II. Justifying a Definition of a Sustainable Corporation

The need for a definition of a sustainable corporation may appear to some practitioners as merely an uninteresting academic exercise. It is admitted that such a sceptical posture, why define or what is the point of defining sustainable corporation, should be raised, and most importantly, that addressing this question will not only clarify inconsistencies in the arbitrary description of the term and set criteria for verifying corporate self-claim to sustainability,Footnote ²⁶ but also provides a vital precursor for understanding the kind of norm contestation (in Section V) that the pursuit to define this term may produce.

One potential scepticism about why an internationally recognised human rights definition of a sustainable corporation matters is that it cannot settle the fundamental questions and problems arising from corporate abuses of human rights and the environment.Footnote ²⁷ Two responses are presented against this sceptical posture. First, the merit of proposing a definition of a sustainable corporation—and whether it can address fundamental concerns arising from corporate violations of human rights—depends on the theory underlying the definition.Footnote ²⁸ Thus, if states decide to come up with a definition of a sustainable corporation that is based on a human rights theory (especially a theory that consolidates corporate respect for human rights and the environment),Footnote ²⁹ with roots in natural law theory and social justice, this would support the argument that modern corporations should not only have a moral but a legal obligation to respect human rights in their operations.Footnote ³⁰ Second, an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation can settle fundamental problems associated with corporate abuses of human rights because definitional certainty adds to the broader conceptual and practical project in BHR to strengthen corporate respect for human rights.Footnote ³¹

Furthermore, the justification for defining a sustainable corporation is premised on the need to create and maintain a minimal framework for meaningful discourse on the direct human rights obligations of transnational companies.Footnote ³² This is no small task because defining a sustainable corporation reinforces existing interstate contestations over the life of transnational corporations, as evidenced in the relatively unsuccessful efforts to develop an international, legally binding treaty on transnational companies. The need to create a minimal framework of discourse on direct human rights obligations for companies is important in establishing and verifying whether the companies that claim to be sustainable today are truly sustainable.Footnote ³³ The point here is that without definitive criteria on the content of a sustainable corporation, the present global BHR discourse on direct human rights obligations of corporations may continue to fail.Footnote ³⁴ One of these definitive criteria is the direct human rights obligation of transnational companies, as suggested in Section IV.

Defining a sustainable corporation sets the limits on which transnational companies are truly sustainable. There are at least three interrelated merits of setting limits on how a sustainable corporation is defined and categorised. First, the merit of setting limits on a classification of sustainable corporations is to prevent arbitrary specifications of what a sustainable corporation is; it counteracts the arbitrariness of ‘self-claimed sustainability’.Footnote ³⁵ The second merit of setting limits on the use of the term is to establish uniform normative standards under IHR for determining which corporations are sustainable. Third, setting a limit on how a sustainable corporation is defined and classified provides a conceptual monitor for the use of the term, assisting states in drafting uniform mandatory corporate human rights obligations at the national level.Footnote ³⁶ Depending on the state and legal system, the precise scope of what constitutes a sustainable corporation under domestic (corporate) law may differ.Footnote ³⁷ Monitoring how the term ‘sustainable corporation’ is used reveals some practical, social, and legal realities in efforts to regulate corporations in international law, as discussed in Sections IV and V.Footnote ³⁸

If states produce an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation, why would a company want to become sustainable? In other words, could a company use a definition of sustainable corporation to its advantage, such as to get a tax benefit, or a reduced due diligence obligation? While questions like these are vital, the point here is not whether companies want to be sustainable or why they would want to be sustainable, because these entities are already claiming sustainable practices as a strategic communicative tool to boost their commercial reputation; claims that can be termed generally as ‘greenwashing’.Footnote ³⁹ How powerful corporations selectively use the term ‘sustainable’ to qualify their operations and entice consumers demonstrates the problem of self-claimed sustainability,Footnote ⁴⁰ depicting subjective ascription of meaning to the term ‘sustainable corporation’ that results in definitional indeterminacy.

