Introduction
Scholars often studied the process of developing overarching collective identities involving multiple groups as an effective technique for reducing conflict, especially those fueled by ethnic and religious divisions. Accordingly, some scholars argue that the inclusion of groups into a larger “superordinate identity” can reduce the perception of the “other” as an enemy (Gaertner et al., Reference Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman and Rust1993; Prentice and Miller, Reference Prentice and Miller1999; Rousseau and Rocio, Reference Rousseau and Rocio2007). Nevertheless, a contending literature challenges this assumption and postulates that shared collective identities among groups can have an opposite effect. Shared collective identity often incited groups to employ identity narratives that distinguish the group from others, even though these identities prescribe close cooperation among its adherents (Brewer, Reference Brewer1993; Snyder and Fromkin, Reference Snyder and Fromkin1980). Whether it is ethnic or religious identities, scholars found that shared identities among groups can be a source of division, as groups have an inherent need for distinctiveness and thus build a categorization of “us” versus “them.” The Middle East abounds with examples of how larger collective identities between groups created divisions. Pan-Arabism, an ethnic identity which overly aims to overcome national territorial differences by uniting Arabs, has been a force for rivalry (Barnett, Reference Barnett1998; Walt, Reference Walt1987). Pan-Islamism, which often prescribes a close cooperation between Muslims based on religious prescriptions, was a source of division rather than unity (Darwich, Reference Darwich2016, Reference Darwich2019). As some regional actors invoked pan-Islamism to mobilize support around regional issues, both Sunni and Shia movements invoked a sectarian narrative, distinguishing themselves from the other by drawing on sectarian divisions within Islam (Helou and Mollica Reference Helou and Mollica2025; Saleh and Kraetzschmar, Reference Saleh and Kraetzschmar2015). Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to this predominant trend. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the case study of this article, presents a notable puzzle; a Sunni group rejected sectarianism and chose to adhere to the larger collective identity of pan-Islamism. This pattern stands in contrast to the behaviour of many Sunni Islamist movements that increasingly adopted sectarian narratives during periods of heightened regional tensions.
Existing scholarship has devoted considerable attention to explaining why political and social actors adopt and promote sectarian identities (El-Husseini, Reference El-Husseini2021; Valbjørn Reference Valbjørn2020; Fibiger, Reference Fibiger2018; Ghobadzdeh and Akbarzadeh, Reference Ghobadzdeh and Akbarzadeh2015). Far less attention has been paid to why some social movements rejected these divisions and adhered to larger collective identities (Milan, Reference Milan2022). The phenomenon that this article seeks to explain is the Egyptian Brotherhood’s persistent rejection of anti-Shia sectarianism during major waves of sectarian mobilization in regional affairs. This article argues that collective identities do more than mobilise support and distinguish groups from others. They also structure the repertoire of political options available to actors by defining which political choices are considered legitimate, appropriate, and consistent with a movement’s foundational commitments. By examining the collective identity frames employed by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s (Brotherhood thereafter) leadership, the article demonstrates how enduring identity commitments constrained the movement’s ability to opportunistically adopt divisive sectarian narratives.
In the last half-century, anti-Shia sectarian waves have evolved in the Middle East following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the 2003 Iraq War, and the 2011 Arab uprisings (Abdo, Reference Abdo2017). Sectarian tensions spread not only in societies with preexisting sectarian social fabrics—such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain—but also to most unlikely places, where hardly any Shia communities existed, such as Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan (Abou-El-Fadl, Reference Abou-El-Fadl and Abou-El-Fadl2015; Buehler and Schulhofer-Wohl, Reference Buehler and Schulhofer-Wohl2023; Wagemakers, Reference Wagemakers2021). In particular, Salafi (Sunni) movements prominently adopted sectarian narratives (Lacroix, Reference Lacroix2025; Saleh and Kraetzschmar, Reference Saleh and Kraetzschmar2015; Wagemakers, Reference Wagemakers2022). The Egyptian Brotherhood illustrates an outlier case among Sunni political Islamist groups, and the rejection of sectarianism shaped the group’s distinct positions toward various regional issues.
This article examines why the Brotherhood in Egypt rejected sectarianism in the international relations of the Middle East. We argue that the Brotherhood’s stance is grounded in the group’s collective identity based on two master frames: (1) a constitutive norm of inclusivity based on pan-Islamism and (2) the social purpose of resistance against imperialism and authoritarianism. First, the Brotherhood maintained an inclusive collective identity married with a pan-Islamist narrative to garner support domestically and internationally. This inclusivity was established by the group’s leader Hassan al-Banna, who was a pioneer in the rapprochement between Sunni and Shia scholars, and his principles presented the cornerstone for the group’s inclusive identity and its stance on anti-Shiism even decades later. Second, the Brotherhood was founded on the social purpose of resisting colonialism and imperialism, which defined the cause of the movement and the interests it represents. The social purpose not only embraced the material goal of independence from colonial rule but also an ideational viewpoint defining the group’s self-conception, positioning, and belonging. Sectarianism was viewed by the Brotherhood as an element of the postcolonial era in the Middle East and a strategy used initially by colonial rulers as a divide-and-rule policy and then by authoritarian political elites to control their societies. Thus, for the Brotherhood, rejecting sectarianism is part of a continuous struggle against imperialism and authoritarianism.
This article advances theoretical and empirical frontiers of knowledge. First, it enriches burgeoning scholarship on why and how social movements may choose to reject divisive identity frames, especially in contexts of heightened religious tensions. Second, by bringing together two strands of the literature—collective identity and sectarianism—this article enriches scholarly understanding of social mobilization at the intersection between collective identity and behavior of political Islam movements. Third, despite the expansive literature examining the sectarian behavior of various actors, there are significant gaps in scholarly understanding of exceptions to dominant sectarianization in the Middle East. The Egyptian Brotherhood’s rejection of sectarianism received little attention; existing explanations have focused on either theological affinities or geopolitical necessities (Elad-Altman, Reference Elad-Altman2009b; Hamid, Reference Hamid2021; Helfont, Reference Helfont2009). The article complements these explanations using an analysis of collective identity frames in the context of social movements while historically tracing their developments, thus offering a systematic analysis of the Brotherhood’s identity construction, which shaped the group’s repertoire of political action toward sectarianism. Offering an ideational explanation, this article illustrates how the group’s collective identity has delineated its rejection of anti-Shiism in the Middle East. Methodologically, this article uses discourse analysis of both primary and secondary sources to scrutinize the Brotherhood’s official statements during major sectarian waves in the Middle East. It draws on archival sources, official public statements, and media outlets to study how the group’s leaders constituted identity frames that shaped its stance on sectarianism.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the puzzle posed by the case of the Brotherhood and examines rival explanations. Second, it presents a theoretical argument outlining the collective identity framing of social movements that delineate their systems of meaning and action, and we discuss why the Egyptian Brotherhood has been chosen as a case study while outlining the methodology. We analyzed two master frames embraced by the groups’ leadership: (1) sectarianism is a divisive force that contracts pan-Islamic norms dictating inclusivity and cooperation among Muslims and (2) imperialism and authoritarianism are the main proponents of sectarianism. We then trace these master frames in the Brotherhood’s collective identity since the inception of the movement, then explore how these frames delineated the group’s rejection of Sunni-Shia divides during moments of heightened anti-shia discourses, namely the period following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath, and the post-2011 Arab uprisings. During these waves, where Sunni movements have predominantly adopted a sectarian narrative, the Brotherhood in Egypt stood as an outlier and rejected the sectarian card.
