1 Introduction
In a four page manuscript entitled “Of the Principle of Utility,” which is an unpublished draft of part of the proposed first chapter of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780, 1789) (“ IPML ”), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) stated that with respect to “the Principle of Utility”
For matter of censure or approbation, I appeal solely to this principle. The principle such as it is, is not of my own invention. The merit of discovering it is none of mine. The legitimate consequences of it, should any of them prove obnoxious are not chargeable upon me. I had it from Epicurus, from Carneades, from Horace, from Helvetius, from Beccaria. All that remains for me is only to apply it to particular cases as they come under review.
(University College London Bentham Papers, Box c, fo.114, pp. 3–4) [Emphasis added.]Footnote 1
In his list of declared sources of “the Principle of Utility,” Bentham named five thinkers in chronological order: Epicurus (341–270 BCE), Carneades (214–129 BCE), Horace (65–8 BCE), Helvetius (1715–1771), and Beccaria (1738–1794).
This paper focuses on the first two philosophers in Bentham’s list and investigates Bentham’s declaration that he “had” the principle of utility from the ancient Greek philosophers Epicurus and Carneades.Footnote 2 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the influence of the remaining three sources in Bentham’s list, the Roman poet and writer Horace who developed themes from Epicurus (particularly justice), and 18th century Enlightenment philosophers whose works were influenced by Epicurus, namely, Claude Adrien Helvetius (particularly his work De l’esprit (On Mind) 1758) and Cesare Beccaria (particularly his work Dei delitti e delle pene (On crimes and punishments) 1764). In the manuscript quoted above, Bentham stated “I could not easily have thought it [the principle of utility] had been new to any one if I had not remembered that before I had read Helvetius it was new even to myself.” (Manuscript, p.4)
After some background and introductory sections, the paper explores ways that Bentham’s development of the principle of utility in IPML was influenced by Epicurus with respect to (1) What is the goal in life? What has value for a human being? (2) How do human beings make choices to act? and (3) What actions are right or just? What is justice? What is a just law? The paper shows that Epicurus’ doctrines served as an important foundation for the principle of utility developed in IPML .Footnote 3
Next, the paper examines the influence of Carneades, an ancient Greek philosopher who developed a form of mitigated skepticism. For our purposes here, the paper shows that Carneades developed three requirements that any ethical theory must satisfy and that Bentham embraced such requirements and declared that the principle of utility – unlike other ethical theories – complied with them.
2 Epicurus: brief background
Epicurus (341–270 BCE) was born on the Greek island of Samos. He studied philosophy in several Greek cities before settling in Athens around 306 BCE. He purchased a property, which became known as the Garden, where he established his own school of philosophy. For Epicurus, humans and all animals experienced two feelings, pleasure and pain; and every choice and avoidance in acting were decided in relation to pleasure and pain.
While Epicurus wrote numerous texts, few have survived. In Lives of Eminent Philosophers , Diogenes Laertius (circa 200–250 CE), an important early Greek historian of ancient philosophy, provided a brief description of Epicurus’ life and, most significantly for our understanding of Epicurus, quoted (and thus preserved) four texts of Epicurus: his Principal Doctrines (a collection of forty aphorisms) and three letters.Footnote 4
Another important source of information about Epicurus’ ethical theory is the Roman statesman and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE), active during the late Roman Republic. In 88 BCE, Cicero attended lectures in Rome presented by Philo of Larissa (158–84 BCE), a Greek philosopher who adopted and embraced a form of mitigated skepticism developed by Carneades and known in the ancient world as “Academic Skepticism.” Thereafter, in 79 BCE, Cicero traveled to Athens and studied philosophy for a year with Greek philosophers teaching Stoicism, Epicurus, and Academic Skepticism.
Cicero was a lifelong student and practitioner of Academic Skepticism and sought to make Greek philosophy accessible for Romans. Cicero wrote philosophical works reporting the views of Greek philosophers, sometimes in dialogue form in imitation of Plato. Cicero created a Latin vocabulary to convey to Romans the meaning of Greek philosophical terms, some of which, for example, virtu, honestum, qualitas, probabilia, and comprehensio, have had a strong and lasting impact on Western philosophy.