However, the question of why companies would want to be sustainable is largely a cost-benefit question from the perspective of the relevant companies, which differs from the question of why companies should be sustainable from a social justice perspective, which takes human rights obligations as the normative core of sustainability. Thus, the question should be, why do companies claim to be sustainable when they do not have direct human rights obligations? As companies have claimed to be sustainable, an internationally recognised definition helps the international community to objectively ascertain the criteria for such claims. The incentives for companies are not, in themselves, what necessitate a definition of a sustainable corporation; it is the consideration of social justice, expressed through human rights protection, in corporate operations. As discussed in Section IV, a direct human rights obligation is the defining feature of the sustainable corporation this article proposes. A human-rights definition of a sustainable corporation translates ‘sustainable’ from the periphery and exogenous life of the transnational corporation into its endogenous life, thereby making it an undertaker of human rights obligations as a matter of social justice.Footnote ⁴¹

III. A Sustainable Corporation in the Sustainable Development and Business and Human Rights Instruments

Although the traditional IHR instruments predate sustainable development instruments (such as the Brundtland Report, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and SDGs),Footnote ⁴² these IHR and development instruments interact to influence the evolving BHR framework in varying degrees, which cannot be entirely captured here. The Brundtland Report, the MDGs and the SDGs emphasise sustainable practices, corporate social responsibility and respect for human rights. However, the normative content of the Brundtland Report, the MDGs and the SDGs does not create binding human rights obligations for corporations. It is this latter point that places the BHR and SD movements, as they are today, on a quest for IHR validation, expressed as a search for an international, legally binding instrument on transnational corporations. The reason for this quest is to consolidate a common normative ground of an enforceable framework to regulate the practices of transnational corporations, as evident in the current work of the UN Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (UN IGWG). At the core of this quest for a legally binding instrument on transnational corporations is the functional relevance of a definition of sustainable transnational corporations. As will be discussed in Sections IV and V, a definition of a sustainable corporation is a legally normative act with relevance for the making of a global BHR treaty. Since most of the SDGs are grounded in or poised to actualise human rights, one would logically expect companies that claim to be sustainable to embrace direct human rights obligations. However, this is not the case. Thus, an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation is a logical first step in solving this integration problem.

However, the efforts to arrive at an international, legally binding BHR instrument on transnational corporations are not only to integrate the soft norms in the Brundtland Report, the MDGs, and the SDGs into IHR, but also to translate them into a hard, enforceable BHR framework. These IHR instruments, which traditionally impose obligations on states, include but are not limited to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),Footnote ⁴³ the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),Footnote ⁴⁴ the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)Footnote ⁴⁵ and other specialized conventions addressing specific rights, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),Footnote ⁴⁶ and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).Footnote ⁴⁷ While these instruments do not expressly define a sustainable corporation, they establish the framework for human rights protection and provide a basis for understanding the broad scope of human rights, including the state’s obligation to ensure corporate responsibility to protect human rights.Footnote ⁴⁸ Articles 29 and 30 of the UDHR, the common Article 5 of the ICCPR and the ICESR not only prohibit states but also any person or group from violating human rights.Footnote ⁴⁹ These key provisions have informed the expectations beyond the obligation of states to include the human rights responsibilities of corporate actors across jurisdictions.Footnote ⁵⁰

Nevertheless, it would be false to claim that there is no slight reference or effort to define a sustainable corporation in the context of IHR law applicable to BHR framework. While the SD and BHR instruments include indicators of a sustainable corporation, states have not provided a precise definition or concrete criteria that unambiguously specify what the term entails.Footnote ⁵¹ For instance, the International Labour Conference (ILC) Conclusions Concerning the Promotion of Sustainable Enterprise (2007) speaks expressly of ‘sustainable enterprises’. However, the ILC Conclusion connects the term to sustainable development, a term that is very elusive, indeterminate and essentially contested, at least from the viewpoint of international law.Footnote ⁵² Although sustainable development is a well-known concept in international law, and international courts have recognised it,Footnote ⁵³ its meaning remains largely ambiguous.Footnote ⁵⁴ In other contexts, the idea of a sustainable corporation is loosely associated with terms such as sustainability or sustainable development, which are essentially contested in the legal context.Footnote ⁵⁵ For example, the ‘Norms on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (also known as the Draft Norms) mentions in its Article 14 the obligation of transnational corporations and other business enterprises to ‘generally conduct their activities in a manner contributing to the wider goal of sustainable development’.Footnote ⁵⁶ Similarly, while the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises sets out ‘recommendations on responsible business conduct’,Footnote ⁵⁷ which can be interpreted as fostering an idea of a sustainable corporation, it ties this idea to terms with no legal certainty such as ‘responsible business conduct’, ‘sustainability’, ‘sustainable development’, ‘sustainable economies’ and ‘sustainable development outcomes’. However, the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (also known as UN Code of Conduct) makes provision for transnational corporations to protect the environment and ‘respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries in which they operate’.Footnote ⁵⁸

