Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-7zcd7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-08T10:24:47.921Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Order-building from the margins: Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea reconsidered through liminality and competing systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2025

Kenki Adachi Open the ORCID record for Kenki Adachi [Opens in a new window]
Kenki Adachi*
Affiliation:
College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan
*
Email: kenadach@ir.ritsumei.ac.jp
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article reinterprets Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea (1592–1598) as a project of revisionist order-building undertaken by a liminal polity situated between two competing systems: the declining Ming-centered Chinese international system and the advancing Spanish–Portuguese imperial order. Rather than viewing the invasions as products of domestic consolidation, megalomania, or simple expansionism, the study situates them within Japan’s systemic dilemma of in-betweenness. From this perspective, Hideyoshi’s campaigns represented an attempt to construct a Japan-centered international system designed to assert autonomy, deter Iberian colonization, and reconfigure regional hierarchy. Drawing on the concept of liminality in international relations (IR), the paper shows how actors at the margins of overlapping systems can exercise strategic agency – not only adapting to dominant orders but seeking to create alternative ones. Hideyoshi’s vision combined elements of the Chinese international system and deterrent signaling aimed at European powers, producing a hybrid order neither Confucian nor colonial. Although the project collapsed after his death, it temporarily deterred European expansion and reshaped East Asian political dynamics. Theoretically, this case extends debates on revisionism and liminality, demonstrating that order-building from the margins can be both creative and destructive, illuminating broader dynamics of plural international orders.

Keywords

East Asiahistorical international relationsliminalityorder-buildingToyotomi Hideyoshi

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , First View , pp. 1 - 16
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The British International Studies Association.

Introduction

Why did Toyotomi Hideyoshi launch the invasions of Korea, and what do they reveal about the dynamics of international order in early modern East Asia? Traditional interpretations have explained the campaigns as an extension of Hideyoshi’s domestic consolidation, as a product of personal megalomania, or as an expansionist attempt to challenge Ming China’s hegemony. Yet these interpretations overlook the broader systemic context: Japan’s position at the intersection of two competing international systems – the declining Chinese international system and the advancing Spanish–Portuguese imperial system.

While these established explanations – domestic consolidation, megalomania, and expansionism – capture essential dimensions of Hideyoshi’s motives, this article argues that they should be seen as means rather than ends. Domestic consolidation provided the internal foundation for external projection, and expansion served as a performative instrument for a larger systemic goal: the construction of a Japan-centered order in response to liminality. Thus, traditional and systemic interpretations are not mutually exclusive.

This article argues that Hideyoshi’s invasions should be understood as a revisionist order-building project undertaken by a liminal polity. By the late sixteenth century, Japan was no longer fully integrated into the Ming-centered international system, yet it was increasingly exposed to the expanding Spanish and Portuguese imperial system. This liminal position created both constraints and opportunities. Rather than reintegrate into the Chinese system or accommodate European imperial penetration, Hideyoshi sought to construct a Japan-centered international system – one designed to assert autonomy, deter subordination, and reshape regional politics.

Existing historiography rarely interprets Hideyoshi’s campaigns as a systemic intervention in international order. In international relations (IR), revisionist order-building is typically theorized with reference to great powers possessing material parity – whether through replacement of a hegemonFootnote 1 or the construction of a plural order.Footnote 2 By contrast, this case shows a liminal actor engaging in order-making from a position of structural disadvantage. This makes the project analytically unexpected, extending the concept of revisionism to polities that are neither dominant nor fully subordinate but suspended between systems.

By making this argument, the paper contributes to two key debates. First, it refines scholarship on liminalityFootnote 3 by showing how actors situated between systems may pursue strategies of creating an alternative system, rather than merely conforming to either existing one. Second, it clarifies the distinctive ordering principles of Hideyoshi’s envisioned system – submission demands, deterrence signaling, and expansion beyond East Asia – that set it apart from both the Ming-centered international system and European imperial logics.

The broader stakes of the argument extend beyond early modern East Asia. Contemporary international relations are increasingly marked by similar dynamics, as powers such as China and Russia advance alternative principles of order that deepen divisions with the US-led liberal international order.Footnote 4 As the coexistence of multiple international orders once again comes to the fore, the dilemmas faced by liminal actors – states caught between overlapping normative and institutional frameworks – are becoming ever more salient. Understanding the behaviour of such actors is therefore of growing importance. Hideyoshi’s ultimately failed project underscores both the possibilities and the challenges of order-building from the margins, offering historical insight into the repertoire of strategies available to actors navigating fragmented global orders.

Liminality in international systems

The study of international order has increasingly emphasized its contested and plural character. Rather than viewing history solely through the lens of a singular, Europe-centered system, scholars of historical IR have highlighted the coexistence of multiple regional systems well into the early modern era.Footnote 5 In many parts of the world, regional orders persisted even as European empires began to extend their reach.

While these studies have enriched our understanding of non-European international orders, comparatively little attention has been paid to how actors operated under conditions of overlapping and coexisting orders. Actors situated between multiple orders often encountered distinctive structural constraints as well as opportunities. Their strategic choices were shaped by the need to navigate the normative, institutional, and material dynamics of intersecting systems. This analysis treats material and ideational factors as mutually constitutive. Liminal agency arises not merely from structural pressures but from the actor’s own interpretive framing of in-betweenness. Hideyoshi’s project drew simultaneously on material constraints – such as geopolitical exposure to two systems and deterrence – to produce meaning for both domestic and foreign audiences.

To theorize how actors manage these situations, scholars have drawn on the concept of liminality. Liminality refers to an in-between state or condition – neither fully one thing nor the other, but suspended between categories, roles, or systems.Footnote 6 Originally introduced in anthropology, the concept has been adapted across a wide range of disciplines, including IR. Scholarship on liminal actors in IR has often emphasized the ambiguity, instability, and insecurity associated with such in-betweenness.Footnote 7 Yet the anthropological notion of liminality also highlights how actors positioned in liminal spaces may actively leverage their in-betweenness to challenge or subvert existing structures.Footnote 8

Building on these insights, this article conceptualizes the strategic agency of liminal actors operating amid competing international systems. I argue that Japan under Toyotomi Hideyoshi exemplified a distinctive form of order-building agency that sought neither reintegration into the declining Chinese international system nor submission to the expanding Spanish–Portuguese imperial system. Instead, Hideyoshi pursued the construction of an alternative international system aimed at asserting autonomy and deterring subordination.

This perspective differs from earlier studies that argue Japan, in response to ‘Western’Footnote 9 expansion into Asia, actively embraced Western norms and strove to become ‘civilized’ in order to gain recognition as a member of the Western international system.Footnote 10 Such behaviour can also be understood as characteristic of a liminal actor.Footnote 11 Japan, however, adopted such a strategy only in the nineteenth century, when the overwhelming military power of the Western great powers, strengthened by the Industrial Revolution, compelled its participation in the Western international system.

The period examined in this article, by contrast, was one in which the Chinese international system and the Spanish–Portuguese international system intersected in Asia. Neither system at the time possessed sufficient power to forcibly incorporate Japan. This was therefore a period in which a liminal actor could exercise greater agency. By focusing on this moment, the article explores how liminal actors pursued alternative order-building – an aspect that has received little attention in the IR literature on liminality to date.

