Introduction
Over the past decades, the idea of total defence has gained renewed salience in Europe. Defined as a whole-of-society approach to security that integrates both military and civilian capabilities, total defence is designed to enhance resilience and withstand a wide range of threats, from hybrid warfare to large-scale military attacks.Footnote 2 While most visibly articulated in national contexts such as in the Nordic and Baltic states,Footnote 3 the European Union (EU) has also edged towards elements of a total defence posture. Its long-term emphasis on resilience building in crisis management and the defence field in tandem signals a gradual, albeit incomplete, shift towards a more integrated total defence architecture. Yet, despite these ambitions, a coherent European total defence strategy, combining civilian and military capabilities under one umbrella, has not yet materialised, even though external challenges, such as deteriorating transatlantic relations and Russia’s war on Ukraine, to name a few, have certainly accelerated the agenda. This became particularly evident in 2025, when the European Commission articulated its twin aspirations for establishing both a Defence Union and a Preparedness Union, thereby laying clearer groundwork for a total defence approach.
Alongside these developments, the concept of strategic autonomy has become increasingly prominent in the EU’s foreign and security policy. Broadly defined as the Union’s ability to act independently to protect its strategic interests and build its own capabilities and resilience in an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment, strategic autonomy has expanded beyond defence into trade policy;Footnote 4 energy policy;Footnote 5 and the cyber domain.Footnote 6 By linking disparate policy areas under the banner of security and capability building, strategic autonomy has signified the EU’s geopolitical awakening and the desire to reduce dependence on external actors.
With the adoption of a comprehensive understanding of security, the stressing of resilience and autonomy, and the integration of the civil and military dimensions, there appears to be a significant overlap between the idea of total defence and the concept of strategic autonomy. Yet, despite this convergence, the two strands of research have largely evolved in parallel rather than in dialogue, and their relationship remains underexplored. This is particularly striking given that strategic autonomy has ignited the ambition to make ‘a quantum leap forward on security and defence’,Footnote 7 fuelling discussions on the maturation of a potential European Defence UnionFootnote 8 while simultaneously highlighting the strategic importance of other, non-military capabilities. These policy changes, however, are often necessitated by referencing external events and their potential bearing on actual policy change.
Yet, from the perspective of discursive institutionalism, with its focus on ideational power, external events may open windows of opportunity for policy action, but these moments only translate into change when they are framed and constructed as such. Policy shifts, therefore, do not occur simply ‘when windows of opportunity open’ but rather must be considered in relation to the broader, long-term programmatic ideas that shape and sustain policy.Footnote 9 Thus, a puzzle emerges of the ideational impact of the concept of strategic autonomy for the potential consolidation of a long-term European total defence idea, raising the question of to what extent the adoption of the concept of strategic autonomy has discursively opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for the EU to move towards total defence. In other words, how has the discursive push for autonomy shaped – or not – the EU’s long-standing pursuit for a European Total Defence Union?
Accordingly, this article has two aims: the first is to investigate the trajectory of the EU’s security policy through the lens of total defence; and the second is to assess the ideational impact of the concept of strategic autonomy within the EU’s total defence approach. To do so, the study applies the ideational power framework,Footnote 10 concerned with the question of why certain ideas become successful and others do not. By focusing on three dimensions of ideational power – power through, over, and in the idea of total defence, the study investigates security discourses in official EU documents and statements from 2010 to 2024 and demonstrates that the rhetoric of a more resilient and autonomous Europe, with both civil and military defence capabilities, has been on the horizon far longer than the reemergent concept of strategic autonomy. Nevertheless, strategic autonomy has been used to elevate the total defence idea and to justify capability development, though primarily by intertwining civil and military domains, rather than in terms of establishing a collective armed force. This article concludes that while the concept of strategic autonomy has not yet consolidated a European total defence strategy, it has nonetheless played a significant role in the making a ‘quantum leap forward’ in the EU’s total defence approach, especially in the civilian realm. The analysis thereby underscores long-term discursive developments in the direction of total defence, also evident in the recent EU Commission’s aspiration for a European Preparedness Union.
