Insights and pitfalls from the Confucian tradition

The Confucian tradition is sometimes known as a rich resource in support of women's development. Any ethical theory that places great importance on emotional responses can benefit greatly from the Confucian tradition's abundant resources on the cultivating and managing of emotions. Ren, the highest ethical achievement and virtue in Confucian philosophy, is closely related to care and filial love between children and parents. For this reason, a number of writers have contributed to a debate surrounding the idea that care ethics—a prominent approach in feminist ethics—shares some common ground and even a similar approach with Confucian philosophy.Footnote ¹ In addition to its potential for feminist ethics, Confucianism's idea of personhood also helps to challenge the rational, essential self that is common in Western philosophy. The Confucian tradition views personhood as flexible and in a constant process of change; furthermore, it considers the individual's roles in family and society as relational. As Karyn Lai points out, the concept of “a situated self”—as opposed to an abstract and universal idea of self—has recently attracted the attention of many scholars working in the area of feminist theory. Lai suggests that the Confucian relational understanding of personhood supports this conception; she writes, “a person's identity may only be fully understood in terms of how he or she stands in relation to significant others. In this way, the Confucian self is a concrete, located self” (Lai Reference Lai and Pang-White2016, 111–12). Confucianism's non-fundamentalist approach to understanding the self and personhood makes it a natural ally of feminist theories, which oppose the approach to understanding personhood in traditional philosophy.

This non-fundamentalist approach to personhood leads to another point: Confucian philosophy does not support the idea that women are inherently weaker than or inferior to men. Women in the Confucian tradition are constrained to the domestic sphere due to the particularities of their gendered social roles—not because their physical or intellectual potential is in anyway inferior to that of a man. A woman can be as educated as a man; she does not lack the capacity to learn. Examples from Chinese history suggest that, in certain circumstances, when a male family member is absent, a woman can take a leading role in the family—provided their doing so aligns with Confucian virtues, such as filial piety. Disney's popular adaptation of the story of Mulan, a girl who enlists in the army out of filial piety to her old father, is one such example. Mulan had no brothers who could enlist and wanted to save her father from the draft as he was too old to fight. In other words, women's physical and intellectual capacities are not thought of as constraints on their development—in Confucian philosophy women are not the “weaker sex.”

This is very different than the Aristotelian tradition, which proposes that women lack certain rational capacities and assumes that their inferior social position is determined by their biological sex. Conversely, Confucian thinkers are often considered quite supportive of women's moral development; this is especially true of Mencius, given his emphasis on the emotive and intuitive side of human nature and human development, and his proclamation that our moral potential resides in seemingly basic emotional responses. Many Confucian female thinkers such as Madam Liu (~sixteenth century) and Yunjidang Im (1721–93), inspired by Mencius, argue that women have equal moral potential to men. The reason is straightforward—women and men are not that different when it comes to basic emotional responses of compassion or shame (see H.-K. Kim Reference Kim and A2016; S. Kim Reference Kim2014).

Despite this rosy picture, the Confucian tradition is also associated with the suppression of women in history. Female infanticide, foot-binding, and the celebration of women's suicide over their imposed chastity are deeply connected to the cultural phenomenon of which Confucian thought is a large part. Many people today would equate Confucianism with the ideologies and traditional cultural practices that are responsible for the oppression of women throughout Chinese history and would therefore reject Confucianism all together. However, the consensus in the fields of feminism and Confucian studies seems to be that certain forms of Confucianism support the equal treatment of women and some of its philosophical insights could be useful to feminist theorists, particularly those gleaned from The Confucian Four Books for Women, a set of historical texts devoted to women's teaching and learning.Footnote ² However, if we look into the practice of Confucianism, the history of the Chinese civilization (like many others) is deeply sexist. Though some scholars try to disentangle sexist social structures and practices, such as foot-binding and female infanticide, from Confucian philosophy (or at least classical Confucian philosophy), it remains in question whether such disentanglement is really possible in both theory and practice.

