Reestablishing party authority in new fields

As Huntington argues, “in the longer run … the strength of an authoritarian regime will, in large measure, depend on the strength of its party” (Huntington Reference Huntington1970, 3–47). Existing studies offer various conceptualizations of autocratic ruling party strength and competing explanations for its sources.

Party strength in authoritarian regimes is commonly assessed across three dimensions. First, elite-level institutionalization refers to stable and formalized structures that regulate power and resource distribution among regime elites (Huntington Reference Huntington1968, 397–433; Levitsky Reference Levitsky1998; Meng Reference Meng2021; Panebianco Reference Panebianco1988, 1–68; Randall and Svåsand Reference Randall and Svåsand2002; Zeng Reference Zeng2021). Second, elite cohesion highlights internal unity among ruling elites (Brownlee Reference Brownlee2007, 2–3; Kavasoglu Reference Kavasoglu2022; Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2010; Geddes et al. Reference Geddes, Wright and Frantz2018). Third, organizational penetration captures the party’s grassroots presence and infrastructural power, such as membership density, local branches, and ties to social organizations (Selznick Reference Selznick1952; Slater Reference Slater2003; Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2010; Morse Reference Morse2019; Koss Reference Koss2018, 55; Zeng Reference Zeng2024). Some studies also rely on composite indexes to measure overall party strength (Bizzarro et al. Reference Bizzarro, Gerring, Knutsen, Hicken, Bernhard, Skaaning, Coppedge and Lindberg2018; Kavasoglu Reference Kavasoglu2022).

Party strength is sometimes conflated with how it is measured. To clarify, this article distinguishes two sources of party strength: first, the inherent characteristics of autocratic parties before coming to power; and second, the party-building strategies they adopt after taking power.

The historical origin of the party is one of the most explored. Many studies have found that parties that attain power through violent revolutions and social movements possess greater strength (Slater Reference Slater2010; Geddes et al. Reference Geddes, Wright and Frantz2018; Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2022; Zeng Reference Zeng2021, Reference Zeng2024). Methodologically, studies that emphasize the importance of historical origins have an advantage in addressing the issue of endogeneity (Pepinsky Reference Pepinsky2014). Yet equally important are party-building strategies, which have received less research attention. Autocratic ruling parties adopt various party-building strategies, influenced by factors such as geopolitics, economic globalization, state–society relations, technological changes, ideology, and leadership choices (Esen Reference Esen2014; Peou Reference Peou, Randall and Svåsand2015, 212–36; Reuter and Turovsky Reference Reuter and Turovsky2014).

Regarding the sources of strength of the CCP, existing studies can also be classified into the two aforementioned types. In terms of historical legacy, Heilmann and Perry (Reference Heilmann and Perry2011) argue that the CCP’s adaptive governance, characterized by guerrilla-style decision-making, originated from China’s prolonged revolution. Similarly, Koss (Reference Koss2018) draws on the local patterns of the Sino-Japanese War and Civil War to explain the uneven presence of rank-and-file party members. In the context of post-revolution party building, the concept of “adaptation” has been used to describe the CCP’s continuing efforts to strengthen itself (Dickson Reference Dickson1997; Shambaugh Reference Shambaugh2008; Heilmann and Perry Reference Heilmann and Perry2011; Dimitrov Reference Dimitrov2013). Adaptive responses to major threats have enabled the CCP to survive thus far (Dimitrov Reference Dimitrov2024). Students of China have examined how the CCP rebuilt itself in ideological and organizational dimensions (Shambaugh Reference Shambaugh2008; Dimitrov Reference Dimitrov2013; Mittelstaedt Reference Mittelstaedt2021).

How the CCP reestablishes its authority in new socioeconomic fields following the reform era has increasingly attracted scholarly attention, with several important studies emerging on this topic. With the rise of private firms and social organizations, there has been a notable atrophy of the party (Shambaugh Reference Shambaugh2008). Against this atrophy, the CCP is dedicated to reestablishing its authority in these new frontiers (Blanchette Reference Blanchette2019). Since Xi Jinping’s ascendance to power, the CCP has aimed to “harness private capital for specific national goals as the party defines them” (Johnson Reference Johnson2023). To extend its control over private firms, the CCP has established new official institutions to coordinate CCP affairs related to the private sector, deployed “party-building instructors” to private enterprises, appointed private business elites to party positions, and adjusted local party organs to better align with the needs of private businesses (Yan and Huang Reference Yan and Huang2017). The CCP may also combine “brand-new practices alongside ostensibly outmoded and temporarily neglected ones” (Koss Reference Koss2021). Equally important is the CCP’s penetration into social organizations. The emergence of so-called party-organized non-governmental organizations (PONGOs) exemplifies the CCP’s control over civil society (Thornton Reference Thornton2013). A new regulatory regime for NGOs’ party building and diverse organizational forms has been developed (Xin and Huang Reference Xin and Huang2022; Kan and Ku Reference Kan and Ku2021).

