Over the past few decades, federal studies have been re-energized by new generations of scholars who are linking federalism simultaneously with institutional efficiency and the fair management of pluralism (from a more normative point of view). Scholars have also relaxed their analytical framework to include a wider range of cases that can be associated with “federal systems” more broadly. This edited volume further continues this trend by associating federalism and consociationalism as varieties of power-sharing mechanisms, which “combine institutions of shared-rule and self-rule,” just as they “both can take a variety of institutional forms” (3).

In Power-Sharing in Europe: Past Practice, Present Cases, and Future Directions, Soeren Keil and Allison McCulloch bring together both younger and more established scholars to deliver an authentic state-of-the-art review of the literature on how deeply divided societies (attempt to) manage their differences in a way that can achieve a peaceful democratic coexistence. Of course, relevant cases are found beyond Europe; but the nine case studies presented cover the main relevant features one would find elsewhere. Some chapters discuss divided societies that epitomize ongoing manifestations of workable power-sharing devices (Switzerland, by Sean Mueller; Belgium, by Patricia Popelier; South Tyrol, by Elisabeth Alber), while others refer to polities that have gradually moved away from these mechanisms (the Netherlands, by Matthijs Bogaards; Austria, by Peter Bussjäger and Mirella M. Johler). John McGarry reflects on Cyprus, where power-sharing ended abruptly in the 1960s, while John Hulsey and Soeren Keil (Western Balkans) and Cera Murtagh (Northern Ireland) focus on “new wave” cases. Finally, Paul Anderson suggests how and why power-sharing institutions could potentially attenuate tensions in the “Estado de las Autonomías,” even though “these have yet to gain much traction among Spanish and Catalan political elites” (203).

The book opens with a remarkable introduction by Allison McCulloch, which does much more than simply present the chapters to come. Setting the bar high, McCulloch discusses the context in which Arend Lijphart came to present—and then actively promote—consociationalism and power-sharing mechanisms as optimal institutional tools to restore peace where (violent) conflicts emerge out of dissatisfaction with majoritarian democracy in plural societies. She then lays out a specific analytical framework: “In this volume, we consider how consociationalism is adopted, how it functions and how it ends” (4). More precisely, she contends that it is fundamental to consider first the relative “adoptability” of power-sharing devices—for example, “the conditions under which parties agree to share power or come to see power-sharing as an acceptable arrangement for mediating and resolving their collective disputes” (4). In turn, this should be distinguished from analyzing its “functionality”—for example, “the ability to get things done” (5) under such institutional designs. Finally, one should also discuss the “end-ability”—for example, “the ability of a polity to reform its power-sharing rules and to move beyond such a system if and when the governing partners agree to do so” (6).

Even though the specific terms of this analytical framework do not systematically inform the content of all chapters, Keil and McCulloch provide their readers with a thorough concluding chapter in which they offer a more comprehensive view. In doing so, they suggest a classification of the various cases discussed in the book in relation to all three key analytical dimensions presented by McCulloch in the introduction. This encapsulates the most convincing original contribution to the literature this book makes, and I believe many scholars will find the typology of interest in defining their own research agendas.

While I do not have the space here to present in detail the originality of the various chapters, they all point in one direction: context and history matter highly if one is to understand how and why federalism, consociationalism and institutional asymmetry may be key to restoring peace—or why they may fail to do so. That is why the authors systematically combine historical knowledge with an overview of the constitutional and political landscape of their case studies. Nevertheless, John McGarry, one of the leading authorities in the field, rightfully concludes his chapter by stressing two general conclusions: “Majorities may be prepared to support consociational power-sharing, or oppose it less, if the settlements in which consociations are embedded address other core concerns, particularly over self-determination and security. A majority may also support such a settlement if realpolitik dictates that it should” (252).

I highly recommend this book to anyone who intends to learn from established and emerging experts on the usefulness, as well as inherent limits, of power-sharing devices. It could very well be used as a central reading for a graduate seminar, just as it would be a welcome addition to the textbooks that comparative politics PhD students ought to read in preparation for their comprehensive doctoral exams.