Introduction
In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of “women-friendly” states on the international stage (Aggestam and True Reference Aggestam and True2020). These states share a public commitment to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and put gender equality at the forefront of their foreign policy. In 2014, this trend took a new turn with Sweden’s adoption of the first explicitly feminist foreign policy,Footnote 1 which was followed by many countries including Canada in 2017. While adopting the label marks a departure from conventional foreign policy approaches, it does not always signify a deeper commitment to feminist principles (Thomson Reference Thomson2022). For instance, Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) is not unlike Australia’s focus on gender equality in its 2014 Aid Policy and 2016 Gender Equality Strategy (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2014; 2016). As Lee-Koo notes, “there is limited evidence to suggest that [Canada’s] policy is more feminist than Australia’s, except in name” (Reference Lee-Koo2020, 243). This comparison suggests that while some states, such as Canada, actively mobilize the feminist label as part of their international identity, others may adopt similar priorities without explicitly branding their policies as feminist. Thus, this article asks why certain states choose to explicitly label themselves as feminists. More specifically, it asks why Canada decided to adopt a feminist branding as part of its foreign policy approach.
Although some scholars have emphasized the performative aspects of feminist foreign policies (Zhukova, Sundström, and Elgström Reference Zhukova, Rosen Sundström and Elgström2022; Thomson Reference Thomson2022), few studies have significantly engaged with the puzzle that states’ self-identification with the feminist label raises. Most studies have focused on the impact of a feminist approach on states’ practices (for example, Parisi Reference Parisi2020; Thomson Reference Thomson2020) or have been concerned with the shortcomings and normative aspects of such initiatives (for example, Tiessen and Swan Reference Tiessen, Swan, Hillmer and Lagassé2018; Brown and Swiss Reference Brown, Swiss, Katherine and Allan2018; Duriesmith Reference Duriesmith2018; Swan Reference Swan2021). Yet, there is a crucial distinction between states that endorse the feminist label and those that refrain from doing so despite their firm commitments to gender equality and values. States that adopt the label are carefully crafting and projecting an image of themselves that is progressive and “feminist” (Thomson Reference Thomson2020; Jezierska and Towns Reference Jezierska, Towns, Cynthia and Larsen2021). In reality, these states are not inherently more feminist than their counterparts (Lee-Koo Reference Lee-Koo2020; Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad Reference Skjelsbæk and Lise Tryggestad2020), which suggests that states possess distinct motivations for integrating this branding into their policy narratives. These motivations have yet to be explored in more details.
Building on the constructivist insight that states experiencing insecurity about their international identity are more likely to adopt international norms (Gurowitz Reference Gurowitz2006), I suggest that Canada adopted its branding in a period of significant insecurity toward its international identity, which prompted the country to rebrand as a way to strengthen its sense of identity. To verify this argument, I conduct a thematic analysis of Canadian foreign policy debates between 2006 and 2017, focusing on how Canada’s identity, foreign policy, and gender equality are discussed by Members of Parliament (MP). My dataset consists of 1,551 statements from the Canadian House of Commons and additional documents published by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. This extensive dataset allows me to capture the context leading to the adoption of the FIAP and Canada’s feminist branding, focusing on how MPs perceive and discuss the country’s image, priorities, and interests. The analysis reveals discursive traces of insecurity about the country’s role, image, and international status leading up to the adoption of the FIAP, with MPs often mentioning Canada’s diminishing status and influence, as well as its disengagement from international affairs. Although this is not a new theme in Canada’s foreign policy (see, for instance, Cohen Reference Cohen2003), I show how MPs’ statements also highlighted a strong aspiration to enhance the country’s role and standing, with gender equality emerging as a key area for strengthening Canadian leadership on the international stage. These insights confirm the initial argument presented in this article: that Canada’s choice to adopt a feminist brand occurred within a broader context of identity insecurity, and that gender equality provided a strategic opportunity to strengthen the country’s role through enhanced leadership in this area. This article advances our understanding of feminist foreign policies by drawing on constructivist insights to highlight how the adoption of the feminist label can address identity insecurity and reinforce a country’s global image, role and status. It provides a rationale as to why states might be drawn to strategically adopt certain brandings like the feminist label despite their moderate commitments, explaining the diffusion of openly feminist countries in recent years.
Canada provides a compelling case to study feminist branding, especially the conditions under which type 3 countries—those with issue-specific feminist commitments that adopt the feminist label—choose to embrace this branding. Canada was the second country to explicitly brand its foreign policy as feminist through the launch of the FIAP, which is restricted to foreign aid. While Canada’s broader feminist foreign policy strategy includes the FIAP, several National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security (C-NAP), and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces WPS strategies (Blatt Reference Blatt2020), the country does not have an official policy that defines its feminist approach to the foreign policy sector as a whole.Footnote 2 In 2020, Trudeau’s government committed to broadening its feminist agenda in a white paper on Canada’s feminist foreign policy (Canada and Champagne Reference Champagne2020). However, five years later, in 2025, the document remains unpublished. Despite the absence of an official policy guiding Canada’s feminist foreign policy outside of foreign aid, officials proudly assert the country’s feminist identity. By 2019, Deputy Minister Prime Chrystia Freeland was regularly and openly advocating for Canada’s feminist approach to international relations (Chapnick Reference Chapnick2019, 192). This trend has since continued, with Canadian officials routinely mentioning Canada’s feminist status in their communications. A quick analysis of data from Diplomatic Pulse,Footnote 3 which highlights diplomatic trends among United Nations member states since 2020, shows that Canada ranks second, after Mexico, in mentions of the word “feminist” in its official communications. Mexico leads with 117 mentions, followed by Canada with 70, Germany with 60, and France with 54 (2025). Overall, this stark contrast between the country’s strong rhetoric and the absence of an official foreign policy outside of foreign aid provides a compelling case to study the strategic use of the feminist label.
