1. Introduction
Theories of welfare are commonly classified into mental state theories of welfare, which hold that individuals are well-off to the extent that they experience specific kinds of mental states (e.g., Clark et al. Reference Clark, Sarah Flèche, Powdthavee and Ward2018, on happiness; Feldman Reference Feldman1997, on pleasure), preference satisfaction theories of welfare (henceforth, PSTW), which hold that individuals are well-off to the extent that their own preferences are satisfied (e.g., Bernheim Reference Bernheim2009; Ferreira Reference Ferreira2023), and objective list theories of welfare, which hold that individuals are well-off to the extent that they have certain goods/experiences (e.g., health, education, friendship) irrespective of whether they experience specific kinds of mental states or satisfy their preferences (e.g., Fletcher Reference Fletcher2013; Nussbaum Reference Nussbaum2000).Footnote 1 Philosophers/welfare economists frequently assume that individuals’ preferences can be reliably inferred from their choices and often rely on PSTW (e.g., Adler and Fleurbaey Reference Adler and Fleurbaey2016; Angner Reference Angner and Fletcher2016; Sobel Reference Sobel1998; Sumner Reference Sumner1996, ch. 5). In recent years, however, several prominent authors have argued that PSTW fail to provide a plausible theory of welfare. In this article, I develop and support a qualified defence of PSTW against the most influential objections put forward in the economic and philosophy of science literatures. My main claim is that although PSTW face significant conceptual and practical challenges, specific versions of PSTW – namely, informed PSTW – are more plausible than their critics maintain, and philosophers/welfare economists are justified in relying on such versions of PSTW.Footnote 2
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the main tenets of PSTW and distinguishes between the three main proffered versions of PSTW, namely actual PSTW, informed PSTW, and ideal PSTW. Sections 3–7 defend informed PSTW against five prominent objections. More specifically, I explicate and address in turn: (i) the objection from inner rational agents (e.g., Infante et al. Reference Infante, Lecouteux and Sugden2016a; Sugden Reference Sugden2018, ch. 4–5); (ii) the objection from unfeasible preference reconstruction (e.g., Infante et al. Reference Infante, Lecouteux and Sugden2016b; Rizzo and Whitman Reference Rizzo and Whitman2020, ch. 6–7); (iii) the objection from dubious normative commitments (e.g., Hausman and McPherson Reference Hausman and McPherson2009; Kraut Reference Kraut2007, part II); (iv) the objection from conceptual ambiguity (e.g., Hausman Reference Hausman2024; Lecouteux Reference Lecouteux2022); and (v) the objection from conceptual replacement (e.g., Levy and Glimcher Reference Levy and Glimcher2012; Thoma Reference Thoma2021a).
Before proceeding, the following three preliminary remarks are worth making. First, the objections I address target the main tenets of informed PSTW, which concern the existence of informed preferences, the possibility of reconstructing these preferences, and the normative/evaluative significance of such preferences. These objections do not exhaust the set of critical issues faced by informed PSTW (e.g., Sugden Reference Sugden2008; Whitman and Rizzo Reference Whitman and Rizzo2015, holding that adopting informed PSTW leads philosophers/welfare economists to endorse unjustified paternalistic interventions; Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2024, for a reply). Still, as I illustrate below, those objections target the main respects in which the plausibility of informed PSTW has been called into question in the recent economic and philosophy of science literatures. I take such objections to be especially interesting to philosophers/welfare economists since they encompass the major bones of contention between the proponents and the critics of informed PSTW and highlight the most pressing challenges faced by PSTW more generally.
Second, PSTW are not the only approach that aims to ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations on information concerning individuals’ preferences. Still, PSTW differ from several other preference-based approaches to welfare evaluations in that PSTW take preference satisfaction to constitute welfare rather than merely provide evidence for welfare (e.g., Hausman and McPherson Reference Hausman and McPherson2009, 1–2, on the evidential account of welfare, which holds that ‘if individuals seek to benefit themselves and are good judges of what is good for them, then […] their preferences will be reliable indicators of what is good for them’). I do not aim in this article to assess the comparative strengths and limitations of different preference-based approaches to welfare evaluations. However, I shall expand on preference-based approaches other than informed PSTW when consideration of such approaches directly bears on my defence of informed PSTW (e.g., Section 5 on the evidential account of welfare).Footnote 3
And third, my defence of informed PSTW primarily focuses on individual welfare evaluations rather than social welfare evaluations since social welfare evaluations raise additional complications that are orthogonal to the merits of informed PSTW (e.g., Adler Reference Adler2012, ch. 3; Fleurbaey Reference Fleurbaey2012, on various epistemic challenges faced by attempts to ground interpersonal comparisons of welfare; Adler Reference Adler2019, ch. 3–4; Fleurbaey and Maniquet Reference Fleurbaey and Maniquet2011, ch. 2–4, on various normative challenges faced by attempts to determine what weights should be ascribed to different individuals’ welfare in interpersonal aggregations of welfare). Still, I shall comment in various places on the applicability of informed PSTW to social welfare evaluations (e.g., Sections 3–7 on the evaluation of policies’ welfare implications).Footnote 4
2. Preference satisfaction theories of welfare
According to PSTW, the satisfaction of individuals’ preferences constitutes individuals’ welfare, i.e. makes individuals better off than they would be in otherwise identical situations where their preferences are not satisfied (e.g., Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2021; Hausman Reference Hausman2012, ch. 7–8). In particular, an individual’s preferences for some state of affairs count as satisfied if such state of affairs occurs (e.g., Hausman Reference Hausman2010, 326; also Griffin Reference Griffin1986, ch. 1; Sumner Reference Sumner1996, ch. 1). Individuals may derive feelings of pleasure or satisfaction from knowing that their preferences are satisfied. Still, on PSTW, preference satisfaction does not have to involve any feelings of pleasure or satisfaction (e.g., Hausman and McPherson Reference Hausman and McPherson2009, 13; Kraut Reference Kraut2007, 98–99) and may constitute welfare irrespective of whether it involves such feelings (e.g., Hausman and McPherson Reference Hausman and McPherson2009, 10, holding that ‘there is only [a] contingent connection between the satisfaction of a preference and the satisfaction [felt by] a person’; also Arneson Reference Arneson1999, 123; Rabinowicz and Österberg Reference Rabinowicz and Österberg1996, 2).Footnote 5