Scholarly research on Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea has grown substantially, encompassing studies on the war’s impact on Korea, Japan, and China,Footnote 12 as well as analyses of Hideyoshi’s motives in launching the campaign.Footnote 13 Interpretations of his motivations remain broadly divided into two paradigms. One view holds that the campaign was primarily an instrument for strengthening domestic political control,Footnote 14 while the other sees it as driven by expansionist ambitions, particularly Hideyoshi’s desire for overseas territories.Footnote 15

However, as will be examined in more detail later, Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea – and the order-building vision he articulated around them – cannot be fully explained by references to domestic consolidation or territorial ambition. Rather, they must be situated within the broader structural dilemma of liminality.

Among previous studies, some have examined Hideyoshi’s invasions in light of the international context of the time. These works argue that, as the Chinese international system weakened and Spain and Portugal advanced into Asia, destabilizing the East Asian order, Japan sought either to ‘rebel’Footnote 16 against the existing order or to ‘reconstruct a new one’.Footnote 17 Yet such earlier research has generally stopped at identifying the turmoil in the East Asian international order as a motive for Hideyoshi’s invasions. They have paid little attention to what kind of order Hideyoshi actually attempted to construct, or why he endeavored to construct it. This article seeks to clarify precisely what kind of order Japan, as a liminal actor, attempted to construct and why.

The following sections examine how Japan’s international environment in the late sixteenth century embodied these dynamics. First, the paper considers the weakening of the Ming-centered international system, which undermined the stability of East Asia’s traditional order. Second, it analyzes the simultaneous advance of the Spanish–Portuguese imperial system into East and Southeast Asia, which brought new pressures of colonization and conversion. Together, these developments placed Japan in a precarious in-between position – one that both compelled and enabled Hideyoshi’s pursuit of a Japan-centered order.

The Chinese international system and Japan

To examine the background of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea, this section first provides an overview of the Chinese international system that governed East Asian international relations at the time. Although there are various definitions of international systems,Footnote 18 they generally share the common view that an international system involves multiple units, interactions, and ordering principles. Taking these into account, this paper defines an international system as ‘a network of political entities that interact according to ordering principles, such as rules and regulations governing who is included and how such entities interact with each other’.Footnote 19

The Chinese international system gradually emerged between the Chinese dynasty and its neighbouring countries through continuous interactions during the Han dynasty period in the second century BCE. Instead of direct rule, the Han emperors sought to stabilize and pacify relations by granting Chinese official titles to the rulers of neighbouring countries – a practice known as investiture. By bestowing these titles, the Han emperor symbolically subordinated foreign rulers, reinforcing a hierarchical but stable diplomatic framework.Footnote 20

The Han dynasty thus recognized them as distinct political units within the international system. Conversely, these neighbouring entities acknowledged Han authority and accepted a vassal status, contributing to the formation of a hierarchical order centered around the Han emperor. To symbolically affirm their recognition of Han authority, these states adopted the Chinese calendar and regularly paid tribute, explicitly declaring their vassal status to the Han court. In response, the Chinese court reciprocated by not just granting investiture but offering generous return tributes, further incentivizing participation in the system. Through repeated interactions based on these hierarchical relationships, the Chinese dynasty and its neighbouring states established a relatively stable and peaceful order.Footnote 21

Despite the Chinese dynasty’s considerable military, economic, and cultural power, neighbouring states were not reduced to vassals by coercion alone. Rather, many actors were drawn to the Chinese dynasty’s economic power, advanced technology, and culture, and actively sought participation in the system by offering tribute. The system was further reinforced by the legitimating influence of Confucian ideology. Though it waxed and waned with the fortunes of successive dynasties, this Chinese international system remained a defining framework of East Asian relations until the nineteenth century.Footnote 22 Key features of this system are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1.

Chinese international system.

Source: Author

Several Japanese polities began actively engaging with the Chinese international system as early as the first century because the benefits of participation in the system, such as enhanced legitimacy, economic advantages from return tribute, and access to advanced technology and culture, were substantial.Footnote 23 However, Japan started to reject participation despite its clear advantages or pressure from the Chinese dynasties from the late fifth century to the fourteenth century due to the emergence of a worldview within Japan that rejected subordination to China.Footnote 24

The Ming dynasty, established in 1368, began to reinforce the Chinese international system by excluding non-tributary states from maritime trade and introducing a strict sea-ban (haijin) policy. Relations between Japan and Ming China temporarily deteriorated, as Japan was reluctant to join the Chinese system by vassalizing to the emperor of the Ming, prompting the Ming to even hint at the possibility of military action.Footnote 25 In 1401, however, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, the third shogun of the Muromachi shogunate, pledged allegiance to the Ming, marking Japan’s return to the Chinese international system for the first time in 900 years. While Japan at times refused to send tribute even when requested by the Ming due to strong domestic resistance to subordination to China, the Chinese court continued to regard Japan as part of its system, and Sino-Japanese relations remained relatively stable.Footnote 26

As the monetized economy developed and demand for trade increased, it became increasingly difficult for the Ming to regulate maritime commerce. The Chinese international system, led by the Ming, which imposed the sea-ban policy and restricted trade to tributary states, was becoming increasingly dysfunctional, compounded by the decline of the Ming’s national power. In Japan as well, by the sixteenth century, the Muromachi shogunate had grown weak. Faced with severe financial difficulties and unable to procure sufficient tribute goods, the Muromachi shogunate began lending licenses to actors wishing to engage in tribute trade with China, allowing them to pose as envoys of the King of Japan, in exchange for monetary payments. The so-called ‘tribute missions’ conducted by powerful regional powers who received these trade licenses were little more than sham embassies.Footnote 27 The Ouchi clan, which had held a monopoly on official licenses, collapsed in 1551, bringing an end to the ‘official’ tribute by Japan. This marked Japan’s withdrawal from the Chinese international system in both name and substance.Footnote 28

European imperial penetration and the Spanish–Portuguese international system

In the sixteenth century, Spain and Portugal advanced a distinctive form of imperial order-building, centered on the division of global territories between their respective empires. The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) and the Treaty of Zaragoza (1529), endorsed by papal authority, formalized this division, asserting claims over vast maritime and terrestrial domains. This Spanish–Portuguese international system was predicated on both colonial conquest and religious conversion – an order in which new territories were to be incorporated through both material domination and cultural subordination. The key characteristics of this Spanish–Portuguese international system are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2.

Spanish–Portuguese international system.

Source: Author

As Portuguese maritime reach expanded across Southeast Asia, China, and ultimately Japan, European actors unilaterally claimed Japan within the Portuguese sphere, despite Japan’s lack of consent. Initially, Portuguese interest in Japan was limited, with priority placed on trade with China. However, from 1549, with the arrival of Francisco Xavier and subsequent Jesuit missionaries, a new dynamic emerged.Footnote 29 European actors increasingly viewed Japan as a potential target for Christianization and, ultimately, for imperial incorporation.

Japan initially showed little alarm. Their arrival coincided with the decline of the Muromachi shogunate and the height of the Sengoku (Warring States) period, a time of constant warfare and fragmented political authority. Rather than resisting these foreign influences, sengoku daimyos, powerful regional warlords during the Warring States period, engaged with Portuguese merchants and missionaries pragmatically to enhance their military and economic capabilities.