Lisa Rosenlee (Reference Rosenlee2006) insightfully points out that, in the history of China, Confucianism is sometimes a scapegoat for sexist, suppressive institutions, politics, and power structures (121). If in overthrowing the patriarchy we simply target Confucianism—as happened in the Great Cultural Revolution (1966–76), during which one of the main slogans used by the revolutionaries was to “takedown the Confucian shop”—we may take down the philosophical and cultural tradition while leaving largely intact the structure and institutions that are responsible for the suppression of women (Rosenlee Reference Rosenlee2006).Footnote ³

While I agree with Rosenlee's points that Confucianism has been a scapegoat in the recent history of China and many people simply use it to refer to anything that is old, traditional, and oppressive, I would add that some Confucian scholars have not only made justifications for this oppressive hierarchy but also attempted to normalize it. Even if, in theory, we can neatly disentangle Confucian philosophical thought from cultural and ideological sexism, we need to take a closer look at the lives of women who are part of the Confucian tradition to understand the various forms in which such sexist structure affects their lives. Feminist thinkers outside of the tradition are free to pick and choose the tools of the Confucian tradition they find most useful, discarding the rest, unlike Confucian women who have different views or experiences of their tradition as it relates to feminism.

Unfair burden on women in non-Eurocentric culture

Appreciating Confucianism's longlasting influence on women's plight is not possible without a careful examination of certain social issues prevalent in the East Asian culture today, where Confucianism is often portrayed as an equivalent to conservative and traditional values. Many modern women simply reject Confucianism and all of its resulting values without much thought. However, nowadays in China, Korea, and Japan—cultures under strong and consistent Confucian influence—there is a strong need for a local ideology and philosophy that celebrates woman's strength and growth. Rosenlee (Reference Rosenlee and A2016) criticizes the idea of using Eurocentric feminism as the model to “liberate” or “save” the women in other traditions—“And surely under this purview, no one is capable of being a bearer of a non-Western culture and being a feminist of some sort at the same time. It is indeed ironic to say that women in the non-Western world can only be saved if their inferior culture identity is beaten out of them” (2016, 161). She further convincingly states that “to reorganize one's culture by integrating new patterns of practice is always possible, but to strip one's culture all away is simply unthinkable” (161).

Rosenlee's warning has practical implications. Due to the complex entrenchment of Confucianism in different institutions and various social practices, women who try to maintain their culture while also fighting for their own rights and well-being—two goals that often conflict—are placed in a vulnerable position. However, it should not be the responsibility of individuals with limited philosophical and theoretical resources to disentangle sexist practices from their cultural practices, which are themselves enmeshed in a complex system of values. This places women in an indefensible position where they have not only to fight for their rights but also fight against the value system of their culture.

The need for reformed Confucian ethics thus comes from two directions; the need for a feminist theory that enables women to make sense of their experiences, which are embedded in their culture and tradition; and the need for the traditions that developed in a patriarchal and agriculture-based economic society to adapt and re-invent themselves to conform with gender equality, among other contemporary issues. Through the lens of modern-day Confucian theory, this paper aims to address some of the moral dilemmas that women in the Confucian tradition face today. I argue that Confucian philosophy should provide ethical guidance to women regarding their moral development and provide resources to help resolve contemporary normative/practical moral dilemmas, such as the social devaluation of women who achieve success in the public sphere.

Moral potential

The Confucian-Mencian tradition is famous for its emphasis on moral cultivation on both theoretical and practical levels. Mencius maintains that all people have innate moral potentials or the four beginnings of virtues. These are the hearts of ceyin (compassion/commiseration), xiuwu (a sense of shame), cirang (deference), and shifei (right and wrong). These sprouts are to be understood as both moral potentials and moral inclinations that would grow into more mature virtues of ren (benevolence, humaneness), yi (righteousness), li (propriety, observance of rites), and zhi (wisdom). Because all people have these four hearts, they also have inclinations towards moral goodness. This means that the individual is on a continual journey towards a moral ideal. Mencius further claims that, given proper cultivation, anyone can become a morally exemplary person and even a moral sage. Mencius states that “we and the sage are of the same kind. … What is it that hearts prefer in common? I say that it is order and righteousness. The sages first discovered what our hearts prefer in common” (Mencius 6A7, trans. Van Norden Reference Van Norden2008). He claims the difference between sages and the average person lies in the level of cultivation of these moral potentials and that the sages simply discovered, before everyone else, what the four hearts prefer. Mencius’ assertion about human moral potential is encouraging not only to women but also people from different social classes, as well as anyone who might be considered “morally hopeless” because of their limited capacities.