Three main versions of PSTW have been articulated in the specialized literature. Actual PSTW take individuals’ welfare to be constituted by the satisfaction of their actual preferences, i.e. the preferences individuals happen to have in the examined choice settings (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer Reference Gul, Pesendorfer, Caplin and Schotter2008, 24). For their part, informed PSTW take individuals’ welfare to be constituted by the satisfaction of their informed preferences, i.e. the preferences individuals are able to form on the basis of accurate information and considerate judgements concerning their choice options/circumstances (e.g., Griffin Reference Griffin1986, ch. 1–2). Still differently, ideal PSTW take individuals’ welfare to be constituted by the satisfaction of their ideal preferences, i.e. the preferences individuals would counterfactually have ‘if they had complete information [concerning their choice options/circumstances and] unlimited cognitive abilities’ (Sunstein and Thaler Reference Sunstein and Thaler2003, 1162; also Harsanyi Reference Harsanyi, Sen and Williams1982, 55, on the preferences individuals would have if they ‘had all the relevant factual information [and] were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice’).Footnote 6
The distinction between actual PSTW, informed PSTW, and ideal PSTW categorizes the proffered versions of PSTW into three exclusive sets. These versions of PSTW require preferences to meet dissimilar conditions to qualify as actual preferences, informed preferences, and ideal preferences, respectively. I shall expand on these dissimilarities in Sections 3–7. For now, I note that – contrary to actual PSTW – both informed PSTW and ideal PSTW impose at least two conditions on individuals’ preferences, namely information (epistemic) conditions, which concern the extent to which individuals’ preferences are grounded on accurate information concerning individuals’ choice options/circumstances, and consistency (structural rationality) conditions, which concern the extent to which individuals’ preferences fit specific consistency requirements (e.g., transitivity). The idea is that only some of individuals’ preferences are such that their satisfaction constitutes individuals’ welfare and that only preferences which satisfy specific information conditions (e.g., accurate information about the available choice options) and specific consistency conditions (e.g., transitivity) are plausibly taken to belong to such a set of welfare-relevant preferences (e.g., Griffin Reference Griffin1986, ch. 1–2; Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2025).Footnote 7
More specifically, ideal PSTW impose rather demanding information and consistency conditions on preferences, in that they hold that only fully informed and consistent preferences are such that their satisfaction constitutes welfare (e.g., Harsanyi Reference Harsanyi, Sen and Williams1982, 55; Sunstein and Thaler Reference Sunstein and Thaler2003, 1162). For their part, informed PSTW impose less demanding information and consistency conditions on preferences, in that they allow that the satisfaction of incompletely informed and partly inconsistent preferences may constitute welfare (e.g., Bernheim Reference Bernheim2021, 390–92; Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2024, 89–91). Distinct versions of informed PSTW impose different information and consistency conditions on preferences (e.g., Griffin Reference Griffin1986, ch. 1). These differences by no means justify taking any information and consistency conditions to reliably track individuals’ welfare (e.g., Sections 3–4 on the inadequacy of various information and consistency conditions). Still, those differences are not inherently problematic for the proponents of informed PSTW. For both information and consistency are plausibly taken to admit of degrees, and the specification of the information and consistency conditions presupposed by informed PSTW may justifiably vary across choice settings (e.g., how much information individuals must possess for their preferences to qualify as informed may justifiably vary depending on what individuals are involved and what choices they face). I shall explicate such differences in Sections 3–7.Footnote 8
According to the critics of PSTW, neither actual PSTW nor informed/ideal PSTW withstand scrutiny. The critics’ case against actual PSTW can be explicated as follows. Let us call those actual preferences whose satisfaction is plausibly taken to constitute welfare (if any) actual preferences*. Philosophers/welfare economists can identify actual preferences* only if individuals’ actual preferences meet stringent information conditions (e.g., accurate information about the available choice options) and consistency conditions (e.g., transitivity). However, individuals’ actual preferences frequently fail to meet these conditions (e.g., Sugden Reference Sugden1991, on violations of transitivity; Hausman Reference Hausman2011, on cases where individuals’ actual preferences rest on inaccurate information about the available choice options). Moreover, individuals’ actual preferences often track factors that appear to be prudentially irrelevant (e.g., Camerer and Loewenstein Reference Camerer, Loewenstein, Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin2004, on cases where individuals’ actual preferences depend on frames) or even hamper what most theories of welfare regard as individuals’ welfare (e.g., Hausman and McPherson Reference Hausman and McPherson2009, on cases where individuals prefer options that hamper their welfare because they mistakenly believe that such options enhance their welfare; Stoljar Reference Stoljar, Veltman and Piper2014, on cases where individuals prefer options that hamper their welfare as a result of adaptation). For these reasons, the critics of actual PSTW go, the satisfaction of individuals’ actual preferences cannot be plausibly taken to constitute individuals’ welfare.Footnote 9
