Scipio Africanus and magnanimitas

Scipio Africanus, conquering hero of Spain and Africa, saviour of Italy, the general who took the agnomen ‘Africanus’ in victory over Hannibal, was the man who announced to the ancient world that Rome was a Mediterranean power and set it on its course to become the cultural capital of mare nostrum. He served under his brother Scipio Asiaticus in the war against Antiochus and could claim victory in Asia, the third continent. Literary sources described him exhibiting qualities unconventional for a politician, soldier, and statesman of a prominent patrician house. He was renowned as a daily visitor to the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline Hill where he would commune with the god before the break of day, and, by way of public approbation of the bond with Jupiter, his ancestral image came to be placed in the temple. These visits furthered belief in the divinity of his lineage and his conception was likened to a story about the conception of Alexander the Great.Footnote ¹¹ Alexander was of the Argead (Temenid) dynasty that traced its lineage to Hercules, and the king followed in the footsteps of his heroic forebear, adopting images, furthering the cult, and fathering a son, Heracles.Footnote ¹² Africanus cultivated links to Hercules as well as to Alexander and modelled his actions on the virtue of fortitude which had elevated that hero into heaven and immortality.Footnote ¹³

Like other Romans, Africanus admired Alexander, the king who conquered the world before his death aged 32, making himself master of the three continents (Europe, Africa, and Asia) and earning the epithet ‘Great’ (ὁ μέγας Ἀλέξανδρος). Alexander’s tutor at court, Aristotle, had magnified the concept of μεγαλοψυχία into a moral and political ideology of excellence in the man of most worth who is deserving of the greatest honour by performance of the greatest actions and accomplishment of the greatest achievements (Arist. Eth. Nic. 1123a34–5a35). More than a single virtue, Aristotle made it the crowning glory of all virtues. Alexander’s father, Philip II, is said by Polybius to have demonstrated μεγαλοψυχία on many occasions, especially in victory, exercising moderation, justice, and beneficence.Footnote ¹⁴ The source tradition ascribed Aristotle a role in imparting this virtue to Alexander, who claimed it for himself.Footnote ¹⁵

Alexander also had a violent temper, not least displayed when ordering the death of the philosopher Callisthenes, Aristotle’s nephew. There were dangers inherent in μεγαλοψυχία and potentially in the man who claimed to possess it. Greatness of soul held the capacity to overpower its subject and lead him into the vice of folly, the opposite of wisdom.Footnote ¹⁶ Alexander would prove a problematic moral exemplum, politically great but of morally compromised temperament. A negative philosophical tradition arose comparing him unfavourably with Hercules by accenting bloodlust and the creation of an empire of fear on which he based hopes of apotheosis.Footnote ¹⁷ He had exercised insufficient restraint succumbing to the emotional irruption of anger and selfish passion for power. On the other hand, a positive tradition softened his image by making him the recipient of a letter of advice purportedly written by Aristotle on ethical monarchy linking the ruler’s possession of reason and morality to advantages for the ruled. The letter instructed the king (Alexander) to deploy his ‘reason’ (λόγος) and guide his subjects towards the ‘advantageous’ (συμφέρον) for, it argues, λόγος enables the king to uphold qualities of justice and benevolence.Footnote ¹⁸

Macedon rose to become a world influence due also to the qualities inhering in the friends of Philip II and Alexander, described by Polybius as kingly men on account of their moderation, bravery, and μεγαλοψυχία, men who left glorious accounts as the successors of Alexander (Polyb. 8.10.10–11). These successors adopted kingship as their preferred form of leadership (Plut. Dem. 18) and they worked out a theory that expressed the moral qualities of the ruler.Footnote ¹⁹ They broadcast a concept of the personality whose epithet embodies his leadership qualities – Benefactor (Euergetes), Saviour (Soter), God Manifest (Epiphanes). In developing these ideas, the successors were assisted by Stoic moral and political philosophy.

Stoic philosophy emerged in the wake of Macedon’s conquests and sought to explain the world Alexander made, the Hellenistic world.Footnote ²⁰ Plutarch writes how Zeno of Citium, founder of Stoicism, rejected Aristotle’s focus on the city-state and advocated suzerainty under a system of common law (Plut. De Alex. fort. 329A–B=LS 67A). This rejected parochialism and ethnic distinction and embraced universalism and moral distinction between good and bad. Humans have ‘affinity’ (οἰκείωσις) for themselves and affinity for their fellow humans on account of the rationality they share with one another and with God, Right Reason, and Providence. Providence (πρόνοια) implants affinity in humans, designs existence with purpose, and governs through Natural Law. Natural Law is prior to, and transcends, the laws and conventions of states, and therefore the latter must be brought into line with the former for justice to prevail in states.Footnote ²¹ Altruism is the principle of the society of the human race and justice is the virtue of its political leaders who are wise men, or advised by wise men, who undertake other-regarding actions for the common good. Their moral duty is to uphold in society universal principles of justice and fairness.