As Dimitrov (Reference Dimitrov2024) argues, “rival incorporation” into the Party constitutes a key dimension of the CCP’s adaptability—alongside economic reform, expansion of the social safety net, and protection of cultural security. Dimitrov (Reference Dimitrov2024) also provides comprehensive data tracing the evolution and coverage of Party organizations within NGOs and private firms between 2012 and 2023.

However, these pioneer studies on the CCP’s expansion into new fields have some limitations. Most existing literature examined the CCP’s penetration into NEOs and NSOs separately, with few exceptions of comparative research on these two fields (Thornton Reference Thornton2012; Dimitrov Reference Dimitrov2024). Additionally, research on party building in NSOs has overwhelmingly focused on those registered within the Civil Affairs system, while largely overlooking other types of NSOs—such as private accounting and law firms—thereby neglecting a significant portion of the CCP’s presence in the non-public sector. Further, the detailed processes and mechanisms through which the CCP penetrates TNOs have not been thoroughly explored. Most existing studies examine how PPOs function within TNOs after the PPOs have already been established. However, questions remain about how the CCP initially manages to establish PPOs within TNOs, and how these PPOs seek ongoing cooperation from TNOs to operate effectively. Among the few studies that touch upon such penetration (Koss Reference Koss2021; Xin and Huang Reference Xin and Huang2022; Hu et al. Reference Hu, Zeng and Wu2022), detailed analyses of the CCP’s tactics—especially the rhetoric used to penetrate TNOs—remain largely absent. To address these gaps, this article investigates the dynamic processes and mechanisms of the CCP’s penetration through a comparative study of NEOs and NSOs.

Organizational vacuums and penetration

With a formidable party machinery, the CCP fundamentally transformed Chinese society and firmly embedded itself in China’s post-revolutionary social system, thus actualizing “the unity of [social] system and [party] organization” (Schurmann Reference Schurmann1966, 5–11). However, China’s market reforms since 1978 have produced new socioeconomic fields in which the CCP has a fragile organizational presence, thus undermining the unity of the social system and the party organization.

Since 1978, China’s non-public sector of the economy and society has experienced rapid development. In 2018, Xi Jinping highlighted the substantial contributions of the non-public sector: “The private economy has the characteristics of ‘five-six-seven-eight-nine’: it contributes more than 50% of tax revenue, more than 60% of GDP, more than 70% of technological innovation achievements, more than 80% of urban employment, and more than 90% of the number of enterprises.”Footnote ² According to the SAMR, as of the end of May 2024, there were 180.45 million private economic entities in China, accounting for 96.4 percent of all business entities, up from 95.5 percent in 2019. Among these were 55.177 million private enterprises and 125.273 million individual businesses.Footnote ³ On the part of NSOs, according to China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), as of the first quarter of 2024, there were 375,000 social associations (shehui tuanti), 497,000 civil non-enterprise units (minban feiqiye danwei), and 9,668 foundations.Footnote ⁴

Although the CCP has adopted various strategies to co-opt private entrepreneurs and contain social organizations—such as recruiting new elites into the CCP and engaging them through institutions like the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the United Front system (Dickson Reference Dickson2008; Yan Reference Yan2011)—it remains deeply uneasy about their potential to challenge the CCP’s authority.

Scholars have examined how the emerging civil society challenged the CCP’s authority, with such challenges manifesting in economic, political, or ideological realms. First, the economic autonomy of private enterprises reduces their dependence on the party-state, thereby undermining the patron–client system through which the CCP traditionally exerts control (Walder Reference Walder2003). This independence weakens their political subordination to the regime and erodes the CCP’s capacity to dominate the redistribution of resources (Nee Reference Nee1989). Second, regime support among private entrepreneurs is far from uniform. Many demonstrate a clear affinity for democratic norms and express favorable attitudes toward Western-style democratic institutions (Chen and Dickson Reference Chen and Dickson2008). While not openly opposing the regime, some have become a strategic force that gradually reshapes the internal dynamics of the ruling coalition (Heberer and Schubert Reference Heberer and Schubert2019). Third, even as the CCP strategically utilizes emerging social organizations to enhance governance capacity (Teets Reference Teets2014), it remains highly vigilant toward their activities, particularly those related to human rights advocacy, labor mobilization, religious expression, and potential connections to Western actors (Fu Reference Fu2018; Spires Reference Spires2011; Tong Reference Tong2012; He and Huang Reference He and Huang2015).

Since the CCP has developed what is often called “consultative authoritarianism,” it encourages the growth of a relatively autonomous civil society while relying on indirect tools of control (Teets Reference Teets2013). Under this arrangement, civil society can coexist with the party-state in a form of “contingent symbiosis” (Spires Reference Spires2011) and negotiate with the state for resources and institutional space (Saich Reference Saich2000). By strategically combining selective control, co-optation, and targeted deployment, the CCP can harness a vibrant civil society to reinforce, rather than undermine, an adaptive authoritarian regime (Perry Reference Perry2012; Mattingly Reference Mattingly2020).