The critics’ case against informed/ideal PSTW can be explicated as follows.Footnote 10 Let us call those informed/ideal preferences whose satisfaction is plausibly taken to constitute welfare (if any) informed/ideal preferences*. Informed/ideal PSTW can accommodate the fact that individuals’ actual preferences are often inconsistent, ill-informed, and track factors that appear to be prudentially irrelevant/detrimental. For as leading critics of PSTW acknowledge, one may plausibly ascribe to individuals informed/ideal preferences* in several cases where individuals’ actual preferences are inconsistent, ill-informed, and track factors that appear to be prudentially irrelevant/detrimental (e.g., Hausman and McPherson Reference Hausman and McPherson2009, 11, holding that informed/ideal PSTW ‘resolve […] most of the difficulties facing the actual preference-satisfaction view’ since a person’s actual preferences often fail to be ‘informed’ ‘and so satisfying [such preferences] would not make the person better off’; also Loeb Reference Loeb1995, 1; Rosati Reference Rosati2006, 63; Sumner Reference Sumner1996, ch. 5). However, it is difficult to determine what notion of informed/ideal preferences should ground welfare evaluations unless one makes substantive normative/evaluative assumptions (e.g., McQuillin and Sugden Reference McQuillin and Sugden2012, 560, claiming that the concepts of ‘complete information’ and ‘unlimited cognition’ figuring in ideal PSTW are ‘inescapably normative’). Moreover, different approaches have been developed to reconstruct individuals’ informed/ideal preferences*, and different approaches classify different subsets of preferences as informed/ideal preferences* (e.g., Dold Reference Dold2018; Whitman and Rizzo Reference Whitman and Rizzo2015, for illustrations). In fact, reconstructing some individuals’ informed/ideal preferences does not per se enable philosophers/welfare economists to reliably assess these individuals’ welfare (e.g., Sugden Reference Sugden2018, ch. 4, on putative cases where individuals’ choices reveal context-dependent informed/ideal preferences). For these reasons, the critics of informed/ideal PSTW go, the satisfaction of individuals’ informed/ideal preferences cannot be plausibly taken to constitute individuals’ welfare.Footnote 11
In the following sections I argue that the proffered criticisms of PSTW cast doubt on both actual PSTW and ideal PSTW, but fail to undermine informed PSTW. In particular, I shall defend informed PSTW against five prominent objections, namely: the objection from inner rational agents (Section 3); the objection from unfeasible preference reconstruction (Section 4); the objection from dubious normative commitments (Section 5); the objection from conceptual ambiguity (Section 6); and the objection from conceptual replacement (Section 7).Footnote 12
3. Objection from inner rational agents
The objection from inner rational agents holds that informed PSTW do not withstand scrutiny because individuals cannot be plausibly taken to have well-informed and consistent informed preferences*. The objection proceeds as follows. Individuals’ informed preferences can be regarded as either actual attitudes or merely hypothetical attitudes. Now, if individuals’ informed preferences are regarded as actual attitudes, then the claim that individuals have ‘inner rational agents’ with well-informed and consistent informed preferences* ‘lacks psychological foundations’ (Sugden Reference Sugden2018, 13, italics added). For ‘there is no general reason’ to think that ‘inner rational agents’ with well-informed and consistent informed preferences* ‘exist at all’ (Infante et al. Reference Infante, Lecouteux and Sugden2016b, 34; also Infante et al. Reference Infante, Lecouteux and Sugden2016a, 22). Conversely, if individuals’ informed preferences are regarded as merely hypothetical attitudes, then these preferences lack sufficient connection to individuals’ welfare to ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations. For what one would prefer under hypothetical circumstances may be rather uninformative about her welfare (e.g., Cowen Reference Cowen1993, 265, holding that ‘a self with radically different brain endowments and capacities […] cannot judge my welfare [because such self] is a different individual altogether’).
This objection correctly notes that some versions of informed PSTW presuppose (rather than show) that individuals have a set of well-informed and consistent informed preferences* (e.g., Infante et al. Reference Infante, Lecouteux and Sugden2016a, for illustrations). Still, there are at least two reasons to doubt that the objection undermines informed PSTW. First, informed PSTW do not rest on the assumption that individuals have inner rational agents with informed preferences*. In particular, the proponents of informed PSTW may provide detailed specifications of the conditions under which individuals are plausibly ascribed informed preferences* without having to posit any inner rational agents having such preferences* (e.g., Hausman Reference Hausman2016). For informed PSTW’s information and consistency conditions do not concern whether individuals’ preferences are formed via any particular psychological process. And the proponents of informed PSTW can determine what preferences meet such conditions without having to posit any inner rational agents (e.g., Beck Reference Beck2023; Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2024).Footnote 13
And second, the proponents of informed PSTW can identify preferences that both meet the information and consistency conditions presupposed by informed PSTW and have sufficient connection to individuals’ welfare to ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations (e.g., Bernheim Reference Bernheim2021; Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2025, on various sets of well-informed and transitive preferences). To be sure, the fact that an individual’s preferences meet some information and consistency conditions does not per se imply that satisfying such preferences is plausibly taken to constitute the individual’s welfare. For not all information and consistency conditions are plausibly taken to reliably track individuals’ welfare (Section 2; also Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2021). Still, the information and consistency conditions presupposed by leading versions of informed PSTW (e.g., transitivity, accurate information about the available choice options) provide a reliable criterion for reconstructing informed preferences*. For satisfying well-informed/consistent preferences tends to yield individuals higher welfare-relevant payoffs than satisfying ill-informed/inconsistent preferences (e.g., Beshears et al. Reference Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian2008, on cases where satisfying ill-informed preferences prevents individuals from achieving their own welfare-related goals; Gustafsson Reference Gustafsson2022, sec. 4, on cases where satisfying intransitive preferences makes individuals vulnerable to sure loss).Footnote 14
A critic of informed PSTW may object that informed PSTW evaluate individuals’ welfare ‘relative to the preferences that [individuals] would have revealed if not subject to reasoning imperfections’, and so implicitly presuppose that individuals have well-informed and consistent latent preferences*, i.e. preferences ‘that are formed within the minds of individual[s and] do not correspond directly with objective properties of the external world’ (Infante et al. Reference Infante, Lecouteux and Sugden2016a, 7 and 9, italics added; also Infante et al. Reference Infante, Lecouteux and Sugden2016b, 33). However, the proponents of informed PSTW can ascribe individuals well-informed and consistent informed preferences* without presupposing that individuals have well-informed and consistent latent preferences*. To illustrate this, consider Bernheim and Rangel’s preference-based approach, which aims to reconstruct a range of informed preferences* in settings where individuals’ choices depend on ancillary conditions, i.e. ‘feature[s] of the choice environment that may affect behaviour, but [are] not taken as relevant to [welfare]’ (Reference Bernheim and Rangel2009, 55).Footnote 15