The article proceeds as follows. It first reviews the idea of total defence in EU contexts, underlining its dual emphasis on military as well as civilian capabilities. This is followed by a discussion of the various interpretations of the concept of strategic autonomy in the EU literature. It then discusses the commonalities as well as discrepancies between the respective topics, while clarifying how discursive institutionalism helps to shed light on these. The brief methodological section is followed by an empirical analysis of how the ideational power of total defence has manifested in the EU’s foreign and security policy from 2010 to 2024. The article concludes with a final discussion of the prospects for a European Total Defence Union.
The idea of total defence in the EU
The idea of total defence is framed by a comprehensive notion of security, implying a whole-of-society approach to national security that integrates both military and civilian activities to counter a wide range of threats, including war. The common, and historically rooted, understanding of total defence distinguishes it as a deterrence strategy by ‘raising the cost of aggression and lowering the chance of success’.Footnote 11 Total defence is a strategy for both ‘the future and the present – it is simultaneously preparation for (total) war, but also a way to avoid (total) war’.Footnote 12 Mounting a credible deterrent requires visible capabilities and the willingness to resist an attack, meaning both a robust military and a resilient society, defined as ‘the ability of societies to withstand challenges that arise and the ability to “bounce back” once hit’.Footnote 13
To that end, total defence consists of two, equally essential, sides – military and civil defence. While the objective of the former is rather straightforward, in terms of building military capabilities that serve as a credible deterrent, it is the idea of civil defence that makes this approach a ‘total’ one. In wartime, this would entail activities conducted by civilians to plan for and organise alarm systems, shelters, and communication.Footnote 14 However, contemporary civil defence, addressing broader threat perceptions, involves a wide range of activities and actors, covering everything from psychological to economic defence and beyond, with the main purpose of ensuring societal functioning in times of crisis or war.
Thus, the core idea within total defence in general and civil defence in particular is resilience – both state and societal, where the former is reached through security of supply and robust critical infrastructure in crucial areas (such as energy, transport, health, communication, and finances); and the latter through enhancing the resistance of the population to external pressures, from disinformation to cyber-attacks and beyond.Footnote 15 What distinguishes civil defence from traditional crisis management measures is its explicit focus on the preparation for war and the emphasis on civil–military collaboration. Civil defence can thus be understood as the capacity of actors to prepare for and withstand various threats, including war, by enhancing resilience through civilian means in close cooperation with military forces. In this sense, civil defence must function in tandem with military defence.
While total defence is a national security doctrine, often employed by small states, the idea of total defence is not limited to the national context. Indeed, the logic is increasingly being implemented in security institutions such as the EU and NATO, mainly expressed through discourses of enhancing resilience and civil–military interoperability.Footnote 16 For instance, Missiroli and Rühle illustrate how, during the Covid-19 pandemic, military actors under both the EU and NATO flags played a major role in fighting the pandemic by providing support for civilian actors through transportation, setting up hospitals, and other services. The authors find that narratives around the role of military involvement were different for NATO, which had to balance its core task of deterrence with peace-time crisis management, and the EU, which was able to showcase and enhance its internal crisis management capacities. They argue for a broader concept of defence that should increasingly be understood as ‘total defence’.Footnote 17
A comprehensive notion of security has anchored EU security policy since long before 2014. The EU endorsed common civil security governance at the European Council summit in December 1999, committing ‘to endowing the Union with a capacity for autonomous action in the area of crisis management’.Footnote 18 Rieker writes that ‘the Union’s potential to coordinate diverse tools of security policy – economic, political and military – makes it one of the most important security actors of the post-Cold-War context. It is precisely this broader view that is emphasized by the EU itself’.Footnote 19 The ambition to move towards a ‘secure European community’ was underpinned by an all-hazards approach to protecting citizens, which meant the expansion of EU policies into fields that were once solely competences of the individual Member States.Footnote 20 However, some argue that because the EU’s civil security competences are scattered across various policy areas, it is hard to establish the scope of the policy space and the strategic vision or reference object that binds it together.Footnote 21 In line with national-level moves to dismantle civil defence policies in favour of crisis preparedness in the post–Cold War period, military means also remained relatively absent from the EU’s comprehensive all-hazards approach.Footnote 22