Many sengoku daimyos eagerly sought trade with Portugal. In the 1550s, some sengoku daimyos in Western Japan sent letters of friendship to the Portuguese viceroy of India, expressing their desire to establish a trade agreement and their willingness to receive missionaries to facilitate this.Footnote 30 In addition, these sengoku daimyos actively procured cannons, gunpowder, and other supplies from the Jesuits and Portuguese merchants in exchange for promises of protection.Footnote 31

European observers, in turn, referred to these sengoku daimyos as ‘kings’, reflecting their recognition of Japan’s fragmented but autonomous political landscape.Footnote 32 The Portuguese, particularly the Jesuits, regarded sengoku daimyos as sovereign rulers who could protect Christian missionaries in East Asia. Notably, several prominent sengoku daimyos converted to Christianity, becoming known as Christian daimyos. However, many adopted Christianity not out of pure faith, but rather as a strategic move to secure the economic benefits brought by Portuguese trading ships.Footnote 33

Since the mid-sixteenth century, Portugal had been losing momentum. Meanwhile, Spain had colonized most of the Americas by destroying the Aztec kingdom in 1521 and the Inca empire in 1532. In search of spices, Spain expanded into Southeast Asia, and in 1565 succeeded in colonizing the Philippines.Footnote 34 Spain steadily colonized the Philippines, and in 1571 established a regular shipping route between Manila and Acapulco, with annual round trips. Many Spanish missionaries believed that China could be easily conquered.Footnote 35 As the colonial administration of the Philippines progressed, the Philippine governor-generals began making frequent appeals for the conquest of China.Footnote 36 Jesuit missionaries working in Asia began to support the idea of Spain’s attempts to conquer China after Felipe II became King of Portugal.Footnote 37 The missionaries reiterated the belief that Spain could easily conquer Ming China.Footnote 38

Japanese leaders grew increasingly aware of the potential colonial threat posed by European actors. The example of Spanish expansion into the Americas and Southeast Asia, combined with reports of European ambitions toward Ming China, underscored the risk that Japan itself might face similar pressures. By the late 1580s, sengoku daimyos perceived that European missionary activity and commercial penetration could serve as precursors to broader imperial ambitions. The advance of the Spanish–Portuguese international system into East Asia confronted Japan with a complex strategic dilemma. Japan’s liminal position – no longer fully integrated into the Chinese hierarchical order, yet increasingly exposed to European imperial dynamics – demanded new forms of strategic agency. It is within this context that Hideyoshi’s subsequent foreign policy choices, including the invasions of Korea, must be understood. The next section explores these Japanese strategic responses in greater detail.

Japanese strategic responses to inter-systemic pressures

The growing penetration of European imperial dynamics into East Asia, through both Spanish–Portuguese competition and Jesuit missionary network, placed Japan’s leadership in an increasingly precarious position. Initially, sengoku daimyos had engaged European actors pragmatically, leveraging Jesuit connections to acquire firearms, military supplies, and financial resources. For example, the Jesuits frequently provided financial assistance to Omura Sumitada, the first Christian daimyo in Japan.Footnote 39

Portuguese ships from Macau annually visited Nagasaki, which had been given to the Jesuits by Omura Sumitada as a refuge for their followers. Ryuzoji Takanobu relentlessly attacked the city in an attempt to monopolize the profits from this trade.Footnote 40 To protect the order and its followers from these attacks, the Jesuits built a wall around Nagasaki and armed the city with guns, ammunition, and cannons aboard their warships, transforming Nagasaki into a military fortress.Footnote 41

As the Jesuit missionaries began to mediate arms sales and fortify Nagasaki, there was a growing sense of caution against missionaries in Japan. Additionally, it became known in Japan that Portugal and Spain were promoting colonization and missionary work in various regions. After his first tour of Japan from 1579 to 1582, Alessandro Valignano, the Jesuit East India patriarch, wrote that the sengoku daimyos ‘had a strong suspicion that the Jesuits might revolt in Japan with the Christians’ and ‘believed that the Jesuits would take the missionaries’ lands and try to recover the cost of the missionaries since they were sending missionaries to Japan at great expense’.Footnote 42

During this period, Oda Nobunaga was advancing the unification of the country. His subordinates repeatedly voiced concern to him about the Jesuits’ alleged intention to conquer Japan. Nobunaga, however, was not particularly worried about the Jesuits or Spain colonizing Japan. In his view, ‘It is impossible for enough soldiers to come from such a distant place to achieve their goal of conquering Japan’.Footnote 43

To avoid unnecessary conflict with the Jesuits and Spain, Nobunaga nevertheless considered it important to deter any attempts at colonization. To this end, he presented Valignano, on his return to Europe, with a folding screen painting that depicted a detailed view of Azuchi Castle and its surrounding town.Footnote 44 Valignano responded that the painting was more valuable than any other gift because it could introduce the castle to China, India, and Europe, which could not easily be explained in words.

Oda Nobunaga sought to make his power and the prestige of the Japanese nation known to the world.Footnote 45 According to Luis Frois, a Portuguese Jesuit missionary and historian renowned for his close interactions with Nobunaga, Nobunaga stated that he would conquer the Ming dynasty after uniting Japan, expressing his rivalry with Portugal and Spain.Footnote 46 In the context of a weakening Chinese international system and the growing presence of Spain and Portugal in Asia, the notion arose that Japan could seek to conquer the Ming as a means of countering the Spanish–Portuguese international system.

When Nobunaga was killed in a rebellion in 1582, it was Hashiba (later known as Toyotomi) Hideyoshi who proceeded to unify Japan. In July 1587, on his way back from his conquest of Kyushu, he abruptly issued a decree banning missionaries, ordering them to leave Japan within 20 days. Many Jesuit missionaries, caught off guard by the crisis, seemed to believe they should resist their persecutors by military force.Footnote 47 Gaspar Coelho, the Jesuit superior of the Japan mission, asked the governor-general of the Philippines to dispatch reinforcements, but none were sent.Footnote 48 Ultimately, as Hideyoshi strongly wished to continue trade with Portugal, he ended up not strictly enforcing the order to expel the missionaries. The Jesuit missionaries’ presence in Japan was tacitly approved thereafter.

It is certain that Hideyoshi became aware of the missionaries’ military power when Coelho showed him a fusta ship loaded with cannons. It was, in fact, nine days after seeing the fusta ship that Hideyoshi issued the decree banning missionaries. Furthermore, Hideyoshi had begun to feel threatened by the fact that the missionaries had the power to influence the Christian daimyos and that the Christians were strongly united. Hideyoshi ‘often made clear his belief that the Jesuits had come to Japan under the pretext of conversion and were trying to become rulers of the Japanese nation’.Footnote 49 The decree to expel missionaries also served as a policy tool for domestic unification. He began to use shinkoku shisou, the divine nation ideology, as a tool to legitimize his rule as well as expelling missionaries.

The Christian missionaries’ conversion of the Japanese people and the destruction of temples and shrines undermined the religious ideological framework Hideyoshi was using to promote the unification of Japan.Footnote 50 Another reason for Hideyoshi’s decision to expel the missionaries was their involvement in the Japanese slave trade.Footnote 51 On 18 June 1587, Hideyoshi issued a memorandum emphasizing that ‘Japan is a country protected by the gods,Footnote 52 and it is not permitted to impose evil laws from a Christian country’ (Article 1). He also criticized ‘the destruction of shrines’ (Article 2) and ‘strongly condemned and prohibited the buying and selling of Japanese people’ (Article 10).Footnote 53 The following day, he issued the decree banning missionaries in Japan.

Hideyoshi’s foreign policy vision extended beyond defensive measures. In response to both the weakening of the Chinese international system and the rising Spanish–Portuguese imperial threat, Hideyoshi pursued an ambitious strategy to reconstruct the Asian order under Japanese leadership. Hideyoshi had articulated his intention to attack the Ming dynasty even before completing the unification of Japan. At this time, Hojo Ujimasa in Kanto and Date Masamune in Tohoku, both with significant power, had not yet yielded to Hideyoshi.