Bernheim and Rangel’s approach relies on the notion of ‘unambiguous choice’ as its welfare criterion. The idea is that ‘one alternative is unambiguously superior to another if and only if the second is never chosen when the first is available’ to individuals (Bernheim Reference Bernheim2016, 15). Conversely, when individuals’ choices between two options vary across ancillary conditions, one should regard it as indeterminate which option enhances individuals’ welfare unless the observed choices result from demonstrable mistakes, i.e. are ‘predicated on a characterization of the available options […] that is inconsistent with the information available’ to individuals and ‘there is some other option in the opportunity set that [individuals] would select [in the absence of such] characterization failure’ (2016, 48). According to some critics, Bernheim and Rangel’s approach presupposes that individuals have ‘a neoclassical agent deep inside that is struggling to surface’ (Rizzo and Whitman Reference Rizzo and Whitman2020, 80; also Sugden Reference Sugden2018, 57). However, the approach does not assume ‘a context-independent objective function […] defined over a domain encompassing all the options of potential interest’ (Bernheim Reference Bernheim2021, 392). In particular, the approach does not define mistakes in terms of divergences between choices and latent preferences*, and ‘does not assume that error-free choices reveal’ well-informed and consistent latent preferences* (392). In fact, Bernheim explicitly claims that individuals frequently ‘aggregate the many diverse aspects of [their] experience only when called to [choose]’ (2016, 20).Footnote 16
4. Objection from unfeasible preference reconstruction
The objection from unfeasible preference reconstruction holds that informed PSTW do not withstand scrutiny because philosophers/welfare economists cannot reliably reconstruct well-informed and consistent informed preferences*. The objection proceeds as follows. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that individuals can be plausibly taken to have well-informed and consistent informed preferences*. Even so, the assumption that philosophers/welfare economists ‘can reconstruct [these preferences*] is a mirage’ (Sugden Reference Sugden2018, 14, italics added). For the information and consistency conditions presupposed by informed PSTW frequently allow for different (and sometimes contradictory) reconstructions of individuals’ informed preferences* (e.g., Matson Reference Matson2022). And apparent conflicts between preferences can typically be resolved in multiple ways (e.g., Whitman and Rizzo Reference Whitman and Rizzo2015, on the difficulty of identifying welfare-optimal rates of saving and intertemporal discounting). Hence, philosophers/welfare economists often ‘have no means of determining which of the conflicting preferences reflect [informed preferences*]’ (Rizzo and Whitman Reference Rizzo and Whitman2020, 75; also Dold Reference Dold2018, 161).
This objection correctly notes that philosophers’/welfare economists’ attempts to reconstruct informed preferences* face significant epistemic and normative challenges (e.g., Pettigrew Reference Pettigrew2023, on the epistemic and normative assumptions required to establish whether correcting specific inconsistencies enhances individuals’ welfare). Still, there are at least two reasons to doubt that the objection undermines informed PSTW. First, philosophers/welfare economists can reconstruct informed preferences* in several cases where the involved individuals fail to exhibit well-informed and consistent actual preferences (e.g., Bernheim and Rangel Reference Bernheim and Rangel2009, for reconstructions of informed preferences* in settings where choices are affected by ancillary conditions; Salant and Rubinstein Reference Salant and Rubinstein2008, for reconstructions of informed preferences* in settings where choices are affected by frames). To be sure, philosophers/welfare economists may be unable to reconstruct informed preferences* in presence of widespread choice inconsistencies (e.g., Sugden Reference Sugden2018, 58; also Bernheim Reference Bernheim2016, 60, conceding that his approach ‘may not be very discerning […] in settings where choice inconsistencies are pervasive’). Yet, individuals’ choice inconsistencies are rarely so widespread that they prevent philosophers/welfare economists from reconstructing informed preferences*. To illustrate this, consider situations where individuals make some intransitive choices. These choices complicate philosophers’/welfare economists’ attempts to reconstruct individuals’ informed preferences*, but do not generally prevent philosophers/welfare economists from reconstructing such preferences*. For philosophers/welfare economists are frequently able to reconstruct informed preferences* in presence of some intransitive choices based on the core of transitive choices made by the involved individuals (e.g., Nishimura Reference Nishimura2018, 589–99, for reconstructions of informed risk/time preferences* based on the core of transitive choices made by individuals). And philosophers/welfare economists can often point to experimental evidence demonstrating that individuals tend to regard transitivity as normatively compelling and are willing to revise intransitive choices when they realize these choices’ intransitivity (e.g., Hands Reference Hands2014, 401–2; Nielsen and Rehbeck Reference Nielsen and John Rehbeck2022, 2237–39).
And second, philosophers/welfare economists can frequently rely on multiple sources of evidence to reconstruct informed preferences*. In fact, philosophers/welfare economists have grounded several reconstructions of informed preferences* on both choice-based sources of evidence (e.g., Bernheim and Taubinsky Reference Bernheim, Taubinsky, Bernheim, DellaVigna and Laibson2018, on information concerning individuals’ hypothetical choices; Ferreira Reference Ferreira2023, on information concerning the choices individuals would repeat at the time of welfare evaluation) and non-choice-based sources of evidence (e.g., Arieli et al. Reference Arieli, Ben-Ami and Rubinstein2011, on eye-tracking data showing whether individuals attend to the available choice options; Bernheim Reference Bernheim2016, on factual questions with objectively verifiable answers showing whether individuals understand the examined choice problems). To be sure, philosophers’/welfare economists’ attempts to reconstruct informed preferences* typically depend on normative/evaluative presuppositions about the notion of welfare (e.g., Haybron and Tiberius Reference Haybron and Tiberius2015, 714–17). However, these dependences do not reflect limitations inherent in informed PSTW, but rather reflect the thickness of the notion of welfare, i.e. the fact that this notion involves both positive and normative/evaluative dimensions (e.g., Dold and Schubert Reference Dold and Schubert2018, 223–24) and that, as a result, welfare ascriptions typically rely on both positive and normative/evaluative presuppositions (e.g., Fletcher Reference Fletcher2019, 703–4).