Claims like “everyone has the heart of ceyin” (2A6) sound reassuring to the women readers of Mencian texts, as they suggest that becoming a sage rests on one's basic emotional responses—ceyin, xiuwu, cirang, and shifei all have an affective component.Footnote ⁴ Further, while Mencius does not explicitly say that both men and women possess these moral potentials, in several passages he describes a women's emotional response as the manifestation of one's heart/mind (xin). For example, 4B33 of Mencius describes the reactions of a wife and concubine who discover that their husband begged for the leftovers of the sacrifices at the tombs instead of providing for the family in a respectable way. The wife tells the concubine “‘a husband is somebody you look up to for the rest of your life. And now he turns out to be like this!’ So she and the concubine cursed their husband and broke down crying in the courtyard…” (4B33) (Van Norden Reference Van Norden2008). The husband's behavior brings shame to the wife and concubine; their tears demonstrate that they have a better sense of morality than their husband. Mencius goes further to claim: “As a gentleman sees it, it is seldom the case that the manner in which people seek wealth, rank, profit, and success would not shame their wife and concubines and make them break down in tears if they knew about it” (4B33) (Van Norden Reference Van Norden2008). According to Mencius, the wife and concubine possess a good sense of shame—not only would they feel shame for overstepping their own moral duties, they further feel shame for the husband's wrongdoing.

Other early Confucian texts attest to women's moral potential as well. In Han Shi Wai Zhuan(dated to around 150 bce), a collection of anecdotes that inspire readers to follow Confucian teaching, Mencius is frequently depicted as a filial and sometimes confused son who seeks moral advice from his mother, who always appears to have a better understanding of morality.Footnote ⁵ Mencius's mother has long been respected as an exemplary virtuous woman on the basis of her own virtues, as well as her raising Mencius to become an outstanding moral sage.

One may rightly point out that women, either as wife or mother, are used as tools to either shame or educate men in the above-mentioned texts; they are not discussed as the subject of moral education or cultivation. Mencius 4B33 merely points out that even women would feel shame at the idea of a man begging for the leftovers of a sacrifice ceremony; how then is it possible for this man to withstand his own moral failure? Nonetheless, it is clear from the Confucian texts that women were not denied education or cultivation on account of their lack of moral potential or moral capacity.

Historically, a number of female Confucian thinkers investigated the subject of women's moral potential—these thinkers ask whether they, or any woman, can become Confucian moral sages. Their findings seem rather optimistic. They determined that women's lack of education and their lack of access to the Confucian classics were the main obstacles to women's moral development. The solutions these female thinkers proposed were thus very straightforward—they composed a number of Confucian books specifically for women readers, which could serve as the textbooks. Most notably, they authored the aforementioned Confucian Four Books for women, which were modeled after the Confucian classic Four Books (Sìshū, they are: Doctrine of the Mean, The Great Learning, The Analects, and The Mencius)—introductory texts that every Confucian student is expected to learn, which illustrate the core values and belief systems of Confucianism. These female thinkers conclude that women not only have the same moral potential as men, they can achieve sagehood if they cultivate their moral potential with the appropriate Confucian texts.

Women's achievement—sagehood

The most important achievement in the Confucian tradition one could achieve is sagehood. The commonly known sages are the ancient sage kings, Yao, Shun, and Yu. Histories and ancient texts from Confucian and other philosophical schools frequently refer to them as virtuous individuals and exemplars for generations to follow. Confucius himself is referred to as a sage due to his exemplary virtues and teaching. Mencius, for the same reason, is commonly referred to as the Second Sage of the Confucian school. In the Confucian-Mencius school, few scholars claim to have attained the status of sage despite being well-respected. However, Confucianism holds that sagehood is attainable and it has always served as an inspiration and ideal for Confucian students. As mentioned, Mencius audaciously claims that everyone can become a sage—no matter their social class or birth. We, the commoners, are not substantively different from the sages in terms of our natural capacities and tendencies, the difference lies in our environment and moral cultivation (6A7).