This article is organized as follows: I first review the current explanations for the growth of feminist branding in international relations and highlight their shortcomings. Building on these limitations, I then examine how the constructivist literature on branding, identity, and the adoption of international norms provides fertile ground from which to analyze the puzzle raised in this article. This is followed by an empirical analysis of Canada’s foreign policy debates and a concluding discussion of the findings.
The Growth of Feminist Branding
Adopting a feminist label is often associated with the launch of pro-gender equality policies that range from extensive to limited in scope. If a state is not committed to gender equality in any capacity, there is little reason to expect it to explicitly adopt a feminist label. In this sense, the study of feminist foreign policy is inherently restricted to countries that demonstrate at least a minimum commitment to gender equality in their foreign policy. From this starting point, I propose a typology of states’ adoption of the feminist label (see Figure 1). I identify four distinct types based on the extent of their policy commitments and whether or not they adopt the feminist label.
Typology of States’ Adoption of the Feminist Label.
Note: This typology draws on Jessica Cheung’s work. She introduced a similar typology in her 2021 presentation at the International Feminist Journal of Politics Conference called “Dis(connecting) Feminist Foreign Policies: Strategic Adoption and ‘Othering’ in International Politics.”
Type 1 includes states that have introduced an extensive policy and explicitly adopted the feminist label. The main example here is Sweden, which launched its feminist foreign policy in 2014, targeting multiple sectors of foreign policy (Government Offices of Sweden 2019). Type 2 refers to states with an extensive policy, but that refrain from adopting the feminist label to characterize their commitment. An example is Norway, which adopted its “Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Norway’s Foreign and Development Policy” in 2023 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023). While this action plan establishes gender equality and the promotion of women’s rights as priority areas in Norway’s foreign policy, the country does not use the feminist label to describe its commitments. Type 3 encompasses states that have adopted the feminist label but whose policies are limited in scope. For example, Canada exemplifies this category with its Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP). While the FIAP formalizes Canada’s feminist approach in the foreign aid sector, the country has yet to publish an official comprehensive policy document addressing its feminist approach to foreign policy sector as a whole. Lastly, Type 4 encompasses most countries that have some commitments to gender equality—usually limited to the aid sector—but do not adopt the feminist label. For instance, the United Kingdom’s “International Women and Girls Strategy 2023–2030” commits to ensuring that at least 80% of its bilateral aid programs focus on gender equality by 2030 (2023, 23), but it does not brand its strategy as feminist. Similarly, most OECD countries incorporate a focus on gender equality in their bilateral aid programs without adopting this branding. From this typology, an interesting puzzle emerges: states in Type 3 do not necessarily demonstrate a deeper or more extensive commitment to gender equality than states in Type 2. Why, then, do they choose to adopt a feminist branding?
A prevailing explanation in the literature as to why states self-identify as feminists revolves around the presence of windows of opportunity, suggesting that feminist foreign policies are adopted when leaders perceive an opening in the political landscape and can effectively advocate for the policy. Aggestam and True argue that political leaders navigate a complex international social world shaped by gender symbolism and normative structures that impact how states, non-state actors, and individuals present themselves and are perceived (Reference Aggestam and True2021, 393). Political actors therefore act within a gendered multilevel game to either support or hinder the adoption of gender equality policies in foreign policy. Gill-Atkinson et al. outline five key factors necessary for the adoption of a feminist label: a high level of political will, an enabling global environment, political leaders that value gender equality and feminism, the “need for an announceable,” and an opportunity on the world stage (Reference Gill-Atkinson, Alice Ridge, Tillbury, Warambourg and Peña Porras2021, 4). Yet, it is worth noting that such adoption is also contingent on domestic audiences’ receptiveness to gender equality values; otherwise, pro-gender policies risk being developed and adopted “by stealth,” as was the case in Australia (Lee-Koo Reference Lee-Koo2020). Following this assumption, we would expect that countries with high levels of popular approval for gender equality would adopt the label when a progressive government concerned with gender equality comes to power.
However, this is not always the case. For instance, countries like Norway and New Zealand, despite having strong domestic support for gender equality and progressive governments actively promoting such values, have thus far refrained from adopting the feminist label (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad Reference Skjelsbæk and Lise Tryggestad2020; Beaulieu Reference Beaulieu2022). In Norway, Prime Minister Erna Solberg (2013–2021) introduced an Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign and Development Policy in 2016, focusing on empowering women and girls and promoting their self-determination (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016, 5). Similarly, in New Zealand, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern (2017–2023) appointed Nanaia Mahuta as the first Māori woman Foreign Minister in 2020 and adopted a Gender Action Plan to direct 60% of development aid towards women’s empowerment (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2021). The next year, she announced a significant contribution of 12.6 million dollars to support Fiji’s Gender Action Program, highlighting that “gender equality and women’s empowerment is a priority for Aotearoa New Zealand, and for [its] engagement in the Pacific” (Ardern and Mahuta Reference Ardern and Mahuta2022). Ardern herself identifies as a feminist and has spoken many times about the importance of gender equality (Ardern Reference Ardern2017; Reference Ardern2018; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2021). Nonetheless, although both Solberg and Ardern prioritized gender equality and were vocal about their commitments, they refrained from adopting a feminist branding, illustrating that opportunistic timing is not sufficient to understand what prompts states to label themselves as feminists.
