The unprovoked attack by Russia on Ukraine in February 2022, and its far-reaching consequences for both security and energy security, has once again highlighted the complex relationship between fuel and power. Nowhere has this relationship been more visible than in the context of EU–Russia relations, a dynamic that has attracted much political and academic attention. For decades, Baltic and Eastern European states warned their Western partners of the risks of becoming dependent on energy supplies from Russia. Despite these warnings, the promise of ostensibly reliable and inexpensive energy supplies proved too tempting, leading to high reliance on Russian energy imports for many EU Member States, such as Germany. This dependence ended in crisis when, in July 2022, Russia cut off natural gas supplies through the Nord Stream pipeline, citing maintenance work and, in particular, delays in the return of a turbine as the causes. With the war in Ukraine raging and energy prices in the EU reaching record levels, Russia was willing to wield not only conventional weapons against Europe, but also the ‘energy weapon’.Footnote ¹

The origins of this situation stretch far back in time, and fears of the ‘energy weapon’ are not new in the EU–Russia context. Jeronim Perović’s Fuel and Power offers an engaging and informative account of how the energy industry in Russia had evolved into what it was until 2022. From an historical perspective, the contours of Russian energy ambitions over the past two decades become clearer, and arguably, such strong European dependence should not have been built up. While drawing parallels between historical episodes is fraught with uncertainty due to many changing variables, some general inferences can and should be made. Thus, this volume is timely and relevant.

Chronologically, the book begins in Tsarist Russia in the early 1900s and moves through the Soviet era to the present day, weaving a compelling narrative that traces the development of the oil, gas, and coal industries. Although oil remains at the centre of the Russian energy system, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the entire energy complex, including coal and natural gas. While not at the centre of the book, there are also some illuminating excursions on the role of electricity, for example Lenin’s view of electrification as a “fifth element” and his early plans to electrify the entire country in the 1920s.

Many of historical insights resonate with developments in recent years. The Russian strategy of achieving maximum power with minimal concessions, visible in its modern energy politics, is shown to have deep historical roots. In terms of foreign investment, this approach can already be seen in the Soviet Union’s short-lived oil concessions of the 1920s, when early foreign investors were swiftly expropriated once investment and equipment had been secured. A similar situation occurred some 80 years later, following Putin’s rise to power, when foreign companies were de facto expropriated from major energy investments in a move to ‘correct’ perceived mistakes made during post-Soviet privatization. In terms of political relations and sanctions policies, parallels are also clearly visible, beginning with the 1962 NATO sanctions urged by the United States to avoid Europe becoming the target of the Soviet ‘oil weapon’. Some 20 years later, the Reagan administration introduced sanctions not only against exports of pipelines to the Soviet Union but also against pipeline technology. Much like the Trump administration’s sanctions almost four decades later against the building of Nord Stream 2, Reagan’s measures had an extraterritorial effect, applying not only to US companies, but also to European firms with US licences.

A recurring theme throughout Fuel and Power is the assumption, shared by both the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation, that energy exports could serve as instruments of political influence. Until the 1950s, this potential remained largely unrealized due to limited production capacity and poor export infrastructure. However, from the 1960s onward, as export volumes grew, concerns by importing nations over the political leverage created by energy dependence intensified. Western responses thus varied. While the United Kingdom imposed import restrictions on Soviet oil, Western countries also restricted exports of technology and pipeline materials to the USSR in an attempt to limit Soviet influence.

Overall, Fuel and Power offers an insightful and compelling account of how Russia’s use of fuels has shaped its economic and geopolitical power. Readers familiar with Per Högselius’s Red Gas, Footnote ² a study of gas flows between Russia and Europe, will find Fuel and Power both complementary and broader in scope. Unlike Högselius’s work, this volume covers not only gas but also oil and electricity, offering a more holistic view of the Russian energy sector. Academics will appreciate the book’s thorough referencing, with citations that make it a valuable research tool. Although maps are provided at the beginning of the volume, their inclusion alongside the chapters would have enhanced the reader’s understanding of the geographical dimension of Russia’s vast energy networks.

Fuel and Power succeeds as both an historical and analytical study, providing essential background for understanding the strategic role of energy in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, and ultimately the weaponization of fuel and power in Europe’s most recent crisis. While the last chapters also discuss events in the post-Soviet era, the book’s focus lies on the period between the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. For readers interested in more recent energy relations, the coverage of the post-1991 period remains rather compact.

As for the book’s intended audience, there is no simple answer. Since its focus lies firmly on the energy industry, an interest in this field is essential. For researchers and scholars, the book provides not only a wealth of concentrated knowledge but also an extensive range of references for further exploration. Yet, given the times we live in, a clear recommendation can be made: Fuel and Power ought to be read by those shaping energy policy in Europe and beyond. The war in Ukraine has starkly demonstrated the lengths to which the current Russian leadership is willing to go in pursuit of their ambitions. Yet some policymakers still appear reluctant to recognize that Russia’s strategy of using energy as a weapon is not new but a continuation of a long-standing policy. Before 2022, speculation about whether modern Russia would employ energy coercion remained hypothetical; today it is an established fact. For this reason, policymakers should read this book not merely to understand the past but to avoid repeating its mistakes.

While dependence on Russian energy supplies is no longer an option for the EU, the author concludes that Russia will nevertheless play a role in supplying the EU in the future. Although this may be an uncomfortable thought while the war in Ukraine continues, I share that view. The future approach must, however, be different. The Ostpolitik maxim of Wandel durch Handel (‘change through trade’) should be reversed: trade should be offered only in exchange for geopolitical change, that is Handel durch Wandel (‘trade through change’). Existing pipelines could, in time, be used to supply the EU, with profits directed toward reparations for Ukraine. The prerequisite for this is an end to the war and Russia’s recognition of its obligation to make full reparations for its internationally wrongful acts.