The puzzle and existing explanations
Sectarianism relates to the idea of a group or sect with distinctive religious beliefs. Notwithstanding conceptual, normative, and scholarly challenges in defining and demystifying sectarianism (Haddad et al., Reference Haddad, Hintz, Majed, Matthiesen, Salloukh, Siegel, Lynch, Schwedler and Yom2022), this article understands sectarianism from its broad sense in terms of intra-faith division that places a barrier based on beliefs against some “other” and a tendency to impede social cohesion by the production of separations. Identities are, thus, politicized to construct divisions and differences between the “self” and the “other.” This sectarianization of the Middle East reveals that social movements often employ frames and narratives that “distinguish bystanders from opponents” (Polletta and Jasper, Reference Polletta and Jasper2001, 292). This “us” versus “them” categorization is used by movements to draw the boundaries between the group and others, attributing meanings to certain differences. Many political Islam groups (whether Sunni or Shia) have adhered to the prescription of Islam as a unifying force among Muslims; early political Islamic thinkers, such as Gamal al-Dine al-Afghani and Rashid Rida, have embraced the unitary element in pan-Islamism (Ryad, Reference Ryad and Motadel2014). The Islamic Revolution in Iran also adopted a pan-Islamic identity in an effort to appeal to other political Islam movements across the region and beyond (Berry, Reference Berry2012). Nevertheless, the nature of mobilization around pan-Islamism in the region, especially after the Islamic Revolution (1979), underwent changes where pan-Islamism has rarely acted as a unifying collective identity across groups in the modern Middle East (Chalcraft, Reference Chalcraft2016, 393–528). Many actors have adopted sectarianism as a strategy to distinguish themselves from their rivals (Darwich, Reference Darwich2016). Nevertheless, the dominant sectarianization has some exceptions; the Egyptian Brotherhood has rejected and sidelined sectarianism. Nevertheless, groups that rejected these divides were rarely systematically studied. Even though Salafi groups in Egypt have widely adopted sectarianism (Lacroix, Reference Lacroix2025; Saleh and Kraetzschmar, Reference Saleh and Kraetzschmar2015), and the rise of an exclusionary narrative can encourage actors to conform to prevailing societal discriminations (Brooke, Reference Brooke2017), the Brotherhood rejected sectarian narratives and warned against its effect on the unity of the Muslim umma.
With the sectarianization rising in Middle East politics, existing literature has expanded to explain why actors adopt sectarianism (Valbjørn, Reference Valbjørn2020). Nevertheless, the Brotherhood’s rejection of sectarianism received limited scholarly attention; existing explanations have been divided between ideological affinities or geopolitical necessities. The first strand of scholars studied the positionality of the Brotherhood towards Shia and Shiism through tracing their ideological convergence, even before the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Abou Bakr, Reference Abou Bakr2012; Al Mesbar Studies and Research Center 2017; Ruṣaṣ, Reference Ruṣaṣ2013; Yar, Reference Yar1997). Scholars attributed these early stages of cooperation to sharing the goal of establishing a unified Islamic cooperation to resist Western imperialism, transcending theological divergences. After the 1979 revolution, the Brotherhood supported the Iranian Republic to bypass international sanctions, and both found common ground politically and ideologically based on the shared elements of popular representation of the people and being anti-Western (Pisecky and Grinberg, Reference Pisecky and Grinberg2015, 10). This ideological convergence was somewhat affected when Iran formed an alliance with the Syrian regime, which engaged in an open clash against the Syrian Brotherhood (Talhamy, Reference Talhamy2009). Scholars argued that the lack of threat perception from the Brotherhood toward Shiism is rooted in the presence of a common goal that overshadows ethnic and sectarian divides.
The second strand in literature follows an instrumentalist approach, arguing that political Islamist movements are rational actors who engage in strategic calculations driven by interest. Accordingly, the Brotherhood’s behavior is determined by exigencies of regional and domestic politics. Scholars, from this strand, then explained the behavior of the group during the 2006 Lebanon war between Israel and Hezbollah, downplaying religious differences and noting that differences shall be suspended until the battle with Zionism and Western imperialism ends (Hamzawy and Bishara, Reference Hamzawy and Bishara2006). The Brotherhood thus perceived Israel and the West as eminent threats in the region, and any ideological differences with other groups sharing the same agenda would constitute unwanted distraction (Hamid, Reference Hamid2021; Helfont, Reference Helfont2009). Helfont’s (Reference Helfont2009) contribution adds a nuance to this instrumentalist perspective by questioning whether the Brotherhood straightforwardly rejects sectarianism. He highlights that the Brotherhood’s position has at times been ambiguous, shaped not only by pan-Islamist commitments but also by concerns about regional power politics, including growing Shia influence after the 2003 Iraq War, Iranian nationalism, and perceived Shia proselytization. His analysis, therefore, shows that the Brotherhood’s approach to sectarianism is neither uniform nor entirely ideational but mediated by broader strategic considerations in the context of the emerging “Shia Crescent.” Hamid’s (Reference Hamid2021) work has further turned scholarly attention to the case of the Brotherhood, his analysis offered some region-wide reflections on the “theological indifference” that the Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Kuwait, among others holds for Shias. However, his brief reflections invited further systematic inquiry into the issue.