Another explanation as to why states might adopt a feminist label involves domestic political dynamics. For instance, in Canada, Thomson notes that Trudeau was motivated to launch an openly feminist policy to distance his government from the previous Harper government (Reference Thomson2022). This explanation provides part of the answer, especially when we consider how different Canadian Prime Ministers have approached gender equality in their foreign policies throughout the years. Between 2009 and 2013, the Harper government removed the term “gender equality” from the Canadian Development Agency (CIDA) documents to replace it with “equality between women and men” (Tiessen Reference Tiessen2016, 189). This decision was a conscious move by the Conservatives to distance themselves from the previous approach favored by CIDA in regard to gender equality,Footnote 4 which was introduced by the Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) and Paul Martin (2003-2006). As Tiessen notes, “near the end of the Harper era, the language of gender equality was making a slow return to official documents and government webpages, but by then substantial damage had been done to Canada’s reputation as a leader in the promotion of gender equality” (Reference Tiessen2016, 200). After winning the elections in 2015, Trudeau introduced Canada’s FIAP, which “recognizes that supporting gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls is the best way to build a more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world” (Global Affairs Canada 2017, vi), and its usage of the word “feminist” was no coincidence. In line with Thomson, this back-and-forth between the Conservatives and the Liberals about wordings illustrates how gender has been used by governments to signal their ideological stance and to distance themselves from previous governments. However, although these motivations must be considered when explaining the puzzle of Canada’s self-identification, it captures only part of the strategic incentives associated with the act of rebranding. As Tiessen highlighted, Harper’s removal of the term “gender equality” impacted Canada’s reputation and image on the international stage. This suggests that Trudeau’s use of the word “feminist” may have been aimed not only at distancing his government from Harper’s but also at restoring Canada’s international standing—an explanation that this article examines more thoroughly.
Theoretical Framework
In order to answer the question raised in this article—why Canada chose to explicitly brand itself as feminist—it is useful to define the concept of political branding. The aim of political branding is to communicate an image or a national identity to an external (or national) audience to achieve political, economic, military, or commercial goals (van Ham Reference Ham2001; Potter Reference Potter2009; Varga Reference Varga2013). As Browning emphasizes, branding implies a strategic action by the state and is targeting specific audiences (Reference Browning2015, 201), either domestic or international, or both. Brands rely on established identities and are essentially “simplified representation of national identities” (Browning Reference Browning2015, 201). Seminal works by constructivist scholars such as Wendt (Reference Wendt1994; Reference Wendt1999), Katzenstein (Reference Katzenstein1996), and Hopf (Reference Hopf2002) have illustrated how identities influence actors’ self-perception, interests, and ultimately actions. National identities are “constructed within the social environment of international and domestic politics” (Finnemore and Sikkink Reference Finnemore and Sikkink2001, 398–99), and influence foreign policy. As McDonald aptly notes in the case of Canada, “the pictures politicians paint of who Canada is are integral to pursuing how Canada acts internationally” (Reference McDonald2023, 2). Hence, national identities play a foundational role in shaping political brands and foreign policy, as the articulation of identity defines both their possibilities and limitations.
A central question that needs to be addressed, then, is why states rely on branding. A first perspective emphasizes how political branding is motivated by the economic and political benefits it yields. On the one hand, branding allows states or groups of states to rely more on soft power to influence global politics (Diez Reference Diez2005; Janusch Reference Janusch2016). States that build a positive brand can also attract more tourists, international students, and companies compared to other countries that have a weaker image (Anholt Reference Anholt2007). This is seen as especially attractive in today’s globalized and competitive world. As highlighted by Aggestam and True, “for [states that adopt the feminist label], the promotion of pro-gender equality norms in foreign policy is seen as a chance to exercise global and regional leadership and to undertake ‘nation-branding’, as well as ‘smart’ diplomacy and economics” (Reference Aggestam and True2021, 386). On the other hand, adopting a normative or progressive branding like the feminist label can help states reposition themselves within the global community, potentially leading to enhanced bilateral and multilateral relationships and strengthening their overall status on the international stage (Farris Reference Farris2017; Thomson Reference Thomson2022). This was exemplified by “the Canadian (2018) and French (2019) presidency in the Group of Seven (G7), and the Swedish (2017–18) and Mexican (2021–2) non-permanent seats on the [United Nations Security Council] after their [feminist foreign policy] launch” (Zhukova, Sundström, and Elgström Reference Zhukova, Rosen Sundström and Elgström2022, 198). Another example of this is the Nordic countries,Footnote 5 which have individually and collectively crafted an image as the “gender-progressive Nordics.” This image has helped set the region apart and contributed to a sense of exceptionalism that is core to Nordic countries’ identity (Enloe et al. Reference Enloe, Larsen, Marie Moss and Skjelsbæk2021). Hence, adopting a pro-gender strategy in areas like diplomacy and security, which are traditionally seen as “high politics,” can position a state as part of an elite group in the international political arena (Bouka et al. Reference Bouka, Stéfanie von Hlatky, Martin-Brûlé, Martin de Almagro Iniesta and Zahar2021).