The shift towards total defence was initially accompanied by the concept of resilience. While ‘the ambition of the EU to provide security in a comprehensive manner’ raised strategic, operational, and implementation challenges,Footnote 23 the concept of resilience, intertwined with that of security, became increasingly employed as a framework for addressing broad and interrelated security threats.Footnote 24 Resilience was still mainly connected with civil protection and preparedness, rather than defence,Footnote 25 but it did feature in EU foreign and security policy documents. There, resilience was perceived as the
ability of states to confront security threats, ranging from Russian hybrid warfare to terrorism, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns, and to assaults on critical infrastructure … by striving to prevent them, by responding to them when they occurred, and by recovering promptly from the damage incurred.Footnote 26
Attempts to integrate resilience and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were also noted in the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017,Footnote 27 with clear links to the idea of total defence. Yet, resilience has not functioned as a sufficient signifier to unify diverse policy areas into a coherent comprehensive approach at the EU level. Instead, it has largely operated as a projection tool, conveying the appearance of a holistic strategy while, in practice, fragmentation across institutional levels and Member State interests remains.Footnote 28 In recent years, strategic autonomy has emerged as a potentially ‘constructively ambiguous’ alternative.
The many facets of strategic autonomy
When the concept of strategic autonomy reemerged in the EU’s security discourse in 2013, after first being mentioned at the end of 1990s amidst ambitions for a European CSDP, both academic and policy circles investigated its implications for the development of European foreign and security policy. The concept is widely considered ambiguous,Footnote 29 and various definitions can be found in the literature. Most agree that in essence, strategic autonomy denotes an actor’s ability to act autonomously in pursuing its strategic goals and interests.Footnote 30 European strategic autonomy is therefore about ‘the capacity to act independently in an interdependent world. It is not synonymous with autarky, but it does require developing a capacity to act, particularly in traditional security fields’.Footnote 31
This has sparked an evolving scholarly debate with two main perspectives: conventional and global.Footnote 32 The conventional view, dating to the 1990s, emerged from concerns over US disengagement and Europe’s ability to defend itself, revived during the Trump presidency. Strategic autonomy here refers to the EU’s capacity to plan and conduct military operations independently and develop related capabilities with minimal US assistance.Footnote 33 Accordingly, most debates focus on the EU’s military defence, its transatlantic relationship, and the evolution of European defence policy.Footnote 34 While some evidence, such as the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine, suggests growing cohesion and autonomy,Footnote 35 others remain sceptical, seeing conventional strategic autonomy as largely symbolic due to differing threat perceptions and national strategic cultures.Footnote 36
While conventional perspectives on strategic autonomy focus on the EU’s military defence and capabilities, a broader interpretation of it considers contemporary challenges that extend beyond military issues. The concept is often called ‘open’ strategic autonomy when expanded to policy areas such as trade, health, digitalisation, or energy.Footnote 37 This strand of research responds to growing competition between China and the US, and the EU’s ambitions to promote its interests and values globally,Footnote 38 with the pandemic exposing the EU’s inability to act collectively as well as the vulnerabilities of European economic security in light of geopolitical competition.Footnote 39
Although differing in their policy focus, these studies converge on three key dimensions of strategic autonomy: political, institutional and material. The political dimension refers to ‘the ability to independently define common priorities and take decisions’; the institutional is concerned with ‘distinct structures and instruments for the planning and implementation of policies’; and the material relates to the ‘capacity to independently implement decisions’.Footnote 40 Howorth argues that the most important dimension is the political, as ‘without agreement on the long-term political and strategic finalité of SA [strategic autonomy], there is little point in focusing on the nuts and bolts’.Footnote 41 Still, he concludes that viable strategic autonomy must combine all three elements.
Strategic autonomy is multifaceted, possessing what could be perceived as constructive ambiguity.Footnote 42 This diversity of meaning could be beneficial to actual policy development towards total defence, especially if the political, material, and institutional dimensions align on both the civilian and military domains. To assess the potential influence of the concept of strategic autonomy in EU security policy discourses, the following section introduces the ideational power framework.