However, for a Leninist ruling party, such indirect approaches have clear limits, and potential challenges persist. These concerns have led the CCP to conclude that direct organizational penetration into the non-public sector offers a more reliable and effective means of control than co-optation or surveillance alone.

While the Chinese state regulates TNOs through legal and administrative measures, the CCP itself struggled to assert a strong organizational presence within the non-public sector. The 14th National Congress of the CCP in 1992 officially marked the CCP’s endorsement of the “socialist market economy.” Consequently, the CCP developed a pressing sense of urgency as organizational vacuums in the non-public sector became more pronounced. The “Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Major Issues Concerning Strengthening Party Building,” adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee in 1994, was the first to formally introduce the task of party building in TNOs. Following the 15th National Congress of the CCP in 1997, which recognized the non-public sector as an important component of the socialist market economy, the CCP has implemented more concrete measures to strengthen its organizational presence within this sector. In China’s “new era” since 2012, as proclaimed by Xi, there has been an evident trend toward the concentration of power. Under the slogan “The Party exercises overall leadership,” the CCP has increasingly asserted its organizational presence and political authority in the non-public sector. As outlined in the Appendix, numerous political and legal documents demonstrate the party-state’s efforts of penetration into TNOs.

However, the CCP’s organizational penetration in these TNOs is far from achieving the “comprehensive coverage” it claims. According to the statistical bulletin of the CCP’s Central Organization Department, by the end of 2023, there were 771,000 PPOs in party-state agencies, 997,000 in public institutions (shiye danwei), 1.6 million in enterprises, and 183,000 in social organizations nationwide.Footnote ⁵ Among these, PPOs in enterprises include those in both public and non-public sectors. Comparing this with the previously mentioned data on private enterprises and social organizations, we find that the CCP’s organizational penetration has yet to reach its stated goal.

We argue that the CCP’s strategies for penetrating TNOs have been influenced by a tradeoff between political control on the one hand and socioeconomic vitality on the other, which the CCP Constitution has demonstrated, particularly in Article 33. In the public sector, party building has been pervasive and systematic since the early years of the People’s Republic of China, with only brief disruptions during the Cultural Revolution. Consequently, there is no need for the CCP to “penetrate” public organizations, as PPOs have long been embedded within them. The CCP exercises direct control over such public organizations as state agencies, public institutions, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through its authority over personnel and financial resources, and party building in these organizations is dictated by the CCP’s policy imperatives. In the non-public sector, in contrast, the CCP frequently encounters vacuums in its organizational presence and must continually work to extend its reach into non-public organizations. Since the CCP exercises indirect control over TNOs, party building in these organizations has to accommodate attentively these organizations’ operational needs. More specifically, in NEOs, the CCP emphasizes balancing political control with business development, whereas in NSOs, it prioritizes political control over social service provision.Footnote ⁶

A dynamic penetration process

To achieve the goals of organizational penetration, the CCP must find capable party members to engage with TNOs. The main objectives of the CCP’s party agents are to win over TNOs for their cooperation in party work, and to mobilize CCP members in TNOs to actively participate in party work. The CCP’s party agents can be classified into two types—internal and external. Internal party agents are CCP members working inside TNOs, either as owners or employees. Their dual affiliation with both the CCP and TNOs positions them as natural entry points for the CCP’s organizational penetration. However, the CCP first needs to locate these individuals, reignite their “party spirit” (dangxing), and then train and incentivize them to work more actively for the CCP. External party agents, on the other hand, are either non-bianzhi, full-time grassroots party workers or bianzhi cadres, both of whom are outside of TNOs. They work directly under party authorities, yet their limitation is that they have no natural footing within TNOs, and thus, must overcome the initial difficulty of gaining access. Here, the distinction between non-bianzhi party workers and bianzhi cadres hinges on whether they are on the state payrolls as permanent employees.Footnote ⁷

The CCP’s three-step penetration of TNOs entails a complex interplay between the CCP’s external and internal party agents. The first step is to approach TNOs, whereby the external party agents use their arsenal of both coercive and non-coercive tactics. Here, the external party agents play a vital role in personalizing the CCP’s will to penetrate TNOs, transforming abstract political and legal documents into tailored interactions with individual TNOs. The external party agents’ non-coercive tactics are thus particularly important in this regard. Yet, this penetration process could hardly be sustained unless a second critical step is taken, whereby the external party agents identify CCP members inside TNOs and reactivate them as reliable internal party agents. With their dual roles of TNO owners or employees and CCP members, these internal party agents either exercise control over their TNOs or maintain regular interactions with their employers and colleagues, and thus, have a much higher chance of being trusted. With their non-coercive tactics and the backing of the external party agents, internal party agents play a larger part in securing TNOs’ cooperation for party work. The third step marks the initial success of the CCP’s penetration—the formation of PPOs within TNOs. With functioning PPOs inside TNOs, the CCP achieves its initial objective of organizational penetration, laying the groundwork for robust and long-term influence on TNOs.

