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A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2000

Jeffrey s. Banks  and
John Duggan
Jeffrey s. Banks
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
John Duggan
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
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Abstract

We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of bargaining to the multidimensional spatial model. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium outcomes in structural and preference parameters, and equivalence of equilibrium outcomes and the core in certain environments, including the one-dimensional case. The model generates equilibrium predictions even when the core is empty, and it yields a “continuous” generalization of the core in some familiar environments in which the core is nonempty. As the description of institutional detail in the model is sparse, it applies to collective choice in relatively unstructured settings and provides a benchmark for the general analysis of legislative and parliamentary politics.

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American Political Science Review , Volume 94 , Issue 1 , March 2000 , pp. 73 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2000

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