Whereas both strands in the literature examined the position of the Brotherhood as distinct, none so far have focused on how the group’s collective identity articulated the rejection of sectarianism, which omits a crucial aspect of how groups construct a system of meaning attributed to events to make sense of reality in their environment. The remainder of the article complements this existing literature by offering an ideational argument tracing how the Brotherhood’s collective identity framing prioritized some elements of the identity that were put forth during moments of rising sectarianism in the Middle East. This article argues that the Brotherhood’s rejection of sectarianization is grounded in the group’s collective identity frames. Sectarianism contradicted two defining master frames in the group’s collective identity. The first was the constitutive norm of inclusivity, that is tolerating non-homogeneity within societies and overcoming differences with other Islamic groups, adhering to a pan-Islamist narrative encouraging Muslims to unite. The second is the social purpose of the collective identity, which entailed an adherence to “resistance” against imperialism and authoritarianism. Sectarianism was viewed by the group as a tool by external actors to divide the Muslim umma.
An inclusive collective identity: a theoretical framework
Identity politics relating to social movements have yielded an enormous literature (Jasper and McGarry, Reference Jasper and McGarry2015; Jasper et al., Reference Jasper, McGarry, Tramontano, James and McGarry2015; Polletta and Jasper, Reference Polletta and Jasper2001). Scholars have long suggested that collective identity is socially constructed and historically reproduced (e.g., Brubaker, Reference Brubaker2004). In the context of social movements, collective identity is a process through which meanings are attributed to certain differences, delineating the relationship of the group with other social actors. The concept of “identity” links cognition to action; the way actors conceive themselves in terms of the “self” influences how they categorize and behave toward some “other.” Theorists posited several understandings of how the “self” is defined and accordingly, the in-group as well as critical mechanisms that explain behavior toward “out-groups” or “others.” As Wendt (Reference Wendt1999, 224) highlights, in his classic definition, identity entails not only an actor’s understanding and expectations of the self but also “motivational and behavioral predispositions.” As the self is defined, social identity boundaries are activated drawing a distinction between the in-group versus an out-group. Out-groups are considered then acceptable targets for discriminatory behavior and prejudices (Brewer, Reference Brewer1993; Tajfel, Reference Tajfel and Tajfel1978; Tajfel land Turner, Reference Tajfel, Turner, Worchel and Austin1986). Thus, a group’s self-conception can prefigure behavior toward others by making some policy options (in)appropriate in ontological and emotional terms. Movement leaders, through frames, articulate collective identities to build a shared sense of unity and solidarity among members while ascribing meaning to particular differences with other groups (Benford and Snow, Reference Benford and Snow2000; Goffman and Berger, Reference Goffman and Berger1986). Frames, often constructed by movement leaders, are “schemata of interpretation” that make sense of reality in a way that mobilize and persuade bystanders of the legitimacy of their cause (Milan, Reference Milan2022, 1063).
In this article, we draw on Abdelal et al. (Reference Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott2009, 17–32) typology on the content of collective identity articulated in master frames that actors employ. We analyze that the Brotherhood’s master frames evolved around two elements of the group’s identity: constitutive norms and social purpose. Constitutive norms refer to defining a group identity by formal and informal rules, thus shaping appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Social purpose refers to the goals that are shared by members of a group (Abdelal et al., Reference Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott2009, 19). These components are associated with the collective history and self-conception of the movement that shaped the group’s perception of Shiism as a non-other, which explains, so we argue, their rejection of sectarianism.
The rationale for selecting these two dimensions is twofold. First, theoretically, constitutive norms and social purpose are elements of identity directly linked to behavioral expectations and motivational logics. Constitutive norms specify what is considered appropriate or inappropriate behavior for a given identity, while social purpose defines the goals that a group perceives as intrinsic to its identity (Abdelal et al., Reference Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott2009). These dimensions, therefore, explain when and why a movement rejects certain identity frames—such as sectarian ones—as inappropriate with its self-conception. Second, empirically, our analysis of the group’s identity construction revealed that constitutive norms and social purpose are the only identity components that appear consistently across the group’s leaders and official platforms, thereby rising to the level of master frames. Other components in Abdelal et al.’s typology, such as relational comparisons or cognitive models, were not predominant in structuring the Brotherhood’s interpretation of sectarianism. We therefore argue that the Brotherhood’s master frames evolved around two core elements of the group’s collective identity: (1) constitutive norms and (2) social purpose. These components, rooted in the movement’s historical development and self-conception, have shaped the group’s rejection of sectarianism.
Constitutive norms encompass implicit rules and values that delineate how actors behave toward others. They embody historical expectations, collective understanding of the group’s self-conception, and its raison d’être. Constitutive norms identify “appropriate” behavior for a particular identity, and these norms define the boundaries and practices of a group. These are an integral part of the social meaning of an identity that delimits collective expectations of the group. Therefore, reasons to act are found in the normative development of notions relating to self-conceptions. When a proposed policy contradicts these normative components, members of the group perceive the leadership to be acting inappropriately, which might lead to cognitive dissonance, that is, the inconsistency between what is observed and what is expected (Festinger, Reference Festinger1962).
For the Brotherhood, the constitutive norm has been framed as tolerating difference with other Islamist groups infusing the group with an inclusive, yet ambiguous, adherence to pan-Islamism. Islam, in the case of the Brotherhood, constitutes a “superordinate identity” yielding consolidation across Islamic groups. A superordinate identity is defined as an overarching identity including both ingroups and outgroups (Wenzel et al., Reference Wenzel, Mummendey and Waldzus2007). Therefore, it is inappropriate for the Brotherhood to stand against other Islamic groups, as this presents the group with the danger of falling into dissension (fitna), creating fragmentation (tamzīq), and threatening the unity (wiḥda) (Abu Bakr, Reference Abu Bakr2021). Therefore, the group accepts difference and diversity with other groups.
If constitutive norms relate to how a group defines the appropriate behavior, social purpose in a collective identity refers to particular goals. The purposive content of an identity refers to those interests, goals, and preferences (Abdelal et al., Reference Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott2009, 22–23). This does not mean that these elements in the collective identity stem from a rational, interest-oriented perspective, but the purposive content is a group’s collective identity frame—i.e., who they are and how they are recognized by others—becoming the funnel through which the world is interpreted, and social purposes create obligations to engage in practices that make the group’s achievement of a set of goals more likely” (Abdelal et al., Reference Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott2009, 22).