Defining a sustainable corporation as one that is sustainable or as one that ‘fosters sustainable development’ is unhelpful, since the concepts of sustainability or sustainable development do not provide concrete legal criteria.Footnote ⁵⁹ The ILC Conclusions Concerning the Promotion of Sustainable Enterprise ties the idea of sustainable corporation to ‘sustainable development’, stating that ‘sustainable enterprise is related to the general approach to sustainable development – forms of progress that meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs –an approach which postulates a holistic, balanced and integrated perspective on development’.Footnote ⁶⁰ Arguably, the circularity problem arising from the latter statement rests on the assumption that, since terms such as sustainability, sustainable development and corporate sustainability are ubiquitous today, the meaning of a sustainable corporation is already known and requires no further definition. As corporation and sustainable development are mutually exclusive terms, placing them side by side does not, in and of itself, define sustainable corporation. For example, the International Labour Organisation’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy in 1977 uses terms such as ‘sustainable development’, ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ and ‘sustainable economic growth’ in mutually exclusive ways that suggest a BHR shift towards the idea of a sustainable corporation.Footnote ⁶¹

Comparatively, the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework in 2011 (the UNGPs), and the Draft UN Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) make some attempt to avoid circularity in defining a sustainable corporation, even though none of the instruments expressly mentions the term. First, the UN Global Compact positions corporate operations within ‘principles on human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption’.Footnote ⁶² The Global Compact nudges states and other actors to adopt and implement these principles. These guidelines provide a foundation for sustainable corporate operations and ethical business conduct. Second, the UNGPs aim to drive ‘a socially sustainable globalization’ under the BHR-specific mantra. Although the UNGPs do not expressly mention or define a sustainable corporation, they can be interpreted as providing an ‘authoritative statement’ on the subject while connecting it to legally determined terms, such as the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and the right of victims to access remedy.Footnote ⁶³ While the UNGPs are largely concerned with state duties, their specific content provides concrete elements for a sustainable corporation. Third, the UN LBI, in its Preamble, speaks to the capacity of enterprises to foster sustainable development, contextualising and specifying the idea of a sustainable corporation in IHR law. This logic is evident in the mandate of the UN IGWG, which seeks ‘to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises’.Footnote ⁶⁴ Emphatically, the cumulative reference to sustainable development and IHR in these instruments suggests a BHR posture towards a human-rights type of sustainable corporations.

IV. Defining a Sustainable Corporation: A Human-Rights Approach

This article suggests the following BHR definition of a sustainable corporation as a minimally satisfactory proposal and inspiration for states and other actors:

This proposed definition is minimally sufficient but does not suggest a degree of voluntariness, which may appear aspirational, and captures only companies that voluntarily undertake human rights obligations. For the avoidance of doubt, the proposed definition is intended to mean that a sustainable corporation is any business entity of a transnational character that is required to undertake direct human rights obligations. Thus, for a transnational corporation to be sustainable, the obligation arising from the proposed definition is not optional.

The soundness of this human rights definition of a sustainable corporation is based on the sufficiency of the explanation it produces about the concept.Footnote ⁶⁵ The sufficiency of this explanation is determined under the following criteria: first, whether there exists prior definitive legal criteria of the notion of a sustainable corporation within the existing BHR normative thresholds; second, the normative consequence(s) of the suggested definition; third, whether the thresholds of the definition are adequate in light of the problem it is designed to solve.