Stoic philosophy captured the zeitgeist and spread its influence throughout the Hellenistic world, with the kingdom of Macedon a centre of its political influence. Antigonus I, founder of the Antigonid dynasty, was the first of the successors to adopt the title king (306 BC). He entered the philosophical tradition as a ruler who possessed power of retribution and yet exercised restraint and other qualities (Sen. Ira 3.22). Antigonus II Gonatas, grandson of Antigonus I, heard Zeno’s lectures in Athens and invited the philosopher to attend court and tutor king and kingdom in virtue. Zeno declined and instead sent Persaeus who, with other philosophers, provided moral advice about the obligation of kingship to serve others, not selfish desire, a ‘glorious servitude’ distinguished by mildness and humanity.Footnote ²² Antigonus II heard lectures by Cleanthes (Diog. Laert. 7.169), Zeno’s successor as scholarch, and he discussed points of Stoic doctrine with Persaeus like the ‘indifferents’ (ἀδιάφορα) (Diog. Laert. 7.36; Them. Or. 32.358b). For all intents and purposes, the king was a practising Stoic. Antigonus restored confidence in the Macedonian monarchy but did not undertake social and economic reform. ‘Glorious servitude’ to his mind was an idea of rulership buttressing the institutions of state following a period of instability and invasion, and ultimately it was a conservative concept, a political morality geared for social stability.

Stoics esteemed Hercules as a moral paragon for emulation. He was the man with a second divine father in Zeus (Jupiter) in the Graeco-Roman conception. At a crossroads early in life, he was confronted with the choice between two pathways, Virtue or Vice. Following lengthy deliberation, he chose Virtue and undertook labour in the service of his fellow men, thereby manifesting the cardinal virtues, notably moral strength or fortitude. Pagan antiquity exalted him as benefactor and servant of humanity and praised him as the exemplification of kingship and good governance over tyranny and malfeasance.Footnote ²³ Diogenes Laertius linked Hercules to Stoic scholarchs. Although Zeno had not undertaken the labours of Hercules and ascended to the stars by means of the virtue of self-control, Cleanthes was ‘a second Hercules’ on account of his indifference to provocation, withstanding anger when publicly insulted (Diog. Laert. 7.29, 170, 173). Stoic philosophy received greatness of soul into its cluster of virtues and explained it as a quality of the man indifferent to the vicissitudes of fortune (Diog. Laert. 7.92, 93). Panaetius probably cited Hercules at the crossroads to illustrate the third of his four personae, the moral exemplum of the exercise of choice in selecting the better path of life; and the character of the Roman Stoic Cato cited Hercules as a guardian of the human race (Cic. Off. 1.118, Fin. 3.66). Hercules was an example of the stoic way of living in accordance with nature, reason, and virtue, and of the fulfilment of obligations to humanity. He was an exemplum of magnitudo animi serving the society of the human race in harmony with Natural Law.Footnote ²⁴

The degree to which the historical Scipio Africanus cultivated and committed to this ideological tradition is open to debate. The seeds might have been planted by sources like Ennius, his friend and poet, to proliferate as his legend grew in his afterlife and his example entered into collections of Lives of Illustrious Men. Ennius wrote a Scipio eulogising Africanus and he provided ‘the first extant example of the juxtaposition of magnus with animus’ in Latin literature.Footnote ²⁵ Polybius proves that second-century BC sources described Africanus as a man of great soul favoured by Providence. He called Africanus μεγαλόψυχος, citing information told to him in person by Africanus’ companion, Laelius the Elder (10.3.1–3). After his appointment as proconsul to take command of the war against the Carthaginians in Spain, Africanus’ μεγαλοψυχία led to the conviction that he would capture New Carthage (App. Hisp. 20). He received guidance and assistance during the siege of the city from Neptune and Providence (Polyb. 10.11.7–8), and this enabled him to inspire feats of endeavour in his men.Footnote ²⁶ When Iberians hailed him king in victory, he demurred, proclaiming he was not to be called king even if he possessed kingly quality. Polybius (10.40.2–10) interrupted this narrative of events to praise Africanus’ character, declaring that rejection of royal power was nothing less than an expression of his unique μεγαλοψυχία (magnitudo animi in Livy 27.19.6). Livy (38.56.10–57.1) recorded the assessment of an opponent who tempered a rebuke for Africanus’ arrogance with praise for his ‘restraint’ (moderatio) and ‘temperance’ (temperantia) and explained that these virtues signified magnitudo animi moderated by imperatives against transgressing constitutionalism and justice.

Africanus had become the leading man of the republic in his lifetime and was extolled thereafter as an exemplum of moral virtues like temperantia and continentia.Footnote ²⁷ Apotheosis, said Ennius, was recompense for his labours, entry through the gates of heaven like Hercules before him.Footnote ²⁸ Silius Italicus presented him imitating Hercules’ deliberation between Virtue and Vice and selecting Virtue, which placed him on the road of service to others; his entry into Carthage was that of Hercules.Footnote ²⁹ Africanus emerges in an ideological tradition as a unique personality whose moral excellence elevated him to the pinnacle of political culture. His descendants could claim links to the chief deity who protected the city of Rome and empire, to the semi-divine Hercules and the great kings of Macedon, to the ideology of magnanimitas and service to the community. Destiny beckoned. However, family expectations were dashed by the ill-health of Africanus’ son, P. Scipio (augur 180 BC). This Scipio resorted to the contemplative life, finding succour in books and writing, bequeathing to his successors a model of the cardinal virtues to emulate (Cic. Off. 1.121).