It is important to note that even before completing national unification, Hideyoshi informed the Jesuits of his plan to invade the Ming dynasty, thereby signaling his intention to counterbalance European influence. In other words, plans to attack Ming China did not emerge only after domestic unification; rather, Hideyoshi already perceived the need to signal such intention to Portugal and Spain while unification was still underway. He even declared, ‘I do not intend to occupy the Ming dynasty if it becomes a vassal to me’, suggesting that territorial expansion was not his primary objective. Instead, Hideyoshi sought to reconstruct a hierarchical international order centered on Japan.Footnote 54

In the same year he issued the edict expelling the missionaries, Hideyoshi began demanding submission from neighbouring countries and launched a project to restructure the international system in Asia. In 1587, Toyotomi Hideyoshi demanded that Joseon submit to him. The following year, in 1588, he also demanded that Ryukyu submit to him. In 1589, the Ryukyu Kingdom paid tribute to Hideyoshi. Joseon dispatched an envoy to Japan in 1590, recognizing Japan’s new ruler.Footnote 55 Hideyoshi interpreted the envoy’s visit as a gesture of submission. Subsequently, Hideyoshi guaranteed Joseon’s security and demanded its participation in leading Japan’s planned attack on the Ming dynasty,Footnote 56 but Joseon refused. In 1591, Hideyoshi sent a letter to the vice-king of India in Goa, suggesting that Portugal submit to him.Footnote 57 In the same year, he sent a letter to the governor-general of the Philippines in Manila, directly threatening to dispatch an army if the governor-general did not submit to Hideyoshi.Footnote 58 In response, the governor-general declared martial law in Manila and requested reinforcements from the king of Spain via Mexico.Footnote 59

In 1592, Hideyoshi dispatched an army to Joseon. As he advanced his plan to conquer the Ming dynasty, he had already devised a further scheme ‘to attack India thereafter’.Footnote 60 He also threatened the Philippines, declaring that he would send troops if they refuse to engage in trade with Japan,Footnote 61 and in 1593 he repeated his demand that they submit to him. Around the same time, Hideyoshi demanded submission from TaiwanFootnote 62 and even issued a warning to the King of Spain, saying, ‘King of Castile, do not disrespect Japan merely because it is far away’.Footnote 63

Both Hideyoshi’s actions leading up to the invasions of Korea and his subsequent behaviour suggest that territorial expansion was not the primary objective of the campaign. Had expansion been his goal, there would have been no need to issue threats even against Spain. Rather, his aim appears to have been to deter Portuguese and Spanish encroachment into Asia and to assert Japan’s primacy by explicitly presenting a vision of an international order centered on Japan and demonstrating the capacity to realize it. With only a small Spanish garrison defending Manila, colonial authorities feared their rule would collapse if Japan launched an attack.Footnote 64 In response, ships carrying soldiers and weapons were dispatched from Mexico to reinforce Manila’s defenses.Footnote 65

Hideyoshi’s invasion of Joseon was not merely an extension of territorial expansion following the unification of Japan. His demands for submission from Joseon and Ryukyu, together with his vision of conquering Ming China, were not simply expressions of personal ambition but part of a calculated effort to reshape regional order on Japan’s terms. He declared his intention to settle not in Beijing but in Ningbo after unifying Japan and subduing Korea and the Ming dynasty.Footnote 66 This plan to establish himself in Ningbo, a key hub for maritime transportation, suggested that he did not seek to replace the Ming emperor at the center of the existing Chinese international system, but instead envisioned the creation of an alternative order.

The fact that Hideyoshi demanded submission from Taiwan, the Spanish-ruled Philippines, and Portuguese-ruled India – entities that were not subordinate to the Ming at the time – clearly indicates that he was not merely attempting to replace the Ming as leader of the Chinese international system. Rather, he sought to transcend that system and construct a new international system encompassing not only East Asia, but also Southeast Asia and India.Footnote 67

To counter the potential conquest of Japan by Spain and Portugal, Hideyoshi expelled the missionaries and invaded Joseon to demonstrate his formidable military power. However, despite such signaling, missionaries continued to travel to Japan. In particular, when Franciscan missionaries from the Spanish Philippines arrived in Japan, Hideyoshi responded with open hostility. In fact, the Franciscan Martín de la Ascensión was a strong advocate for the conquest of Japan.Footnote 68 Ascensión arrived in Japan in 1596 and began missionary work.

That same year, the navigator of the Spanish ship San Felipe, which had drifted ashore in Japan, was interrogated and reportedly responded, ‘Spain was able to establish its vast overseas territories by first sending missionaries to tame the population and then sending troops to conquer them’. Toyotomi Hideyoshi was outraged by this statement and ordered the execution of six Franciscan missionaries and 20 Japanese Christians in the event known as the ‘Martyrdom of the 26 Saints of Japan’, which also included the execution of Ascensión.Footnote 69

After peace negotiations with the Ming failed, Hideyoshi launched his second invasion of Korea in 1597. However, he found himself at a stalemate with Joseon, which had received reinforcements from the Ming dynasty. After Hideyoshi’s death in 1598, Japan withdrew from the Korean peninsula. And thus, Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea came to be frequently regarded as a reckless failure. It is certain that the invasions were a foolish war that inflicted immense human and material losses on Korea, Ming China, and Japan alike. However, it also seems clear that Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea were driven, at least in part, by an intention to pre-empt European imperial encroachment by asserting Japan’s role as an autonomous order-builder. This strategic agency – rooted in Japan’s liminal position between two competing systems – underscores the complex ways in which liminal actors navigated plural and contested international environments. As the next section will show, Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea constituted a central component of this revisionist order-building project.

Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea reconsidered through liminality

Understanding Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea requires situating them within the broader context of Japan’s strategic positioning amid competing international systems. Far from being driven solely by territorial ambition or personal megalomania, these campaigns reflected a calculated effort to reconfigure regional order and establish a Japan-centered system in response to the decline of the Chinese international system and the growing challenge of European imperial expansion.

As Japan achieved increasing internal unification under Hideyoshi, the weakening of the Ming-centered international order created both opportunities and dangers. With Portugal and Spain advancing their imperial ambitions in East and Southeast Asia – and with missionary networks acting as potential vectors of subordination – Hideyoshi faced a strategic imperative: to assert Japan’s autonomy before it could be drawn into an unfavorable regional configuration.

From the late 1580s onward, Hideyoshi articulated an expansive vision of regional order. He demanded submission from Joseon Korea and Ryukyu, presenting these moves not as acts of conquest but as steps toward constructing a new Asian order centered on Japan. His diplomacy with both Portugese India and Spanish Philippines likewise reflected this intent: rather than seeking territorial incorporation, Hideyoshi aimed to secure recognition of Japan’s leadership and to deter imperial encroachment into Asia. His threats to Manila and correspondence with the Spanish and Portuguese authorities reveal a deliberate strategy of signaling – demonstrating Japan’s military strength and political will.

The decision to invade Korea emerged from this order-building logic. Initially, Hideyoshi sought Joseon’s cooperation in a broader plan to advance against Ming China. When this was refused, military action followed – not merely to occupy Korea, but to create a platform for projecting Japanese influence deeper into the continent. Hideyoshi’s campaign rhetoric and strategic planning extended beyond Korea, envisioning a post-conquest Japanese-led regional system encompassing China, Southeast Asia, and even India. Importantly, Hideyoshi’s approach echoed elements of the Chinese international system while also diverging from it.