First, since a sustainable corporation is legally undefined within the existing IHR/BHR system, this suggested definition is minimally sufficient for thinking about the concept. This suggested definition retains the transnational character of businesses that fall within the material content of those corporations relevant under the proposed UN LBI, and it is not limited to any sector.Footnote ⁶⁶ To be considered a sustainable corporation, the transnational company must undertake direct human rights obligations under an international, legally binding instrument on BHR, such as the proposed LBI. The latter point raises a key question: what happens if a sustainable corporation is defined in a regional instrument before or together with an international treaty? Where a regional instrument is the first to define a sustainable corporation, it should be amended, where necessary, to give effect to an internationally recognised definition that subsequently appears in an international treaty. In any case, a regional instrument that gives coherence to the core of this suggested definition, pending when such a definition is adopted in an international instrument, should not be discouraged, provided that a direct human rights obligation for transnational corporations is at the core of such a regional instrument. The main point is to avoid the problem of fragmented definitions of a sustainable corporation across different instruments. To ensure convergence, coherence, and uniformity across regions of the world, an international instrument such as the LBI provides a more suitable locus for such a definition, provided that regional and domestic systems can implement it. To avoid the multiplicity of instruments and standards on the definition of a sustainable corporation, regional instruments, such as the European Union Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directives (CS3D), should follow the proposed definition or any definition that this article suggests should be in an international framework, in particular, the LBI. Similar explanations are offered in the context of domestic implementation in Section V. However, a proposal for a definition of a sustainable corporation in the LBI offers a stronger position, as the LBI represents global community interests, than a definition in a regional instrument representing fundamentally the interests of the relevant region. Thus, an international instrument, rather than a regional one, should exclusively cover the field of defining a sustainable corporation. This argument is not a presumption of the supremacy of international law over regional law,Footnote ⁶⁷ which has received considerable attention in the Kadi case.Footnote ⁶⁸

Second, this suggested definition requires taking a normative position on the meaning and content of the concept of a sustainable corporation.Footnote ⁶⁹ The normative position is ‘a direct human rights obligation’ for transnational corporations. ‘Direct human rights obligation’ is a legal criterion because of its binding nature and is based on principles of natural and social justice, which are sources of human rights norms.Footnote ⁷⁰ Importantly, the problem of defining a sustainable corporation, or definitional indeterminacy, in the existing SD and IHR/BHR instruments is not the absence of norms; social justice norms underpin these instruments. Rather, it is the non-binding nature of the norms in the SD and BHR instruments and their imprecision in a legal sense that underpins the uniqueness of this suggested definition. The norm in the suggested definition is enforceable, which is different from other normative contents in existing instruments, which are voluntary, non-binding and less effective,Footnote ⁷¹ requiring the push in BHR for an international, legally binding instrument on transnational corporations.Footnote ⁷²

The normative consequence of the suggested definition of a sustainable corporation requires a distinction between aspirational actions and formational actions for legal ascription of meaning.Footnote ⁷³ By aspirational action, one may speak of what a corporation should do to have the status of a ‘sustainable corporation’. Aspirational action makes a sustainable corporation a ‘destination’ that companies should reach. This analysis accounts for the non-binding nature of existing BHR instruments, which can be generally considered as aspirations. It is for aspirational reasons that one may ask why corporations would want to be sustainable, as discussed earlier. In answering the latter question, the search is for incentives that make companies want to be sustainable—for example, undertaking voluntary sustainability initiatives to maintain customer loyalty or to be in the government’s good books. However, the core of the suggested definition of a sustainable corporation is ‘formational action’, meaning it is grounded in legally binding norms requiring transnational corporations to undertake direct human rights obligations. In other words, the proposed definition of a sustainable corporation requires such a transnational company to take an enforceable normative position on human rights. By the standard of the suggested definition, it is not aspirational but indispensable for a transnational corporation to have direct human rights obligations because, among other reasons, its operations have effects on people and planet more than ever. The suggested definition of a sustainable corporation, in the context of ‘formational action’, presents an endogenous proposal: that transnational companies should be considered undertakers of direct human rights obligations, rather than merely responsible for protecting human rights and the environment across their supply/value chains. Thus, the ‘sustainable’ becomes an internal logic of corporate existence,Footnote ⁷⁴ and, therefore, it should be integral to the nature of corporations operating in two or more jurisdictions.