3 Carneades: brief background
Carneades (214–129 BCE) was born in Cyrene, a Greek city in North Africa, and came to Athens and studied with the Stoics. In 167 BCE, Carneades became the head of the New Academy (a successor academy of the first or Old Academy of Plato). He was an orator and renowned for his skill in arguing against the dogmatic positions of other philosophers, particularly the Stoics, and also in developing arguments in favor of views that had never been considered before, in order to demonstrate that no conclusion can be held to be absolutely true.
Carneades wrote nothing. Therefore, we must look to reports of his views. According to a leading scholar of ancient Greek philosophy
Though the interpretation of ancient texts is inevitably difficult, Carneades presents what one might call a worst-case scenario. In the first place, he wrote nothing. To complicate matters, Carneades’ views were so obscure that his faithful disciple Clitomachus confessed that he could never figure out what Carneades actually believed (Cicero Academica 2.139). Showing remarkable fortitude in the face of such an obstacle, Clitomachus, attempting to play Plato to Carneades’ Socrates, reportedly recorded Carneades’ teachings in 400 books (Diogenes Laertius 4.67). Not one remains. None the less, Clitomachus’ attempt to make a philosophy of Carneades’ anti-theoretical stance was not a complete failure; Carneades had a tremendous influence on the later Academy as well as the Stoa, and his views (or lack thereof) have been handed down to us by both Sextus Empiricus and Cicero.Footnote 5
Reports of Carneades by Sextus Empiricus concern Carneades’ historical position in the New Academy, and his views with respect to belief, knowledge of truth, and the criterion of probable or “plausible (pithanon)” impressions. The passages do not discuss Carneades’ views or classification of ethical theories, or his requirements for an ethical theory.Footnote 6
Reports of Carneades by Diogenes Laertius concern Carneades’ background, study of the Stoics and his reputation: “He was so prominent in philosophy that even the orators would dismiss their classes and go to hear him lecture.”Footnote 7
Cicero offers the most relevant reports of Carneades’ views for investigating Bentham’s development of the principle of utility.
4 Cicero’s texts were an important source for Bentham’s views of Epicurus and Carneades
During Bentham’s lifetime (and today), Cicero’s philosophical texts were one of the most important surviving sources of information about ancient Greek moral philosophy, particularly Epicurus, the Stoics and Academic Skepticism, the three schools of philosophy that thrived during the Hellenistic period (considered to be from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE to the end of the Roman Republic in 31 BCE).
Cicero’s texts provided Bentham with important source material for understanding the debate on moral issues between followers of Epicurus and Stoics.Footnote 8
In De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (“ De Finibus ”), Cicero presented and then criticized the ethical theories of Epicurus (books 1 and 2), the Stoics (books 3 and 4), and the Old Academy (book 5).Footnote 9 According to Cicero, De Finibus presented “a more or less comprehensive discussion of the question of the highest goods and evils. In it I have investigated not only the views with which I agree, but those of each of the philosophical schools individually.” De Finibus , Book 1.12.
In Tusculan Disputations , another important philosophical text, Cicero examined five questions: Is death an evil? (Book 1); Is pain the greatest of all evils? (Book 2); Is the wise person subject to grief? (Book 3); Is the wise person free from excessive joy and lust? (Book 4); and Is virtue sufficient for a happy life? (Book 5) Cicero presented the argument in dialogue form, examining the different and conflicting positions held by the Stoics, Epicurus, and Academic Skeptics.
In De Finibus and Tusculan Disputations , Cicero wrote favorably of Carneades, praising his philosophical skill and approach.Footnote 10 Cicero claimed that he adopted Carneades’ method to examine all possible views and to suspend judgment.Footnote 11 However, Cicero was openly critical of Epicurus and his views, especially concerning ethics.Footnote 12
5 Bentham’s engagement with Cicero
When he arrived at Oxford on October 17, 1760, at age 12, Bentham brought with him, among other books, seven texts by Cicero.Footnote 13 Each mentioned or reported the views of Carneades:
While attending Oxford during 1760–1763, Bentham read and translated works by Cicero. Indeed, Cicero’s works were a key part of the curriculum for undergraduate students at Oxford during the eighteenth century.Footnote 14
Moreover, during his first year at Oxford, at his father’s request Bentham translated Tusculan Disputations .Footnote 15 On February 15, 1761, Bentham wrote to his father enclosing several pages of his translation of Tusculan Disputations :Footnote 16
Dear Papa I send you enclosed my Translation as I promised you and shall continue it every Week and send it you this day as being the last of the Week, for I think I need have at least a whole Week to do it in, for I am got to a very hard part, and deeply immersed in Philosophy.