To establish an analytical framework for examining the dynamic penetration process, this article draws on theories from political and organizational sociology. We propose that when one organization seeks to influence another, it typically employs three types of tactics: coercion, indoctrination, and incentivization. Weber’s (Reference Weber, Roth and Wittich1978, 926–39) three-component theory of stratification and Mann’s (Reference Mann2012, 1–32) theory of social power both underscore the multidimensional nature of social power. From a more interactional perspective, organizations are constantly engaged in processes of mutual influence, with social power mediating interorganizational relationships. The influencing organization may first resort to coercion, compelling the target organization through force or pressure. In such cases, fear becomes the operative mechanism. Second, the organization may employ indoctrination, attempting to persuade the target through ideological alignment. Here, value transmission is the core strategy. Third, the organization may use incentivization, offering rewards to encourage cooperation. In this case, benefits constitute the driving force behind the influence.

Informed by theories of resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik Reference Pfeffer and Salancik2003), institutional isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan Reference Meyer and Rowan1977), and the organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell Reference DiMaggio and Powell1983), we propose that within an organizational field, the degree of resource dependence between an influencing organization and its target helps explain both the specific tactics employed by the influencing organization and the extent of the target’s isomorphic change. When both organizations are mutually dependent on each other’s resources, their relationship tends to be balanced, making non-coercive tactics—such as indoctrination and incentivization—more likely. In contrast, when the target organization depends on the influencing organization’s resources, but not vice versa, the relationship becomes asymmetrical, increasing the likelihood that the influencing organization will rely on coercion. The choice between indoctrination and incentivization further depends on the distribution of social power available to the influencing organization.

When a dominant organization influences multiple target organizations that occupy similar niches within an organizational field, these targets may undergo a process of institutional isomorphism. Over time, the targets may adopt similar structures, cultures, and behaviors because they share a common source of influence—namely, the institutionalized rules promulgated and legitimized by the dominant organization. In this context, coercive tactics deployed by the influencing organization may directly result in coercive and mimetic isomorphism among the targets, while non-coercive tactics (indoctrination and incentivization) are more closely associated with normative and mimetic isomorphism.

Organizational penetration is a particularly potent form of influence, in which the influencing organization inserts personnel or establishes subunits within the target organization. This strategy functions as a mechanism of control, integration, or transformation, enabling the influencing organization to alter the target organization’s internal structure.

The CCP’s penetration of TNOs is a dynamic process involving all three types of tactics. Overall, TNOs tend to be the more dependent side, relying on the CCP for essential resources such as sociopolitical legitimacy—necessary for their very existence—and state funding to sustain or enhance their operations. Yet the CCP also depends on TNOs for socioeconomic resources, including tax revenues, innovation, and social service provision. However, the CCP engages differently with NEOs and NSOs, largely due to their varying degrees of resource dependence on the CCP. At the same time, some TNOs actively “invite” the CCP’s penetration in exchange for sociopolitical legitimacy and state funding. This phenomenon, which we term “solicited penetration,” reflects a pattern of institutional isomorphism in the non-public sector, where party-building is increasingly regarded by TNOs as a normative organizational practice.

Coercive tactics: Formal and informal

The CCP, as China’s single ruling party, is well positioned to employ coercion in its efforts to penetrate TNOs. It utilizes both formal and informal coercive tactics. Formal coercive tactics are articulated in political and legal documents—enacted primarily by central party-state agencies—that mandate party-building requirements for TNOs, thereby exposing non-compliant TNOs to potential state-imposed sanctions. Informal coercive tactics, by contrast, encompass the practical methods employed by the local party agents during their penetration efforts. These often entail the abuse of state power or actions that skirt legal boundaries. As a result, such tactics are normally neither publicly acknowledged nor officially endorsed by the CCP.

Between 1994 and 2025, various central party-state agencies in China issued 33 political and legal documents addressing party-building in TNOs. Of these, 21 were released after Xi Jinping assumed all top leadership positions.Footnote ⁸ Some documents are general ones, addressing party-building across multiple sectors, including the public sector, while others are specifically focused on TNOs. Together, these documents establish the political-legal framework that legitimizes party agents’ use of coercive tactics.

The CCP’s formal coercive tactics leverage state power, extending beyond party rules and discipline. In the public sector, executives act as enforcers of party directives, rendering the use of state coercion largely unnecessary for party-building. However, in the non-public sector, where the CCP’s authority isn’t assured, the use—or at least the threat—of state coercion becomes essential for party-building. Consequently, the CCP translates its political will to penetrate TNOs into legal instruments through formal legislative procedures.