Another perspective emphasizes the link between branding, identity, and (in)security. As highlighted by Browning, “nation branding may also contribute to a nation’s self-esteem and sense of ontological security” (Reference Browning2015, 202). Ontological security is a concept derived from psychoanalysis and sociology that refers to the “security not of the physical body but of the self or identity” (Mitzen and Larson Reference Mitzen and Larson2017, 1). Consequently, branding can play a crucial role in constructing and reinforcing states’ sense of self-identity. This is exemplified in Sweden, for instance, where gender cosmopolitanism—the commitment to protecting women’s rights both domestically and internationally—has helped the country “to construct its physical reality and sense of self as a ‘good state’” (Bergman Rosamond Reference Bergman Rosamond2013, 330). In her analysis of Canada’s and Sweden’s policies, Thomson echoes this argument, observing that “this ‘feminist nationalism’ creates a particular brand for both countries that enmeshes their feminist policies with each nation’s sense of itself and the understanding of the country that it wishes to project into the international realm” (Reference Thomson2020, 434). Adopting a specific branding, therefore, is understood as the outcome of a process in which a state seeks to reinforce its sense of self-identity.
This conceptual link between states’ self-esteem and identity has been further explored in constructivist accounts of norm adoption. In her work, Gurowitz asserts that a state’s ability to adopt international norms domestically is contingent on two identity-related aspects: (1) its conceptualization of its role and self-image on the global stage and the degree to which it aligns with the international society (international identity), and (2) its level of confidence (that is, being secure or insecure) toward this identity at a given time (Reference Gurowitz2006). The first aspect can predict the likelihood of its adopting international norms. Generally, states with stronger international identities are more likely to adopt international norms (for example, pro-gender equality policies). However, to understand when states are more inclined to adopt international norms, the second aspect is crucial. States experiencing identity insecurity are more compelled to adopt international norms as a way to reduce their insecurity. A key mechanism thus connecting action with identity is the idea that states insecure about their international identity will seek to align with the broader global community to enhance their sense of belonging and reduce their feelings of insecurityFootnote 6 (Keck and Sikkink Reference Keck and Sikkink1998; Gurowitz Reference Gurowitz2006, 333).
Building on the theoretical framework of identity and insecurity, I contend that states grappling with greater insecurity regarding their international identity are more inclined to resort to progressive branding, such as adopting the feminist label. Thus, I suggest that identity insecurity acted as an important contextual factor in Canada’s decision to mobilize a feminist branding. This argument is consequent with previous literature regarding feminist branding in foreign policy. For example, Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad (Reference Skjelsbæk and Lise Tryggestad2020; Reference Skjelsbæk, Lise Tryggestad, Cynthia, Larsen and Skjelsbæk2021) argue that states with strong international roles might avoid adopting a feminist label if it conflicts with their established identity. In their study of Norway, they attribute the country’s reluctance to adopt a feminist branding to its international image and role of a “neutral mediator.” They contend that embracing a feminist label could compromise Norway’s neutrality-focused approach to international politics, potentially necessitating the introduction of provisions perceived as “too liberal” or Western (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad Reference Skjelsbæk and Lise Tryggestad2020, 190). Their findings thus support the argument that the variation in label adoption can be understood through the degree to which states experience insecurity about their international identity. As emphasized, because Norway already has a strong identity as a neutral mediator and centers its international engagement around this role, the country refrains from using the label. In contrast, as future sections will illustrate in greater detail, Canada has struggled to establish a strong identity and clear priorities in its foreign policy, resulting in an insecure international identity.
Research Design
Establishing the presence or absence of a sense of insecurity is challenging, given its subjective nature. Identity insecurity is less about a physical condition and more deeply tied to a country’s self-perception and international image. To navigate this difficulty, I look for discursive traces of insecurity in Canadian foreign policy debates, which shed light on how MPs perceive and discuss the country’s image, roles, and status. More specifically, I conduct a thematic analysis, which is “a flexible method for identifying and analyzing patterns of meaning—‘themes’—in qualitative data” (Braun and Clarke Reference Braun, Clarke, Morin and Olsson2021, 283). I adopt a reflexive approach where the “researcher’s subjectivity is viewed as a resource rather than a potential ‘threat’ to reliable coding” (Braun and Clarke Reference Braun, Clarke, Morin and Olsson2021, 285). Put differently, I do not seek to establish causality but rather develop an interpretative account of the data.
As part of this process, I first developed a coding scheme with indicators and keywords around the theme of insecurity, which I refined as I manually coded the data. As Benoit emphasizes, a thematic analysis is an “iterative process whereby the annotation scheme can be refined during the process of reading and annotating the texts” (Reference Benoit, Curini and Franzese2020, 470). My coding scheme includes two main analytical categories: insecurity and aspirations, each with its respective indicators and associated keywords. The first category, insecurity, encompasses references to (1) Canada’s disengagement in international affairs, (2) its diminishing international status, influence, and/or prestige, along with mentions of the need to improve the country’s international image or reputation, and (3) the perceived distance between Canada’s current identity and its “glorious past.” These indicators highlight a lack of confidence in the country’s current strategy and point to significant insecurity about its identity and status on the world stage. The second category, aspirations, logically builds on the first. These aspirations reflect a recognition of Canada’s limitations and signal an intent to enhance the country’s status on the global stage. This category highlights MPs’ desire to expand Canada’s role internationally, which I then link to an analysis of how gender equality is discussed in Parliament and official documents. Table 1 summarizes the key indicators used for the analysis. Taken together, these two categories highlight how MPs perceive Canada’s roles and identity on the international stage and provide greater context for understanding the circumstances under which the feminist label was adopted.
