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A Calamitous Compact

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 October 2016

Darin DeWitt  and
Thomas Schwartz
Darin DeWitt
Affiliation:
California State University, Long Beach
Thomas Schwartz
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (joined so far by ten states and DC) would replace the current presidential-election system, based on the electoral college and the winner-take-all rule, with nationwide plurality rule, and it would do so by changes in state law, not a Constitutional amendment. The mischief that would create (especially procedural instability, noncompliant electors, nation-wide recounts, vote manipulation, and narrowed support), the compact’s questionable Constitutionality, the weakness of its defense, and the availability of less calamitous alternatives are reasons enough to reject it.

Information

Type
Controversy: The National Popular Vote Plan
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 49 , Special Issue 4: Elections in Focus , October 2016 , pp. 791 - 796
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2016 

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References

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