Third, the normative threshold of the suggested definition of a sustainable corporation is adequate considering the problem it is designed to solve. The proposed definition essentially makes human rights the centrifugal factor in defining a sustainable corporation, and it is not circular because it connects the core of such a corporation to direct human rights obligations. The proposed definition avoids definitional circularity by specifying the characteristics of sustainable corporations.Footnote ⁷⁵ It is neither too narrow nor too broad, and it is framed in positive terms.Footnote ⁷⁶ This suggested definition of a sustainable corporation organises and unifies the elements of the term, delineating its core features in a legally normative sense and providing an authoritative basis (discussed in Section V) for direct human rights obligations of transnational companies.Footnote ⁷⁷

The multiplicity of definitions of a sustainable corporation within a non-BHR context is a very good reason for an international, legally recognised definition of the term to be a logical necessity. How might conflicts between definitions (such as between BHR and non-BHR regimes) be addressed? The proposed human rights–centred definition of sustainable corporation is expected to take priority for two reasons.Footnote ⁷⁸ First, the human rights approach places people and planet over profit. Second, the suggested definition is legally binding, and where it conflicts with a non-legal definition, the legally binding one prevails. Even when there are two legal definitions, the first in time, with greater legal authority and representing more global interests, should prevail. However, such a definition must be widely accepted and reflect state practice across different continents to prevail,Footnote ⁷⁹ which, again, makes the LBI or a similar framework a suitable venue for such a definition. What is important here is that an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation helps advance the shared global efforts to regulate transnational corporations. How the definition of a sustainable corporation is developed and implemented will largely depend on the political and legal will of states.

V. A Sustainable Corporation: Discursive and Behavioural Norm Contestation

Nevertheless, contestations are essential regarding the normative content of the suggested definition of a sustainable corporation, which accentuates the problem of public international law in the BHR context.Footnote ⁸⁰ Since any definition of sustainable corporation requires taking a normative position, the suggested definition is, therefore, an ‘essentially contested’ concept.Footnote ⁸¹ Given the normativity of the meaning of a sustainable corporation, two points are key here. First, its source matters; the legitimacy of such a definition originates from the appropriateness of the authority or community, namely the states or international courts, that create, adopt, accept and recognise this or any proposed definition.Footnote ⁸² If states decide to ascribe an internationally recognised definition to the term ‘sustainable corporation’, they give authoritative expression to a set of prescriptions that constitute the term. Second, the definition is expected to be a clear and effective statement detailing the specification of a sustainable corporation for which conformity is required, regardless of how the term is typically used, described or perceived in general parlance. In the suggested definition, ‘direct human rights obligation’ provides the requisite normative criterion for sustainable corporations.Footnote ⁸³

The normativity of the meaning of a sustainable corporation is bound to produce discursive and behavioural norm contestation.Footnote ⁸⁴ Norm contestation is not new in international law and relations; it is at the heart of the international community’s relative success and failure in producing a legally binding instrument on BHR.Footnote ⁸⁵ First, a discursive norm contestation is a debate about the ‘meaning and/or (relative) importance’ of a sustainable corporation as a normative product.Footnote ⁸⁶ Discursive norm contestation is prevalent throughout the history of BHR, particularly in the debates and lack of consensus within the various IGWGs over time regarding the establishment of an international, legally binding instrument on transnational corporations.Footnote ⁸⁷ The meaning of a sustainable corporation and its relative importance are therefore bound to be contested among different actors, particularly states. On the one hand, it would not be surprising to see some states push for a very narrow definition or discredit the need for an international definition of a sustainable corporation. On the other hand, some states may advance a definition that is too broad, depending on their differing economic interests. Although mandatory human rights due diligence (MHRDD) legislations do not expressly define a sustainable corporation, they illustrate the problem of definitional narrowness and broadness that states may face in attempting to define the term. The EU CS3D and some national due diligence frameworks limit the scope of HRDD to certain types of companies.Footnote ⁸⁸ The French Vigilance Act is restricted to large corporations and their corporate partners.Footnote ⁸⁹ The Dutch Due Diligence Act is broad and applies to all corporate entities operating in the Netherlands.Footnote ⁹⁰

The second contestation of any proposed definition of a sustainable corporation is behavioural norm contestation. This norm contestation challenges the practical implementation of the normative content of sustainable corporation in the diverse national jurisdictions. In this context, a corollary of this behavioural contestation is the systemic divide (or the international and domestic divide) of the global legal order.Footnote ⁹¹ Thus, putting forward an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation is bound to produce new contestations or reinforce existing ones over the normative relationships between the international and domestic orders regarding the soul of transnational corporations. International law expressly recognises the primacy of domestic law on corporate matters, a position which has received international judicial approval in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain). Footnote ⁹² While company law is largely a field within national jurisdiction,Footnote ⁹³ IHR law in its contemporary form is mainly a product of interstate arrangements.Footnote ⁹⁴ Accordingly, the creation of corporations is primarily within the legislative precinct of states, even though this article pursues a distinct aim, arguing for internationally recognised criteria for sustainable corporations.