Cornelia, daughter of Africanus, stands at the centre of the Cornelii–Aemilii mega-dynasty and was the conduit through which the Cornelian inheritance passed. She did her utmost to fulfil the legacy of her father through propagation of family culture, memories, and stories.Footnote ³⁰ She was a woman of refinement, steeped in learning and literature, who invited intellectuals and literati to live as house-guests and educated her children in Graeco-Roman classics. Philosophical herself, she was able to bear the vicissitudes of fortune with equanimity as a model of μεγαλοψυχία.Footnote ³¹ This rare description of a woman in possession of greatness of soul probably went back to a republican-era source tradition. Polybius, in the second century BC, could use this quality to contrast Hasdrubal’s wife, another outstanding woman, with her pusillanimous husband.Footnote ³²

Cornelia’s uncle, L. Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, had broadcast qualities of liberality and μεγαλοψυχία in not enriching himself in victory over Perseus at Pydna (Plut. Aem. 28.6). This reference to greatness of soul may have been derived from Polybius’ account of the Third Macedonian War. Today, the account is fragmentary, but the surviving text contains Paullus’ reflections on the qualities of greatness of soul, namely awareness of the vicissitudes of fortune and need to exercise moderation in success.Footnote ³³ Cornelia’s son-in-law, Scipio Aemilianus, became an exemplum par excellence of greatness of soul. Adopted by P. Scipio and married to Sempronia, daughter of Cornelia, he could claim magnanimitas as his inheritance through his natural father (Paullus) and through biology, adoption, and marriage ties to the gens Cornelia. Such was the destiny of the Cornelian inheritance for blue-blooded Romans imbued with Greek culture, the moral exempla of famous forebears, and the family virtue of magnanimitas, not least the descendants of Africanus through Cornelia, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus.

The Gracchi and magnanimitas (the Reformers)

The Gracchi were the noted reformers of the Roman republic surpassing previous advocates of social change and issuing unprecedented challenges to conservatives. Plutarch, their ancient biographer, included positive valuation of their character and careers using the same virtue language as Polybius and Panaetius in the second century BC. He described them as possessing μεγαλοψυχία alongside bravery, temperance, eloquence, and liberality (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 2.1). He also recorded that Blossius called Tiberius Gracchus ‘champion’ (προστάτης) of the Roman people (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 17.4), characterising Tiberius as surpassing rivals in acting on behalf of the people. This was language similar to that used by Panaetius in Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος (On Appropriate Action) of the source of μεγαλοψυχία in the ‘drive to be the first’ tempered by the social virtue of justice.Footnote ³⁴ As μεγαλόψυχος, Tiberius was pre-eminent as benefactor to the people and agent of their will.

Tiberius’ military career was distinguished by bravery and ‘good faith’ (fides); the latter he displayed negotiating a treaty to save the lives of 20,000 Roman soldiers in Spain. Following the senate’s repudiation of the treaty, he sought to realise his worth in civil affairs. Citizens who fought to acquire an empire believed they were denied its benefits and discontent rose as economic problems worsened and reform was abandoned as too difficult. Tiberius responded to their plight as tribune in 133 BC. He proposed an agrarian law (lex Sempronia agraria) directly to the people, bypassing the senate. He was inspired in this measure by Blossius, his adviser, who was a friend of Antipater of Tarsus, scholarch of the Stoic school.Footnote ³⁵

From the authority of the school, these Stoics could present arguments in support of social and economic change. The school held that the righteousness of an action flowed from the intention of the agent to promote the welfare of others. Its great moral principle was altruism and considerate treatment of fellow humans and their interests. It drew a contrast between nature and convention and averred that property rights were unnatural, having come into existence by alienation of property under convention. Since nature supersedes convention, it is natural to overturn practices that exist by convention, especially practices that are not altruistic. On this argument, Natural Law allows property rights only if the interests of the individual identify with the interests of the community.Footnote ³⁶ According to this principle, shared possession of property serves the interest of human fellowship.Footnote ³⁷ This argument was relatable to society.

Hellenistic Stoics had thought Sparta fertile ground for social reform, believing that concentration of property in fewer hands weakened its Lycurgan tradition of arithmetical equality and resulted in a reduction of citizens and moral fibre.Footnote ³⁸ Sphaerus of Borysthenes probably visited Sparta during the reign of Agis IV where he instructed Cleomenes III, the future king, in Stoic doctrines and Natural Law, and he assisted in actual reform (Plut. Cleom. 2.2–3, 11.2). Agis IV sought to rebuild the citizenry through equal distribution of land and cancellation of debts, couching his reforms as restoration of the Lycurgan constitution. Cleomenes and Nabis, the latter the most radical of the three kings, followed suit and ideas of equality and social justice spread throughout Greece in the form of calls for ‘redistribution of land’ (γῆς ἀναδασμός) and ‘cancellation of debts’ (χρεῶν ἀποκοπή). These ideas inspired the poor, worried property holders, and animated political leaders.