Connecting total defence and strategic autonomy through discursive institutionalism
Although total defence and strategic autonomy have different primary objectives – the former emphasises war preparation and deterrence, whereas the latter focuses on reducing dependence on external actors – the two concepts overlap in important ways. Both approaches adopt a holistic view of security, expanding it beyond purely military concerns to include multiple societal sectors and capabilities. In the total defence framework, this is expressed through the combination of strong military capabilities and civil defence measures, ensuring resilience in energy, transport, food supply, and other critical infrastructure. Similarly, strategic autonomy emphasises capability enhancement in not only conventional military terms but also broader domains, calling for enhanced EU-level capabilities and resources to strengthened resilience and independence of the Union as a whole. Both approaches highlight the importance of resilience and the need for effective coordination of available tools, ultimately converging on the shared objective of a stronger, more coherent European security policy.
While the resilience discourse in the EU’s foreign and security policy reflected the EU’s ambition for a comprehensive approach to security, in its vagueness, it has come to be replaced with that of strategic autonomy,Footnote 43 signalling a geopolitical shift towards a more focused and constrained security policy. As proposed in this paper, the total defence idea provides a useful analogy for understanding this transition. Yet important questions remain: how has the concept of strategic autonomy influenced discursive developments in the EU’s security policy?
To examine how the concept of strategic autonomy has influenced the conceptualisation of the total defence idea on the EU level, discursive institutionalism offers a helpful lens, with its emphasis on the role of ideas and discursive processes in politics.Footnote 44 It posits that ideas ‘shape how we understand political problems, give definition to our goals and strategies, and are the currency we use to communicate about politics’.Footnote 45 Ideas can be understood as ‘normative or causal beliefs held by individuals or adopted by institutions that influence their actions and attitudes’.Footnote 46
Two types of ideas emerge from this definition. Cognitive ideas define and offer solutions to the problems at hand, while normative ideas attach values and ideals to political action, with reference to appropriateness.Footnote 47 Furthermore, ideas occur on three levels – policy, programmatic, and philosophical – ranging from specific policies to the more general programmes that underpin them, and to worldviews that ‘undergird the policies and programs with organising ideas, values, and principles of knowledge and society’.Footnote 48
To track the development of ideas and study why some ideas become more successful than others, Carstensen and Schmidt propose a framework for ideational power. They define ideational power as ‘the capacity of actors (whether individual or collective) to influence actors’ normative and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements’.Footnote 49 Three types of ideational power are distinguished: power through, power over, and power in ideas.Footnote 50
Power through ideas refers to the persuasiveness of ideas – the ability of actors to convince others to adopt particular views or courses of action.Footnote 51 This is achieved through cognitive arguments, which define problems and propose solutions, and normative arguments, which appeal to shared values and the appropriateness of specific approaches.Footnote 52 In the context of EU security policy, power through ideas is analysed primarily via coordinative discourses, where policy actors reason for a whole-of-society approach. The total defence idea, for example, emphasises broad threat perceptions and the need to synchronise military and civil capabilities, while strategic autonomy can be incorporated into these arguments to strengthen the rationale for EU-wide resilience and capability building. This analysis allows for the tracing of the evolution of total defence over time and situates strategic autonomy within this trajectory, highlighting when and how the concept is used to encourage European total defence.
Power over ideas refers to ‘the capacity of actors to control and dominate the meaning of ideas’.Footnote 53 In one form discussed by Carstensen and Schmidt, this involves actors who ‘control most of the levers of traditional power – coercive, structural, and/or institutional – and who can therefore promote their own ideas to the exclusion of all others’.Footnote 54 In this sense, actors possessing traditional forms of power also deploy ideational power to ensure that their ideas remain dominant. This occurs, for instance, when political elites seek to convince the public of the validity and value of their ideas through mass media – a dynamic most clearly illustrated in totalitarian regimes – operating through communicative discourses. As Carstensen and Schmidt note, elements of persuasion may also be involved (power through ideas) in this process, which to some extent blurs the distinction between these two forms of ideational power.