A critic of informed PSTW may object that distinct sources of evidence may ground conflicting reconstructions of informed preferences* and that the information and consistency conditions presupposed by informed PSTW do not enable philosophers/welfare economists to discriminate between such reconstructions, i.e. to determine which of the proffered reconstructions of informed preferences reliably track informed preferences* (e.g., Whitman and Rizzo Reference Whitman and Rizzo2015, 420–4). The idea is that philosophers/welfare economists frequently face substantial normative ambiguity and that the information and consistency conditions presupposed by informed PSTW do not enable philosophers/welfare economists to resolve such ambiguity (e.g., Berg and Gigerenzer Reference Berg and Gigerenzer2010, 148–50, on putative cases where satisfying ill-informed and inconsistent preferences enhances individuals’ welfare).
However, the objection significantly overestimates the extent of normative ambiguity inherent in individuals’ preferences. For as noted in Section 3, satisfying well-informed/consistent preferences tends to yield individuals higher welfare-relevant payoffs than satisfying ill-informed/inconsistent preferences. Moreover, the information and consistency conditions presupposed by informed PSTW provide a reliable (though fallible) basis to resolve the normative ambiguity inherent in individuals’ preferences by discriminating between conflicting reconstructions of informed preferences*, or at least by narrowing down the set of plausible reconstructions of such preferences*. To illustrate this, consider situations where individuals exhibit varying willingness to pay for specific goods/experiences across multiple frames. This variability complicates philosophers’/welfare economists’ attempts to reconstruct informed preferences*, but does not per se prevent philosophers/welfare economists from reconstructing a range of informed preferences* by demarcating precise and plausible bounds for minimal and maximal willingness to pay for the examined goods/experiences (e.g., Bernheim Reference Bernheim2016, 60–64; also Abrahamson Reference Abrahamson2024, 24–26, for additional illustrations of philosophers’/welfare economists’ ability to reconstruct informed preferences* in cases where the involved individuals exhibit context-dependent preferences).Footnote 17
5. Objection from dubious normative commitments
The objection from dubious normative commitments holds that informed PSTW do not withstand scrutiny because informed PSTW’s normative assumption that the satisfaction of informed preferences constitutes welfare is implausible. The objection proceeds as follows. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that individuals can be plausibly taken to have well-informed and consistent informed preferences. Assume further that philosophers/welfare economists can reliably reconstruct these preferences. Even so, the satisfaction of such preferences is not plausibly taken to constitute individuals’ welfare. For a given state of affairs is not good for one ‘simply because [one prefers] with proper information, and reflectively [such state of affairs] to occur’ (Kraut Reference Kraut2007, 118, italics added; also Scanlon Reference Scanlon1998, 115). In particular, ‘it is one thing to determine what people’s [informed] preferences would be […] and it is a different thing to determine what is good for people’ (Hausman Reference Hausman2016, 30, italics added; also Hausman and McPherson Reference Hausman and McPherson2009, 12, holding that ‘the fact that [one] prefers x to y does not make it the case that x is better for [her] than y, no matter what conditions one imposes on [her] preferences’).
This objection correctly notes that substantiating informed PSTW requires the proponents of informed PSTW to support informed PSTW’s normative assumption that the satisfaction of informed preferences constitutes welfare. Still, there are at least two reasons to doubt that the objection undermines informed PSTW. First, supporting informed PSTW’s normative assumption that the satisfaction of informed preferences constitutes welfare is less demanding than the objection seems to presuppose. To illustrate this, let us distinguish between fundamental constituents of welfare – i.e. non-instrumentally valuable goods/experiences whose constitutive relation with welfare grounds the constitutive relation (if any) between all other non-instrumentally valuable goods/experiences and welfare – and intermediate constituents of welfare – i.e. non-instrumentally valuable goods/experiences whose constitutive relation with welfare is grounded in the constitutive relation between fundamental constituents and welfare. Supporting informed PSTW’s normative assumption that the satisfaction of informed preferences constitutes welfare does not require the proponents of informed PSTW to provide an exhaustive specification of all (fundamental and intermediate) constituents of welfare (e.g., Rabinowicz and Österberg Reference Rabinowicz and Österberg1996, 8–12). In particular, one may consistently endorse informed PSTW and acknowledge the existence of multiple intermediate constituents of welfare. For the issue of whether a given good/experience is a constituent of welfare is conceptually distinct from the issue of whether the constitutive relation between this good/experience and welfare (if any) is grounded in the constitutive relation between some other goods/experiences and welfare. In fact, several versions of informed PSTW allow that the satisfaction of informed preferences may constitute welfare through dissimilar intermediate constituents of welfare in different contexts (e.g., footnote 5 on the possibility that the satisfaction of informed preferences may constitute welfare through the contingent link between the satisfaction of an individual’s informed preferences and the sense of satisfaction that the individual may derive from knowing that such preferences are satisfied).
