If one were to survey social movements in the last decade that were inextricably linked to global socioeconomic processes, the significant social movements that have emerged in Islamic oil-producing countries could hardly escape notice. Since nine oil-exporting states possess Muslim majorities, there appears to be an objective relationship between the global consequences of the post–1973 oil-price revolution and the socioeconomic transformation of Muslim populations. Although most Muslim states experienced social movements in this period, it is clear that in the oil-producing Islamic countries, the particular social impact and institutional location of petroleum rents greatly intensified the disruption of urban social networks. Indeed, the cases of Shi‘ite Iran and Muslim northern Nigeria indicate how this disruptive element may have contributed to Islamic revolutionary movements which, though having quite distinct goals, ideologies, and social bases, remain inexplicable without analyzing the consequences of the petroleum boom on the relationship between state and society.

Spectacular events tend to capture our attention—the war in Cambodia, oil exploration and production on Malaysia's coast, the assassination of Benigno Aquino and internal strife in the Philippines, the election of two solitary opposition candidates to Singapore's parliament, the rejuvenation of Indonesia's military command structure, coup rumours in Thailand: an endless string of more or less spectacular or even decisive happenings that find themselves in the headlines of the international press.

Political science has become a dismal science for most of the world. In the proverbial third world, where most people live, the “physical quality of life” is often abysmal and liable to further deterioration. Steeped in “realism,” political science foretells a future of dictatorial rule for most of those who face the prospect of increasing physical misery.

This inquiry focuses on one life stage in the life cycle of ancient Babylonia and Assyria of the first millennium B.C., specifically, the age at first marriage for men and women. I will suggest some implications to be drawn for the household and family patterns resulting from probable age at marriage, and identify native terminology employed in reference to the life stage common for first marriage.

Anyone who sees today's high schoolers sporting beards will be surprised— or incredulous—to read in Homer's Iliad that Achilles, the greatest warrior among the Greeks at Troy, was still beardless. Yet Plato accepted it as a wellknown and unsurprising tradition.

My purpose in this study is to refine understanding of the functional role of conventional religion for the viability of communal life (Bainbridge 1985). I shall endeavor to do this by broadly coordinating Talcott Parsons's evolutionary perspective of human society (1966, 1971) with that of Robert Bellah on religion (1964), and applying them to the formation and development of the Religious Kibbutz Federation (RFK) in Israel. By examining the historical experience of the groups that formed religious communes during the Mandatory period in Palestine, I shall attempt to demonstrate that religion can play a dysfunctional as well as a functional role in a communal system.

What are the social and psychological sources of social movements that are committed to (1) equality among their members, (2) communitarian ideals emphasizing strong ties of affection among members and a belief in spontaneous cooperation without direction by authority, and (3) austerity in the consumption of physical goods and also in the use or display of comforts and ornaments? In the course of time what becomes of such a movement as it tries to put its ideals into practice? Many but not all of those that have lasted—and I shall limit this inquiry to examples that have lasted for at least several generations—have become quite wealthy. How and why does this change come about, and what are its consequences?

During the last nine years, while Western feminists were directing critical attention to what they described as “the curious courtship,” the “unhappy marriage,” and the “uneasy hyphen between marxism-feminism,” Western students of Middle Eastern women were pushing the field toward a serious consideration and adoption of Marxian social and economic theories. In two very important articles, Nikki Keddie and Judith Tucker argued that the field can expand its understanding of the different worlds of women by studying their roles in production and social reproduction. This new materialist approach promised to overcome what both said was a serious idealist bias in the literature that derived the status of Middle Eastern women from the major Muslim religious and legal texts and/or relied on the culturally biased Western/Orientalist conceptions of these women.