The constitutive norm of Islamic inclusivity in the Brotherhood’s collective identity overlaps with a purposive element, which constituted the group’s raison d’être, expressed in the master frame of resistance to colonialism, imperialism, and authoritarianism. The group’s founder, Hassan al-Banna, presented the group as a religious grassroots movement with master frames around pan-Islamic values and embodied the struggle against British colonialism and Western influence as the overarching goal of the group. The history of resistance against colonialism and imperialism was followed by a struggle against authoritarianism in the decades that followed decolonization in the region, and Israel is interpreted as a source of threat in the region supported by Western imperialism. This resistance against imperialism and authoritarianism constituted not only the goal of the group but also its identity. In the following section, we examine how constitutive and purposive elements have evolved shaping the group’s identity frames, which delineated its rejection of sectarianism in regional affairs.
Methodological note
This article examines the single case study of the Egyptian Brotherhood as the nucleus organization of the movement, exerting influence over its offshoots in the Arab world and beyond. The Brotherhood defies common trends of political Islam movements by adhering to a superordinate collective identity of Islamism as opposed to predominant divisive sectarian identities. As a representative case study of a movement rejecting sectarian identities, it presents a novel empirical trend useful for theory building on why and how such behavior manifests itself (Goertz, Reference Goertz2017). We trace the group’s historical development and its engagement with sectarianism, a regional phenomenon that dominated central tropes by Sunni movements during major regional events, specifically the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath, and the post-2011 Arab uprisings. These periods were selected as they represent the rise of sectarianism as a regional trope across the Middle East, where various Sunni political Islam movements heightened their anti-Shia narratives, to reveal how the Brotherhood navigated these periods of heightened sectarianism and how their identity frames shaped their political stances. These periods thus offer critical junctures for analyzing how the Brotherhood navigated sectarian periods and constituted their frames of these events, which shaped their action toward these regional events. Our analysis of the Brotherhood is limited until 2013. Following the unprecedent crackdown on the Egyptian Brotherhood after 2013, rejecting sectarianism no longer takes precedence in the group’s agenda and narrative. As a result, the group adopted a retrenching isolationist approach in regional affairs, especially after announcing the group as a designated “terrorist organization” in Egypt and elsewhere in the region (Darwich, Reference Darwich2017). The Brotherhood after 2013 is no longer the same organization in terms of political engagement, and while its outlook on sectarianism has been consistent until 2013, it is hard to envisage whether this will remain a distinctive mark of a movement that is currently undergoing ideological and political internal revisions.
This article examines the collective identity of the Brotherhood by investigating how the master frames guide and constrain the group’s identity and behavior, while taking into account contemporary developments. To investigate how the Brotherhood articulated its collective identity and constructed master frames related to sectarianism, we conducted a systematic qualitative discourse analysis of the group’s official communications. We collected all primary texts produced by senior leaders and organizational outlets that addressed sectarian relations directly or indirectly. These texts included foundational writings since the 1920s (e.g., Rashid Rida’s al-Manar and Hassan al-Banna’s books and the Muslim Brotherhood Newspaper), organizational publications from key historical periods (Al-Da‘wa, 1976–81; Liwa’ al-Islam, 1987–88), and digital-era materials from the early 2000s onward, including spokesperson statements, press releases, communiqués, and publicly accessible content on the Brotherhood’s official website and affiliated social media accounts, where digital platforms became the primary means for disseminating the group’s ideas, especially amid state repression (Howard, Reference Howard2011). Texts were included based on two criteria: (1) authorship by senior or official organizational voices and (2) relevance to sectarian dynamics, Sunni–Shi‘a relations, or broader identity-related narratives.
Each text was examined to identify how the Brotherhood characterized sectarianism, defined the sources of division within the Muslim community, articulated Islamic norms relating to unity, and interpreted regional crises. Attention was given to recurrent narrative, justifications, and references to Islamic precedents. To identify the movement’s master frames, we examined (a) whether they appeared across multiple historical episodes; (b) whether they resonated with longstanding Islamic idioms central to the Brotherhood’s identity; and (c) whether they recurred across different leaders, platforms, and time periods. Through this process, two master frames emerged. First, the Brotherhood framed sectarianism as a divisive force that undermines pan-Islamic unity and the moral imperative of cooperation among Muslims. Second, the group framed sectarianism as a phenomenon instrumentalized by imperialist and authoritarian actors seeking to weaken the Muslim world. These frames were not tied to specific periods or particular leaders but appeared consistently across the movement’s discourse from the early twentieth century through 2013. Cross-temporal comparison ensured that the identified frames were not artifacts of a specific moment but reflected persistent features of the organization’s discourse. Triangulation was also pursued by comparing the narratives emerging from primary sources with existing scholarship on the Brotherhood’s identity and engagement with sectarian politics. Source triangulation across print, historical, and digital materials reduced the risk that observed patterns were specific to one platform or medium.
This study focuses on the group’s official position and those of its senior leadership. We acknowledge the limitations in examining official narratives, as diverse positions within the group may not be represented in the analysis, especially for a large and diverse group like the Egyptian Brotherhood. To address this, we have included internal discussions and rifts in the group over the sectarian question when these emerged in the public sphere, and we showed how the group’s leadership has officially addressed these rifts. Assessing the resonance of these frames among group members presents a significant challenge, particularly in the Egyptian context, where the demonization and criminalization of the group severely hinder any feasible data collection efforts.
The Brotherhood collective identity: from Islamic inclusivity and resisting imperialism to rejecting sectarianization
The Sunni-Shia divide emerged as a deeply controversial issue in the Middle East, especially after the 2003 Iraq War and Iran’s growing power and influence in Arab states, including Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. Throughout waves of sectarianization, the Egyptian Brotherhood rejected sectarianization. Since the early days of the group’s inception, narratives that shaped the Brotherhood for decades evolved around two master frames related to the constitutive norms of inclusivity under pan-Islamism and the purposive content of the identity based on resistance against imperialism and authoritarianism. The following sections explore how these master frames delineated the group’s stance on sectarianism since the movement inception and throughout heightened sectarianism in the Middle East following major events, including the Islamic Revolution (1979), the 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath, and the post-2011 uprisings.
Constitutive norm of inclusivity
The Egyptian Brotherhood was established in 1928 by a scholar named Hassan al-Banna (Wickham, Reference Wickham2002). Egypt was then under de facto British colonialism. Al-Banna founded the group to be a religious grassroots movement that works towards combining political activism based on Islamic values, with an aim to gradually Islamize state and society as the main mechanism for independence and development (El-Hudaibi, Reference El-Hudaibi2010).