On March 25, 1761, Bentham wrote to his father enclosing several more pages of his translation.Footnote 17 On December 12, 1761, Bentham wrote to his father “I send you inclos’d the last 36 Pages of the Tusculan disputations, which I doubt not will give you pleasure, as it does me to think my labours are at an End, which I hope are not in vain.”Footnote 18
In 1763, Bentham selected Tusculan Disputations to be one of the subjects of his graduation examination at Oxford.Footnote 19
In summary, by the time he graduated from Oxford in June 1763, Bentham had developed a deep familiarity with Cicero’s texts and a facility for translating Cicero’s Latin prose. Cicero’s texts discussed the views of Epicurus, the Stoics, and Academic Skepticism, and thereby provided Bentham with a serious study of ancient Greek philosophy and an introduction to the views of Carneades. By graduation, Bentham had further developed his proficiency in reading and writing in ancient Greek.Footnote 20
Bentham’s engagement with Cicero’s texts disclosed to Bentham, among other things, the major doctrines and issues debated by the Stoics, Epicurus, and Academic Skeptics; and that Carneades was an outstanding philosopher and eloquent orator who examined and classified all ethical theories, those known to be held and those that could be held theoretically, based on the finibus (Greek telos) or supreme good (summum bonum) pursued by each ethical theory. Significantly, Bentham learned from Cicero’s texts that Carneades discussed and strongly opposed the Stoics, whose ethical theory viewed pain as indifferent and honestum was the supreme good, in their debate with Epicurus, and that Carneades developed requirements or constraints that any ethical theory must satisfy.Footnote 21
6 Epicurus as a source for Bentham’s development of the principle of utility
To determine Bentham’s familiarity with the philosophical doctrines of Epicurus and the extent to which Epicurus influenced Bentham’s development of the principle of utility, it was necessary to examine passages in Bentham’s IPML alongside the philosophical doctrines attributed to Epicurus by Cicero (particularly in De Finibus ) and in Epicurus’ own texts, his Letter to Menoekeus (“ Letter” ) and Principal Doctrines . While I have no direct evidence that Bentham read Epicurus’ texts, printed editions of Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers , and thus Epicurus’ texts, were available to Bentham at the time (and even before) he began his studies at Oxford in 1760.Footnote 22 The focus of this paper is narrow and the discussion is restricted to Cicero’s reports of Epicurus and Epicurus’ own texts, excluding the Epicurean tradition and texts of later Epicureans, whose works Bentham may have read.
In the manuscript quoted in section 1 above, Bentham identified Epicurus by name and three thinkers influenced by Epicurus as sources for the principle of utility. He did not use the term “Epicurean.” (Manuscript, p.4)Footnote 23
6.1 The goal in life; what has value for a human being
Cicero reported that Epicurus’ ethical theory identified pleasure as the highest good and pain as the highest evil for a human being. De Finibus 1.29.
Every animal as soon as it is born seeks pleasure and rejoices in it, while shunning pain as the highest evil and avoiding it as much as possible. This is behavior that has not yet been corrupted, when nature’s judgment is pure and whole. De Finibus 1.30.
For Epicurus, the goal for man’s life, according to nature, was to seek pleasure and avoid pain. The pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain were natural to man, operated as original motivating factors in human nature, and constituted the origin of all value for man.
The ethical theory of Epicurus presented in De Finibus Book 1 is very similar to passages in Epicurus’ Letter , where Epicurus stated that the goal (telos) for man’s way of life, according to nature (phusis), was to be free of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul:
Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, all pleasure is good because it is naturally akin to us… By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of disturbance in the soul. Letter 10.129 and 10.131.
For Epicurus, pleasure was man’s first and natural “good” and defined as “the absence of pain in the body and of disturbance in the soul.” According to Epicurus, it was part of our nature (naturally akin to us) to direct our action to be free of pain.
Bentham followed Epicurus’ doctrine that the goal for man’s life, according to nature, was to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Bentham agreed with Epicurus that the pursuit of pleasure was natural to man (grounded in human nature) and the origin of all value. According to Bentham,
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do… They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: … The principle of utility recognizes this subjection. IPML , ch.1.1 (CW 11)
By the natural constitution of the human frame, on most occasions of their lives men in general embrace this principle, without thinking of it. IPML , ch.1.12 (CW 13).