Similar to the traditional hierarchical Chinese international system, Hideyoshi sought to establish a Japan-centered hierarchical international system not by directly governing subordinated states, but by treating them as vassals of Japan. States that submitted would retain local autonomy under Japanese leadership. This, however, did not mean that Japan aimed to replace China as the leader of the Chinese international system. Whereas the Chinese international system, at least nominally, sought to stabilize hierarchical order under the authority of the emperor, Hideyoshi lacked the Confucian and cultural authority that the Chinese emperor possessed.Footnote 70 Therefore, he sought to construct a hierarchical international system on the basis of force. In other words, Hideyoshi had no choice but to threaten to attack those who refused to submit.

Of course, Chinese dynasties sometimes threatened to attack those who refused to submit, as when the Ming demanded Japan to pay tribute to the court. Yet, at least in form, surrounding states were expected to offer tribute out of admiration for the Chinese emperor’s virtue, to which the emperor would respond with reciprocal gifts. In practice, these return gifts often exceeded the value of the tribute several times over, thereby creating strong incentives to participate. As a result, many neighbouring states voluntarily offered tribute to the Chinese dynasty, contributing significantly to the formation and maintenance of the hierarchical order. By contrast, Hideyoshi sought to construct a hierarchical order almost entirely through force.

Hideyoshi also aimed to expand the scope of regional order beyond the traditional Chinese world. The Chinese international system, rooted in the Confucian authority of the emperor, was largely confined to East Asia. Hideyoshi, lacking such cultural authority, faced no such limitation. In reality, even if the Chinese international system could be stabilized, it would not have been easy to halt the advance of Spain and Portugal, which were expanding into Southeast Asia and India.

For this reason, Hideyoshi sought to counter European expansion by securing recognition of Japan’s hegemony in Asia. Accordingly, he threatened Spanish-ruled Philippines and Portuguese-ruled India, in an attempt to construct a Japan-centered international system that encompassed a vast area stretching across East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. His vision of order was therefore shaped by strategic concerns and represented a fundamentally different model from the Chinese international system. Table 3 summarizes the key features of the international system envisioned by Hideyoshi.

Table 3.

Hideyoshi’s vision of the Japanese international system.

Source: Author

Unlike Iberian colonialism, which pursued conversion to Christianity and colonization, Hideyoshi’s order-building vision did not aim at religious conversion or direct rule. Instead, it sought to reconstruct order in Asia through the subordination of various polities to Hideyoshi and their recognition of his authority, thereby deterring the advance of European powers into the region. As in the Chinese international system, as long as these polities accepted subordination to Hideyoshi, they were expected to retain a certain degree of autonomy. From the perspective of the Asian countries targeted by Hideyoshi’s order-building project, it was, in some respects, merely a substitution of Japanese domination for Iberian rule. Yet unlike Iberian imperialism, which sought to expand empires across the globe, Hideyoshi’s vision of order was primarily aimed at securing the autonomy of the Asian region and countering the Iberian imperial expansion into Asia.

While strongly influenced by the Chinese international system, Japan consistently avoided receiving investiture from the Chinese emperor and thus refrained from formally joining the system from the late fifth century onward – except for several decades in the early fifteenth century when it submitted to the Ming. In other words, Japan mostly remained in a liminal position. For this very reason, it had neither the desire to reintegrate into the Chinese international system nor any hesitation in dismantling it. Moreover, lacking the Confucian and cultural authority of the Chinese emperor, Hideyoshi could not realistically contemplate reconstructing that system in China’s place.

Japan also sought to avoid incorporation into the Spanish–Portuguese international system. Although it initially engaged pragmatically with Spain and Portugal – and some sengoku daimyos even converted to Christianity – there was no prospect of Japan joining that system on equal terms. Incorporation would have meant becoming a colony, something utterly unacceptable. While Japan occupied a liminal position within the Spanish–Portuguese international system, it seemed inevitable that it would eventually be absorbed into it. In this context, Hideyoshi sought to construct a new international system distinct from the Chinese one. He pursued this project through threats backed by military force. His reliance on military power also reflected an effort to deter the advance of the Spanish–Portuguese international system into Asia and to assert Japan’s hegemony in the region to the Europeans.

Although this attempt ended in grand failure, it nonetheless had significant regional effects. The campaigns signaled to European observers that Japan possessed formidable military capacity, creating a deterrent effect against potential European interventions. Spanish plans to subjugate Japan faded in the aftermath of Hideyoshi’s campaigns.Footnote 71 Moreover, the image of Japan as a strong and autonomous actor persisted into the Tokugawa period, shaping European perceptions and contributing to Japan’s later ability to avoid colonization during an era of global imperial expansion.

When Tokugawa Ieyasu, Hideyoshi’s successor, began to implement the so-called national isolation (sakoku) policy, Spain, Portugal, and other European countries initially resisted but ultimately had no choice but to accept it. As Rodrigo de Vivero, the provisional governor-general of the Philippines, observed: ‘It is difficult to invade Japan by force, because Japan has a large population and strong fortifications. If they were as savage as the Mexican natives, there would be little to fear, but the Japanese have bows, arrows, spears, and swords, and use long guns with great skill’.Footnote 72

At the same time, Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea also had significant ramifications for Japan’s domestic governance structure. Specifically, the invasions served as a catalyst for further centralization, through which Japan developed into a late premodern state.Footnote 73 The seemingly ‘reckless’ Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea had an impact that cannot be ignored as one of the factors that helped Japan avoid European colonization.

Viewed through this lens, Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea represent a historically significant case of revisionist order-building by a liminal actor. Facing the collapse of one regional system and the rise of another, Hideyoshi pursued an ambitious – but ultimately untenable – strategy to assert Japan’s autonomy and leadership within a contested international environment. His campaigns illustrate how liminal polities could engage in proactive order contestation – not merely adapting to systemic pressures but seeking to reshape them.

Concluding remarks

This article has reconsidered Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea through the lens of order-building from the margins, situating them within Japan’s liminal position between a declining Chinese international system and an expanding Spanish–Portuguese one. By reframing these campaigns not as reckless aggression or mere extensions of domestic consolidation, but as a deliberate attempt at systemic construction, the study highlights how liminal actors navigate and reshape international environments marked by competing orders.

Lacking the cultural legitimacy of the Chinese emperor and rejecting subordination to Iberian imperialism, Hideyoshi turned to military force and deterrent signaling to assert autonomy. Japan thus illustrates how liminal actors may pursue alternative order-building, challenging both dominant and encroaching systems. This reinterpretation also underscores the dynamism of liminality. Japan’s ambiguous position was not a static status but a condition that enabled strategic agency. Through the Korea campaigns and associated diplomacy, Hideyoshi sought to transform Japan’s structural role in regional politics, reimagining the parameters of order at the cusp of early modern global integration.

The broader theoretical significance also extends to debates to global IR.Footnote 74 Hideyoshi’s ambitious but unsuccessful project demonstrates that Japan was not a passive subject of Chinese hierarchy or European imperialism, but an active participant in revisionist contestation. Such cases remind us that international order has long been plural and contested, with creativity and resistance emerging even from the margins.

Regionally, Hideyoshi’s campaigns reshaped the trajectory of East Asian order in paradoxical ways. They temporarily deterred Iberian colonization and contributed to Japan’s later autonomy, yet they simultaneously devastated Korea and deepened regional enmities. The Japan-centered order he envisioned might have pre-empted colonial domination, but it was not necessarily more just or humane. In this sense, Hideyoshi’s project exemplifies the moral ambiguity of order-building from the margins – an enterprise that can resist external hierarchy only by constructing another.