Since its inception, the Brotherhood has rejected divisive identities within Islam, including sectarianism, and instead adhered to a pan-Islamism, which constituted a core element of the group’s collective identity. Tracing how this core element evolved in the group’s collective identity, this section shows how this master frame delineated the group’s position toward sectarianism. From the onset, the Brotherhood was built on a collective identity under the slogan of “Islam is the solution” for social, political, and economic problems. Over the decades, the group embraced a holistic, comprehensive (shumūliyya) view of religion as a “system for life” (Meijer, Reference Meijer, Bakker and Meijer2013, 317), epitomized in al-Banna’s eminent quote: “We are a Salafiyya call, a Sunni path, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a league of cultural knowledge, an economic company, and a social idea” (Al-Banna, Reference Al-Banna1992, 122–123). The groups’ sense of collective identity was based on an Islamic identity of inclusivity (al-Anani, Reference al-Anani2016, 56–57) through the concept of the “Muslim umma”, as al-Banna called for non-territorial solidarity between Muslims around the world (Gani, Reference Gani2019), which featured as one of the highlights of al-Banna’s legacy in the group (Santing, Reference Santing2020, 78–82). To the Brotherhood, achieving the movement’s goals and dominating the world based on the teachings of Islam are bound to building the Muslim individual, family, society, government, state, and umma (al-Anani, Reference al-Anani2016, 56–57). This further weaved the collective identity of the movement through the Islamic concept of “jamā‘a” (collective), where Muslims are commended to act collectively to unite the entire Muslim umma (al-Anani, Reference al-Anani2016, 56–57). Hence, the movement’s identity is embedded within Islamist incitements for collective action, preservation of unity, and the rejection of individualism, as those who disturb this collective order convict themselves, the entire group, and Muslims (Kandil, Reference Kandil2015).
Since the early days, the group’s leaders emphasized the importance of Muslim unity while downplaying religious differences among sectarian groups, thus delineating the group’s initial rejection of sectarianism. Al-Banna considered that all of Islam’s many sects as belonging to the worldwide Muslim umma, and he called for rapprochement between Sunni and Shia. Al-Banna was influenced by earlier prominent Islamic scholars. The concept of “rapprochement” was first coined in the teachings of early contemporary Islamic intellectuals: Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani then Mohamed Abdo (Al-Qafari, Reference Al-Qafari1993, 191–192). Their student, Mohamed Rashid Reda, had taken further steps in establishing the theological foundation for the rapprochement in his book Letters of Sunna and Shia (Rida, Reference Rida1947), and he invested efforts in debating with both camps in Egypt, Syria, India, and Iraq (Al-Qafari, Reference Al-Qafari1993, 194). In his magazine Al-Manar, he established al-Manar golden rule:Footnote 1 “We should cooperate on issues where we agree, and we forgive one another what we disagree about.”Footnote 2 This rule stemmed from his effort to unite the various sectarian groups under the Ottoman Empire, and he called for applying the same rule with Shia Muslims, stating that “our effort to unite the umma hinges upon scholars from both camps to adopt the rules of al-Manar.”Footnote 3
This rule was later propagated widely by al-Banna, who advocated for setting aside sectarian and theological differences to attain the unity of Muslim umma. This rapprochement is visible in al-Banna’s twenty principles that he outlined in the “Messages of Teachings/Education” in his seminal book The Messages of Hassan al-Banna (Al-Banna, Reference Al-Banna1992, 275–278), which constitutes the intellectual foundation of the Brotherhood movement. Six of these principles (6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 20) are on overcoming controversies among Muslims. In principle 20, al-Banna stated:
Never label an unbeliever (kāfir) any Muslim who has confessed the two declarations (shihāda) of faith, acts accordingly, and performs the obligatory (farḍ) duties of Islam unless he clearly professes the word of unbelief, refuses to acknowledge a fundamental principle of Islam, belies the verses of the Quran, or commits an evident act of unbelief (Al-Banna, Reference Al-Banna1992, 278).
Al-Banna also advised his students and followers on several occasions that “there is no difference between Sunni and Shia, as our religion is one, our God is one, our Messenger is one, our Qibla is one, and our Sunnah is one” (Youm7, 2013).
In 1948, Hassan al-Banna played a prominent role in establishing the “House of Rapprochement between the Islamic Legal Schools” (Dār al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-‘Islāmiyya), which was designed to bridge religious divides between Sunnis and Shia. The organization involved prominent Shia scholars advocating for Muslim unity, namely Mohammad Taqiy Al-Qummi, who was hosted by al-Banna in the Brotherhood headquarters discuss the rapprochement. And when al-Banna went to Hajj in 1948, he met with Ayathollah al-Kashany. Al-Banna’s followers recount the story that following an incident of an Iranian Hajj who was executed in Saudi Arabia in the 1940s, many Iranians stopped going to Mecca. The Association for Rapprochement printed a book showing how Sunnis and Shia are similar in Hajj rituals. Upon difficulties of allowing this book in the Saudi Kingdom, al-Banna printed the text in the Muslim Brotherhood Newspaper and distributed it during Hajj in 1948 (Al-Taskhīrī, Reference Al-Taskhīrī2013).
The inclusivity under pan-Islamism, while rejecting sectarianism that was set by al-Banna, constituted the line that the Brotherhood followed for decades, rejecting sectarian differences while focusing on attaining the group’s goal, that is, Muslim unity. Omar Al-Tilmisany, the Brotherhood’s third murshid (i.e., group leader), states that al-Banna was keen to organize a conference where all sects are present to debate paths of rapprochement and mutual acceptance, following the Quranic verse that was often recited by al-Banna: “Truly, this, your umma is one religion” (Sura 21:92) (Al-Tilmisany, Reference Al-Tilmisany2003, 78).
