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Accepted manuscript

A Morality Evolutionary Game Theory Can Model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2026

Mikhail Volkov*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, LSE London, UK mik_volkov@hotmail.com
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Abstract

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Evolutionary game-theoretic (EGT) models of morality face powerful under-addressed objections. Critics claim the simulations fail to specify their explanandum, muddying their explanatory value. Additionally, morality is suggested to be not computationally representable, jeopardising the method’s general applicability. This paper explicates and addresses the objections. I argue at least one concrete explication of morality, emotionism coupled with functionally understood emotions, can be a plausible subject of EGT explanations. I demonstrate how fixing this explanandum assuages the methodological objections and provide a computational model as proof of concept. If successful, the contribution placates serious long-standing criticisms of EGT as a meta-ethical tool.

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Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Philosophy of Science Association