In China’s legal system, legal instruments pertaining to party-building in the non-public sector fall within the category of administrative law, thereby providing legitimacy for coercive state action. Specifically, these instruments include two laws enacted by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee; one departmental regulation (bumen guizhang) promulgated by a ministry under the State Council; three administrative normative documents (xingzheng guifanxing wenjian) issued by a ministry under the State Council; and two hybrid documents jointly released by party and administrative organs at the ministerial level, encompassing both intra-party and administrative normative features. Additionally, there are five administrative policy documents (xingzheng zhengcexing wenjian) issued by the State Council and its General Office that, although legally nonbinding, nonetheless exert significant influence on administrative behavior. If TNOs violate any of the above 13 legal documents, they may face state coercion or discrimination, such as fines, denial of access to state resources, or revocation of licenses.

Further, the influence of the 20 political documents—categorized as the CCP’s intra-party regulations (dangnei fagui)—on administrative behavior should not be underestimated. Among these documents, eight are intra-party normative documents (dangnei guifanxing wenjian), issued (sometimes jointly) by party authorities (dangzu or dangwei) embedded within ministries, commissions, and national-level industry associations legally authorized to manage public affairs. Given China’s party-state relations, the political priorities articulated in these intra-party normative documents are likely to directly shape how the corresponding administrative organs and industry associations exercise discretion in applying state coercion within their respective jurisdictions.

Overall, the CCP has shown greater willingness to employ formal coercive tactics to penetrate NSOs than NEOs. First, central party-state agencies have issued far more political and legal documents targeting NSOs than NEOs. Of the 24 political and legal documents specifically targeting TNOs, 18 focus exclusively on NSOs, five on NEOs, and one on both NEOs and NSOs. In the part of legal documents, one departmental regulation, three administrative normative documents, and three administrative policy documents were all issued exclusively for NSOs, while one law was enacted solely for NEOs. Among the 14 intra-party normative documents, 10 target NSOs exclusively, three target NEOs, and one address both NEOs and NSOs.

Second, a greater number of central state agencies, state-sponsored associations, and their respective party authorities have issued political and legal documents for NSOs than NEOs. This disparity can be partly attributed to the fact that multiple state agencies oversee NSOs’ matters, including the MoCA, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Administration of Taxation, as well as industry associations in the legal, accounting, and tax agent professions. In contrast, only the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation, along with their party authorities have issued documents pertaining to NEOs. Additionally, unlike industry associations such as the China Certified Tax Agents Association, the Federation of Industry and Commerce—representing entrepreneurs—is not authorized by the party-state to exercise significant regulatory power over NEOs.

Third, the MoCA has made party-building work an important evaluation criterion for the registration and annual license verification of NSOs. According to a 2016 administrative normative document issued by the MoCA, NSOs that fail to submit the required party-building work documents will have their registration applications denied. Further, according to a 2019 administrative normative document issued by the MoCA, party-building work, and registration, annual verification, and rating of NSOs should be executed concurrently.Footnote ⁹ In contrast, the SAMR does not require that registration or annual license verification of NEOs be contingent upon these businesses’ party-building work. The MoCA’s such policies enable the Chinese party-state to regularly collect information on, and thereby monitor, the party-building activities of NSOs.

Fourth, the MoCA has developed a sophisticated rating system for NSOs, and party-building work is counted in this rating. Only NSOs rated 3A or above will be prioritized for government contracts.Footnote ¹⁰ NSOs that perform poorly in party-building work will not be rated 4A or higher.Footnote ¹¹ According to a 2018 departmental regulation enacted by the MoCA, those NSOs that fail to establish their PPOs in accordance with related documents will be labeled by the MoCA as engaging in “abnormal activities.” If, within two years, such NSOs do not fulfill their obligation of establishing PPOs, they will be further labeled as engaging in “serious breach of law and dishonesty.” The consequences of this latter label include being barred from all government contracts, subsidies, and honorary titles; being subject to stringent inspections; and having their current rating lowered, or even completely revoked.Footnote ¹² Such systematic state coercion and discrimination would be fatal for NSOs, which rely heavily on state resources. In contrast, the SAMR does not have a rating system for NEOs.

The CCP’s preference for coercive tactics to penetrate NSOs can be attributed to two key factors. The first factor is the CCP’s political and legal considerations. Some NSOs play an active role in sociopolitical advocacy, which, in the eyes of the CCP, can easily produce troublemakers, such as human rights lawyers and labor activists. Thus, the CCP is keener to monitor NSOs to preempt potential (organized) political challenges.Footnote ¹³ There are also cases where NSOs are merely shell corporations by which donors take advantage of NSOs’ nonprofit status for tax evasion. This exacerbates the CCP’s political distrust of NSOs.Footnote ¹⁴ In contrast, NEOs typically adopt a “business-is-business” approach, refraining from sociopolitical advocacy beyond their commercial scope and, as such, are not generally seen as a significant source of political challenge.