While ideational power in general ‘is less observable and its effects are not as clearly measurable’ as traditional powers, to capture power over ideas in coordinative discourses is particularly challenging, not least in the EU context and the field of security, as much of detailed policy discussions that reflect on the positions of various individual actors are conducted behind closed doors, thus granting limited access to assess actors’ power to control, dominate, or resist ideas. Yet, novel attempts to conduct such analysis can be found in the literature. For instance, Juncos and Vanhoonacker analyse the ideational power surrounding the concept of strategic autonomy in the EU’s security and defence policy, where they reason that an actor’s power over ideas depends on their authority and competences within a specific institutional context, both of which stem from traditional power.Footnote 55
However, for a study that treats the EU as a single entity and does not distinguish between its various institutional and national actors, examining the Union’s collective power over the idea of total defence through coordinative discourses poses particular analytical challenges. To bring greater clarity and structure to the analysis, the EU’s power over ideas – or what Blyth refers to also as ‘power by ideational veto’Footnote 56 – is understood here as being reflected in the enhancement of the Union’s authority and capabilities. The discursive bargaining regarding the establishment of collective EU-level capabilities in both civil and military sectors leading to increased EU competences in these fields indicates a degree of consensus among EU actors, ultimately granting the Union (increasing) power over (the idea of) total defence. The analysis of power over ideas thus examines the discursive expressions of proposed and established EU initiatives in these fields, while also highlighting the role of the concept of strategic autonomy in it.
Power in ideas is concerned with ‘the constraining or structuring power of ideas’.Footnote 57 Thus, while the above two ideational powers
focus on the direct use of ideas to influence other actors, power in ideas is about the background ideational processes – constituted by systems of knowledge, discursive practices and institutional setups – that in important ways affect which ideas enjoy authority at the expense of others.Footnote 58
These processes are difficult to alter as they build on deeply rooted philosophical ideas that affect why certain policy and programmatic ideas succeed and why others do not. These include ability to reach unity, which is the cornerstone of its collective action, rooted in its identity as a global actor as well as Member States sovereignty, not least in the security field. Examining power in ideas reveals how strategic autonomy is inscribed within existing institutional and philosophical frameworks, shaping the authority of total defence discourses and highlighting both opportunities and constraints for establishing a coherent European total defence strategy.
Applying this framework reveals how total defence and strategic autonomy intersect across cognitive, normative, and institutional dimensions, showing how strategic autonomy has shaped the development, persuasive appeal, and institutional embedding of the total defence idea within EU security policy. It also highlights the ideational factors that can determine why certain policies fail to gain traction, even in the face of external pressures perceived as ‘windows of opportunities’ for policy change.
The following section outlines the specific discourses and types of evidence that are used in applying the ideational power framework in this study.
Discourses and materials
Methodologically, this article relies on discourse analysis. Discourses are defined as interactive processes of expressing ideas, assigning importance to not only ideas within discourses but also agency.Footnote 59 The article analyses EU security policy discourses to assess how the concept of strategic autonomy has influenced the trajectory of the total defence idea. For policy development, a successful discourse depends on several factors, including ‘relevance to the issues at hand, adequacy, applicability, appropriateness, and resonance’.Footnote 60 Additionally, a discourse’s credibility is enhanced by consistency and coherence across policy sectors, although a degree of vagueness or ambiguity is often present. The ideational power framework foregrounds the dynamic relationship between ideas, discourses, and institutions – in this case the EU – and how discourses are used to shape political outcomes – a security policy including both civil and military defence.
The analysis covers the period 2010–2024, thereby capturing EU security discourse both before and after the reemergence of strategic autonomy and allowing inferences about its impact. The primary sources are official documents and statements from the European Commission and the European Council, as the key actors for strategic policy development within the EU. Focusing on these institutions underscores the ideational developments shaping the Union’s long-term strategic direction. From distinct institutional positions, the Commission – as a supranational authority – and the European Council – representing the collective stance of the Member States – both occupy strategically central roles for a total defence policy development.