Key indicators
My data collection spans from 2006 to the end of 2017, a period chosen for two main reasons. First, 2006 marks the beginning of the 39th Canadian Parliament, led by Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party, which won the election in January. Second, the end of 2017 aligns with the adoption of the FIAP earlier that year by Trudeau’s government. Since this article focuses on the context leading up to the adoption of a feminist branding, data collection concludes in 2017. This timeframe includes both Harper’s and Trudeau’s governments, providing a comprehensive understanding of the period preceding Canada’s adoption of the feminist label. Second, while data is available from September 2002 onward, it is inconsistent for the years between 2002 and 2006. Moreover, it is not possible to isolate statements specifically related to foreign policy during that earlier period, making meaningful analysis difficult. Overall, I gathered 1,551 statements from the Canadian House of Commons website concerning foreign policy from 2006 to 2017, creating a robust dataset to analyze how MPs discuss the country’s image, roles, and status. I also rely on documents published by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development during this period to highlight how gender equality and feminism were discussed. I manually coded approximately 30 per cent of the material, using a combination of keyword searches and reading through statements from different periods. This initial manual coding served as the foundation for the NVivo automated coding. Given that some keywords (such as leadership) appear in multiple categories within my coding scheme, creating potential overlap between different indicators, I made sure to review all material coded by NVivo.
Empirical Analysis
In 2015, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party secured 184 seats out of 388—a remarkable gain of 148 seats for the Liberals. After nearly a decade of Conservative leadership under Stephen Harper, Trudeau declared that “Canada [was] back” during his inaugural speech. He pledged that his government would champion multilateralism and re-engage in global affairs, with revitalized Canadian leadership on key global issues such as the promotion of human rights, gender equality, and women’s empowerment. Stéphane Dion, whom Trudeau named as his Minister of Foreign Affairs, was explicitly mandated “to restore constructive Canadian leadership in the world” as an overarching goal (Trudeau Reference Trudeau2015). At the time, this seemed like a wind of change in Ottawa, with Trudeau deeply committed to improving the country’s international standing.
However, this ambition was by no means a new aspiration in the Canadian foreign policy scene. In fact, both Stephen Harper (2006-2015) and Paul Martin (2003-2006) also committed to the same thing. When Harper got elected, he asserted that Canada would be “a vital player” in international affairs (cited in Chapnick Reference Chapnick2021). Before him, Martin envisioned “Canada playing a leading role on the world stage,” acknowledging criticisms that “Canada [had] not maintained its influence on the world stage” (McCarthy Reference McCarthy2003). Notably, both Harper and Martin, like Trudeau, employed the statement “Canada is back” to refer to their foreign policy ambitions—to which critics argued that Canada had never really left in the first place (nor significantly re-engaged afterward) (Chapnick Reference Chapnick2021). This recurrent rhetoric of “Canada is back” underscores how Canadian prime ministers in the last twenty years have been concerned with Canada’s international presence. This persistent anxiety has also been echoed in the public discourse, as exemplified by Andrew Cohen’s 2003 book “While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World,” which describes Canada’s waning capabilities in the areas of defence, aid, trade, and diplomacy since the “golden age” of the 1940s and 1950s.Footnote 7 Thus, the theme of identity insecurity is not a new feature of Canadian foreign policy, but rather an enduring one. In that sense, Canada provides fertile ground for understanding how identity insecurity, as a rather stable contextual feature, shapes the country’s foreign policy aspirations and actions.