The Agiad and Eurypontid dynasties of Sparta claimed descent from the sons of Hercules, the Heracleidae. As in the case of Hercules, Spartan kings were valued in philosophical terms for undertaking service on behalf of the community. Agis demonstrated μεγαλοψυχία, temperance, and other virtues, outshining in moral quality the ostentation of Hellenistic kings, and his μεγαλοψυχία was displayed in surrendering his own possessions to the community (Plut. Agis 7.2, 10.1). Cleomenes was μεγαλόψυχος, and a model of simplicity, paragon of self-control, a king truly descended from the line of Hercules (Plut. Cleom. 1.3, 13.1–2). Nabis was delegitimised by hostile sources as a revolutionary but, in a speech probably derived from Polybius, he claimed to have restored Sparta to strength through redistribution of land and freeing of slaves (Livy 34.31.11–19). These kings of the line of Hercules possessed the moral intention to promote the welfare of their body politic through social and economic change.

Republican Romans knew about Spartan history from their comparisons of Rome with Sparta and from Polybius. They believed they derived some of their own customs from Sparta via the Sabines and Numa, their Sabine king,Footnote ³⁹ and they admired Sparta for its constitution, which they credited to the foresight of Lycurgus (Polyb. 6.10–11). Roman statesmen will have reflected on the nature of the social reform ideas and resurgence of Spartan power before defeat by the Macedonian intervention arranged by Aratus of Sicyon. The Gracchi, therefore, had a reference point in recent history for the convergence of righteousness and reform in solving social problems and restoring health to the citizenry.Footnote ⁴⁰ The alignment of Greek and Roman reformers was evident before Plutarch wrote Parallel Lives, marking a return to Cicero (Off. 2.80) and probably to the age of Panaetius. Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος shared the same ethical language of Plutarch’s Lives of Cleomenes and Agis and of the Comparison with the Gracchi. Panaetius appears to have been critical of Cleomenes, Agis, and Lysander, and supportive of the moral claims of Aratus, Cleomenes’ enemy, but only on Pohlenz’s dating of Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος to 129 BC can Panaetius have criticised Tiberius Gracchus.Footnote ⁴¹

The agrarian law was drafted carefully to comply with legal precedent and conventions and yet its reformation of a smallholder economy caused a crisis of unprecedented magnitude. This is because the law serving the interests of the people could claim to rest on a higher ethic, the authority of Natural Law and its universal principles of justice and fairness. Natural Law had entered Rome by the age of the Gracchi to be the standard of justice by which human law should be determined. It commanded humans to practise ‘justice’ (iustitia), ‘fairness’ (aequitas), ‘good faith’ (fides), and insists on the identification of the ‘advantageous’ (utilitas/συμφέρον) with justice.Footnote ⁴² Men of great soul fight for justice and true greatness of soul entwines justice and ‘fairness’ (aequitas) (Cic. Off. 1.62–4). This, as we shall see, was the position held by Panaetius and very likely endorsed by Blossius, Tiberius’ philosophical adviser, albeit with reformist political imperative.

Blossius was eminently qualified to advise the lawyers who drafted the agrarian law about the spirit of the law.Footnote ⁴³ Tiberius claimed ‘fairness’ (aequitas) in presenting the law (Cic. Leg. agr. 2.31), couching it in moral terms by insisting on ‘what is fair and just’ (aequum atque iustum).Footnote ⁴⁴ The aequum has a quantitative meaning of equal or level and a moral sense of fair. The aequum was linked to the intentions of Tiberius Gracchus and to the question of whether or not he ‘acted from fairness and right’ (sive aequo et bono ductus).Footnote ⁴⁵ His law addressed the possessors of all public lands and required them to end their unjust, unfair, and immoral occupation. His cause was described as honourable and just and he spoke about the lack of ownership of land in the common light of day, evoking the metaphor of the sun shining alike on the backs of all men (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 9.2–5). He argued that it was just to divide common land among common people and that a person possessing a share in the polity was likely to preserve the common interest (App. B Civ. 1.11), which understood the polity in Greek terms as the sum of its people.Footnote ⁴⁶ He could aver, after all, that the Roman people were sovereign in their state and res publica (‘public business’) was res populi (‘property of the people’) (Cic. Rep. 1.39, 41). When the tilt to radicalism became pronounced with the deposition of Octavius, Tiberius explained it the following way: since the Roman people were sovereign, it is unjust for a tribune to wrong them and, since it is just for a man to be elected tribune, it is more just for a tribune who has wronged the people to be deposed by the people.Footnote ⁴⁷ Gaius Gracchus used the same ideological language as Tiberius of popular sovereignty and people’s ownership. Vestiges of his arguments were preserved in Florus. He affirmed that it was ‘just’ (iustum) for people victorious in the world to receive back what was their own and it was ‘fair’ (aequum) for a people in need to live from its own treasury.Footnote ⁴⁸ His personal style also attracted attention: supervising public business in a way that was magnificent and philanthropic and receiving friends in a manner that was courtly and regal.Footnote ⁴⁹