Finally, viewing Hideyoshi’s Korean invasions through the lens of liminality offers lessons for the present. In today’s world of overlapping and rival orders, many states find themselves in liminal positions. Diplomacy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under US–China rivalry, for instance, is often interpreted through balancing or hedging,Footnote 75 perspectives that risk portraying it as passive. A liminality perspective instead highlights the capacity of such actors not only to adapt but also to subvert existing frameworks and initiate new ones.

Whereas nineteenth-century Japan was compelled to adapt to the Western system, sixteenth-century Japan could still pursue alternative visions of order, demonstrating the importance of political space for the exercise of strategic agency. As Hideyoshi’s ultimately failed but consequential project illustrates, liminal actors may also destabilize existing orders and bring about widespread destruction, yet they can also generate novel arrangements that transcend systemic rivalries. In today’s world of competing orders, it remains crucial to recognize how actors in liminal positions practice their agency to contest and reimagine international order.

Acknowledgement

Parts of an earlier versoin of this paper were presented at the 2024 International Studies Association Annual Conference. I am grateful for the valuable comments and feedback provided by the participants. I also thank the three anonymous reviewers and the editorial team of the Review of International Studies for their highly constructive and insightful comments on the article.

References

1 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981).

2 Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order (Oxford University Press, 2020).

3 Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, ‘The international politics of liminality: Relocating Australia in the Asia Pacific’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 32:2 (1997), pp. 169–85; Bahar Rumelili, ‘Liminal identities and processes of domestication and subversion in international relations’, Review of International Studies, 38:2 (2012), pp. 495–508; Zeynep Gülsah Çapan and Ayşe Zarakol, ‘Turkey’s ambivalent self: Ontological insecurity in “Kemalism” versus “Erdoğanism”’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32:3 (2019), pp. 263–82.

4 Andrew Grant, ‘China’s double body: Infrastructure routes and the mapping of China’s nation-state and civilization-state’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 59:3–4 (2018), pp. 378–407; Christopher Coker, The Rise of the Civilizational State (Polity, 2019); G. John Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’, International Affairs, 94:1 (2018), pp. 7–23; Amitav Acharya, ‘After liberal hegemony: The advent of a multiplex world order’, Ethics and International Affairs, 31:3 (2017), pp. 271–85; Trine Flockhart, ‘The coming multi-order world’, Contemporary Security Policy, 27:1 (2016), pp. 3–30.

5 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Andrew Phillips and Christian Reus-Smit (eds), Culture and Order in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2020); David Kang, East Asia before the West (Columbia University Press, 2010); Ayşe Zarakol, Before the West: The Rise and Fall of Eastern World Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2022).

6 Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process (Penguin Book, 1974), pp. 81–2.

7 Ayşe Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Higgott and Nossal, ‘The international politics of liminality’; Rumelili, ‘Liminal identities’; Çapan and Zarakol, ‘Turkey’s ambivalent self’.

8 Turner, The Ritual Process, pp. 92–118.

9 Here, the term ‘Western’ is used heuristically to refer to the early modern Iberian empires that retrospectively came to signify the ‘West’, as well as to the European and American countries that, building on that legacy, embarked on imperial and colonial expansion. It therefore does not denote a monolithic or temporally continuous conception of the ‘West’. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson warns that the ‘West’ is best treated as a historically contingent identity-construct rather than a timeless civilizational essence. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (University of Michigan Press, 2006).

10 Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society (Routledge, 2009); Kenki Adachi, Changing Arms Control Norms in International Society (Routledge, 2021).

11 Ayşe Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

12 Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War, 1592–1598 (Cassell, 2002); Samuel Hawley, The Imjin War: Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China (Cheng & Tsui Co, 2005); Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598 (University of Oklahoma Press, 2009).

13 Naohiro Asao, ‘Toyotomi seiken ron [Theory of the Toyotomi regime]’, in Saburo Ienaga (ed), Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi 9 [Iwanami Lecture Series: Japanese History Vol. 9] (Iwanami Shoten, 1963); Nam-lin Hur, ‘Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of the Chosŏn kingdom, 1592–1598’, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History (28 February 2020), available at: {https://oxfordre.com/asianhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-62}, accessed 5 April 2025.

14 Giuliana Stramigioli, ‘Hideyoshi’s expansionist policy on the Asiatic mainland’, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Third Series, 3 (1954), pp. 74–116; Asao, ‘Toyotomi seiken ron’; Hur, ‘Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion’.

15 Turnbull, Samurai Invasion; Hawley, The Imjin War; Swope, A Dragon’s Head; James B. Lewis (ed), The East Asian War, 1592–1598: International Relations, Violence and Memory (Routledge, 2015).

16 Jyun’nosuke Sasaki, ‘Touitsu seiken ron ni tsuite no noto [Note regarding the discourse on unification regime]’, in Hisashi Fujiki and Manji Kitajima (eds), Shokuhou Seiken [The Oda and Toyotomi Regimes] (Yuseido, 1974), p. 21.

17 Naohiro Asao, ‘Sakoku-sei no seiritsu [Establishment of the National Isolation System]’, in Historical Science Society of Japan (ed), Koza Nihon-shi 4 [Lectures in Japanese History 4] (University of Tokyo Press, 1970), pp. 62–3.

18 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 79–101; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 3–21; Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 1–31; Barry Buzan, ‘From international system to international society: Structural realism and regime theory meet the English school’, International Organization 47:3 (1993), p. 331.

19 While an international system requires neither shared values nor institutional depth – only sustained interaction organized by some ordering principle, whether anarchic, hierarchical, or otherwise – an international society presumes a thicker form of association. It arises when political entities not only interact but also recognize one another as members of a common normative order, bound by shared rules and institutions. Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 13–16. The term international order, by contrast, refers not to a structure or mode of interaction but to the outcomes that such systems and societies produce. In this sense, order denotes a relatively stable and organized pattern of relations that sustains certain fundamental goals, such as peace or the regulation of conflict.

20 Sadao Nishijima, Nihon rekishi no kokusai kankyo [International Environment of the Japanese History] (University of Tokyo Press, 1985).

21 Robert E. Kelly, ‘“Confucian Long Peace” in pre-Western East Asia?’, European Journal of International Relations, 18:3 (2008), pp. 407–30; David Kang, ‘War and peace in early modern East Asia: Hierarchy and legitimacy in international system’, University of Montreal/McGill University Working Paper, 25 (2008), pp. 1–48; David Kang, East Asia before the West.

22 John K. Fairbank (ed), The Chinese World Order (Harvard University Press, 1968); Kang, East Asia before the West; Ji-Young Lee, China’s Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination (Columbia University Press, 2017).

23 Han Shu: Dilizhi [Geographical Treatise of the Book of Han]. The earliest recorded instance of a Japanese ruler receiving an investiture from the Chinese dynasty was the King of Na in 57 CE. Hou Han Shu [Book of the Later Han] 58. Later, in the third century, Queen Himiko of Yamatai was granted the title of ‘Queen of Japan, Friend of Wei’, marking Japan’s continued participation in the Chinese international system. Sanguozhi [Records of the Three Kingdoms] 30. In the fifth century as well, five successive kings of Japan repeatedly received investiture from the Chinese court, thereby taking part in the system. Son Shu [Book of Song] 97. However, during the Sui and Tang dynasties, while Japan did send tribute missions to China, it consistently refused to accept investiture and thus declined formal participation in the Chinese international system.

24 Nishijima, Nihon rekishi no kokusai kankyo.

25 In July 1381, Emperor Hongwu escalated tensions by openly threatening an armed invasion of Japan, boasting that he could destroy the country with just a few thousand ships. Ming Taizu Shilu [Ming veritable records: Emperor Taizu] 138.

