerbation of crises has brought increasing scholarly attention to the ‘politics of crises.’ Scholars in political science have examined the politics of crises across a range of domains, such as energy (e.g. Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013; Hancock and Allison, 2020; Bayer et al., 2025), finance (e.g. Mosley and Singer, 2009; Walter, 2013; Pepinsky, 2014; Copelovitch and Singer, 2020), pandemics (e.g. Worsnop, 2017; Youde, 2018), and migration (e.g. Rudolph, 2003; Hopkins, 2010).

This study examines the amendatory activities of the majority and opposition parties in the Italian 18th legislature (2018–2022) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Following the rally around the flag hypothesis, we test whether both sides exhibited similar legislative behaviour during emergencies. We exploit an original database covering amendments tabled by Italian legislators on bills converting decree-laws. Results reveal that the COVID-19 pandemic affected amendment activities without aligning majority and opposition behaviours. In other words, the opposition did not pull in the same direction of the government legislation. This can be explained by contingent factors and pre-existing party polarization.

The relationship between parliaments and governments during the Covid-19 pandemic has been closely examined by various disciplines, which have typically analysed data on the laws and procedures enforced to manage the emergency. This literature generally agrees that the government dominated the management of the pandemic, often at the expense of parliamentary prerogatives. However, such data may not be sufficiently detailed to fully grasp some nuances. Above all, they may provide limited information on the factors that influenced the balance of powers between the two institutions. This article focuses on the Italian case. It complements data on legislation with the findings of semi-structured interviews conducted with members of parliament and government, as well as high-ranking bureaucrats, to gain a more in-depth understanding of these processes. The data on legislation suggest that governmental dominance was strong at every stage of the emergency, although parliament slightly regained some prerogatives over time. This recovery began under Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, but it became more pronounced under Mario Draghi. The acquisition of knowledge about the pandemic was perceived by several interviewees as a factor that helped parliament regain some control, making it a possible outcome of a policy learning process. However, other factors also emerged as significant, such as the direct role of the prime ministers in strengthening the role of the executive and the difficulties of the technocratic members of the government in navigating parliamentary dynamics during Draghi’s tenure.

Parliaments are the intermediate link in the representative chain connecting citizens to the government. The parliamentary agenda is often seen as highly responsive because public priorities are usually mirrored in parliamentary debates. However, the level of responsiveness is affected by formal and informal rules of each activity, which considerably shape the attention–concentration capacity and thus the possibility for policy change. During moments of crisis, institutional frictions can be substantially placated, making the agenda concentrating on the crisis issue even in the presence of high institutional frictions. Building on the literature about parliamentary questioning and agenda-setting studies, this article compares the determinants of issue attention for crisis-related issues (economic, migration, and pandemic) in the Italian case over the past 20 years, assessing their impact on written questions and oral questions with immediate response. This article overcomes a limitation of the agenda-setting literature which treats different forms of parliamentary questions as having a single logic and dynamic. Instead, we demonstrate that frictions are extremely variable among different forms of parliamentary questioning and thus, that written and oral questions exhibit different forms of issue responsiveness. This article explores which type of signal parliamentary questions are most responsive to – public concerns, media attention, or real-world indicators – and finds that the answer is highly conditional both on the specific issue under examination and the type of parliamentary questions.

Centralisation of powers typically occurs in times of crisis. The paper investigates and compares the intergovernmental relations (IGRs) in the Italian decentralised systems during the economic and financial crisis (2008–2013) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2022). During both these two phases, Italy experienced a transition from a political government to a technical one. During the economic and financial crisis, Silvio Berlusconi's government (2008–2011) was succeeded by a technical one led by Mario Monti (2011–2013); similarly, during the pandemic, Giuseppe Conte's government (2020–2021) was followed by a technical one led by Mario Draghi (2021–2022). The hypothesis is that the presence of ‘political’ governments still guarantees a certain degree of cooperation with lower levels of government (i.e. regional and local administrations), while ‘technical’ governments further exacerbate the centralisation of powers. The paper analyses the legislative activities of the central government and the documents of the Italian ‘conference system’ during the two periods of analysis. According to our hypothesis, the findings show a greater centralisation of power under the technical government during the pandemic, but not during the economic crisis. This outcome suggests that the policy domain may serve as a main intervening factor over the degree of centralization of the IGRs during periods of crisis.