This essay contends that Western Europe's economy started to grow at a more rapid pace than the rest of the World during the Early Modern or Late Medieval era. Using the latest quantitative information available it is argued that, between the years 1000 and 1820, GDP per head in Western Europe experienced a threefold increase whereas that of the rest of the World grew only 33 per cent. Among the factors responsible for this difference the author highlights the progress in navigation techniques, with its consequences on trade and the division of labour; the adoption of institutions that also favoured trade; the knowledge revolution which started during the Renaissance period; the political division of Europe, with its corollary of competition among states and enhanced freedom, as well as the development of individualism favoured by the Christian cultural tradition.

This article verifies the existence of three different and complementary geographies in the 1790–1830 period, a stage in the Catalan industrialization process that has deserved little attention among historians. The first one, of manual spinning by means of an improved jenny –locally named bergadana– in inner Catalonia; a second one of improved water-frame spinning in Manresa and the surrounding villages; and, finally, a third one of wood mule-jenny in Barcelona and some towns of the seaside district of the Maresme. These three areas were characterized by using distinctive power sources and producing different types of thread; they also had different wage levels; but they were complementary until the 1830's when the introduction of new mechanical instruments required important and innovative organization changes. The article ends with two analitical case studies: Salient as a typical example of manual spinning, and Manresa as a case of water frame spinning.

This article examines some effects of the political and military alliance between Spain and the United States on the Spanish business community in the 1950s and 1960s. The technical aid is taken to be the set of official programs and private contracts and investments that helped disseminate in Spain the techniques and ideas associated with the American model. The articulation process of the economic interests of the United States in Spain is quantitatively and qualitatively analysed. Our research reveals that technical aid and the pro-American circles formed around it, which were partially based on existing business relations, were essential to such process. The Spanish case shows therefore, first, that US foreign economic policy favoured, even if only indirectly, American business during the Cold War. Second, this work provides material and ideas to analyse the Spanish «miracle» as a rather exogenous growth process.

The Averly foundry in Saragossa is an enterprise belonging to the mechanical constructions branch. It opened in 1863 with eight workers, and by the end of the XlXth century it employed one hundred workers. This article tries to understand the labour policies developed by this family enterprise, as a function of its market outlook and its type of work organization, based on a division of jobs and tasks by qualifications. Looking at these policies, we consider this firm as an example of what is called «flexible specialization», with productions adapted to demands and customers' needs.

Stefan Houpt ha publicado recientemente en la Revista de Historia Económica un trabajo en el que sostiene que la siderurgia vasca fue competitiva en dos productos que no exigían demasiado carbón: lingote y carriles de acero1. Tras ello, plantea un conjunto de hipótesis sobre las razones por las que, pudiendo haber exportado grandes cantidades de ambos bienes, los empresarios prefirieron venderlos mayoritariamente en el mercado español. Trataré de demostrar que la siderurgia vizcaína no fue competitiva después de la generalización de los aceros básicos y que, por consiguiente, huelga cualquier hipótesis sobre por qué no se exportó más.

Debo admitir que me ha costado reconocer mi hipótesis de trabajo, su contraste y mis conclusiones tal y como aparecen reflejadas en la nota que publica Antonio Escudero en este número. Trataré en pocas líneas de centrar el debate de nuevo en el tema de mi artículo y explicar algunos de los aspectos que pueden haber llevado a una lectura confusa de mi investigación.

Estamos ante un libro largamente esperado y que representa la culminación de una línea de investigación madurada a lo largo de toda una generación de investigadores en historia econòmica de España. Leandro Prados de la Escosura comenzó a manifestar su interés por la estimación de la renta nacional española desde los primeros trabajos que publicó. De hecho, todo su inicial interés investigador sobre el comercio exterior estaba íntimamente ligado a obtener estimaciones razonables del PIB por habitante español que permitieran delinear el grado de desarrollo –o de atraso– de la economía española en el siglo XIX largo –de 1780 a 1914, aproximadamente–. Podemos rastrear sus esfuerzos desde el inicio de su actividad investigadora. A principios del decenio de 1980 (1982 y 1984) ya presentó diversas estimaciones procedentes de un análisis detallado de las cifras propuestas por M. G. Mulhall en pleno siglo XIX. En trabajos sucesivos se fue atreviendo a ampliar y sistematizar sus estimaciones.