A number of historical thinkers inspired by the Confucian-Mencian tradition, especially educated women of the Confucian school, explore the philosophical question: can women become moral sages? Even though Mencius’ claims regarding sagehood seem to suggest that it is possible, he never specifically says so. Empress Renxiaowen (1361–1407）of the Ming Dynasty is the first to openly state that women can become sages. Empress Renxiaowen (maiden name Xu) is the wife of Emperor Chengzu (1360–1424); upon her death, he bestowed on her the honorary title of Renxiaowen in praise of her “humaneness” (ren), “filialness” (xiao), and her literary achievements (wen). She is the author of Teachings for the Inner Court (Neixun), one of the four books later collectively referred to as the Confucian Four Books for Women. As Pang-White (Reference Pang-White2018) points out, “Empress Renxiaowen opens the door for women's sagehood. She firmly states that a woman can become a sage if her deeds equal those of exemplary sage queens” (125). The empress proclaims that “regardless of their gender or sex, all human beings are endowed with virtuous nature” (chapter 1), and further praises “her mother-in-law Empress Xiaocigao's teaching ‘sagely teachings’” (Pang-White Reference Pang-White2018, 125). Pang-White further comments, “no previous writers, male or female, ever made this claim as clearly as she does, a remarkable step that has inspired a multitude of later women writers” (Pang-White Reference Pang-White2018, 125). Given the empress's social position as the wife of the emperor, her claim—i.e., that the empress and emperor are on equal footing when it comes to pursuing moral sagehood—is especially relevant as she and her husband are the moral examples for all wives and husbands.

In addition, Madam Liu, the author of The Short Records of Models for Women (Nü Fan Jie Lu)—the last of the Confucian Four Books for Women—cites over 150 examples of real women from history. Madam Liu is the most progressive in all the authors of the Confucian Four Books for Women as she adamantly claims woman's status as sages. In this book, she calls exemplary women “woman sages” and praises women whose talents surpass their husbands’. The work of female Korean thinker, Queen Sohae (1437–1504), is relevant here as well. Hye-Kyung Kim (Reference Kim and A2016) presents a historical argument that Queen Sohae, inspired by Mencius, composed the Naehoon (Lessons for the Inner Quarter), a text for the instruction of women. Queen Sohae argues that women not only can become sages but should strive to become sages (Kim Reference Kim and A2016, 90–91). Further, Sungmoon Kim (Reference Kim2014) examines the philosophical thought of the iconic Korean female neo-Confucian thinker, Im Yunjidang (1721–93) and her feminist appropriation of Neo-Confucian philosophy. Yunjidang argues that men and women have equal moral potential and are, therefore, equal in their pursuit of the ideal of moral sagehood.

After examining these arguments of historical female thinkers about women's sagehood, we can conclude that, in their estimation, the idea of a female sage is attainable in the Confucian-Mencian tradition in theory. In other words, women's moral achievement is possible provided they follow the Confucian teachings and cultivate their virtues.

These thinkers also reflect on the obstacles many women face in their moral development; one frequently mentioned practical obstacle is women's lack of education. How can women become moral sages if they cannot learn and recite the Confucian classics—such as Lunyu, Mencius, Daxue, Zhongyong, which are only available in schools reserved exclusively for men? If women receive no formal Confucian education, they surely will not have the opportunity to cultivate their virtues and achieve the ideal of sagehood—their moral potential will be left uncultivated and will be wasted.

The lack of education and the lack of access to Confucian texts

Due to the absence of educational resources for women, a number of female thinkers authored their own books that focus on feminine virtues. Empress Renxiaowen points out that “women's education should not be delayed … None [of the exemplary women] could have been so accomplished without being taught first ” (Pang-White Reference Pang-White2018, 125). This is one of the reasons she composed the Teachings for the Inner Court, a text which includes the stories of exemplary women who serve as models for other women to follow.

Madam Liu identified further ways the lack of education affects women through the nei–wai distinction, or the inner–outer distinction (nei-wai zhi bie).Footnote ⁶ She claims that girls are placed at a disadvantage when it comes to moral education because they are confined to the nei (household) domain and are not able to go to school with boys who study the Confucian classics from a young age. However, she argues that “children grow up to be men and women, and husbands and wives; consequently, education for both boys and girls is essential for a rightly ordered family life” (Pang-White Reference Pang-White2018, 212). Women's lack of opportunity for moral development thus has repercussions not only for women but for all of society. Madam Liu encouraged women to cultivate their virtues despite these constraints and thus composed the Short Records of Models for Women so that women in the inner domain could learn from these exemplary women.Footnote ⁷

The efforts made by these female thinkers are very promising; they give us hope that women not only have the potential and capacity to become moral sages, to cultivate and develop themselves, they also have the necessary “roadmap.” On the other hand, some recognize that, despite sagehood being theoretically achievable, there are other realistic barriers women face besides their lack of education—such as the division of labor and the social/familial roles assigned to women. A roadmap of the inner court is simply not enough.

