This article examines how Black communities in New York City and Atlanta responded to the crack epidemic of the 1980s and how their grassroots activism shaped the rise of order-maintenance policing. Although much scholarship attributes the development of order-maintenance policing to top-down neoliberal and conservative forces, we demonstrate that residents—facing daily violence, open-air drug markets, and social collapse—demanded more aggressive enforcement. Drawing on extensive archival research, including municipal records, police files, oral histories, and congressional testimony, this study analyzes the formation of Tactical Narcotics Teams in New York and Operation Red Dog in Atlanta. We find that community activism was both a catalyst for and a constraint on policing strategy. Ultimately, this article complicates dominant accounts of contemporary policing by showing how demands for authority and public order, forged from the ground up, helped pave the way for order-maintenance policing.

Central banking and monetary policy face particular challenges in heterogenous and multilevel currency areas. And yet, most literature on central banking, like most modern central banks themselves, assumes the validity of a unitary monetary authority implementing uniform monetary policy, even in compound polities. Here, I explore the dilemmas of central banking and monetary policy in politically decentralized currency areas by analyzing the origins of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and its provisions for a multilevel governance structure and decentralized monetary policy. The origins of the Federal Reserve remain puzzling because its decentralized structure is often dismissed as a failed experiment or a political compromise that nobody truly wanted. However, I find that its design was the product of a deliberate political effort to reimagine central banking in a federal society, and I trace the idea of a decentralized “central” bank to a distinct interpretation of the American political-constitutional tradition.

This article analyzes Southern cotton interests and the agricultural politics within the Roosevelt Administration, offering insights into how market conditions can shape reform agendas and the considerable opportunities for capture that accompany ambitious reform agendas that rely on interested experts. It shows that Southern cotton interests within the Administration were divided into interest groups, depending on their market position, that mapped onto a broader national constellation of agricultural interest groups. These groups competed among themselves for capture of a reform agenda that was adjudicated by the responses of the cotton market to different interventions.

During the Nine Years’ War, limitations of state capacity required that English imperial policy makers delegate substantial authority to provincial governors and assemblies in North American colonies. Proximity to sites of conflict, along with access to developed regional financial networks, gave provincial leaders relative efficiency when planning and executing military campaigns. Although useful in the short term, imperial policy makers considered the influence of provincial leaders like William Phips in Massachusetts to be a threat to their centralized authority in metropolitan London. Consequently, North American colonial wars revealed a tension in the transatlantic imperial relationship between the metropolitan English state and English colonies—namely, that peripheral expansion required delegation but that same delegation threatened central authority that English authorities considered necessary for sovereignty. This tension reached a breaking point on the issue of monetary policy. Phips’s advocacy for colonial monetary autonomy would ultimately provoke his removal as governor and imprisonment.