For Bentham, pleasure constituted the origin of all value for man:
Strictly speaking, nothing can be said to be good or bad, but either in itself; which is the case only with pain or pleasure. IPML, ch.8.13 (CW 88–89).
Now, pleasure is in itself a good: nay, even setting aside immunity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil; and, indeed, without exception, the only evil; or else the words good and evil have no meaning. IPML , ch.10.10 (CW 100).
With respect to goodness and badness, as it is with everything else that is not itself either pain or pleasure, so it is with motives. If they are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects: good, on account of their tendency to produce pleasure, or avert pain: bad, on account of their tendency to produce pain, or avert pleasure. IPML , ch.10.12 (CW 100)
Bentham described numerous pleasures as having a positive aspect.Footnote 24 Even so, Bentham often stated (similar to Epicurus) that pleasure “comes to the same thing” as the absence of pain. For example,
A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains. IPML , ch.1.5 (CW 12)
…pleasure, and what comes to the same thing, immunity from pain. IPML , ch. 3.1 (CW 34)
In summary, the strong similarities of philosophical doctrines disclosed by examining the texts, supported by Bentham’s identification of Epicurus as a source, provide a basis to conclude that Bentham’s development of the principle of utility in IPML was influenced by Epicurus’ doctrines that pleasure and pain are natural to mankind (“sovereign masters” set by nature over man), operate as original motivating factors in human nature (“By the natural constitution of the human frame”), and determine value for man (“the only good” and “the only evil”).
6.2 How human beings make choices to act
Moreover, Bentham embraced Epicurus’ method for making choices to act. Cicero observed that, for Epicurus, “the impulse to seek and to avoid and to act in general derives either from pleasure or from pain. This being so, it is evident that a thing is rendered right and praiseworthy just to the extent that it is conducive to a life of pleasure.” De Finibus 1.42.
For Epicurus, “the wise person will uphold the following method of selecting pleasures and pains: pleasures are rejected when this results in other greater pleasures; pains are selected when this avoids worse pains.” De Finibus , 1.33.
Epicurus outlined in the Letter a method for making choices to act and selecting pleasures that evidenced a reasoned process of measuring pleasures and pains, “one against another,” and comparing the advantages and disadvantages of every choice and avoidance based upon observed facts of how pleasures and pains were experienced.
And since pleasure is our first good and natural to us, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatever, but often pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And often we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. Letter 10.129.
It is, however, by measuring one against another (summetrēsei), and by looking at the benefits (or advantages) and disadvantages, that all these matters must be judged… it is sober reasoning (nēphōn logismos), searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest disturbances take possession of the soul. Letter 10.130–132.
In describing a method for selecting pleasures, Epicurus directed attention to (1) the pain experienced performing acts in order to obtain pleasures and (2) the pain resulting from acts that produce pleasures. “No pleasure is bad in itself, but the things capable of making certain pleasures bring disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Principal Doctrine 8 (10.141).
In summary, for Epicurus, the selection of pleasure was a reasoned process: “we do not choose every pleasure whatever, but often pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them.” The process was guided by “sober reasoning” focused on observed facts of how human beings experienced pleasures and pains.
Bentham embraced a nearly identical method for making choices to act. Bentham outlined a “process” that involved measuring pleasures against pains and comparing the advantages and disadvantages of every choice and avoidance by considering the “properties” or “values” of how human beings experienced pleasures and pains.
According to Bentham, the process was “alike applicable to pleasure and pain, in whatever shape they appear: and by whatever denomination they are distinguished” and was “nothing but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable to.” IPML , ch.4.7 and 4.8 (CW 40).
Bentham described a key part of the “process” in terms of measuring or weighing as follows:
To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any act, [s]um up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole. IPML , ch.4.5 (CW 40).
In order to assign “values” to the pleasures and pains being measured in the “balance,” Bentham explicitly identified four “properties” of how pleasures and pains were experienced: “1. Its intensity. 2. Its duration. 3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness. ***” IPML , chapter 4.2 (CW 38).
In determining choice or avoidance, a person also needed to consider the pleasure or pain “of the act, or other event, by which such pleasure or pain has been produced:” the act’s “fecundity, or the chance it [the act] has of being followed by sensations of the same kind” and the act’s “purity, or the chance it [the act] has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind.” IPML , ch.4.3.5–6 (CW 39).