Mapping Insecurity
During the Harper years, many statements hinted at Canada’s disengagement from international affairs. In early 2007, Canada closed some of its consulates in Italy, Russia, and Japan, which was very negatively perceived by the opposition. “These closures are symbolic of how badly the government misunderstands foreign policy. Could the minister tell this House why his government continues to downgrade Canada’s relationship with countries around the world? Is it because the government lacks a vision and an understanding about Canada’s role in the international community, or is it because the government just does not care about how we are perceived internationally?”Footnote 8 Another Liberal MP pointed that, “[Canada has] great opportunities. Unfortunately, the government has not chosen to embrace those opportunities at a time of great surpluses. Because of that it makes itself less than what it could be and it makes Canada less than what it could be.”Footnote 9 Such statements clearly emphasize a perceived decline in Canada’s international engagement. Yet, after the first Parliamentary session, the Conservatives celebrated their accomplishments in foreign policy and highlighted how “[they] revived Canada’s traditional leadership role on the international stage,”Footnote 10 and that “after 13 years of empty platitudes, Canadians are proud we have a government that is putting Canada back on the world stage.”Footnote 11
Fast forward to 2010, Canada failed to secure a seat on the Security Council, a loss attributed to Harper’s lack of meaningful engagement with important multilateral forums. This setback prompted sharp criticism from opposition parties. For instance, one MP from the New Democratic Party (NDP) remarked, “Mr. Speaker, in Canada’s campaign for a [United Nations] Security Council seat, the Conservatives snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. They have no one to blame but themselves. The government failed to make an impact at the G8 and G20.”Footnote 12 Earlier that year, another MP from the Liberal Party had asked, “why Canada has taken such a large step backwards in international diplomacy.”Footnote 13 Throughout Harper’s tenure, opposition leaders continued to denounce his disengagement from multilateral institutions, aside from NATO. For example, one MP from the NDP criticized his decision to forgo an invitation to speak at the [United Nations] General Assembly, asking, “Has the Prime Minister given up on Canada’s role at the [United Nations]?”Footnote 14 In 2013, criticism persisted as another MP from the same party noted: “Recognizing that the Conservatives’ bad policies are hurting our chances, the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced yesterday that Canada would not make another attempt to get a seat. Why is he ducking his international responsibilities? When will things change?”Footnote 15
Harper’s limited engagement with multilateral forums such as the United Nations was not without consequences for Canada’s perceived global status, influence, and image. As one Liberal MP emphasized, “If Canada had a seat at the United Nations Security Council, which we do not because Canada squandered its international reputation and its position among nations for the last several years, we could have made a difference.”Footnote 16 Others deplored the erosion of Canada’s traditional role in global diplomacy. “It has been expected for many decades, for over a hundred years, for Canada to take the lead, to bring other countries together in a peaceful manner, yet over the last number of years we have seen especially the present Conservative government fail to provide that leadership.”Footnote 17 As another MP from the Green Party put it, “I think when we aspire to leadership, we do not, at this point, have the credentials to back it up, as much as it pains me to say that. […] I do believe, to a certain degree, that our leadership role in the world has somewhat diminished over recent years.”Footnote 18 The frustrations extended to Canada’s standing within international organizations. One MP from the NDP asked, “How did Canada manage to go from being a world leader to fighting tooth and nail just to keep international organizations in the country?”Footnote 19 Another criticized the growing disconnect between the government’s foreign policy and Canadians’ expectations: “under [the Harper] government, in terms of our foreign affairs policy and international development, the disconnect between what it is doing and how Canadians perceive our role on the international stage, or what our role should be, is incredibly vast.”Footnote 20 This was also emphasized by an MP from the Bloc Québécois, who mentioned that the Harper’s government’s policies were “slowly destroying Canada’s image.”Footnote 21 Overall, these statements reflect how opposition parties hope for greater engagement in international affairs from the Harper government and emphasize the perceived decline of Canada’s image, influence and status during his term.
When Trudeau was elected in 2015, he said that “Canada was back” on the international stage, a statement similar to what Harper had said in 2007. However, opposition parties quickly pointed out parallels between Trudeau’s government and Harper’s perceived disengagement in international affairs. One MP from the NDP remarked, “[…] it is so deeply disappointing for me as a Canadian to stand in this place and observe the Liberals walking away from the leadership role that this country has played in the past.”Footnote 22 Many MPs emphasized a significant misalignment between Canada’s stated goals and its actual actions on the international stage. As one MP criticized, “[…] this government is all talk and very little action, […],”Footnote 23 echoing a sentiment prevalent in the data. Claims of empty rhetoric toward Trudeau’s government were widespread in the data: “All we have now is a lot of talk and rhetoric but no action”Footnote 24 ; “What is needed from the government, what is missing, is action on these issues”Footnote 25 ; “I say again that the problem that I have is that words are not enough, there needs to be action.”Footnote 26 These criticisms were especially aimed at the government’s promises to prioritize the protection of human rights globally, which one MP described as “another broken promise.”Footnote 27 As another Conservative MP pointed out, “Expressing goodwill inside the Canadian House of Commons is not enough for the people on the ground who are suffering as a result of human rights abuses, especially when the government made specific commitments to be involved in supporting the advancement of justice and human rights on the ground.”Footnote 28 Reflecting on the government’s broader inaction, a Conservative MP argued, “Apparently that is what responsible conviction means: making claims, saying that Canada is back, but not really doing much to help the people targeted by these atrocities.”Footnote 29 Through these statements, the opposition portrayed Trudeau’s government as one focused on rhetoric while failing to engage meaningfully in international affairs.
Similar to the Harper years, it was noted that Canada had lost some of its former glory on the international stage. As one MP from the NDP remarked, “It is true that Canada has lost some stature over the last decade or so.”Footnote 30 Another MP from the NDP criticized the government’s approach to nuclear negotiation, contrasting it with Canada’s previous achievements in this area and emphasizing the country’s diminishing status.
In 1930, Canada ratified the Geneva protocol banning gas and bacteriological weapons. We ratified the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1970. We have adopted bans on nuclear weapons testing, bans on weapons in outer space, and hosted the 1997 meeting that led to the Ottawa treaty, which aims at eliminating anti-personnel landmines. As recently as 2010, the House unanimously passed a motion calling for nuclear disarmament. Perhaps Canada’s greatest contribution to peace was from former Liberal prime minister, Lester B. Pearson, whose creation of our peacekeeping forces won Canada immense international respect and earned “Mike” Pearson a well deserved Nobel Peace Prize. I hate to imagine what Pearson would say if he could see today’s Liberal government renounce nuclear disarmament. All this leads me to wonder how far we have fallen.Footnote 31
Another Conservative MP stated, “It is time we got some of the courage and leadership back that we had in the past.”Footnote 32 These reflections underscore a shared perception of insecurity and decline in Canada’s international status, spanning both the Harper and Trudeau governments. Yet, despite this recurring notion that Canada has relinquished its leadership role and, more significantly, deviated from its glorious legacy, MPs also expressed significant aspirations for Canada, as the next section will explore in detail.