The second factor is the varying degrees of TNOs’ resource dependence on the CCP. NSOs generally depend more heavily on the party-state than NEOs for funding and legitimacy, making the CCP less accommodating toward NSOs.Footnote ¹⁵ Given their role as providers of social services, many NSOs are inherently non-lucrative and generally depend on public expenditures or philanthropic contributions for funding. In earlier years, many NSOs could access substantial funding and legitimacy from foreign sources (Hildebrandt Reference Hildebrandt2013, 99–100). However, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, stringent state regulations enacted in the name of national security, exemplified by the 2016 Law on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in Mainland China, have significantly restricted such access to foreign resources (Holbig and Lang Reference Holbig and Lang2022). Consequently, many NSOs have shifted their focus to competing for domestic resources (Hu et al. Reference Hu, Zeng and Wu2022), which are either drawn directly from state coffers or subject to rigorous state oversight. Many NSOs could not survive without government contracts and subsidies, such as those from Government Procurement of Social Services (zhengfu goumai shehui fuwu) projects.Footnote ¹⁶ So-called intermediate organizations (zhongjie zuzhi)—a subset of NSOs such as law firms—are actually for-profit organizations that can thrive in a market economy without having to rely on state funding. But these types of organizations are more heavily regulated by the party-state and state-sponsored associations than NEOs, particularly regarding issuing or renewing practicing licenses. In other words, both the party-state and the professions themselves participate in shaping the organizational fields that heighten intermediate organizations’ resource dependence on the party-state for legitimacy. Consequently, neglecting party-building work may put their licenses at risk. In contrast, NEOs are purely for-profit organizations that rely less on state funding, and they can register and pass annual reviews relatively easily without stringent political requirements. In summary, the centralization of key resources around the party-state has heightened NSOs’ resource dependence on the Chinese party-state and subjected NSOs to a greater degree of coercive isomorphism than NEOs.

Informal coercive tactics are not clearly defined, existing in a gray space in which external party agents have discretion in penetrating TNOs at the local level. Various party-state agencies may employ state harassment to penalize uncooperative TNOs, such as engaging in frequent inspections of their licenses and tax records, fining them for alleged fire safety violations, pressuring landlords to refuse to renew their leases, or even threatening to cut off power or water supplies. These informal tactics can never be found in official documents, but have been developed by external party agents in their daily operations to deal with TNOs’ overt resistance to the CCP’s penetration. Actually, such resistance by TNOs—primarily in the case of NEOs—may not be considered “illegal” under existing laws and regulations. Such informal coercion heightens uncertainty in TNOs’ interactions with the CCP, potentially giving rise to mimetic isomorphism among TNOs. As one local bianzhi cadre candidly stated,

Yet the external party agents still use coercive tactics—particularly informal ones—with caution, because these tactics can backfire, potentially harming the local economy, escalating confrontations with TNOs, and jeopardizing local party-state leaders’ political career. Typically, local party agents—often reluctantly and cautiously—resort to coercion when under intense pressure from the CCP’s central authorities to achieve a specified level of “two coverage” (liang fugai) for TNOs within a set timeframe. Such coercion is usually directed at TNOs that openly resist CCP’s penetration.Footnote ¹⁸ The party agents exhibit limited regularity in their use of informal coercive tactics, with no fundamental distinction between NEOs and NSOs in this respect. However, such cases of open resistance are relatively rare compared to more subtle forms of “everyday resistance.” For instance, in the initial stages of the CCP’s penetration attempts, some TNOs deny having any CCP members among their staff to avoid the obligation of party building. There are also cases when TNOs simply refuse to allow the party agents to visit their organizations.Footnote ¹⁹

In summary, the CCP’s use of coercive tactics to penetrate TNOs reflects a distinct central–local dynamic. Formal coercive tactics are institutionalized by central party-state authorities in the form of intra-party regulations and administrative law. This overarching political–legal framework of coercion embodies the CCP’s unilateral rule-making power vis-à-vis TNOs and simultaneously mandates local party agents to implement coercive tactics on the ground. The CCP’s unilateral authority is particularly evident in the case of NSOs, which are more dependent than NEOs on the party-state for access to essential resources such as legitimacy and funding. As long as TNOs are aware of the political and legal consequences of noncompliance, this coercive framework enhances the efficacy of local party agents’ non-coercive tactics—rendering coercion less a routine practice than a deterrent seldom exercised in reality.

However, as the CCP’s party-building requirements for TNOs—particularly for NSOs—grow increasingly stringent and pervasive, local party agents are left with diminishing discretion in how to carry out organizational penetration. Even when they perceive non-coercive tactics as more effective for softening a TNO’s resistance, they are often compelled to enforce compliance through coercive tactics in accordance with central mandates—for instance, by revoking or threatening to revoke an NSO’s registration license. Moreover, beyond formal coercive tactics, local party agents may also resort to informal coercive tactics to expedite the fulfillment of centrally determined penetration targets. As a result, the relationship between the CCP and TNOs becomes more uncertain, while non-coercive tactics risk being marginalized or losing credibility, at least temporarily.