Bentham’s calculus “for estimating the tendency of any act or event” to produce pleasure or pain was based on the “value” or “force” of how human beings experienced pleasures and pains (“Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure”) is nearly identical to Epicurus’ reasoned process for measuring pleasures and pains against one another.
Bentham’s distinction between (1) the properties of a pleasure or pain “considered by itself” and (2) the pleasure or pain resulting from “the act, or other event, by which such pleasure or pain has been produced,” was clearly stated in Epicurus’ texts. The reasoned process for measuring pleasures and pains against one another and the properties describing how pleasures and pains were experienced by human beings, were found in Epicurus’ texts and thus not original to Bentham.Footnote 25
6.3 What actions are right or just; what is justice; what is a just law
For Epicurus, right actions and virtues were praiseworthy not for their own sake but for their utility (utilitate) in producing pleasure (absence of pain) ( De Finibus 1.42) and providing security from harm by others.
Epicurus derived right action or justice (dikaion) from nature’s good, to be free from harm by others. Justice rendered life more secure from harm by others.Footnote 26
Nature’s justice (phuseōs dikaion) is a token (sumbolon) of benefit (sumpherontos) relating to men not harming one another and not being harmed. Principal Doctrine 31 (10.150).
Epicurus’ conception of “nature’s justice” (phuseōs dikaion) was an extension of his doctrine that it was “nature’s good” (phuseōs agathon) for men to have security from being harmed by others. See Principal Doctrine 6 (10.141).Footnote 27
The state of affairs that men do not harm one another was declared right or just according to nature, a token or expression (sumbolon) of what was beneficial and useful for men in achieving nature’s goal (telos) to be free of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul. For Epicurus, it is “nature’s good” or naturally good that men do not harm one another and, accordingly, it is naturally right or just – “nature’s justice” – that men refrain from harming one another.
According to Epicurus, the concept of justice embodied a content that was universal, while the specifics of what was just may vary depending on location, time, or other circumstances. Principal Doctrine 36 (10.151)Footnote 28
Epicurus extended his conception of “nature’s justice” to establish a criterion for evaluating whether a particular law was “just.”
Among actions which are recognized as right or just (dikaiōn) by law, those which are proven on examination to have utility (chreiais) for reciprocal relations of one another in the community (allēlous koinōnias), then such laws are stamped as just… But if a man establishes a law and it does not turn out to lead to what is useful (sumpheron) in men’s reciprocal relations with each other in the community, then it [the law] no longer has the natural qualities of justice. Principal Doctrine 37 (10.152).Footnote 29
According to Epicurus, while the particular application of justice may vary depending on circumstances, the concept of justice contained universal content: an agreement by each member of the community not to harm one another or be harmed that was useful in men’s reciprocal relations with each other in the community.
Thus, for Epicurus, three elements for a “just law” emerged: an exchange of promises or agreement (sunthēkē) to not harm one another or be harmed; embodied in a law that is judged to be useful (chreiais) for the reciprocal relations of each member of the community (allēlous koinōnias) to not harm one another or be harmed; and enforced by punishment.
In summary, Epicurus derived “nature’s justice” from “nature’s good” that men should be free from pain and harm by others. Nature’s justice was a token (sumbolon) of benefit (sumpherontos) relating to men not harming one another and not being harmed. Justice may vary in particular application but the concept of justice expressed a form of utility (chreiais). Epicurus separated law and justice and developed a criterion for determining whether a positive law was “just” (dikaion), that is, whether the law was useful (chreiais) for men’s reciprocal relations with each other in the community (allēlous koinōnias).Footnote 30
Bentham developed a conception of justice that was based on key features of Epicurus’ conception of dikaion: “right action” or “justice” derived from utility. First, Bentham stated that the “meaning” of the concepts of “right action” and “justice” was best understood as a form of utility:
Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility… [o]ne may say also, that it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words ought, and right and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none. IPML , ch.1.10 (CW 13).
But justice, in the only sense in which it has a meaning, is an imaginary personage, feigned for the convenience of discourse, whose dictates are the dictates of utility, applied to certain particular cases. IPML , ch.10.40 note b2 (CW 120).