By contrast, the European Parliament is excluded given its inherently polyphonic character. While it plays an important legislative role, it is not the primary institution for strategic policy development. Similarly, the Council of the EU in its various configurations (e.g., General Affairs and Foreign Affairs Councils) is not included, even though it too adopts conclusions and could, in principle, be studied systematically. This article, however, focuses on the EU’s long-term strategic direction, and thus limits its scope to actors that set the strategic agenda. Likewise, individual Member State positions are not included, since the analysis is concerned with the collective EU perspective.
To that end, the material includes a total of seventy-four documents produced by the Commission and the European Council. Commission documents include State of the Union addresses (SOTEU) held by the incumbent president of the European Commission since 2010. These have become an annual tradition, where the achievements of the past year and priorities for the year ahead are presented to the European Parliament and public. For scholars of the EU, these speeches represent an opportunity to comprehend the union’s self-understanding and trace the transformation of this hybrid entity.Footnote 61 The discourses within provide a window into the past, present, and future evolution of the Union. Therefore, the SOTEU addresses provide a systematic source of data for tracing the idea of an emerging European total defence. To that end, this study relies on the twelve SOTEU addresses held every year since 2010 with the exception of 2014, 2019, and 2024, when there was a new president of the European Commission incoming.
While the addresses provide a glimpse of the most acute challenges to the Union at the time of the speeches, and plans to mitigate them, they do not go deep into long-term strategies. For these, documents such the European Union’s Global Strategy (EUGS) issued in 2016 (and its follow-up from 2019), as well as the Strategic Compass published in 2022 (and its follow-up from 2024) are important sources of information regarding the advancement of the EU’s foreign and security policy in general, and strategic autonomy in particular.
Finally, rooted in the EU’s founding treaty is the idea that the foreign and security policy domain remains in the hands of its Member States, with decisions taken by unanimity in contrast to the qualified majority used in other policy areas. Thus, the material also includes the conclusions from European Council meetings, which give insight into what has been collectively discussed and decided upon. Fifty-eight European Council conclusions from scheduled meetings – with heads of state or government present – held between 2010 and 2024 were examined.Footnote 62 From the initial examination, documents with discourses concerning threat perceptions and enhanced autonomy, resilience, and capacity building in both civilian and military domains were identified for further analysis.
European total defence through strategic autonomy
The rest of the paper analyses EU security discourses from 2010 to 2024. It examines the persuasiveness of the total defence idea, situating the concept of strategic autonomy within it. It then focuses on discourses around the establishment of EU-level total defence capabilities, which could potentially enable the Union to more effectively advance the idea of European total defence. Finally, it considers how the idea of total defence and strategic autonomy are embedded in the Union’s prevailing ideational structures and philosophies, which both constrain and enable the potential to deliver total defence. The analysis follows a chronological order to trace the trajectory of EU security policy, with each section beginning with a brief theoretical introduction that frames the empirical material.
Power through ideas: A total defence for Europe
This section examines the EU’s efforts over the years to justify the adoption of a total defence idea. It highlights how both the Commission and the European Council have employed cognitive and normative arguments – emphasising the relevance of a comprehensive approach and appealing to EU values – to advance European total defence, ultimately integrating the concept of strategic autonomy into these arguments.
During the early 2010s, the EU was preoccupied with the global economic crisis and its consequences, particularly in the Euro area, working on strengthening the Union’s economic resilience,Footnote 63 while also seeking a greater role on the global stage. For this, as argued by the Commission President Barroso, key elements included ‘a common crisis response capacity and also a common foreign and a common defence policy’.Footnote 64 Barroso also stated,
if Europe is to exert its influence fully, if Europe really wants to be a power, we must strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It must be credible. It must be based on a common security and defence dimension if we are really to count in the world.Footnote 65
Hence, the cognitive arguments for total defence were mainly centred on the importance of resilience and the EU’s global actorness. Even the European Council agreed ‘that EU Member States must be ready to provide future-oriented capabilities, both in the civilian domain and in the field of defence’,Footnote 66 calling to enhance the effectiveness of the Union’s crisis management capabilities and further develop its military capabilities. Therefore, by the early 2010s, a vision already existed of a more resilient and autonomous Europe, with its own ‘truly collective defence planning’Footnote 67 and more developed civilian preparedness.Footnote 68
When the concept of strategic autonomy briefly entered the discourse in late 2013, it did so amid a rapidly changing European strategic environment. Member States agreed that ‘defence matters’ and called for strengthening the European defence industry to enhance capabilities, which the Council framed as a way to ‘also enhance its strategic autonomy and its ability to act with partners’.Footnote 69 The concept then disappeared from official statements for several years.