And second, the satisfaction of preferences that meet the information and consistency conditions presupposed by leading versions of informed PSTW (e.g., transitivity, accurate information about the available choice options) can be plausibly taken to constitute individuals’ welfare (Sections 3–4). To be sure, one may point to several cases where philosophers/welfare economists disagree as to whether satisfying specific sets of informed preferences constitutes individuals’ welfare (e.g., Griffin Reference Griffin1986, ch. 1; Sumner Reference Sumner1996, ch. 5, on cases where individuals are unaware that their informed preferences are satisfied; Parfit Reference Parfit1984, 494–95; Scanlon Reference Scanlon1996, 111, on cases where individuals’ informed preferences target states of affairs that seem unrelated to individuals’ own welfare). However, the existence of contested cases does not per se license scepticism about informed PSTW. For many cases are not contested (e.g., individuals are often aware of whether their informed preferences are satisfied; individuals’ informed preferences frequently target states of affairs related to what most theories of welfare regard as individuals’ own welfare). And most contested cases are contested because of the normative/evaluative complexity inherent in such cases rather than because of alleged shortcomings inherent in informed PSTW (e.g., Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2022, 532–33; Sunstein Reference Sunstein2015, 518–19). That is to say, adopting theories of welfare other than informed PSTW does not per se enable philosophers/welfare economists to avoid contested cases (e.g., Griffin Reference Griffin1986, 17; Keller Reference Keller2009, 656). And the proponents of informed PSTW may consistently endorse dissimilar positions concerning the proffered contested cases (e.g., Hawkins Reference Hawkins and Shafer-Landau2019, on recent debate about cases where individuals are unaware that their informed preferences are satisfied; Heathwood Reference Heathwood2019, on recent debate about cases where individuals’ informed preferences target states of affairs that seem unrelated to individuals’ own welfare).Footnote 18
A critic of informed PSTW may object that informed PSTW rest on unnecessary normative commitments since philosophers/welfare economists can ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations on information concerning individuals’ informed preferences without endorsing any theory of welfare (e.g., Hausman Reference Hausman2010, 341; Hausman and McPherson Reference Hausman and McPherson2009, 16). The idea is that philosophers/welfare economists should retain informed PSTW’s aim to ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations on information concerning individuals’ informed preferences, but should relinquish informed PSTW’s assumption that the satisfaction of informed preferences constitutes welfare because there is an evidential (rather than constitutive) connection between the satisfaction of informed preferences and welfare (e.g., Scanlon Reference Scanlon1998, 116–18). However, it is dubious that appealing to this purported evidential connection undermines the justifiability of relying on informed PSTW. To illustrate this, consider the so-called evidential account of welfare, according to which ‘if individuals seek to benefit themselves and are good judges of what is good for them, then […] their preferences will be reliable indicators of what is good for them […] regardless of what theory of welfare one accepts’ (Hausman and McPherson Reference Hausman and McPherson2009, 1–2, italics added; also Hausman Reference Hausman2012, 89).
The evidential account has gained significant prominence among the proponents of preference-based approaches in the recent economic and philosophy of science literatures (e.g., Beck Reference Beck2023). Still, it is hard to establish whether the satisfaction of preferences that meet the conditions posited by the evidential account provides reliable evidence for welfare unless one relies on specific theories of welfare (e.g., Sarch Reference Sarch2015, 143–46). Moreover, the evidential account appears to have quite a limited domain of applicability (e.g., Hersch Reference Hersch2015, 282–83; also Hausman Reference Hausman2016, 29, acknowledging that the conditions posited by the evidential account, taken collectively, ‘are often not met’). These complications do not undermine the justifiability of relying on the evidential account in choice settings where the conditions posited by such account hold (e.g., Hausman Reference Hausman2022a, 355–56), but constrain the evidential account’s potential to ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations. In particular, they make it difficult to see on what basis philosophers/welfare economists may rely to establish whether the satisfaction of preferences provides reliable evidence for welfare in choice settings where philosophers/welfare economists are unable to determine whether the conditions posited by the evidential account are met and in choice settings where the conditions posited by the evidential account are not met (e.g., Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2021, 126–28). In this respect, the evidential account’s purported agnosticism concerning the correct theory (or theories) of welfare appears to significantly constrain the evidential account’s potential to ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations.Footnote 19
6. Objection from conceptual ambiguity
The objection from conceptual ambiguity holds that informed PSTW do not withstand scrutiny because informed PSTW are premised on dissimilar (and often conflicting) conceptions of preferences. The objection proceeds as follows. In the economic and philosophy of science literatures, multiple conceptions of preferences have been advocated, which rest on dissimilar (and often conflicting) presuppositions regarding the relationship between preferences and choices (e.g., Thoma Reference Thoma2021b; Vredenburgh Reference Vredenburgh2024, on the relationship between preferences and actual or hypothetical choices), the causal bases of preferences (e.g., Guala Reference Guala2019; Ross Reference Ross2011, on the issue of whether preferences are more plausibly regarded as mental attitudes, dispositions, or behavioural patterns), and the nature of preferences (e.g., Broome Reference Broome, Frey and Morris1993; Hausman Reference Hausman2012, ch. 7–8, on the issue of whether preferences are more aptly characterized as judgements or feelings). However, substantiating informed PSTW requires the proponents of informed PSTW to specify which conceptions of preferences they endorse and put forward convincing reasons/evidence in favour of such conceptions. For the plausibility of informed PSTW critically depends on the merits of the conceptions of preferences on which informed PSTW are premised (e.g., Dietrich and List Reference Dietrich and List2016b). Regrettably, the objection goes, the proponents of informed PSTW have hitherto failed to address these specification and justification challenges (e.g., Lecouteux Reference Lecouteux2022).Footnote 20
This objection correctly notes that substantiating informed PSTW requires the proponents of informed PSTW to specify which conceptions of preferences they endorse and put forward convincing reasons/evidence in favour of such conceptions. Still, there are at least two reasons to doubt that the objection undermines informed PSTW. First, the information and consistency conditions presupposed by informed PSTW impose several constraints on admissible conceptions of preferences (e.g., Hausman Reference Hausman2011, 7–10, on how the consistency conditions presupposed by informed PSTW imply that preferences are inherently comparative). This does not per se enable the proponents of informed PSTW to univocally determine what conception of preferences philosophers/welfare economists should adopt in specific contexts (e.g., Mandler Reference Mandler2005, 255–56, on how the plausibility of various consistency conditions may itself vary depending on what conception of preferences one endorses). Still, it enables the proponents of informed PSTW to significantly narrow down the set of plausible conceptions of preferences (e.g., Cozic and Hill Reference Cozic and Hill2015, 297–99).