During various historical junctures where sectarian tensions erupted in the Middle East, the Brotherhood followed al-Banna’s principles and adopted stances and positionality that rejected sectarianism, while calling for acceptance of Shia under the banner of uniting the Muslim umma. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Iran-Iraq War triggered a sectarian wave in the region, and the movement under the leadership of Omar Al-Tilmisany (group leader 1974–86) relentlessly called for Muslim unity and followed al-Banna’s footsteps in calling for rapprochement and overcoming sectarian divisions. In 1982, in an interview with Al-Tilmisany (Al-Da‘wa, 1982a, 13), when asked about whether the Sunni-Shia divide will become the dividing line of conflict in the region, he replied that “the enemies of Islam and the forces of evil have been long planning for this … and the Brotherhood will not lift arms in the face of another Muslim,” and he insisted on inclusivity as one of the group’s founding principles, insisting that “the group has never been involved in a sectarian rivalry of any form, and reconciling between Muslims is one of the pillars of this movement” (Al-Da‘wa, 1982a, 14). Later during the war, Al-Tilmisany (Reference Al-Tilmisany1985) stated that “apart from all the political differences between Shia and others, the Brotherhood is still very keen to see tangible rapprochement between different sects among Muslims”. For him, Muslims are neither Sunni nor Shia, but all are first and foremost Muslims. Hence, “Muslim jurists, regardless of the sect they follow, have a duty to work towards bringing Sunni and Shia closer together” (Al-Tilmisany, Reference Al-Tilmisany1985). Mustafa Mashhur (group leader 1996–2002) also underlined that despite how there are several Sunni Muslim groups who consider Shia to be infidels, the Brotherhood rejects that emphasizing that the “movement is keen on the unity of Muslims” (Mashhur, Reference Mashhur1998).
Given the sense of an Islamic collective identity, the Brotherhood deems the “duty to work for Islam” as paramount, which later produced a pan-Islamic sentiment that revolved around becoming sympathetic towards all Muslims around the world and wanting to support and help them (al-Anani, Reference al-Anani2016, 53). Therefore, pan-Islamism allows overcoming differences, as it is based on the premises of transnational unity and rallying around the same cause (Lüthi, Reference Lüthi2020). This inclusive pan-Islamic narrative rejecting sectarian divides made the group stand out amongst other “Islamist” groups (Ayoob and Lussier, Reference Ayoob and Lussier2008). The next section shows that during waves of sectarianism, in Syria in the 1980s, the 2003 Iraq War, the 2006 Lebanon War, and the 2011 uprisings, the official narrative of the Brotherhood followed al-Banna’s guiding principles on rapprochement between Sunni and Shia, while rejecting sectarian divides.
Social purpose of resistance
Inclusivity and overcoming difference in the Brotherhood identity were combined with another master frame emanating from an element of social purpose that delineates the group’s rejection of sectarianism. The group has persistently framed sectarianism as a tool in the hands of Western imperialism to divide and control the Muslim umma. Since its foundation, the Brotherhood’s purpose revolved around a master frame that Islam is threatened by erosion in Muslim societies due to Westernization (Frampton, Reference Frampton2019, 11–56). The Brotherhood, through this distinct frame, combined the political goals of resisting imperialism with pan-Islamic unity, which then led to their rejection of sectarianism framed as a Western, imperialist strategy to divide Muslims.
Since the 1920s, al-Banna has emerged as an anti-colonial figure among Muslims in the Arab world and beyond. His anti-colonial worldview provided long-lasting foundations for the group, which became primarily driven by resistance against colonialism. Al-Banna was motivated by his anger towards the injustices that colonialism brought to colonized societies and the enslavement of their bodies and souls. He was against the British colonial logic that instilled oppressiveness and an inferiority complex in colonized societies, who in a postcolonial world looked up to Western ideologies, ideas, and cultures as models to aspire to mimic but were never capable of embodying. Al-Banna considered colonial enslavement and violence to be not only a form of physical dispossession and subjugation of the colonized but also an attack on Islam (Gani, Reference Gani2023, 6).
In the face of growing secularization of the state, particularly after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the endurance of British colonialism, the movement’s goal was to create a religious Islamic reform in Egyptian society to overturn the Western cultural influence, which was framed as the cause of the erosion of Islam (Gani, Reference Gani2019). Second, in response to British colonialism, the movement embodied the struggle and resistance against imperialism and external domination over societies in Egypt and the region to eventually reach liberation (El-Hudaibi, Reference El-Hudaibi2010). These goals motivated the Brotherhood to get involved in similar struggles against colonialism in the Arab region. During the Palestinian uprising in 1936–1939, the Brotherhood sent voluntary members to fight in Palestine (Lagervall, Reference Lagervall, Upal and Cusack2021, 75), and al-Banna’s recognition as an anti-colonial figure was asserted amongst Muslims across the region (Gani, Reference Gani2023, 4–5).
The Brotherhood’s sense of collective identity carried the belief that acting collectively and reviving the Islamic identity will not only insulate the umma from Western subordination but also allow for an alternative political, social, economic, and cultural system that contests Western civilization (al-Anani, Reference al-Anani2016). Through this prism, the purpose of resisting imperialism is not only a material goal but also a master frame that defines the group’s self-conception, positioning, and belonging. This sense of Islamic collective identity, intertwined with political contexts, further developed to create clashes with Egyptian postcolonial governments and ruling elites. According to the Brotherhood, ruling elites are selfish, totalitarian, and tyrannical with no popular support (El-Hudaibi, Reference El-Hudaibi2010). Over time, the movement became one of the most influential political actors with its mobilization ability by embedding itself within poor- and middle-class neighborhoods (Masoud, Reference Masoud2014). Even though the movement experienced harsh periods of repression and persecution from the Egyptian state, it was able to survive (Abou El Willi, Reference Willi2021; Zalaf, Reference Abou El Zalaf2023). Castells (Reference Castells2009) underlines that as a product of regime oppression, a sense of resistance shaped its identity.
This history of resistance in the Brotherhood identity shaped their views and perceptions of sectarianism, which was assimilated to colonial and authoritarian strategies of “divide and rule” and a mode of governance that does not serve societies but external actors (Makdisi, Reference Makdisi2018). This linkage to the history of colonial resistance explains, so we argue, why the Brotherhood rejected anti-Shiism despite surges of sectarianism across the region.
This rejection of sectarianism was illustrated during waves of sectarianism in the Middle East, especially when regional events spurred sectarian narratives. In 1982, the Brotherhood in Syria faced an unprecedented crisis when their rebellion in the city of Hama against the government was crushed by the regime of Hafez al-Assad, in what was known as the “Hama massacre” where more than 40,000 were killed to contain the uprising (Lefevre, Reference Lefevre2013). The Brotherhood in Egypt condemned the attack and called for supporting their brethren against the repression of this authoritarian regime. That said, the Brotherhood never adopted any anti-Shia framing in reporting the events. Al-Da‘wa magazine published a report over four issues in 1982 exploring how the Baath party used sectarian minorities to foster divisions across Syrians to ensure regime survival (Al-Da‘wa, 1982b).