The nei and wai distinction and fundamental constraints to women's development

The division of nei and wai, or the inner and outer realm, is a structure that is neglected by many scholars whose research focuses on gender or sex. Nei and wai do not always strictly correlate with gender, nor should they simply be understood as synonymous with the domestic and the public domain. They are a pair of spatial binary terms that have their own unique characteristics in Chinese texts. Nei literally means “in” or “inner”; wai means “out” or “outer.” In early Confucian texts, the nei–wai distinction has many different meanings; it could mean, as in Mencius, the inner virtues and their outer exhibition; or, as in Xunzi and Guanzi, this distinction may signify the boundary between a civilized area and a barbaric, chaotic one, which does not maintain proper social distinctions, such as the one between men and women. However, no matter the particular meaning, this distinction of nei–wai is never static; it is always a functional definition with a somewhat flexible boundary. As Dorothy Ko puts it, the nei–wai distinction is “a relational category that describes a series of nested hierarchies whose boundary changes with context” (Ko Reference Ko1994, 144–45).

Interestingly, even though the nei and wai distinction is recognized as posing a threat to women's access to education, its abolishment is obviously far too ahead of these thinkers’ time. However, in their texts, these women seem to suggest that women have the capacity to step up into the wai domain to help their fathers, husbands, or sons.

For example, Empress Renxiaowen proclaims that women have great talent not only as care takers, but also as helpmates in the realm of politics and other matters belonging to the wai domain.Footnote ⁸ Madam Liu made the possibility of women's “trespassing” into the wai domain most clear in the “Wisdom” chapter of her book. Pang-White observes “[Madam Liu argues] women's wisdom is beneficial not only in household management but also in state affairs; note how the message crosses the inner-outer boundary between the private and the public” (Pang-White Reference Pang-White2018, 214).

The message is clear from the “Wisdom” chapter that the exemplary women's roles are not strictly limited to the inner domain but also go beyond it so that they are “protectors of their countries and families and the helpmates of their husbands” (Pang-White Reference Pang-White2018, 277). However, as the readers may quickly point out, these women are still constrained to the inner court—their overstepping into the outer domain is temporary and only praised when they were able to help their husbands. Education for women, as these female thinkers point out, can go a long way towards furthering women's opportunities for moral development; however, it may not be the sole factor that limits and hinders their progress and achievements.

At the beginning of the paper, I stated that I would discuss some practical concerns women in contemporary China face and analyze them from a perspective that is informed by Confucian philosophy. After all, looking at the subject of female moral sagehood from a contemporary perspective appears to lead in the same direction as the above-mentioned earlier female Confucian thinkers. Upon closer examination, a different picture emerges. Though they share many of the same challenges, women in East Asia today live under very different conditions: modern education is available to most women and Confucianism no longer occupies a dominant social position. Therefore, if Confucian philosophy is to make a contribution to feminist theory, a critical examination of both Confucianism and the women's condition in today's world is much needed.

In the following section, I will discuss briefly the cases of “leftover women” and the stigmatization of “female PhDs” in China to demonstrate that education is merely a symptom of a more fundamental issue within Confucian tradition—namely, the nei/wai distinction and the traditional family structure. When women's gender roles in the nei realm collide with their social recognition in the wai realm, Confucianism does not have the answers to guide and help them. I further argue that a systematic examination of these fundamental ideas in the Confucian tradition needs to be conducted so that this philosophical tradition can continue to provide moral guidance for women in the future.

Learning becomes a curse

In the last section, we discussed how female Confucian thinkers composed The Confucian Four Books for Women to address the gap caused by women's lack of education. These texts demonstrate that earlier Confucian women believed that women have the moral potential, in theory, to aspire to moral excellence with the proper education. However, during the Qing Dynasty (1636–1912), education or literacy was sometimes viewed as a burden, even a curse, to learned women. Learning not only didn't help them to become female sages, it left them in an unfavorable position. As Rosenlee notes,

The reason the nature of learned women is tragic is that their literary achievement, a skill traditionally viewed as belonging to the wen domain—thus the wai realm—has no practical use, nor legitimacy, because women are constrained to the nei realm. No matter how accomplished a woman is in scholarship or literacy, she cannot enter the elective keju examination and become a government officer; she cannot make a difference or leave a mark in the wai realm. Rosenlee further notes that, in the Confucian societies, “learning and writing, according to the orthodox view, must have a public and ethical function. Unlike their male counterparts, talented and learned women have no legitimate access to the wai realm where their talents can be utilized by the state and hence their advanced literacy can be justified” (Rosenlee Reference Rosenlee2006, 112–13). For these reasons, women's literary skills serve no practical use and have little ethical value in the Confucian tradition. Even when women surpass their brothers or husbands in learning, in Rosenlee (Reference Rosenlee2006)'s words, “without a legitimate outlet to utilize their talents, [they] bring sorrow rather than honor to the family” (113).