And second, the proponents of informed PSTW may justify their reliance on informed PSTW without having to specify and support a single general conception of preferences. For the merits of different conceptions of preferences are plausibly taken to depend on the theoretical and pragmatic presuppositions of the models and the policy applications where preferences figure (e.g., Angner Reference Angner2018, 675–79). And different conceptions of preferences may be suitable for distinct modelling and policy purposes (e.g., Beck Reference Beck2024, 1444–50; also Vredenburgh Reference Vredenburgh, Heilmann and Reiss2021). To be sure, theoretical terms such as ‘preference’ may have specific pre-theoretic connotations (e.g., Hausman Reference Hausman1998, 197–98; Mäki Reference Mäki1998, 306, on folk psychological conceptions of preferences). Yet, these pre-theoretic connotations do not determine the meaning of the theoretical notion of ‘preference’ figuring in informed PSTW (e.g., Ross Reference Ross, Lehtinen, Kuorikoski and Ylikoski2012, 182–84). Hence, the proponents of informed PSTW may consistently acknowledge the existence of such pre-theoretic connotations and advocate distinct conceptions of preferences (e.g., Guala Reference Guala, Lehtinen, Kuorikoski and Ylikoski2012, 137–39).
A critic of informed PSTW may object that the proponents of informed PSTW should ‘clarify the concept of preferences [they endorse] rather than leaving preferences to be defined implicitly by formal conditions and [by their] explanatory and predictive practices’ (Hausman Reference Hausman2024, 213, italics added). The idea is that although the proponents of informed PSTW ‘are free to reconceive of preferences in any way they wish [the proffered] reconceptualizations are not beyond criticism’ (224; also Sen Reference Sen1973, 259). However, the proponents of informed PSTW can draw on several considerations to assess the comparative merits of different conceptions of preferences and support the specific conceptions they endorse. To illustrate this, consider the ongoing debate concerning the comparative merits of behaviourist conceptions of preferences, which regard preferences as indexes of choices (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer Reference Gul, Pesendorfer, Caplin and Schotter2008), and mentalist conceptions of preferences, which regard preferences as mental attitudes (e.g., Rubinstein and Salant Reference Rubinstein, Salant, Caplin and Schotter2008).
Behaviourist conceptions of preferences appear to be more general than mentalist conceptions of preferences since mentalist conceptions ‘limit the attribution of preferences to those with the requisite mental capacities’ (Hausman Reference Hausman2024, 223). In particular, adopting a behaviourist conception of preferences allegedly enables philosophers/welfare economists to ‘black-box […] the psychological processes that lead to choice’ and thereby avoid ‘controversial substantive commitments about psychological processes’ (Thoma Reference Thoma2021b, 165). Conversely, mentalist conceptions of preferences purportedly provide a more informative evidential basis to assess individuals’ welfare than behaviourist conceptions of preferences (e.g., Sumner Reference Sumner1996, ch. 5). In particular, adopting a mentalist conception of preferences may usefully constrain philosophers’/welfare economists’ attempts to reconstruct informed preferences (e.g., Hausman Reference Hausman2011, on how information concerning individuals’ beliefs can help philosophers/welfare economists determine how individuals conceive of the choice options they face). These observations do not determine whether, in general, philosophers/welfare economists should adopt behaviourist or mentalist conceptions of preferences. For what conceptions of preferences philosophers/welfare economists should adopt may plausibly depend on various contextual elements such as individuals’ cognitive/computational abilities (e.g., Okasha Reference Okasha2016) and whether philosophers/welfare economists aim to ground individual welfare evaluations or social welfare evaluations (e.g., Moscati Reference Moscati2021). Still, they nicely illustrate that the proponents of informed PSTW can draw on several considerations to assess the comparative merits of different conceptions of preferences and support the specific conceptions they endorse.Footnote 21
7. Objection from conceptual replacement
The objection from conceptual replacement holds that informed PSTW do not withstand scrutiny because grounding reliable and informative welfare evaluations requires philosophers/welfare economists to replace preference-based approaches with non-preference-based approaches. The objection proceeds as follows. To ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations, philosophers/welfare economists should distinguish between fundamental attitudes that ‘are the starting point of deliberation [and] shouldn’t be changed by the reasoning process’ and non-fundamental attitudes that ‘may be formed in deliberation [and] can be described as mistaken’ in light of the fundamental attitudes (e.g., Thoma Reference Thoma2021a, 355 and 361, on the putative contrast between ‘fundamental desires regarding features of the available options’ and less fundamental preferences). Abiding by this distinction, however, would require philosophers/welfare economists to regard preferences as the outcome of reasoning processes that involve more fundamental attitudes than preferences and thereby abandon preference-based approaches (and, therefore, informed PSTW; e.g., Rizzo Reference Rizzo2025, 10, holding that ‘in back of preferences is desire [and] what is prudentially good for the individual is what she desires’).Footnote 22
This objection correctly notes that non-preference-based approaches may enable philosophers/welfare economists to ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations. Still, there are at least two reasons to doubt that the objection undermines preference-based approaches (and, therefore, informed PSTW). First, philosophers/welfare economists can ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations by refining (rather than replacing) preference-based approaches. To illustrate this, consider again the challenges that apparent inconsistencies in individuals’ actual preferences pose to philosophers’/welfare economists’ attempts to ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations on information concerning individuals’ preferences. The proponents of preference-based approaches have addressed various such challenges by distinguishing between different sets of preferences (e.g., Hausman Reference Hausman2012, 36–37, for a preference-based approach distinguishing ‘basic preferences’, which are independent of individuals’ beliefs about ‘the character and consequences’ of the available options, and ‘non-basic preferences’, which take into account these beliefs and may influence basic preferences in light of such beliefs; also Rubinstein and Salant Reference Rubinstein and Salant2012, 375, for a preference-based approach distinguishing ‘observed preference orderings’, which vary as the result of cognitive processes, and ‘underlying preferences’, which purportedly ‘reflect [individuals’] welfare’).Footnote 23
And second, replacing preference-based approaches with non-preference-based approaches does not per se enable philosophers/welfare economists to ground more reliable and informative welfare evaluations. For the proffered non-preference-based approaches face major conceptual and practical challenges and radically diverge on a number of foundational issues. To illustrate this, consider desire-based approaches. These approaches face major conceptual and practical challenges (e.g., Thoma Reference Thoma2021a, 360, on cases where desire-based welfare evaluations are indeterminate because the involved individuals’ putatively fundamental desires are vague) and radically diverge on a number of foundational issues, including what notions of desire should ground welfare evaluations (e.g., actual versus informed versus ideal desires), on what grounds philosophers/welfare economists should differentiate between more or less allegedly fundamental desires (e.g., the mere fact that a desire happens to be ‘the starting point of deliberation’ falls short of implying that such desire ‘shouldn’t be changed by the reasoning process’) and what exactly the connection between the posited desires and individuals’ welfare is (e.g., constitutive versus evidential connection). These divergences do not exclude the possibility that specific desire-based approaches may ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations, but cast doubt on the claim that philosophers/welfare economists should replace preference-based approaches with desire-based approaches.