For Bentham, the “meaning” of the concepts of “right action” and “justice” should be expressed in terms of “the dictates of utility, applied to certain particular cases.” Thus, for Epicurus and for Bentham, “right action” and “justice” were derived from utility.Footnote 31
Secondly, Bentham separated positive law and law made in accordance with “the dictates of utility.” According to Bentham,
It is necessary, at the outset, to make a distinction between such acts as are or may be, and such as ought to be offenses. Any act may be an offense, which they whom the community of are in the habit of obeying shall be pleased to make one: that is, any act which they shall be pleased to prohibit or to punish. But, upon the principle of utility, such acts alone ought to be made offences, as the good of the community requires should be made so… by being detrimental to some one or more of the individuals that compose it. IPML , ch.16.1 and 4 (CW 187–188) [Emphasis original.]Footnote 32
By separating positive law and law in accordance with the principle of utility, Bentham developed the resources in his theory (similar to Epicurus) to distinguish between “a law” and “a just law.”
In an important (and under examined) passage in IPML , Bentham argued that the following “advantages” will be useful to the “subject” and “legislator” if laws were made pursuant to a “natural method” in accordance with the principle of utility:
By the intimation it [a natural method based on the principle of utility] gives of the nature and tendency of each obnoxious act, it accounts for, and in some measure vindicates, the treatment which it may be thought proper to bestow upon that act in the way of punishment. To the subject then it is a kind of perpetual apology [defense or justification]: showing the necessity of every defalcation, which, for the security and prosperity of each individual, it is requisite to make from the liberty of every other. To the legislator it is a kind of perpetual lesson: serving at once as a corrective to his prejudices, and as a check upon his passions. Is there a mischief which has escaped him? in a natural arrangement, if at the same time an exhaustive one, he cannot fail to find it. Is he tempted ever to force innocence within the pale of guilt? the difficulty of finding a place for it advertises him of his error. Such are the uses of a map of universal delinquency, laid down upon the principle of utility: such the advantages, which the legislator as well as the subject may derive from it. Abide by it, and everything that is arbitrary in legislation vanishes. IPML , ch.16.59 (CW 273–274). [Emphasis added.]
This text demonstrates that, for Bentham, a “natural method” for making laws was “a map of universal delinquency, laid down upon the principle of utility,” instructing legislators (“a perpetual lesson”) to make only such laws that prohibit or command conduct that was useful “for the security and prosperity of each individual.” Thus, laws made in accordance with the principle of utility were neither “arbitrary” nor reflected the legislator’s “prejudices” but protected the interests of “each individual” in the community. This text also made it explicitly clear that the principle of utility prohibited punishment of the innocent, that is, any attempt “to force innocence within the pale of guilt.”
Bentham’s assertion that law made in accordance with the principle of utility (useful to the community) was established “for the security and prosperity of each individual” is strikingly similar to Epicurus’ requirement that a just law was useful (chreiais) for men’s reciprocal relations with each other in the community.
Thirdly, Bentham stated that a “natural method” or “natural arrangement” established a criterion for determining whether a positive law was in accordance with “the dictates of utility” and thus a “just law.” Bentham stated
[A] natural arrangement, governed as it is by a principle [the principle of utility] which is recognized by all men, will serve alike for the jurisprudence of all nations. In a system of proposed law, framed in pursuance of such a method, the language will serve as a glossary by which all systems of positive law might be explained, while the matter [the content of the natural arrangement] serves as a standard by which they might be tried [judged]. IPML , ch.16.60 (CW 274) [Emphasis added.]
For Bentham, a “natural arrangement” of laws “framed in pursuance of” a “natural method” was “governed” by the principle of utility and thus served as a “standard” by which “all systems of positive law…might be tried.”
Bentham’s argument and reasoning relating to the content of his conception of justice and a just law may be outlined as follows:
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(1) The dictates of justice were “the dictates of utility, applied to certain particular cases,” for example, in making a law. IPML , ch.10.40 note (CW 120)
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(2) A law made in accordance with “the dictates of utility” was a “just law” and provided “for the security and prosperity of each individual.” IPML , ch.16.59 (CW 274). If a law did not provide “for the security and prosperity of each individual,” then such a law was not in accordance with the “dictates of utility” and thus not a “just law.”
For Epicurus and Bentham, a “just law” expressed a form of utility (chreiais) and provided for the security of each individual in the community against being harmed by others.
Epicurus’ texts described a conception of justice derived from the utility of men “not harming each other or being harmed” and “just laws” were useful for men’s relations “with each other in the community.” Principal Doctrines 31 and 37. (10.150 and 152). Bentham followed Epicurus in adopting a conception of justice derived from utility: a “just law” was a law made pursuant to “the dictates of utility” and thus provided “for the security and prosperity of each individual” in the community.