This example from imperial China is still relevant in the modern age. Despite the fact that primary and higher education has been made widely accessible to modern Chinese women, they nevertheless still find their learning brings sorrow instead of honor to their families—like their Qing Dynasty counterparts.

The third sex and the “leftover women”

Although contemporary women in Confucian societies are no longer strictly limited to the nei domain, they are still expected to shoulder a greater share of domestic responsibilities than men. Moreover, though they have access to higher education and the classic Confucian texts, women may still find their traditional social roles quite limiting, and the ethical criteria of the nei and wai realms unclear or difficult to comprehend and navigate.

China has the highest percentages of educated and employed women of any country; however, women's achievement is not always welcomed. For example, in the early twenty-first century, the Chinese government launched an infamous campaign to address the problem of “leftover” women—i.e., women who were unmarried by the age of 27. At the same time, the stigmatization of “female PhD” (nü boshi) started to emerge as a new social phenomenon; popular new media and online media openly declared that female doctorate degree holders are undesirable to men and therefore should be considered “the third sex.” It was believed that they lost their feminine qualities by pursuing a doctorate degree.

These campaigns to shame “leftover” women and female PhDs have been well-received by the public; the idea quickly caught on that by pursuing a PhD, women had made themselves undesirable due to their intellectual achievement. Many women gave up their chances of pursuing their intellectual growth under familial and societal pressure—many also hide their doctorates or master degrees, and other achievements, in the match-making process. I will not go into too much detail discussing this phenomenon, but I do want to highlight an excerpt from the New York Times describing how the term “leftover women” was coined by the state agency:

Evidently, the government decided that shaming women into lowering their standards and entering marriage—out of fear that they would otherwise “lose value”—was a more effective strategy than pressuring men to make themselves more desirable to potential female partners. Thus, women today are being forced to accept the familial role of wife and, more importantly, mother of future citizens. There are many possible reasons why the Chinese government, a socialist government founded upon the value of equality between two sexes, would launch a campaign like this—indeed, scholars highlight two main reasons: China's low birthrate, which has dropped from 2.63 per women in 1980 to 1.50 per women in 2000, and the disproportionate sex-ratio between men and women, which resulted from factors such as sex-selective abortion and female infanticide (Wu Reference Wu2018). I do not wish to go into further detail on the social background of this phenomenon—many excellent studies have been conducted on the issue of “leftover women.”Footnote ¹¹ What I want to discuss here is the theoretical and philosophical background that has resulted in the stigmatization of highly educated and/or unmarried women over the age of 27, and the reason why shaming campaigns have received widespread, enthusiastic support from the public. I will also argue that, in its current state, Confucianism is neither helpful nor sympathetic to the plight of women in modern China.

The stigmatization of the female PhD illustrates the conflicting values that inform women's subordinate role in the family and their achievements in the outer domain. China has a long history of valuing education and learning. The most advanced scholars and teachers in the Confucian tradition are referred to by the term Bo Shi, which is used to translate “doctorate degree.” This term symbolizes the utmost achievement in the outer domain of wen (literacy) and zheng (politics/governance). Confucius himself is viewed, first and foremost, as a teacher in addition to being recognized as a great thinker and philosopher; he is frequently addressed as the “exemplary teacher for thousands of generations.” Given the long tradition of having the nation-wide selective exam (keju) serve as the path to the elite, ruling class, a student's achievement in education and scholarly work has always been viewed with the utmost respect.