The Gracchi claimed magnanimitas as social reformers. They sought the ascendancy of true justice in the state by aligning positive law with Natural Law, universal justice, and fairness. They advanced the principle of corrective justice and defined the state as the sum of its people. As champions of the people’s will, they interpreted opponents as enemies of the people. While their personal style attracted the accusation of ‘tyranny’, opposition would fail if advanced only on political grounds. An alternative role beckoned for the man of great soul to act in the service of the community as a conservator.

Scipio Aemilianus and magnanimitas (the Conservator)

Scipio Aemilianus claimed magnanimitas on both family lines, the gens Aemilia through his biological father and the gens Cornelia through his biological aunt, adoption, and marriage. He held the informal position of first man in Rome from 146 BC and was the centre of attention for a generation, popular with the people and disliked among the nobility. His early life had been marked by indifference to the forum and to the obligations expected of aristocrats pursuing a career in public life in favour of cultivation of the Greek moral life (Polyb. 31.23–30); and he continued to display aloofness and non-collegiality on occasions such as the banquet he hosted to honour Hercules (Plut. Mor. 816C). Macedon shaped his moral pedigree. Here was the court of Philip II and Alexander the Great, of Aristotle and μεγαλοψυχία, of Antigonus II and Persaeus the Stoic, and of the concept of rulership as ‘glorious servitude’. Scipio had considered himself like a king while hunting in Macedon’s royal estates after the battle of Pydna (Polyb. 31.29.6). In its royal library, shipped to Rome, he would have found the Cyropaedia, Xenophon’s book that was his constant companion, although he may have already known about it.Footnote ⁵⁰ Its theme was the ethics of rulership so that the leader governs in consonance with moral principles for the prosperity and stability of the state; and in awareness of the foresight of the gods and their propensity to guide human wisdom (Xen. Cyr. 1.6.44–6). He proved himself worthy of Alexander by victories in Africa and Europe and sought command on the third continent, Asia. He was clean shaven in the manner of Alexander (Plin. HN 7.211) and, like the Macedonian king, was accompanied on campaign by philosophers, intellectuals, and men of letters such as Lucilius, Sempronius Asellio, Rutilius Rufus, and, prominent among them, Polybius and Panaetius.Footnote ⁵¹ Both Greeks were eyewitnesses who characterised Scipio in terms of μεγαλοψυχία, with Panaetius referencing him as an example of the man of great soul in Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, most likely alongside Philip II.Footnote ⁵²

Scipio’s friend, instructor, and moral adviser was the foremost Stoic of the age, Panaetius. Scipio was accompanied by Panaetius on an embassy to the East that was remarkable for the austerity of its ambassador and entourage amid the opulence of eastern potentates. The philosopher must have been the authority for the embassy’s superior moral station and regard of external goods with indifference.Footnote ⁵³ During the embassy, Scipio was influenced by Panaetius and Cicero later would state unequivocally how the philosopher’s teaching softened the moral character of this eminent Roman (Mur. 66). Given his Cornelian inheritance, Scipio must have sought Panaetius’ advice about magnanimitas and we may presume in him knowledge of Panaetius’ concept of μεγαλοψυχία and its divergence from that of Aristotle, along with warnings about the moral failings of Alexander in contrast to Philip II.

In Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, Panaetius upgraded ‘bravery’ (άνδρεία) to ‘greatness of soul’ (μεγαλοψυχία), elevating it into a quality of the mind above physical courage, which humans shared with animals.Footnote ⁵⁴ He sourced greatness of soul to a natural impetus, the ‘drive to be the first’ (appetitio principatus in Cicero’s Latin), which is the drive for independence from others, excepting advisers of morality, learning, and justice and law. He advised the disregard of external goods from the superior position.Footnote ⁵⁵ Recognising dangers inherent in μεγαλοψυχία, Panaetius tamed it with the virtues of justice and temperance. He probably defined greatness of soul as the ‘virtue that fights on behalf of justice’ (virtus propugans pro aequitate) in the interests of the common good and not self-interest which is vice.Footnote ⁵⁶ The man of great soul strives to attain moral goodness and temperance and not be subject to another, and he is characterised by performance of great and arduous actions (Cic. Off. 1.66). This was practical advice about ethical action. Men of ability should not hesitate to participate in politics and administration so a state is governed and greatness of soul made manifest (Cic. Off. 1.72). The man of great soul can be active in the service of society, albeit with qualifications like avoidance of anger in administering punishment (Cic. Off. 1.88–9).Footnote ⁵⁷ Thus the ‘drive to be the first’ affirmed in the μεγαλόψυχος independence from others, excepting proficient advisers, and it was restrained by the social virtue of justice and the overarching and harmonising virtue of the ‘fitting’ (τὸ πρέπον, decorum).