7 Carneades as a source for Bentham’s development of the principle of utility
During Cicero’s time, the debate concerning ethics occurred within an intellectual framework and classification of ethical theories constructed by Carneades.
Carneades developed a classification of all possible ethical theories (those actually held and those logically possible) as a way of organizing and investigating what ultimate good we should seek in answering, How ought I to live?Footnote 33
Carneades’ classification identified several possible candidates for the highest good (summun bonum) or possible final end (finibus or Greek telos) for an ethical theory: honestum (the honorable, moral, or Greek kalon); pleasure; freedom from pain; primary goods of nature; or honestum combined with one of the above.
Scholars of ancient Greek philosophy have observed that Carneades incorporated constraints or requirements into his classification of all ethical theories. “Carneades begins from several assumptions; since Academic Sceptics argued only from premises shared with the opponents, these [premises] must have the status of assumptions taken for granted in ethical debate at the time.”Footnote 34
In De Finibus , Cicero reported that Carneades set forth three requirements or constraints that any ethical theory must satisfy: (1) identify the ultimate good and evil, and provide a criterion for making choices how to act; (2) the good and evil must be grounded on a principle external to the theory; and (3) the principle must be well suited to some original motivating factor present in human nature. De Finibus 5.15–17.
7.1 Criterion for choices in every action; what constitutes a right action
For Carneades, “Once… we know what the ultimate good and evil is, then we have a path through life, a model of all our duties, to which each of our actions can thereby be referred [inventa vitae via est confirmatioque omnium officiorum, inventum igitur, quo quidque referatur.]” De Finibus 5.15–16.
Bentham designed the principle of utility to provide a criterion for choices in every action and what constituted a right action. It “approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever” and thus, as required by Carneades, provided “a path through life, a model of all our duties, to which each of our actions can thereby be referred.” De Finibus 5.15–16. For Bentham, “an action that is conformable to the principle of utility… is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done” and “it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be done.” IPML , 1.10 (CW 13).
7.2 Grounded on a consideration external to the theory
For Carneades, an ethical theory cannot merely appeal to feelings or isolated reactions, but must be subject to reflection and present itself as having intellectual content that can be learned.
He [Carneades] declared that no branch of knowledge could be based on itself. There is always something external to it that it comprehends [semper illud extra est quod arte comprehenditur.] … We have the particular branch of knowledge on the one hand, and its object on the other. Thus, medicine is the art of health, navigation the art of steering a ship. Similarly, practical reason is the art of living, and it is necessary that it too have as its basis and starting point something external [vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua.] De Finibus 5.16.
Under Bentham’s principle of utility, the approval or disapproval of an action is based on an external consideration, namely, “the tendency it [the action] appears to have to augment or diminish” the condition of the party whose interest is in question. Thus, as required by Carneades, there is “always something external to it [the principle of utility] that it comprehends [semper illud extra est quod arte comprehenditur]” ( De Finibus 5.16), namely, the consequences of the action on the condition of the party whose interest is considered. According to the principle of utility, approval or disapproval of an action is based on an external factor, happiness of the party in question. Bentham wrote “By the principle of utility…” and footnoted the word “principle” as follows:
The principle here in question may be taken for an act of the mind… which, when applied to an action, approves of its utility, as that quality of it [the action] by which the measure of approbation or disapprobation bestowed upon it ought to be governed. IPML , 1.2 note b (CW 11–12).
7.3 Adapted to a motivating factor originally present in human nature
For Carneades, an ethical theory must appeal to and start from a factor which is antecedently motivating to human nature, and construct its final end based on that factor. “What practical reason is concerned with and wants to attain must be something that is well suited and adapted to our nature [aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale], something that is attractive in itself and capable of arousing our desire (what the Greeks call horme).” De Finibus 5.17.
The principle of utility is grounded upon a motivating factor originally present in human nature, namely, “the happiness of the party.” For Bentham, “happiness” consisted of “enjoyment of pleasures, security from pains.” IPML , 7.1 CW 74. Thus, as required by Carneades, the principle of utility is “concerned with and wants to attain [happiness]… something that is well suited and adapted to our nature.” De Finibus 5.17.
Bentham declared that:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. *** They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think… The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation [of its ethical theory]. IPML , 1.1 (CW 11).