Meanwhile, the push to enhance both civilian and military capabilities continued, and by 2016 the need for a collective, comprehensive security strategy became central. Both the Commission and Member States expressed the need to do more to take greater responsibility for European security and defence in the challenging geopolitical environment, as ‘the EU and its Member States must be able to contribute decisively to collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible’.Footnote 70 The ‘very real threats to our security at home and abroad’Footnote 71 meant that ‘soft power is not enough’.Footnote 72 Subsequently, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called for Europe to ‘toughen up’Footnote 73 and enhance its civilian and especially its military power. Both EU actors employed cognitive arguments based on threat perceptions and the EU’s identity to advocate for a comprehensive approach to security, in line with total defence.
When strategic autonomy reappeared in the 2016 EUGS, it was framed more comprehensively, addressing multiple challenges with a clear total defence focus. Federica Mogherini, then High Representative, similarly emphasised a broad interpretation of ‘global’ in her foreword to the Strategy, asserting that it
is not just intended in a geographical sense: it also refers to the wide array of policies and instruments the Strategy promotes. It focuses on military capabilities and anti-terrorism as much as on job opportunities, inclusive societies and human rights. It deals with peace-building and the resilience of States and societies, in and around Europe.Footnote 74
Subsequently, the EUGS, with ‘the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union’,Footnote 75 suggested using a varied toolbox of policies and instruments at the EU’s disposal for a collective EU response to a wide range of threats.
Following the Strategy’s publication, this broadened threat perception became established in the EU security discourse, as did calls for more autonomy and greater responsibility in security and defence.Footnote 76 The new strategic agenda for 2019–2024 claimed that ‘addressing such threats requires a comprehensive approach with more cooperation, more coordination, more resources and more technological capacities’.Footnote 77 To that end, both the Member States and the Commission would welcome future developments in security and defence, on both the civilian side by strengthening the Union’s resilience, and the military side. This view was reinforced in the EUGS follow-up where calls for a revival of civilian components of CSDP would highlight ‘how the EU’s joined-up approach to security continues to see civilian and military components developing at the same time’,Footnote 78 another key component of the total defence approach.
Both aspects took centre stage in the EU’s Strategic Compass 2022, which aimed to signify ‘a shared threat assessment and a joint commitment to action’Footnote 79 making ‘best use of the entire EU toolbox, including civilian and military policies’.Footnote 80 The concept of strategic autonomy was only mentioned once in the document, but the idea of developing both civilian and military capacities as part of a comprehensive EU defence policy remained central. In the words of Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the EU at the time,
The Strategic Compass is about much more than the war on Ukraine, as we have to confront the full range of threats we face … threats to European security clearly come from a variety of sources, both within Europe and beyond … the conclusion is clear: the defence of Europe requires a comprehensive concept of security.Footnote 81
The ambition expressed in the Strategic Compass was ‘to make a quantum leap forward on security and defence, similar to other big jumps we have made in European history’.Footnote 82 This leap was to be taken in the spirit of total defence, embodying elements of both civil and military defence. This synchronised enhancement of both civil and military capabilities was also endorsed by the Member States:
The European Council underlines the imperative need for enhanced and coordinated military and civilian preparedness and strategic crisis management in the context of the evolving threat landscape. It invites the Council to take work forward and the Commission together with the High Representative to propose actions to strengthen preparedness and crisis response at EU level in an all-hazards and whole-of-society approach, taking into account Member States’ responsibilities and competences, with a view to a future preparedness strategy.Footnote 83
Further, following the publication of the Commission-initiated reportFootnote 84 on how to enhance the EU’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness for future crises in November 2024,
the European Council reaffirms the importance and urgency of strengthening the resilience, preparedness, crisis prevention and response capacities … the European Council considers that enhanced and coordinated military and civil preparedness and strategic crisis management are required, in an all-hazards and whole-of-society approach.Footnote 85
In conclusion, the idea of total defence was present in the EU’s security discourse before the reemergence of the concept of strategic autonomy in 2013, and more significantly after 2016. Both EU actors – the Commission and the European Council – justified the idea mainly by cognitive arguments relating to threat perceptions, demanding a whole-of-society approach comprising both civilian and military capabilities. External challenges – such as Euro crises or Russia’s aggression in Ukraine that in 2022 culminated in a war – clearly created a ‘window of opportunity’ that amplified these arguments and paved the way for the introduction of the concept of strategic autonomy into the discourse. While the initial justifications were closely tied to military defence, the concept was also invoked to promote a total defence approach, emphasising resilience and capability building in the civilian domain. In this way, strategic autonomy helped elevate and broaden the total defence idea, even though the references to the concept itself have significantly decreased in the EU’s security discourse. Given that both EU actors have consistently promoted the idea of total defence, why has this idea not yet materialised?