For Stoics, the social virtue of justice had its origin in ‘affinity’ (οἰκείωσις). Nature, Panaetius averred, joins humans in fellowship and implants in them love of offspring, which ultimately develops into the formation of higher social institutions and communities for their mutual benefit (Cic. Off. 1.12). This pragmatic development recurred in Panaetius’ version of the ‘ladder of nature’ (scala naturae), the hierarchical ordering principle of life and the soul. Cicero’s rendering of it (Off. 2.11–15) sets forth the steps in the development of human society from inanimate objects to animate beings, to human beings and gods who share in reason, up to the stages in the establishment of civilisation and its institutions. Men built cities, created conventions, and promulgated laws that safeguarded their way of life by apportioning an ‘equitable distribution of rights’ (iuris aequa discriptio). They came to the assistance of their fellow men and secured great benefits from human cooperation and consensus (conspiratio hominum atque consensus), which likely translated Panaetius’ word ὁμόνοια (‘harmony’).Footnote ⁵⁸ This rendering of the ladder of nature rationalises civilisation as founded in nature while affirming that it has advanced beyond nature to develop laws and conventions on which humans rely for their security and well-being. Humans derive mutual benefits from one another and reciprocity enables the function of civil society. The ‘equitable distribution of rights’ must include property rightsFootnote ⁵⁹ that came into being with law and convention and it is the responsibility of society to protect and preserve these rights. Peace prevails when everyone in civil society observes and respects its rules because it is unthinkable to revert to the State of Nature.

Scholars accept that Panaetius upheld the obligation of the state to protect property rights.Footnote ⁶⁰ Passages from De officiis thought to be derived from Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος are consistent with the ordering principle of the ‘ladder of nature’, the establishment of civil society, its laws and conventions, and the benefits to humans of reciprocity and exchange. Thus ‘justice’ (iustitia) preserves the bonds of society, obliges humans to refrain from harming each other, and enjoins them to treat common property as common and private as one’s own (Off. 1.20). Since property rights do not exist by nature, property that is common in nature becomes private through occupancy, conquest, law, and other forms of covenant (Off. 1.21).Footnote ⁶¹ Cicero appears to amplify, but not invent, the principle that nature led men to gather together, form communities, and enter cities in the hope of preserving their property (Off. 2.73). Panaetius, after all, was the protégé of Diogenes of Babylon, whose defence of property rights caused division in the Stoic school in the second century BC.Footnote ⁶²

Scipio gained his reputation for μεγαλοψυχία as a young man seeking to demonstrate moral character through integrity in financial matters and generosity.Footnote ⁶³ Panaetius could offer the mature Scipio advice on the limits of beneficence. To the negative definition of justice to give each man his due, Panaetius added the impetus to give more than what is due (liberalitas/beneficentia in Cicero).Footnote ⁶⁴ However, rules must apply. Benefits must be bestowed on the deserving and in proportion to desert so that liberality does not overextend into vice. The undeserving poor coveting their neighbours’ wealth corrupt liberality and affront justice, fairness, and altruism (Cic. Off. 1.42–6). Thus, justice dictates that giving must be in proportion to desert and the lavishing of benefits on the undeserving upsets the moral hierarchy of society.

Panaetius geared his advice towards statesmen making progress to virtue and those of outstanding merit in possession of μεγαλοψυχία located themselves at the pinnacle of the human stage of the ‘ladder of nature’. However, there were qualifications. Panaetius cited Alexander, Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, and Agesilaus as examples of generals in war and statesmen at home who accomplished great deeds through the support of others (Cic. Off. 2.16). They undertook arduous action and accomplished goals with the assistance they received from advisers of morality, learning, and justice and law (mentioned at Cic. Off. 1.13). The man of great soul may have most independence at the top of human society but he must have the support of a moral adviser in undertaking actions. Moral standards have developed with the advance of civilisation. Since civil society depends on reciprocity and civilisation on co-operation and consensus, the fight for justice must be waged by the μεγαλόψυχος in the service of the community and common good.

For Panaetius, humans have a feeling for order and, by means of supervening reason, they may perceive the moral realm of harmony above the physical realm and structure their thoughts and actions accordingly. The καλόν (honestum in Cicero) is realised in such ways.Footnote ⁶⁵ Panaetius illustrated his treatment of μεγαλοψυχία with men of action – kings, politicians, generals – who displayed bravery in civil affairs and on military campaigns (Cic. Off. 1.75–90). He probably praised Aratus of Sicyon as an exemplar of caring for the whole of the body politic and preserving ὁμόνοια (concordia in Cicero) in the state (Cic. Off. 1.85, 2.81–2). Praise of a man renowned for his possession of μεγαλοψυχία (Plut. Arat. 19.3) and an opponent of the social reformer Cleomenes is likely to have made an impression on Scipio, who carried with him the warning of a state which ‘was unconquerable in concord, destroyed in discord’ (concordia inuicta, discordia exitio fuit).Footnote ⁶⁶

Panaetius’ valuation of ὁμόνοια as the definitive quality of civilisation lent philosophical weight to the native concept of concordia and exposed the ruinous effects of discordia. Enemies of order, acting from the self-interested drive for power, lavish benefits on the common people and destabilise the state by favouring this component of the polity. The moral imperative for the man of great soul is to fight for justice in the conservation of civil society. In doing so, the μεγαλόψυχος appeals to a higher ethic because he understands that ὁμόνοια is the design of Providence.