Non-coercive tactics: Indoctrination and incentivization

Coercion is useful for the CCP to either preempt or quell TNOs’ resistance to party work, but it is seldom the best choice for securing their cooperation. Thus, the party agents have developed various non-coercive tactics to make TNOs play ball. The CCP employs both indoctrination and incentivization through diverse methods, such as propaganda campaigns and policy frameworks. However, this article, which focuses on the CCP’s dynamic penetration process, will closely examine how the CCP’s party agents craft indoctrinating and incentivizing rhetoric to engage TNOs at the micro level.

The indoctrinating rhetoric, primarily employed by external party agents, centers on the CCP’s role as the guardian of China’s interests and culture at the national level, aiming to legitimize the CCP’s penetration of TNOs as a way of political tutelage. Under Xi’s leadership, elite-constructed cultural nationalism has become a key source of legitimation for the Chinese state (Lin Reference Lin2024; He and Tang Reference He and Tang2025). The indoctrinating rhetoric is effective to the extent that many, if not the majority of, Chinese citizens perceive the CCP and the Chinese state as one and the same, believing that the fundamental interests of the CCP align with those of the Chinese nation. Thus, indoctrinating rhetoric may help foster normative isomorphism among TNOs seeking to gain sociopolitical legitimacy. A local bianzhi cadre stated,

The incentivizing rhetoric, employed by both external and internal party agents at the organizational and individual levels, offers or purports to offer benefits to TNOs’ operations and the professional development or personal lives of their leaders and personnel in exchange for cooperation in party-building efforts. At the organizational level, the incentivizing rhetoric highlights the symbiotic relationship between the CCP and TNOs. On the one hand, the party agents remind TNO leaders that in many TNOs, management and technical teams are primarily composed of CCP members who are indispensable to the TNOs’ operations. On the other, against the background of the CCP’s efforts of building “service-oriented PPOs,”Footnote ²¹ the party agents assert that PPOs always support TNOs’ operations by aligning party work with TNOs’ development plans and organizing various social and volunteer activities for TNO personnel. These efforts attest to the “utility” of party work to TNOs (Thornton Reference Thornton2012, Reference Thornton2013; Zhang Reference Zhang2015, Reference Zhang2018). Additionally, the party agents emphasize that strong performance in party building can create a positive public perception, signaling that the TNO has a well-structured governance system and a clear vision for long-term development. Such a positive perception, they suggest, can enhance TNOs’ sociopolitical legitimacy, which, in turn, can facilitate business operations, such as by allowing for easy access to state-owned bank loans and supplying greater client trust.Footnote ²² Offering or purporting to offer benefits to TNOs’ operations proves particularly effective when medium and large-sized TNOs are committed to improving corporate governance, fostering a robust corporate culture, fulfilling social responsibilities, and cultivating strong government relations. Thus, incentivizing rhetoric may help foster mimetic isomorphism among TNOs seeking to gain sociopolitical legitimacy or enhance operational performance.

For instance, a full-time grassroots party worker stated that he always begins by asking NEOs what they need for their business and offers useful resources before requesting their cooperation on party-building work. He vividly explained, “It’s like marriage. When you meet your date, you cannot start the conversation by saying, ‘Let’s get a marriage license!’ Party-building work is like getting a marriage license—you need to fall in love first. When you get along well with the companies, they will naturally follow suit.” As an external party agent, he often trains internal party agents under his supervision to integrate party-building work with business development and government relations work in their companies, to convince their superiors that party-building work can yield tangible benefits for their business.Footnote ²³

One local bianzhi cadre told the following story:

At the individual level, the incentivizing rhetoric is employed to cultivate personal relationships (guanxi) between external party agents and TNO leaders and personnel. To sustain their guanxi, both sides feel some obligation to help each other with their work, among which party work is seen as central. Leveraging personal connections to achieve policy objectives is a widespread practice in Chinese policy implementation (e.g., Wan Reference Wan2016; Liao et al. Reference Liao, Tsai and Lin2020). However, offering or purporting to offer benefits to the professional development or personal lives of TNO leaders and personnel is particularly effective for small and medium-sized TNOs that are organizationally less sophisticated and have quite limited capacity to handle risks and challenges. A full-time grassroots party worker boasted of her skills in cultivating guanxi in the following way:

The ultimate objective of the party agents’ penetration is to build up a community of interest encompassing a diverse group of TNO owners and employees, including both CCP members and non-CCP individuals. As described by a local bianzhi cadre, the ideal scenario for party work in TNOs is that “the provision of services [from the CCP to TNOs] comes first, followed by [the CCP’s] request for party work [in TNOs]. We’d better create a situation [where the CCP and TNOs] are inseparable from each other (ni zhong you wo, wo zhong you ni).”Footnote ²⁶ During this process, TNO owners and executives realize that the extensive existence of CCP members in TNOs renders any serious resistance to party-building work not only unwise politically but also unfeasible from a management perspective.