Canada’s Aspirations and Gender as a Leadership Opportunity
Canada’s foreign policy is seen as an extension of Canadian values, which generally include diversity, inclusion, gender equality,Footnote 33 democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of lawFootnote 34 (with some variations depending on the government). Because of this value-based approach to foreign policy, MPs often situate Canada as a moral leader on the global stage—which opens the door to greater Canadian leadership. As one Conservative MP articulated, “I like to think of Canada as being a country that has established moral leadership,”Footnote 35 adding that “Canada is a model country to the world […] and [it] should not be shy about advancing [its values] on the world stage.”Footnote 36 Part of this narrative is rooted in Canada’s glorious past, which is still very present in today’s understanding of the country’s identity. “Canada has a great deal of reason to be proud for the work [it has] done, particularly since the second world war, in developing international standards for human rights. The Declaration of Human Rights was actually drafted by a Canadian.”Footnote 37 There is a real sense of pride among Canadian MPs about the country’s legacy: “In my office, there are two large photographs I see every day, one of former prime minister Lester B. Pearson, a former resident of my riding of Willowdale and a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, and the other of General Roméo Dallaire, a Canadian hero and one of our leading and most resonant and compelling voices on issues of human rights.”Footnote 38 This perception of the country’s past accomplishments helps to consolidate Canada’s self-image as a world leader that should expand its role. This is emphasized in statements such as: “Seventy years ago Canada played a pivotal role in forming the postwar international order. By virtue of our unique experience, expertise, geography, diversity, and values, we are now called to do this again for a new century”Footnote 39 or “As a nation with these characteristics, we are uniquely placed to be the conscience of the international community and to use our relationships and our history to challenge the rest of the world to follow the path we have chosen.”Footnote 40 Therefore, there is often a recognition that Canada is exceptionally placed to play a leadership role in today’s world—and that Canadians are expecting such leadership from the government. “Canadians made it very clear that they wanted a government that reengages constructively and positively on the world stage not just for a question of moral responsibility, […] but because we can create peace and security that will have positive impacts in Canada and around the world. Canada has a role to play, and we take that very seriously.”Footnote 41
This perception of Canada as a moral leader, grounded in its value-based foreign policy and historical achievements, underpins the belief in its potential for leadership in certain areas. Notably, gender equality (and related matters) is highlighted as a significant area where Canada has the opportunity to enhance its leadership. In October 2016, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development published a report called: “An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,” in which it explicitly recommends that “Canada make women, peace and security a core priority of its foreign policy”Footnote 42 (2016, 1). At the end of the report, the Committee mentions that “[…] many of the themes raised in this report will be relevant as Canada campaigns for a seat on the UN Security Council” and that it will continue “to consider issues relevant to women, peace and security as part of its broader consideration of Canada’s foreign and development policies and, ultimately, Canada’s role in the world” (2016, 55).
Following the publication of this report, in 2017, Chrystia Freeland presented a motion inviting the House to “(a) recognize that the government is committed to a foreign policy that supports multilateralism and rules-based international systems, human rights, gender equality, the fight against climate change, and economic benefits being shared by all,” as well as “(b) recognize that further leadership on the part of Canada is both desirable and required; and (c) support the government’s decision to use the foregoing principles to guide Canadian foreign policy.”Footnote 43 During the same speech, she discusses Canada’s feminist commitment, mentioning that:
[Canada] will strive for leadership in all these multilateral forums. We are honoured to be hosting the G7 next year, and we are energetically pursuing a two-year term on the [United Nations] Security Council. We seek this [United Nations] seat because we wish to be heard, and we are safer and more prosperous when more of the world shares Canadian values. Those values include feminism and the promotion of the rights of women and girls. It is important, and historic, that we have a Prime Minister and a government who are proud to proclaim themselves feminists. Women’s rights are human rights. That includes sexual reproductive rights. That includes the right to safe and accessible abortions. These rights are at the core of our foreign policy. To that end, in the coming days, my colleague the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie will unveil Canada’s first feminist international assistance policy, which will target the rights of women and girls as well as gender equality. We will put Canada at the forefront of this global effort.Footnote 44
As emphasized in this speech, Freeland highlighted Canada’s significant opportunity to lead efforts in advancing gender equality and its aspiration to lead the efforts in this field. This point was emphasized by another MP, who stressed that “there is a growing need for Canadian leadership on issues such as respect for diversity and the rights of girls and women.”Footnote 45 This opportunity was especially identified in multilateral forums, perceived as key sites for advancing Canadian leadership. As one MP states, “Drawing inspiration from Italy’s presidency [of the G7] in 2017, Canada will use the event as a platform to promote our priorities, which are to build a solid middle class, advance the cause of gender equality, fight climate change and promote diversity and inclusion. Each multilateral forum gives Canada the chance to make its presence felt in the world.”Footnote 46 Thus, these statements emphasize how gender equality is perceived as both a core Canadian value and an opportunity to increase Canadian leadership on the international stage.