“By the natural constitution of the human frame, on most occasions of their lives men in general embrace this principle [of utility], without thinking of it.” IPML , 1.12. (CW 13).
7.4 Other ethical theories failed to comply with Carneades’ requirements
Moreover, Bentham’s commitment to Carneades’ requirements for an ethical theory was reflected in his analysis and rejection of other ethical theories where they failed, as required by Carneades, to appeal to “something external to it that it comprehends [semper illud extra est quod arte comprehenditur].” De Finibus , 5.16.
Bentham stated
The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong, may all be reduced to the principle of sympathy and antipathy. One account may serve for all of them. They consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author’s sentiment or opinion as a reason and that a sufficient one for itself. The phrases different, but the principle the same. IPML , 2.14 (CW 25–26) [Emphasis added.]
Thereupon, in a lengthy footnote, Bentham reviewed and rejected numerous ethical theories that used a “variety of phrases… in order to conceal… self-sufficiency” rather than appeal to an external consideration to warrant and guide moral approval or disapproval of the conduct. IPML , 2.14 noted (CW 26–29).
Bentham adopted Carneades’ requirement for an ethical theory in declaring “What one expects to find in a principle is something that points out some external consideration, as a means of warranting and guiding the internal sentiments of approbation and disapprobation.” IPML , 2.12 (CW 25).
Significantly, at the end of the first chapter of IPML , Bentham developed a thought experiment to challenge any reader who “may happen to be disposed not to relish” the principle of utility. IPML , 1.14. (CW 15).
Several steps in the thought experiment embodied Carneades’ requirements.
For instance, with respect to the need to appeal to an external consideration, Bentham stated
let him examine and satisfy himself whether the principle he thinks he has found is really any separate intelligible principle; or whether it be not a mere principle in words, a kind of phrase, which at bottom expresses neither more nor less than the mere averment of his own unfounded sentiments. IPML , 1.14.3. (CW 15).
and if “the sentiment which he proposes as a standard must be grounded on reflection, let him say on what particulars the reflection is to turn?” IPML , 1.14.7. (CW 16).
Recalling Carneades’ requirement that the ethical theory must appeal to some original motivating factor present in human nature, Bentham concluded
Admitting any other principle than the principle of utility to be a right principle, a principle that it is right for a man to pursue… let him say whether there is any such thing as a motive that a man can have to pursue the dictates of it: if there is, let him say what that motive is, and how it is to be distinguished from those which enforce the dictates of utility: if not, then lastly let him say what it is this other principle can be good for? IPML , 1.14.10. (CW 16). [Emphasis original.]
Indeed, Bentham’s review and rejection of other ethical theories in Chapters 1 and 2 of IPML evidence a kind of Carneadean method and confidence.
8 Conclusion
This paper investigated Bentham’s declaration in an unpublished manuscript of the first chapter of IPML that he “had” the “Principle of Utility” from, among other sources, the ancient Greek philosophers Epicurus and Carneades.Footnote 35
The paper confirmed the influence of Epicurus on Bentham’s development of the principle of utility by identifying deep connections and similarities in the philosophical doctrines expressed by Epicurus (in his texts and in Cicero’s reports) with Bentham’s views in IPML relating to three key issues: the goal in life and what has value for human beings; how human beings make choices to act; and what actions are right or just, what is justice, and what is a just law.
With respect to Carneades, the paper showed that the “Principle of Utility” developed by Bentham satisfied Carneades’ three requirements for an ethical theory: (1) a criterion for choices in every action and what constitutes a right action; (2) grounded on a consideration external to the theory; and (3) adapted to a motivating factor originally present in human nature. Bentham’s formulation of the “Principle of Utility” may be read in light of Carneades’ three requirements as follows:
By the principle of utility is meant that principle [1] which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, [2] according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish [3] the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. IPML , 1.2 (CW 11–12)
In summary, Bentham’s development of the principle of utility in IPML was strongly influenced by ancient Greek moral philosophy as reflected in the works of Epicurus and Carneades.
Supplementary material
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820826100260
Acknowledgements
I am deeply grateful to Frederick Rosen (emeritus) and Philip Schofield, Bentham Project, University College London; Eric Brown, Washington University in St. Louis; Julia Annas, University of Arizona; Jan Maximilian Robitzsch, University of Florida; and Bruce Buchanan and Batia Wiesenfeld, Stern School of Business, New York University, for their comments and support.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this article.
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