One way of interpreting the ostracization of female PhDs is to see these women as having transgressed into the traditionally male dominated wai sphere of wen and zheng. These women can no longer fit neatly into traditional family roles, which dictate that the position of wife is inferior to that of the husband; moreover, it is popularly believed that they will not find a husband as no man can tolerate having a PhD for a wife. Note that this is very different from the cases illustrated in the “Wisdom” chapter of Madam Liu's book that argue women's talents and wisdom sometimes surpass that of their husbands and thus they can be of benefit to the state. In one story, Madam Liu mentions that Lady Jing, the wife of the prominent philosopher and politician Guan Zhong, was able to decipher a hidden message in a poem that was given to Guan Zhong by a potential political helper, which Guan Zhong himself could not understand.Footnote ¹² Lady Jing gave some clever remarks on this matter and helped him recruit this political helper. Note the difference here: in this example, Lady Jing steps into the wai domain temporarily to apply her wisdom and by assisting her husband she was able to contribute to the affairs of the state. In the case of contemporary female PhDs, society recognizes that these women cannot assume a secondary position to a man after having been honored with highest achievement possible in the intellectual, public domain. The social value of a doctorate degree poses an obstacle to the traditional husband-wife relationship. The value accorded to education and the value accorded to women as wives and mothers are not commensurate. Moreover, as these women are already well established in the wai sphere—having achieved recognition in wen/zhen or financial success—it becomes difficult to ask them to step back into the nei sphere and assume a supportive role. This makes it difficult to place them within the traditional nei and wai distinction—therefore the term “the third sex” for women with doctorate degrees is actually very telling. In China, women's achievement and development is well received by the public so long as it does not pose a threat to the traditional family structure—so long as their achievements do not surpass their husbands’ (surpassing other men is not a problem). The shaming of female PhDs is a natural consequence of this line of reasoning.

Now, let us turn to the subject of “leftover women.” Although this term was initially coined as a negative phrase to induce shame and social pressure, ten years after it was introduced, the meaning of this term has changed. The shaming of female PhDs has subsided, and the term “leftover woman” has been reclaimed and redefined with positive meaning—more and more people from the younger generation choose not to get married out of fear that women's rights are not being protected in marriage—they fear being pressured into accepting a subordinate role, which will force them to abandon professional goals for familial virtues. They also fear that they will be forced to make unappreciated sacrifices and take on unrecognized housework. Many women nowadays refuse to marry and thus they are “leftover” by choice. By not marrying, they remain the head of their families as independent women.

Thus, if we look at the term “leftover women” again, we see that they have not only been left behind by potential husbands; they have been excluded from participating in the traditional family model and from engaging in the relationships that the Confucian tradition deeply values. Such women are outliers in Chinese history; in the past, widows and single women, though they had to endure many hardships in life, made great achievements in the wai domain—as the lives of Madam Liu, Ban Zhao, and Im Yunjidang illustrate. Losing their husbands or sons, while tragic, liberated them from their subordinate family role; because Confucian tradition tolerates such “oversteps” when the male counterpart is not present, their achievements in the wai domain have been well recognized and even praised. Having reclaimed the term and embraced their potential for achievement in the outer domain, the “leftover women” of today may find themselves in a similar situation to these exemplary female outliers.

Although in contemporary China the wai realm appears to be open to women, many find that their lives in this domain are not so easy. Sometimes, their participation in the wai domain is coerced or seen as an obligation. In the 1970s and 1980s, another stigmatizing campaign, directed at “household women (funü)”, was launched through propaganda to shame women who did not hold full-time jobs for their “laziness” and lack of contribution to the “socialist construction” of the country (Zhong et al. Reference Zhong, Wang and Di2001, 27–37). Young girls identified themselves with the genderless notion of qingnian (young person) but not funü (women) because the term funü carried the implication of “staying at home and not contributing (as workers) to the society.” Funü are traditional and simply not progressive enough, so they were told to believe. This movement contributed to the radical change of women's condition in China—China now has a high rate of working women and women with higher education. However, this so-called “liberation of women” movement only reinforced women's obligation to enter the workplace, it did not free them from their nei responsibilities—employed women still managed the household and housework, as well as raised the children and took care of their aging parents and in-laws out of respect for the traditional virtue of filial piety. These women earned the title of “workers or contributors of the socialist regime” at the expense of being “double-taxed” by being made to work both a full-time job, while taking care of a large part of matters in the nei realm. From a theoretical perspective, we could say that the women who were subject to the “household women” and “leftover women” campaigns were evaluated according to the conflicting criteria of both the inner and outer domains, and then shamed for failing to live up to the standard of either.