A critic of informed PSTW may object that the highlighted divergences between the proffered non-preference-based approaches point to open problems in these approaches, but do not justify philosophers’/welfare economists’ reliance on preference-based approaches. In particular, the critic may maintain that neuro-psychological findings may enable philosophers/welfare economists to reduce preference-based approaches to non-preference-based approaches grounded on empirical findings concerning the neuro-psychological substrates of choices (e.g., Glimcher Reference Glimcher2011, ch. 6–8). The idea is that neuro-psychological findings provide ‘a tool for measuring preferences neurobiologically’ (Levy and Glimcher Reference Levy and Glimcher2012, 1027) and enable policy makers to ‘design [policies] that maximize welfare’ (Loewenstein and Haisley Reference Loewenstein, Haisley, Caplin and Schotter2008, 238).
However, the great heterogeneity of the neuro-psychological substrates of welfare-enhancing choices casts doubt on the prospects of reductive non-preference-based approaches. For a given neuro-psychological process may contribute to generating choices having rather different welfare implications, and dissimilar sets of neuro-psychological processes may contribute to generating choices having similar welfare implications across choice settings (e.g., Ross Reference Ross2014; Schulz Reference Schulz2024). Moreover, preference-based approaches frequently enable philosophers/welfare economists to ground reliable and informative welfare evaluations without having to draw on specific assumptions concerning neuro-psychological processes (e.g., Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2019, on informed PSTW; also Section 3). These considerations do not exclude the possibility of grounding reliable and informative welfare evaluations on non-reductive non-preference-based approaches. However, together with the open problems faced by such approaches, they justify philosophers’/welfare economists’ reliance on preference-based approaches.
8. Conclusion
Let us take stock. In recent years, several prominent authors have argued that PSTW fail to provide a plausible theory of welfare. In this article, I have explicated and addressed the most influential objections put forward against specific versions of PSTW, namely informed PSTW. In particular, I have argued that although PSTW face significant conceptual and practical challenges, the critics of PSTW have hitherto failed to substantiate convincing objections against informed PSTW. This result does not exclude the possibility that additional objections may be put forward against informed PSTW. Still, as things stand, it demonstrates that philosophers/welfare economists are justified in relying on such versions of PSTW.
More generally, I take the considerations in this article to contribute to the ongoing cross-disciplinary debate about the plausibility of different theories of welfare in at least two respects of wide interest to philosophers/welfare economists. The first contribution concerns the conceptual and practical import of the objections put forward against specific theories of welfare. To illustrate this, consider again the objections put forward against informed PSTW. As argued in the previous sections, various objections share a tendency to misrepresent model-specific problems and particular contested cases as general conceptual and practical challenges to informed PSTW. This, however, by no means implies that the proffered objections are without merit. On the contrary, such objections provide valuable critical insights concerning philosophers’/welfare economists’ ability to reliably reconstruct welfare-relevant preferences in specific choice settings (e.g., Section 4 on the constraints imposed by widespread choice inconsistencies), the descriptive/normative adequacy of specific information and consistency conditions (e.g., Section 3 on transitivity), and the alleged need to supplement these conditions with further conditions on welfare-relevant preferences (e.g., Section 2 on moral considerations).
The second contribution concerns the need to heed cross-disciplinary differences when assessing the plausibility of different theories of welfare. To illustrate this, consider again philosophers’ and welfare economists’ respective contributions to the debate concerning informed PSTW. On the one hand, philosophers frequently engage in this debate at a higher level of abstraction than welfare economists and occasionally seem to overlook that welfare economists’ model specifications allow for more flexibility in the definition of preferences than many philosophers seek (e.g., Section 6). On the other hand, welfare economists often gloss over what many philosophers regard as significant normative/evaluative questions concerning individuals’ welfare and occasionally seem to overlook philosophically motivated reasons to doubt that the satisfaction of empirically elicited preferences constitutes welfare (e.g., Section 5). In this context, philosophers’ growing attention to welfare economists’ modelling practices and welfare economists’ deeper engagement with philosophers’ normative/evaluative discussions can greatly advance the ongoing cross-disciplinary debate about the plausibility of different theories of welfare.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers, Lukas Beck, Dan Hausman, Gil Hersch, Johanna Thoma, and Jack Vromen for their comments on previous versions of this article. I also received helpful feedback from audiences at the 5th Public Policy and Regulation Workshop (King’s College London), Bicocca University (Milan), the 16th Biennial Meeting of the International Network for Economic Method (Venice), the workshop ‘Adaptive Preferences, Structural Injustice and Moral Responsibility’ (University of Zurich), the Grand Est ‘Economics and Philosophy’ webinar (University of Strasbourg and University of Lorraine), the European PPE Network 2nd Annual Conference (University of Warwick), the University of Bristol, Stanford University, and Rutgers University.
Competing Interests
The author declares none.
Funding Information
The author acknowledges the support of the Centre for the Study of Governance and Society (King’s College London) and the John Templeton Foundation, ‘The Political Economy of Knowledge and Ignorance’, Grant #61823.
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