The contestation between these international and domestic legal orders notwithstanding, the creation of a sustainable corporation (under domestic law) is one issue, and the legal definition of such a corporation (under international BHR) is a different matter. This article is centred on the latter. Thus, the international framework on BHR should shape the definition of a sustainable corporation to ensure a consistent global standard of reference, and domestic laws should foster implementation, including criteria for creating sustainable corporations within national jurisdictions. In this context, the question of the legal meaning of a sustainable corporation is intrinsically linked to the success of an international legally binding instrument, yet these pursuits are not mutually inclusive.

This later analysis raises one vital question: whether an international BHR treaty can effectively address the lack of a definition of a sustainable corporation. Since any definition of a sustainable corporation is normative, its authoritative source should be a treaty or other sources of international law. Three of these sources are briefly discussed: the LBI, an advisory opinion, and domestic legislative sources. First, the current work of the UN IGWG to produce a legally binding instrument on transnational businesses provides an important starting point for defining, or at least expressly referencing, sustainable corporations in the context of the LBI. Thus, the LBI’s ambition should be expressly expanded to address the integration problem by drawing on the proposed definition, as no other legal definition of a sustainable corporation is known at the time of this writing. The LBI is a desirable venue not only for defining a sustainable corporation but also for addressing the integration problem, for at least two obvious reasons. First, the LBI, as compared with the elements of the suggested definition of a sustainable corporation, is expected to be legally binding on transnational companies. Second, the LBI, similar to the suggested definition, places people and the planet above profit. Admittedly, the aim of solving the integration problem is already intrinsic in the LBI’s ambition. The second authoritative source of international law that may produce a definition of a sustainable corporation is an advisory opinion of an international court or tribunal. The UN General Assembly may therefore ask the International Court of Justice: what is the legal definition of a sustainable corporation in international law, with specific reference to IHR instruments and SDGs instruments.

Third, while international law can propel domestic legal change in defining a sustainable corporation, the inverse is also possible: domestic institutions and laws are sources of law, and they can resolve normative contestation at the international level. As national institutions such as courts have influenced the development of norms at the global level by shaping state practice, these institutions may also shape a definition of a sustainable corporation that can be translated to the international level. HRDD laws and National Action Plans (NAPs) can shape state practices towards the meaning of a sustainable corporation. However, as discussed earlier, these practices are inconsistent and set different standards for the nature and types of companies that may be classified as sustainable corporations.

The implementation of a human rights definition of a sustainable corporation within the domestic system is not pursued in this article; however, the following brief suggestions are offered. The relative success and shortcomings of the growing HRDD legislations in translating the UNDPs and other instruments into domestic law speak to how an international definition of a sustainable corporation may be transposed into national systems.Footnote ⁹⁵ Assuming states decide to develop an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation, one way to reflect such a definition in a domestic context is for states to create or amend their existing company and/or HRDD legislation to incorporate a direct human rights obligation for companies.Footnote ⁹⁶ For example, HRDD legislations around the world, such as those discussed earlier and the German Supply Chain Act, encourage companies to respect human rights in their global supply/value chains.Footnote ⁹⁷ Another, but less effective measure for domestic implementation of an international definition of a sustainable corporation is for states to incorporate its meaning into their NAPs on BHR.Footnote ⁹⁸ It will be difficult to convince states to adopt these proposals, as they enact corporate laws to support their economies. These concerns could be addressed at a secondary level after the primary issue of defining a sustainable corporation has been settled, by securing the requisite political will of states for a universally recognised legal definition of a sustainable corporation in BHR context. Norm contestation notwithstanding, the emergence of an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation creates the possibility of normative responsibility for states to implement such a definition at the domestic level.