In the case of the “leftover women” campaign, these women are much more fortunate than their pre-modern counterparts, who lived in an era when women's education and literary achievements brought sorrow and regret. Women in modern China, though they may fail in their roles as wives and mothers, can still be relatively successful in business, academics, or politics. For the women of modern China, these accomplishments can bring them high social status; however, they will not necessarily pave their way to moral excellence or sagehood, as women's sagehood has never been clearly defined or described outside of the nei domain. It must be noted that Confucianism as a school of philosophical thought that focuses on moral cultivation does not effectively guide these women—whatever roadmap it provides is confusing and contains many different, even conflicting, values. The path to sagehood in the wai domain is designated for men, and in the nei domain it is strictly reserved for women who possess outdated feminine virtues, but a roadmap for either gender through both domains is unclear at best, and full of moral dilemmas, or even traps, at worst.

The conclusion I wish to draw here is that a systematic critique of the Confucian familial relationship needs to be conducted. The division of nei and wai needs to be critically reformed. We must have a better and reformed understanding of the inner and outer distinction that addresses not only women but also men's role in a society. For example, in an online debate about how, during the Spring Festival, women were not seen eating alongside men at the main table but were eating at side tables together, the author of an opinion article states that such an occurrence is not a form of discrimination against women; he maintains that women must go in and out of kitchen to prepare the food all the time, and this is compatible with the innocent tradition of “Man manages the wai domain Women the nei” (Yuan, Reference Yuan2019). What shocks me most about this comment is the author's lack of understanding of how the nei and wai domain is the structure that suppressed women throughout Chinese history, as it is the structure that stops women from celebrating the most important festival of the year in the living room and participating in the rituals related to the festival. Instead of understanding sexism through a Chinese or Confucian lens, the author misapplied the Western idea of discrimination as the exclusion of someone based on sex/gender and thus was able to turn a blind eye to the suppression of women in plain sight. This example illustrates that, without a careful examination of the relationships and the nei/wai distinction, Confucian philosophy cannot serve as a very useful resource to women nowadays.

Theoretical weapon for women

When we critically examine the nei–wai distinction, it is important to accord as much attention to the nei domain as the wai domain so that one's achievement and role in the inner domain can also be recognized. It is significant to note that there appear to be no texts that address men's domestic role, though there are passages that compare the reliance a wife has on a husband to that of a man has on his rulers or superiors. In order to achieve a more fluid relationship between the nei and wai, and provide women with a theoretical and practical path to moral cultivation, we need more philosophical discussion of this division itself and its correlation with men and women.

I also want to point out that there are rich theoretical resources that women can use to defend their learning and achievement. For example, facing the stigmatization of “leftover women” and the female PhD shaming, the Mencian idea of shame can be a useful weapon. According to both Confucius and Mencius, whether you are of low birth or are poor, what others think of you should not be a reason to cause you to feel shame. In other words, one should not feel shame for others’ disapproval (Hu Reference Hu2022). Yan Hui is virtuous despite living in an alley, and those who enjoy high stipend in a chaotic time (implying that they acquired their wealth in unjust ways) should feel shame (The Analects, 14.1; Ames and Rosemont Reference Ames and Rosemont1999, 171).

To Mencius, one should feel shame for behaving in ways that fall below one's own ethical standard. This view has been articulated by a number of commentators such as Kwong-loi Shun (Shun, Reference Shun1997, Reference Shun and Shen2013), Bryan Van Norden (Reference Van Norden2002), and Bongrae Seok (Reference Seok2017). Justin Tiwald (Reference Tiwald2017) describes Confucian shame as “autonomous shame” and states that “a person's sense of shame is autonomous if and only if it is elicited by one's own views about what's shameful. This is to be contrasted with a sense of shame that tracks other peoples’ views—especially popular views—of what's shameful and is elicited by the belief that others regard something about oneself as shameful” (Tiwald Reference Tiwald2017, 48). In other words, one should care for her own ethical growth and integrity more than others’ beliefs about her. The Confucian concept of shame can be used as a theoretical weapon against the public shaming and stigmatization against women, or against anyone. These forms of shaming directly contradict the Mencian conception of how shame is supposed to function—the purpose of Confucian shame is to propel the individual to maintain their ethical integrity and pursue moral development, goals which necessitate intellectual growth. Confucian women can thus use their own sense of shame to safeguard their values, instead of falling victims of the public shaming against learned women.