Magnanimitas and Providence

Providence designs the world on the ordering principle of the ladder of nature. The man of great soul at the highest human level of the ladder is able to understand divine design and construe its purpose through his reason and foresight. Foresight (πρόνοια/providentia; prudentia) was the attribute credited to Scipio Aemilianus in the source traditions: historical (Polybius), philosophical (Panaetius), and literary (Cicero) sources feature foresight as the common theme in relation to their treatments of him.

The historian Polybius (36.8.5) presented Scipio in possession of πρόνοια at the fall of Carthage where Scipio wept and cited Homer, foreseeing the same fate awaiting his own city. He reported Scipio’s perception of the fate of Rome and the more immediate effects of the fall of the rival city. This foresight thereafter entered the source tradition: ascent of demagogues, redistribution of land, revolt of allies, internecine civil war.Footnote ⁶⁷ Scullard advanced the influential argument that Scipio at Carthage resolved to maintain the mixed constitution in Rome against internal threats which could activate political decline into democracy and ochlocracy.Footnote ⁶⁸ While this may be so, the argument holds explanatory force for the crisis of 133–129 BC when conservatives feared the body politic was threatened by ambitious politicians lavishing prosperity on the people. Popular politicians threatened stability by tipping the balance of the mixed constitution in favour of a single component, the people.

The philosopher Panaetius referenced Scipio as a man of great soul and approved of his perception of the instability of human affairs and vicissitudes of fortune (Cic. Off. 1.90); that is, he praised the Roman’s understanding of the need to train the intellect and exercise moderation in success in anticipation of peripeteia and of the nemesis that follows hubris. Panaetius had elevated μεγαλοψυχία into an intellectual quality above άνδρεία and judged foresight its attribute. In line with the doctrine of the ‘indivisibility’ (ἀντακολουθία) of the four virtues, he held that the attributes of (1) wisdom cohere with those of (2) justice, (3) greatness of soul, and all cohere with (4) the fitting, which harmonises the virtues.Footnote ⁶⁹ Wisdom warns against decisions made without forethought and planning and by assenting hastily to things unknown (Cic. Off. 1.18). Aulus Gellius (NA 13.28) preserved in Latin a fragment of Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, omitted by Cicero, that had appeared within its treatment of greatness of soul. The fragment contained practical advice for statesmen treading the pathway to virtue, to adopt the pose of pancratists and anticipate challenges to come.Footnote ⁷⁰ When the man of great soul undertakes action in the fight for justice, contemplative wisdom enters the active life as rational consideration of contingency either in civil affairs or on military campaign. The man of great soul uses the power of reason to anticipate events, plan responses, and avoid being forced to say: ‘I had not thought of that’ (non putaram). He functions through ‘foresight and planning’ (prudentia consilioque) and in war is not drawn into disordered, barbaric brawling (Cic. Off. 1.81–2). These appear to be allusions to the very Scipio whom Panaetius referenced as the man of great soul. Scipio was renowned throughout his career for foresight in planning the appropriate action to take prior to taking it and therefore avoiding saying non putaram (Val. Max. 7.2.2). Conscious of caprice and contingency, by prior deliberation he could anticipate the correct course of action and the foresight he displayed on campaign was thought to be divinely inspired.Footnote ⁷¹

Cicero developed the theme of Scipio and foresight which he knew from Polybius and Panaetius. He set his literary work of political science during the Latin holidays of 129 BC, prior to Scipio’s death. He supposed the existence of personal links between Scipio, Panaetius, and Polybius and discussion between Scipio and Rutilius on campaign at Numantia.Footnote ⁷² Rutilius returned to Rome from Numantia with his commander Scipio to find the city rent by violence and division. He later wrote Memoirs, widely read in antiquity, that included an account of the Numantine war in which he credited Scipio with the cardinal virtues and foresight.Footnote ⁷³ He hosted Cicero at Smyrna and was the ‘source of the dialogue’ (auctor sermonis) that became Cicero’s Republic (Rep. 1.13, 17). Cicero’s acknowledgement of Rutilius as a source, via oral and written testimony, lends weight to the philosophical and historical value of the literature.