Penetration and solicited penetration

As discussed, the overarching political–legal framework of coercion reinforces the efficacy of local party agents’ non-coercive tactics. China’s legal profession has witnessed the CCP’s penetration since the late 2000s. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, the All-China Lawyers Association (hereafter, ACLA) has played a pivotal role in this endeavor. The ACLA issues practicing licenses to lawyers in China, provides compulsory professional training to lawyers, and verifies lawyers’ and law firms’ licenses annually. In China, all practicing lawyers must be ACLA members. In 2008, the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee (COD) and the Party Group of the Ministry of Justice issued the “Circular on Further Strengthening and Improving Party-Building Work Among Lawyers.” To implement this intra-party normative document, party committees of local Bureaus of Justice and Lawyers Associations requested that CCP-member lawyers transfer their Party organizational affiliations (dangzuzhi guanxi) to the cities where they practice law and that law firms with enough CCP members establish PPOs.

Against this background, a Beijing-based law firm established its PPO in 2008, with a senior partner as its party secretary. When recruiting lawyers as their legal advisors or barristers, many party-state agencies and SOEs prefer CCP members and request that applicants for such positions submit reference letters issued by law firm PPOs as part of the background check procedure. This party-state preference strengthens the position of PPOs within law firms’ internal power structures and encourages lawyers to openly acknowledge their CCP membership. Since 2017, the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice has further emphasized the party-building requirements in its annual verification of law firms’ licenses; the worst possible consequence of neglecting party work may be failing annual verification. This policy makes party work a “must-do” for law firms.Footnote ²⁷

The case of the legal profession illustrates that the CCP can assertively penetrate NSOs primarily through formal coercive tactics, leading to coercive isomorphism as NSOs seek sociopolitical legitimacy. However, internal party agents within NSOs also use non-coercive tactics, sometimes faced with their colleagues’ doubts, and even opposition. In the initial penetration stage, many lawyers in the Beijing-based law firm did not understand why law firms needed to do party-building work, and they worried that a strong political atmosphere within the firm may scare foreign clients away. Due to this common concern, CCP members’ activity rooms and bulletin boards were located deep inside law firms’ office areas, rather than in more visible locations, such as reception areas.

Over time, as party-building work became a mandatory aspect of law firm operations, open doubts and opposition from lawyers significantly diminished. Many lawyers, however, continued to prioritize their professional autonomy and frequently cited demanding work schedules as reasons for their absence from party activities. In response to such a passive attitude, the party secretary and her assistant leveraged their collegial relationships to seek support from firm partners. They requested that each department ensure the attendance of a CCP member at party-building meetings during working hours and grant them official leave for such participation.Footnote ²⁸

While the CCP has been penetrating TNOs, some politically savvy TNO owners proactively seek connections with the party-state, even when they, themselves, are not CCP members. These TNO owners take the initiative to engage the CCP and invite its organizational penetration, in exchange for legitimacy and funding provided by the CCP. Such initiative eases the CCP’s penetration, and it can be portrayed as an esteemed model in the CCP’s propaganda. Such “solicited penetration” reflects both mimetic and normative isomorphism among TNOs, driven by their efforts to reduce uncertainties in their relationship with the CCP and by interorganizational learning related to party-building practices. In this process, TNOs may find opportunities to proactively socialize with—and even “co-opt”—the party agents to serve their own interests.

As an example, there is a listed company whose politically savvy owner has been highly skillful in soliciting the CCP’s penetration. The board chairman of this company is a minor party (minzhu dangpai) member and a People’s Political Consultative Conference member at the city level, while one of its vice chairmen is concurrently the company’s party secretary and a city-level Party Congress deputy. Drawing on her previous party-building work experience at a private college, and without any pressure from local party authorities, the party secretary proactively applied to establish a PPO in 2016 to enhance the company’s corporate governance with party organization and discipline. Without knowing where to seek support for its initiative, the company submitted its official application directly to the Organization Department of the city’s party authority. Finally, under the auspices of the subdistrict party work committee where the company is located, the company’s party committee was established a month later. Because of the company’s initiative, several party officials at both district and city levels, whom the company’s owners and executives had not known personally, paid several visits to the company intending to establish it as a role model for other TNOs to follow. This party-building initiative also yielded commercial benefits. For instance, through the direct intervention of a district-level party official who authorized a flexible approach to a demolition project, the company was able to avoid significant financial losses related to its rental properties. Consequently, the party secretary said that every time the company establishes a new subsidiary in another city, it will promptly try to establish a PPO, believing this will help the subsidiary gain local government support.Footnote ²⁹