With the widespread sectarianism in the region, especially after the 2003 Iraq War when the US empowered Shia groups in Iraq to challenge the remnant of Saddam Hussein, Brotherhood leaders considered sectarianism as part of a larger US plot to divide the Arab world (Elad-Altman, Reference Elad-Altman2009a, 19). When Mamoun Al-Hudaiby (group leader 2002–2004) was questioned about his opinion about those who prohibited the support of Hezbollah whilst provoking sectarian differences, he replied: “the Brotherhood’s position has been that we are one united umma. We have one Messenger and one Qibla. Islamic sects, Sunni and Shia, are a fabric of the nation” (Al-Haddad, Reference Al-Haddad2021). When the sectarian conflict intensified in Iraq, Mohamed Mahdi Akif (group leader 2004–2010) issued a communiqué entitled: “The unity of umma is the rock on which conspiracies and fitan collapse.” He encouraged Sunnis to end their conflict with Shias and form a common alliance against occupation. He also called for the revival of the Committee of Rapprochement between Islamic Legal Schools, which was set up in the 1940s, to encourage Islamic fraternity (Akif, Reference Akif2006). Moreover, when questioned later about sectarianism in Iraq, Akif stated that the Brotherhood does not believe in the divide between Sunni and Shia and that division in Iraq has heightened due to US invasion and imperialism (Al-Sharqāwy, Reference Al-Sharqāwy2007). He furthermore criticized then-President Mubarak for his statements against the Shia population in Iraq (Al-Bayan, 2006). As violence between Sunni and Shia intensified in Iraq, 50 religious scholars from Iraq signed the “Mecca Charter” calling for an end to sectarian violence. The Egyptian Brotherhood issued an official communique to support the charter and to reiterate that “it is forbidden for any sect to label anyone from another sect as unbeliever… ant that the Brotherhood stresses that achieving Islamic unity is a duty upon every Muslim” (Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, 2006). In 2007, Akif (Reference Akif2007) issued an official statement:
Since the foreign occupier had set foot in Muslim countries, they are looking to create divisions, weaken the unity, use differences, and propagate hateful feelings among brothers in religion and nation… they started dividing the Muslim world into states and sub-states, creating border issues, and forging conflicts based on racial, religious, and sectarian differences….These plans were supported by authoritarian rulers, who tortured their people, forged hatred between Shia and Sunni, and opened the door to the US invasion of Iraq.
In 2006, Hezbollah attacked Israeli targets, which Israel perceived as an act of war and instigated a military response. Despite the following surge of sectarianism, Akif declared that “Islam regained its role in leading the struggle against Zionism” (Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, 2006). The Brotherhood supported Hezbollah and criticized Arab leaders who argued that Hezbollah, as a Shia organization and an ally of Iran, should not be supported. Akif further announced that the Brotherhood considers Hezbollah’s fighters to be Arab Muslims fighting occupation and imperialism while not objecting to the Iranian Shia expansion. He commented: “We have 56 Sunni countries and one Shia country, what harm if the Shia add another country?” and that “Shia have the right to establish a political party that expresses their ideas and political aspirations” (Al-Gazār, Reference Al-Gazār2008). He also declared the willingness of the Brotherhood to supply Hezbollah with ten thousand fighters (Al-Arabiya, 2006). Moreover, the Brotherhood’s Commissioner for international relations at that time, Youssef Nada, rejected anti-Shia narratives by describing that what is said about Shias are “fabrications, lies, and exaggerations” and “saying about them what they are not” (Al-Gazār, Reference Al-Gazār2008).
Nevertheless, the anti-Shia mood that spread in the region, especially after 2003, affected the Brotherhood (Kandil, Reference Kandil2015, 43). The uncovering of a Hezbollah network operating in Egypt in late 2008 contributed to the rise of anti-Shia narratives in Egypt. Senior members in the group were divided over the Shia question. The division was between two camps: one pro-Iranian led by figures such as Youssef Nada (Nada, Reference Nada2009) and the other camp was anti-Iranian, exemplified in the writings of Mahmud Ghuzlan (Reference Ghuzlan2009). This anti-Iranian was also embraced by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who had a prominent role in the intellectual leadership of the group. Despite his initial narrative encouraging convergence between Sunni and Shia, Al-Qaradawi later embraced an anti-Shia position, which has created a debate within the group (Al-Qaradawi, Reference Al-Qaradawi2008). To address this situation, the group leader, Mohamed Mahdi Akif, announced that this debate between the leaders of the group is their personal opinion and not a reflection of the official stance of the group. Akif highlighted the importance of preserving the unity of the Muslim umma against its enemies that aspire to divide it (Aljazeera, 2009). Furthermore, Jum‘a Amin, then a senior member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Office, published a memorandum entitled “Follow jurisprudence (fiqh) and beware of polytheism (shirk),”Footnote 4 where he insisted that “the unity of the umma during this critical time requires refraining from delving into these controversial issues and that Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama‘a are keen to bridge the rift so that efforts can be united toward the same enemy, that is, the Zionist American project.” He further reminded us that al-Banna and other Muslim reformers have been aware of the damages that the Islamic nation is exposed to because of this division. Therefore, he contended that “the Brotherhood should not be involved in doctrinal and sectarian differences” (Amin, Reference Amin2010).
Following the 2011 uprisings and the implosion of the civil war in Syria, anti-Shiism reached an unprecedented intensity, as many Arab people considered Assad’s repression (supported by Iran and Hezbollah) to be a Shia plot against Sunnis in Syria and beyond, as exemplified by popular trends on then Twitter (now X) across the Arab world (Siegel, Reference Siegel and Wehrey2017). Nevertheless, the Brotherhood maintained its official position of rejecting sectarian wars while insisting on preserving Muslim unity and resisting imperialism in the region. Mohamed Badie (murshid 2010–2013) affirmed in 2011 that the group does not fear the so-called “Shia tide” because Sunnis and Shia belong to Islamic sects, indicating that even Al-Azhar was originally established in order to spread Shiism (Al-Nahar, 2011). He added that the Brotherhood appreciates Hezbollah for its stance against Zionism and “its standing with our brothers in Palestine.” Badie further highlighted that despite Hezbollah’s position in Syria that saddens the Brotherhood, the group must stand with the people on all issues (Al-Nahar, 2011).