26 Shigeki Iwai, Choukou, kaikin, goshi: Kinsei Ajia no boueki to chitsujyo [Tribute, Sea Ban, Mutual Market: Trade and Order in Modern Asia] (Nagoya University Press, 2020). Emperor Yongle, enraged by Japan’s refusal to pay tribute, once considered launching a military attack against Japan. Joseon Wangjo Sillok Taejong Sillok [Annals of Joseon Dynasty, Annals of King Taejong] 25. The relationship between Japan and the Ming was not always stable.

27 Yu Hashimoto, Chusei Nihon no kokusai kankei: Higashi Ajia tuukou-ken to gishi mondai [International Relations of Medieval Japan: Diplomatic Rights and the Pseudo Envoy Problem in East Asia] (Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 2005).

28 Despite this, the Sagara, Otomo, and Ouchi clans continued sending envoys to the Ming dynasty. However, the Ming refused them entry into port due to either inadequate licenses or improperly formatted state letters. Míng Shizong Shilu (Ming Veritable Records: Emperor Shizong) 450.

29 ‘Letter from Francisco Xavier to the Jesuits in Europe, from Cochim, dated 29 January 1552’, in Yoshinori Kono (trans), Sei Furanshisuko Zabieru zen shokan [All the Letters from Saint Francisco Xavier] (Heibon-sha, 1985), p. 521.

30 The Otomo clan’s letter was even forwarded to the King of Portugal, who responded with a letter and a gift. ‘Letter from Portugal King Don Sebastiao to Otomo Yoshishige, dated 16 March 1558’, in Historiographical Institute, The University of Tokyo (ed and trans), Nihon kankei kaigai shiryou: Iezusu-kai Nihon shokan shu 3 [Historical Documents in Foreign Languages Relating to Japan: Jesuit Letters Concerning Japan Vol. 3] (University of Tokyo Press, 2014), pp. 190–2.

31 Hirofumi Takahashi, Buki, jyuujika to sengoku Nihon: Iezusukai senkyoushi to ‘tainichi buryoku seifuku keikaku’ no shinsou [Arms, Crosses, and Warring States of Japan: Jesuit Missionaries and the True Story of the ‘Plan for the Armed Conquest of Japan’] (Yousensha, 2012), pp. 144–5.

32 For example, Portuguese documents referred to Ouchi as the ‘King of Yamaguchi’ and Otomo as the ‘King of Bungo’. Toshio Kage, Sekaishi no naka no sengoku daimyo [Sengoku Daimyos in World History] (Kodansha, 2023), pp. 101–2. Similarly, Jesuit records described Oda Nobunaga as the ‘King of Owari’ and Ouchi Yoshitaka as the ‘King of Yamaguchi’. Kazuya Matsumoto, Iezusukai ga mita ‘Nihon kokuou’: Tenno, Shogun, Nobunaga, to Hideyoshi [‘King of Japan’ from the Perspective of the Jesuit: Emperor, Shogun, Nobunaga, and Hideyoshi] (Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 2020).

33 Takashi Gonoi, ‘Kirishitan daimyo to kirishitan bushou [Christian daimyos and Christian military commanders’, in Takashi Gonoi (ed), Kirishitan daimyo: Fukyou, seisaku, shinkou no jissou [Christian Daimyos: Reality of Missionary, Policy, and Faith] (Miyaobi Publishing, 2017).

34 Under the Treaty of Zaragoza in 1529, the Philippines was considered Portuguese ‘territory’. Spain believed that Portugal would not strongly oppose colonizing the Philippines, as it did not produce spices. However, the Portuguese did not officially recognize Spain’s rights to the Philippines until 1750.

William Lytle Schurz, The Manila Galleon (E. P. Dutton & Col., Inc., 1959), p. 130.

35 ‘Letter from Fray Martín de Rada, dated 8 July 1569’. Martín de Rada was one of the first members of the Order of Saint Augustine to spread the Christian doctrine in the Philippines, as well as one of the first Christian missionaries to visit Ming China. Archivo General de Indias, Filipinas, legajo 79, ramo 1 [General Archive of the Indies, Philippines, bundle 79, branch 1], in Koichiro Takase, Kirishitan jidai no kenkyuu [Research of Christian Era] (Iwanami Shoten, 1977), p. 77.

36 Archivo General de Indias, Filipinas 6, ramo 1, nos. 27, 28 [General Archive of the Indies, Philippines 6, branch 1, nos. 27, 28]; Archivo General de Indias, Filipinas 6, ramo 2, no. 45 [General Archive of the Indies, Philippine 6s, branch 2, no. 45], both in Takase, Kirishitan jidai, p. 77, p. 78.

37 Archivo General de Indias, patronato 24, ramo 59 [General Archive of the Indies, patronage 24, branch 59], in Takase, Kirishitan jidai, pp. 79–80.

38 For example, see ‘Letter from Francisco Cabral to the Spanish king, dated 25 June 1584’, in Archivo General de Indias, patronato 25, ramo 21 [General Archive of the Indies, patronage 25, branch 21], in Takase, Kirishitan jidai, pp. 92–8.

39 Takahashi, Buki, jyuujika to sengoku Nihon, pp. 156–8.

40 In fact, it is recorded that even Ryuzoji Takanobu, who attacked Nagasaki, purchased the niter needed to make gunpowder from the namban people. The term namban literally means ‘southern barbarians’ and was used to refer to European foreigners, particularly the Portuguese, during this time. Atsuko Suzuki, Sengoku-ki no ryuutsuu to chiiki shakai [Logistics and Local Societies in Warring State Period] (Tokyo: Dousei-sha, 2011), pp. 82–7. Gaspar Coelho also mentioned that Ryuzouji Takanobu, who was called ‘the great enemy of the Christians’, had been constantly asking Coelho to visit the port in his territory. ‘Letter from Gaspar Coelho to Claudio Acquaviva from Nagasaki, dated 15 February 1582’, in Kiichi Matsuda (trans), 16, 7 Seiki Iezusu-kai Nihon houkoku-shu 3–6 [Collection of the Jesuit Japan reports in 16th and 17th centuries Vol.3, No.6] (Douhousha Shuppan, 1991), p. 8.

41 Takahashi, Buki, jyuujika to sengoku Nihon, pp. 174–85.

42 Alessandro Valignano, trans. Kiichi Matsuda, Nihon jyunsatsu ki (1553) [Summary of Japan Things (1553)] (Heibon-sha, 1973), p. 63.

43 Takahashi, Buki, jyuujika to sengoku Nihon, p. 245.

44 Azuchi Castle was constructed by Oda Nobunaga on Mount Azuchi near Lake Biwa, in present-day Shiga. This castle was notable for its unique design, which mixed practical defensive features with ornate elements. It had a central tower (tenshu), a multi-story structure that served both as a military lookout and as a symbol of power.

45 Arata Hirakawa, Sengoku Nihon to Daikoukai Jidai: Hideyoshi, Ieyasu, Masamune no Gaikou Senryaku [Japan during the Warring States Period and the Age of Discovery: The Diplomatic Strategies of Hideyoshi, Ieyasu, and Masamune] (Chuoukouron-sha, 2018), p. 59.

46 Hirakawa, Sengoku Nihon, pp.60–3; Luis Frois, trans. Kiichi Matsuda and Momota Kawasaki, Kanyaku Nihon-shi 2 [Complete translation of the history of Japan by Luis Frois Vol.2] (Chuokoron Shinsha, 2000), p. 140.

47 Takase, Kirishitan jidai, p. 108.

48 ‘Letter from Alessandro Valignano to the Jesuit superior general’, in Takase, Kirishitan jidai, pp. 108–15.