Discussion
The analysis of Canada’s foreign policy debates between 2006 and 2017 revealed an underlying insecurity regarding the country’s international identity. This was reflected in statements highlighting Canada’s diminishing engagement in international affairs, as well as its declining status, image, and leadership. Such claims were made by all parties in Parliament throughout the period under study, which further underscores the enduring nature of identity insecurity in Canadian foreign policy. At the same time, the debates also emphasized a belief that Canada should take on a more significant role on the international stage, particularly through moral leadership, with a focus on gender equality. Canada’s understanding of foreign policy as an extension of its values supports the idea of the country as a moral leader, reinforcing the belief that it should lead in areas considered core to its identity. In parallel, there was also recognition of the growing positive attention gender equality received in international forums such as the G7, the United Nations, and NATO (also mentioned in Chapnick Reference Chapnick2019), which helped to consolidate gender equality as a strategic area of leadership. This ambition is further exemplified in the 2021 mandate letter to Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly, which instructed her to “continue to develop and implement Canada’s feminist foreign policy with the support of partner organizations, and continue to be a global leader in championing the rights of women and girls in all their diversity, LGBTQ2 people and other marginalized communities” (Trudeau Reference Trudeau2021). These observations strongly support the argument suggested in this article: that identity insecurity was an important contextual factor underlying the adoption of Canada’s feminist branding, with gender equality emerging as a strategic area to improve the country’s role and assert its leadership.
This article addresses a critical gap in the literature by engaging with the strategic adoption of the feminist label. It contributes to the study of feminist foreign policies by investigating why states may opt for feminist branding even when their commitments to gender equality are limited in scope. Although this article focuses on Canada, the broader implication is that identity insecurity acts as a significant contextual factor driving the adoption of a feminist label. This insecurity amplifies states’ strategic incentives to embrace normative branding as a way to mitigate this insecurity. This approach also broadens our understanding of feminist branding patterns, including the choice not to adopt the feminist label. When a country feels more secure about its international identity, there are fewer strategic incentives to pursue feminist branding—especially if the label risks clashing with existing identities (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad Reference Skjelsbæk and Lise Tryggestad2020).
The framework developed in this article also further sheds light on why feminist foreign policies often have limited transformative impact. By emphasizing how identity insecurity drives the adoption of feminist branding, it illustrates how states may use feminist labels to enhance their international image rather than as a catalyst for significant changes in foreign policy practices. As many scholars have noted, feminist branding often serves more as a token of states’ “progressiveness” or as a “signifier of liberal identity” rather than a new way of conducting foreign policy (Thomson Reference Thomson2022, 184). This article substantiates these accounts by providing a rationale for why and when states might strategically mobilize a feminist branding.
It is important to note that this article does not seek to delegitimize feminist foreign policies by suggesting they are merely a branding tool or that they lack the potential to transform global power structures and promote equality. As highlighted by Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond, usage of the “f-word” indicates a controversial way of conducting politics—one “that explicitly seeks to renegotiate and challenge power hierarchies and gendered institutions that hitherto defined global institutions and foreign and security policies” (Reference Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond2016, 323). It is also significant that the feminist label has spread in a time where “there is a noticeable rise of illiberal democracies and right-wing populism, in which men in particular seek to reclaim their entitlements” (Aggestam and True Reference Aggestam and True2020, 145). Canada has also made meaningful contributions to advancing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda internationally, playing a significant role in its global progress. States that act as norm entrepreneurs are crucial in championing these values, and this article does not diminish Canada’s achievements in this regard. However, it is important to critically analyze how states mobilize the feminist label and to further examine the strategic motivations behind self-identifying as feminist—a topic that remains underexplored in the literature.
Conclusion
To summarize, the theory developed in this article seeks to expand the literature on the political and strategic adoption of the feminist label in international affairs by addressing why states choose to explicitly label their foreign policy as feminist. I focus on the case of Canada, a type 3 country, given that its feminist strategy is primarily articulated in the FIAP, which is limited to foreign aid. While Canada has historically demonstrated a commitment to gender equality—as exemplified in initiatives such as CIDA’s 1999 Gender Equality Policy, the Elsie Initiative, its three C-NAPs, and the appointment of an ambassador for Women, Peace, and Security, for instance—the country lacks an official policy document to guide its feminist foreign policy. In this sense, Canada is not necessarily more feminist than other similarly engaged countries, such as Norway or New Zealand (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad Reference Skjelsbæk and Lise Tryggestad2020; Beaulieu Reference Beaulieu2022). I argue that identity insecurity plays a critical role in determining when type 3 countries, such as Canada, are more likely to adopt such a label. The central argument is that when a state experiences significant insecurity regarding its international identity, it has a strong strategic incentive to leverage progressive branding to enhance its status and leadership on the global stage.
While this research introduces a new argument regarding feminist branding in international affairs and provides empirical support for it in the case of Canada, further systematic investigation is required to establish identity insecurity as a necessary condition. Future research should focus on comparative analyses of the relationship between identity insecurity and label adoption, also including cases where the feminist label is not adopted, such as New Zealand and Norway. It should also extend the analysis to other countries that adopted the feminist label, such as Mexico, France, or Germany, for instance. Verifying this argument in other contexts using methodologies like process tracing or interviews could also help strengthen the theory presented here. Another avenue for research could explore other forms of self-identification to examine how identity insecurity influences the adoption of normative branding more broadly. Lastly, it is important to note that evaluating whether Canada’s attempt to reduce its insecurity was successful lies beyond the scope of this article. Future research could investigate how the adoption of the feminist label has influenced Canada’s status and self-perception since 2017.
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