From opposition to power
As the Brotherhood ascended to power in Egypt under President Mohamed Morsi between 2012 and 2013, their stance on anti-Shiism has guided their policies. Morsi was the first Egyptian president to visit Iran after 30 years of broken diplomatic ties between Egypt and Iran since the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Morsi met with Iranian President Ahmadi Nejad during the summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and discussed ending the war in Syria and future cooperation between Egypt and Iran (BBC News, 2013). Morsi’s presidency allowed a short-lived “Shia religious tourism” by easing travel restrictions for Iranian tourists to Egypt (Kamil, Reference Kamil2015). These policies raised fears, particularly amongst Salafists who warned against the spread of Shiism in Egypt. Yet, members of the Brotherhood defended the ease of travel restrictions and the bilateral tourism deal with Iran, saying that Shia tourists would not convert Sunni Egyptians by visiting. Essam El-Erian, a Brotherhood official, commented on his Facebook page that “Egypt is greater than to be penetrated by any thought or current. Egypt has refused all forms of secularism and welcomed nationalism mixed with Islamism” (Hope, Reference Hope2013).
In the meantime, the Brotherhood rejected the rising of anti-Shiism at the popular level in Egypt instigated by the war in Syria. In June 2013, Morsi was present in an assembly at the Cairo stadium where Salafis called for the war in Syria and portrayed Shia as “filthy” and “non-believers who should be killed” (Bengali, Reference Bengali2013). Morsi announced on that day that he would break diplomatic ties and relations with Syria’s Assad government without addressing the Salafists’ anti-Shia rhetoric. A week later, Shia communities in Zawiyet Abu Mussalem village were attacked, amongst them was Sheikh Hassan Shehata, a Shia cleric who was imprisoned during President Mubarak’s era. In response, Morsi’s office officially condemned the killings of Shia and announced that the criminals will be sentenced to justice (Michael and Hendawi, Reference Michael and Hendawi2013). This position by the Brotherhood even after they ascended to power challenges alternative explanations, discussed earlier in the article, especially the instrumentalist approach, according to which the Brotherhood suspended sectarian narratives until reaching power. Instead, whether in opposition or power, the Brotherhood’s leadership on the sectarian issue remained consistent.
While this study focuses on the Brotherhood’s discourse up to 2013, the post-coup period does not invalidate the argument; rather, it delimits its analytical scope. The severe repression following 2013 transformed the movement’s organizational capacity, political incentives, and public voice. Any identity frames—not only those related to sectarianism—became sharply focused on issues of survival. As a result, the absence of anti-sectarian discourse after 2013 reflects a radically altered structure rather than a substantive shift in the group’s stance on sectarianism. Nonetheless, the pre-2013 period remains analytically valuable: it captures the movement’s identity frames under conditions in which it exercised agency, communicated publicly, and engaged meaningfully in regional debates.
Conclusion
This article examined how collective identity frames delineate social movements’ positions toward overarching identities. Specifically, it has examined how some social movements approached sectarianism differently and nurtured a unifying collective identity frame without resorting to the “us” versus “them” categorization. By examining the master frames put forward by the Brotherhood, the study sheds light on how multifaceted groups empirically vary in approaching sectarianism. Tracing the historical development of the Brotherhood’s collective identity, this article demonstrated how identity elements—the constitutive norm of inclusivity and the social purpose of resistance against imperialism and authoritarianism—defined the frames which led to a rejection of sectarianism in regional affairs. These master frames underpinned the group’s consistent rejection of anti-Shia narratives, its dismissal of the significance of theological differences as politically irrelevant while adhering to a larger pan-Islamism calling for the unity of the Muslim umma, and its insistence on portraying sectarianism as a colonial and authoritarian tool. As a result, the Brotherhood adopted political stances in regional affairs that diverged from those of many Sunni Islamist movements during key sectarian waves.
Through the case of the Egyptian Brotherhood, this article has deepened theoretical understanding of collective identity dynamics during moments of heightened, divisive sectarian identities. The analysis underscores that sectarianism is neither a fixed nor inevitable identity script within Sunni political Islam. Instead, the case of the Brotherhood demonstrates how socially constructed identities embracing an organization’s core normative commitments and historical mission can constrain its repertoire of political action. Even in a context where sectarian mobilization was widespread—most notably after 2011—the Egyptian Brotherhood’s leadership could not opportunistically adopt a divisive identity; instead, the group publicly denounced anti-Shia discourse and reaffirmed its inclusive pan-Islamic vision. This suggests that religious movements do not simply mirror their sectarian environments but may actively reinterpret events through their master frames. The analysis also contributes more broadly to theories of identity politics and social movements. It shows that master frames can have an enabling or constraining effect on organizational choices, limiting the extent to which movements can opportunistically adopt divisive identities. This insight calls for greater attention to the ways in which identity frames structure the repertoire of possible political options available to actors.
The case of the Syrian Brotherhood, which sectarianized their struggle against Hafiz al-Assad in the 1980s and again against Bashar al-Assad after 2011 (Hamid, Reference Hamid2021), adds a challenge to extending the findings from the case of the Egyptian Brotherhood to its offshoots in the region. Similarly, the Brotherhood in Bahrain has faced some challenges with the 2011 uprisings, and the group had to conform to anti-Shia narratives imposed by the regime in its strategy to portray the popular uprising as Shia sectarian (Valeri, Reference Valeri, Kraetzschmar and Rivetti2018). These cases present a promising avenue for future research: identifying the conditions under which Brotherhood movements—and other movements more broadly—uphold or depart from anti-sectarian identity frames. Explaining when master frames are resilient and when they adapt will require systematic comparative work across national contexts, organizational lineages, and political environments.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers, Giuditta Fontana, members of the Political Settlement Research Group at the University of Birmingham, and members of the SEPAD Sectarianism, Proxies and De-Sectarianization Project for insightful comments on earlier drafts.
Financial support
This research was supported by the British Academy under Small Research Grant SRG1819\190662.
Transliteration
We followed IJMES transliteration system, and we used common spelling of names and concepts such as Hassan al-Banna, Hezbollah, Hamas, Umma, Shia etc.
May Darwich is Associate Professor of International Relations of the Middle East at the University of Birmingham (UK). She is author of Threats and Alliances in the Middle East: Saudi and Syrian Policies in a Turbulent Region (Cambridge University Press, 2019) and co-editor of International Relations of the Middle East: Theories and Case Studies (Cambridge University Press, 2026).
Lujain Al-Meligy is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations (IR) at King’s College London (KCL). Her research examines coloniality, security narratives, governance, and the politics of knowledge production, with a focus on postcolonial/decolonial critiques of Western-centrism in IR and the study of the Middle East.
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