The best constitution and the best citizen were the subjects of De republica. Discussion began with the division of the state into halves as a consequence of Gracchan land reform (Cic. Rep. 1.31). The best constitution canvassed was not democratic and the people were diminished in their sovereignty because, we are told, the greatest number of people must not have most power in a republic (ne plurimum valeant plurimi) (Cic. Rep. 2.39). The mixed constitution was favoured, but it was in danger of imbalance, and De republica argued the need for leadership, conceived of as the man of outstanding quality, outside the cycle of constitutions. ‘Scipio’, the dialogue’s chief interlocutor, commented on the capacity of the wise man to recognise the cycle of constitutions and of the great citizen and ‘godlike man’ (divinus paene vir) ‘to foresee’ (prospicere) their coming and plot a course through change.Footnote ⁷⁴ As Kaerst observed, since the purpose of the mixed constitution was to counter dangers which lie in the natural course of constitutions, the task of the moderator and rector rei publicae (‘governor’ and ‘guide of the republic’) was to deploy the mixed constitution to this end. A single personality was called on to lead the state in a monarchically oriented position. Kaerst suggested that Scipio and Panaetius would have discussed skilled rulership at this time when political conditions provided the need for a saviour and helmsman of the state.Footnote ⁷⁵ Sabine and Smith wrote: ‘Perhaps the hope of filling such a position [rector] was in the mind of Scipio Aemilianus; and possibly this was the future destined for him by enlightened members of the Roman aristocracy.’Footnote ⁷⁶

The rector rei publicae shares with the μεγαλόψυχος the divine quality of foresight. In De republica, the character of ‘Scipio’ expounds on the qualities of foresight which the guide of the state must possess. The guide was vir prudens (a ‘man of foresight’Footnote ⁷⁷) who, by gentle touch or command and the excellence of his life and temperament, steered the state through strife and discord to safety, harmony, and justice (Cic. Rep. 2.67–70). Commenting on a draft of De republica, Cicero’s friend Sallustius likened it to Aristotle’s compositions on the state and the foremost man (Cic. Q Fr. 3.5.1), presumably with the μεγαλόψυχος in mind. Despite fragmentary text, the concept of greatness of soul was present. Magnitudo animi, McConnell argues, was a central theme of De republica and its character of the rector or moderator rei publicae. Good and brave men ‘with a great soul’ (magno animo) enter public life so as not to be ruled by wicked men or allow them to destroy the state (Cic. Rep. 1.9); and the virtues of the leading statesman include bravery, which contained magnitudo animi and indifference to physical concerns (Cic. Rep. 5.9). McConnell sees the theme of greatness of soul culminating in the Dream of Scipio and the eternal, harmonic, divine cosmos whence come and return the ‘guides and preservers’ (rectores et conservatores) of states (Cic. Rep. 6.13). Statesmen with true greatness of soul serve the state because it was the right thing to do and their rewards are divine.Footnote ⁷⁸

The character of ‘Scipio’ will receive celestial rewards for his service to the state. Africanus appeared to his grandson in a dream and predicted Scipio’s victory over Carthage but also the descent of Rome into disorder because of the actions of another of his grandsons, Tiberius Gracchus. Africanus predicted that the whole state would turn to Scipio for its protection and install him as dictator if he could escape the impious hands of his relatives (Cic. Off. 6.12). Nicolet and Stevenson, adopting the approach of political morality, argue for the historicity of this passage and the possibility that Scipio was about to be appointed dictator in early 129 BC, although other scholars provide political explanation or reject it as literary fiction.Footnote ⁷⁹ As I have argued in this article, the καλόν and the συμφέρον were active considerations in the age of the Gracchi and, as a consequence, conservatives could advance a moral rationale for appointing Scipio dictator for the preservation of the state.Footnote ⁸⁰

De republica 6.9–29 located Scipio in heaven with his adoptive grandfather (Africanus) and natural father (Paullus), in the realm destined for men of virtue who served country and justice by virtuous actions in harmony with the universal order and God.Footnote ⁸¹ Human glory was transitory and true glory (i.e. Stoic εὐδοξία) attached itself to true virtue that was the reward for Scipio (Cic. Rep. 6.25–6). Scipio was presented labouring in the service of the state and on behalf of others, like Hercules receiving the reward of apotheosis and entry of his soul into the cosmic realm.Footnote ⁸² Stoics subscribed to the doctrine that the souls of virtuous heroes survived their deaths (Diog. Laert. 7.88, 7.151). C. Fannius, a Stoic contemporary of Scipio, Laelius, and Panaetius, may have helped shape the tradition of apotheosis and stories of Scipio’s speedy passage to the gods.Footnote ⁸³ The austere funeral banquet in honour of Scipio, the ‘divine man’ (homo divinus), was distinctly Stoic (Cic. Mur. 75). However, his apotheosis was not singular. The Roman people consecrated the locations of the deaths of the Gracchi, setting up statues, giving offerings, and making sacrifices as if they were in the temples of the gods (Plut. G. Gracch. 18.2). Apotheosis was part of the Cornelian inheritance going back to Ennius’ presentation of Africanus and the opening of the door of heaven to him.Footnote ⁸⁴ Africanus’ daughter and mother of the Gracchi, Cornelia, the great-souled woman, was therefore the daughter and mother of gods.