49 ‘Letter from Alessandro Valignano to the Jesuit superior general’, in Takase, Kirishitan jidai, pp. 108–15.

50 Takahashi, Buki, jyuujika to sengoku Nihon, pp. 224–6.

51 Lucio de Sousa, The Portuguese Slave Trade in Early Modern Japan: Merchants, Jesuits and Japanese, Chinese, and Korean Slaves (Brill, 2018). After the decree banning missionaries was issued in 1587, Portugal banned the Japanese slave trade in 1591. However, in 1605, Portugal expressed the view that it would not ban Japanese slaves if there were legitimate reasons, and the slave trade appears to have continued. ‘Letter of the king of Portugal to the vice king of India dated 1605’, in Kouichiro Takase (trans and annotated), Monsuun bunsho to Nihon: 17 seiki Porutogaru koubunsho-shuu [Monsoon Documents and Japan: Collection of 17th Century Portuguese Official Documents] (Yagi Shoten, 2006), pp. 131–2.

52 Shinkoku shisou refers to the belief that Japan is a sacred land protected by the gods. These gods are the myriad gods (yaoyorozu no kami) of Shintoism, which developed from traditional Japanese folk beliefs, nature worship, and ancestral spirit worship. Since the arrival of Buddhism in Japan, beliefs equating Buddha with the gods have spread, leading to a fusion of Shintoism and Buddhism.

53 Koichiro Takase, Kirishitan no seiki: Zabieru tonichi kara ‘sakoku’ made [Christian Century: From Xavier’s Arrival in Japan to ‘Isolation’] (Iwanami Shoten, 1993), pp. 153–5.

54 Frois, Kanyaku Nihon-shi 4, p. 100.

55 Joseon Wangjo Sillok Seonjo Sillok [Annals of Joseon Dynasty, Annals of King Senjo] 24.

56 ‘Reply letter from Toyotomi Hideyoshi to the king of Joseon’, in Manji Kitajima (ed), Toyotomi Hideyoshi Chousen shinryaku kankei shiryou shuusei 1 [Collection of historical documents related to Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of Joseon 1] (Heibon-sha, 2017), pp. 66–7.

57 ‘Letter from Toyotomi Hideyoshi to the vice king of India, dated 1591’, in Naojiro Murakami (trans and annotate), Ikoku oufuku shokan-shu [Collection of Letters to and from Foreign Countries] (Sunnan-sha, 1929), pp. 26–8.

58 ‘Letter from Toyotomi Hideyoshi to the Philippine governor-general, dated 1591’, in Murakami (trans and annotate), Ikoku oufuku shokan-shu, pp. 29–30; ‘Letter from Gomez Perez das Mariñas, governor-general of the Philippines, to the king of Ispania, from Manila’, contains a Spanish translation of this letter from Hideyoshi.

59 It has been noted that the Spaniards in Manila were very wary of the Japanese from the 1580s. During this period, wokou, the Japanese pirates, frequently attacked Manila. In 1589, the Philippine governor-general discovered a secret agreement between the Japanese and the Muslim natives, under which the Japanese would cooperate and supply arms for a planned uprising by the Muslim natives. Given Japan’s perception of the Philippines’ weak military structure, the governor-general was concerned that Japan might invade the Philippines. Setsuko Matoba, Jipangu to Nihon: Nichi-Ou no sougu [Zipangu and Japan: Encounter of Japan and Europe] (Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 2007), pp. 181–205.

60 ‘Letter from Yamanaka Nagatoshi dated 18 May 1992’, in Kitajima (ed), Toyotomi Hideyoshi Chousen shinryaku, pp. 328–31. This letter is believed to have been sent by Yamanaka Nagatoshi, the scribe (yuhitsu) of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, to the maidservant of Hideyoshi’s wife, Kita no Mandokoro, to explain the situation regarding the Japanese invasion of Joseon.

61 ‘Letter from Toyotomi Hideyoshi to the governor-general of the Philippines, dated 1592’, in Murakami (trans and annotate), Ikoku oufuku shokan-shu, p. 53.

62 ‘Letter from Toyotomi Hideyoshi to Taiwan, dated 5 November 1593’, in Manji Kitajima, Toyotomi seiken no taigai ninshiki to Chousen shinryaku [The Toyotomi Regime’s Perception of Foreign Relations and Its Invasion of Korea] (Azekura Shobo, 1990), pp. 100–1.

63 ‘Letter from Toyotomi Hideyoshi to the governor-general of the Philippines, dated 1593’, in Murakami (trans and annotate), Ikoku oufuku shokan-shu, p. 60.

64 Kiichi Matsuda, Shinsou-ban Toyotomi Hideyoshi to namban-jin [New Binding Edition Toyotomi Hideyoshi and the Southern Barbarian] (Choubun-sha, 1992), p. 214.

65 Pablo Pastells, trans. Kiichi Matsuda, 16–17 Seiki Nihon Supein koushou shi [History of Diplomatic Negotiation between Japan and Spain: 16th–17th Century] (Daishukan Shoten, 1994), pp. 159–60.

66 ‘Letter from Yamanaka Nagatoshi’, in Kitajima (ed), Toyotomi Hideyoshi Chousen shinryaku, pp. 328–31.

67 Shosuke Murai, Bunretsu kara tenka touitsu he [From Division to Unification of Japan] (Iwanami Shoten, 2006), pp. 141–7.

68 For Ascensión’s assertions regarding the armed conquest of Japan, the author referred to a summary of Ascensión’s work, Documentos franciscanos de la Cristiandad de Japón (1593–1597) [Franciscan Documents on Christianity in Japan (1593–1597)], in Takahashi, Buki, jyuujika to sengoku Nihon, pp. 188–201.

69 Takahashi, Buki, jyuujika to sengoku Nihon, pp. 92–193; Pastells, 16–17 Seiki Nihon Supein koushou shi, p. 108. However, it is not certain whether Hideyoshi, who was aware of the weakness of the Spanish Philippines’ military and the limitations of Spain’s far-field projection capabilities, really hardened his attitude toward the Franciscans and Spain as a result of the navigator’s story.

70 Born of low social status, Hideyoshi often sought to legitimize his authority by claiming that his mother had conceived and given birth to him after dreaming that the sun entered her womb. Similar myths surrounding the birth of dynastic founders can be found across wide regions of Asia, and it is likely that Hideyoshi was emulating such traditions. When demanding submission from Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, he also referred to himself as a ‘child of the sun’, though it remains unclear how effective such claims were. Kitajima, Toyotomi seiken, pp. 122–6.

71 Hirakawa, Sengoku Nihon.

72 ‘Letter from Rodrigo de Vivero to the king of Spain, dated 3 May 1610’, in Don Rodrigo de Vivero y Velasco trans. Naojiro Murakami, Nihon kenbun-roku [Account of Travels in Japan] (Yuushou-dou, 1929), pp. 111–25.

73 Susumu Ike, ‘Foreign Conquest and Birth of Late Premodern States’, Modern Asian Studies Review, 8 (2017), pp. 1–17.

74 Amitav Acharya, Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics: Whose IR? (Routledge, 2014); John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010 (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, The Making of Global International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

75 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, ‘Getting hedging right: A small-state perspective’, China International Strategy Review, 3 (2021), pp. 300–15; David Martin Jones and Nicole Jenne, ‘Hedging and grand strategy in Southeast Asian foreign policy’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 22:2 (2022), pp. 205–35.

Figure 0

Table 1. Chinese international system.

Figure 1

Table 2. Spanish–Portuguese international system.

Figure 2

Table 3. Hideyoshi’s vision of the Japanese international system.