Power over ideas: Enhancing European total defence capabilities
The question hinges on whether the EU possesses capabilities to impose the idea of total defence on the EU-level – its power over ideas. One departure point in this regard is to reason that actors with traditional power resources also hold ideational power over ideas. Following this line of logic, the EU’s power over the total defence idea is linked to its (actors’) traditional powers such as the Commission’s institutional role and budgetary resources, enabling it to propose initiatives to advance a total defence approach, as well as the European Council’s authority of Member States, with power to ultimately accept or reject these propositions. Thus, increasing or establishing EU-level collective capabilities in both civilian and military sectors can be perceived as expressions of the EU’s increasing power to impose the idea of total defence on the EU level. That is because the implementation of such efforts requires alignment between the two key actors, consequently empowering the Union as a whole. Thus, the following analysis is focused on total defence capability building, highlighting the role of the concept of strategic autonomy in doing so.Footnote 86
The EU’s collective capacities in the civilian domain have been scattered across various sectors. For instance, the establishment of a Banking Union is perceived as insurance for the Union’s financial resilience and autonomy, focusing on reducing and distributing risk.Footnote 87 Ambitions to invest in energy independency and building a resource-sufficient – in essence strategically autonomous – Europe with modern, interconnected infrastructures to ensure energy security also have deep roots.Footnote 88 In the health domain, in reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic, calls for a stronger European Health Union,Footnote 89 with increased resilience and, again, autonomy in terms of crisis preparedness, stockpiling, and reducing supply-chain dependencies, led to positive progress a year later, when von der Leyen claimed that there were already assets in place ‘to deal with future health threats earlier and better’, while also ‘proposing a new health preparedness and resilience mission for the whole of the EU’.Footnote 90
A similar development can be observed regarding Europe’s digital sovereignty, where cyber threats are portrayed as potentially more destabilising than conventional military attacks,Footnote 91 highlighting the need for coordinated EU action. Consequently, the Council welcomed efforts to develop collective cyber capabilities, including coordinated attribution and the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, to enhance resilience and strategic autonomy.Footnote 92 Hence, in these sectors, a clear and long-standing ambition for more autonomy and resilience have led to the strengthening of collective EU instruments, expanding the Union’s authority and thus its capability to advance the idea of total defence, particularly in the civilian domain.
In the military domain, ambitions to establish a Defence Union have come in waves, one of which had emerged already in the early 2010s.Footnote 93 In 2012, Member States called for the ‘urgent necessity to strengthen European cooperation in order to develop military capacities’ through pooling and sharing means.Footnote 94 A year later, they encouraged the development of both civilian and military capabilities for a stronger CSDP, suggesting that willing Member States ‘develop capacities based on common standards or decide on common usage, maintenance or training arrangements’Footnote 95 to improve interoperability and effectiveness, setting favourable preconditions for the EU to have collective resources and structures in place. The development of Europe’s defence capabilities, they reasoned, ‘can also enhance its strategic autonomy’.Footnote 96
Support for more coordination and even collectivisation of military resources grew in the mid-2010s. Juncker expressed the ambition to increase the EU’s own military capabilities and assets, claiming that ‘we should also move towards common military assets, in some cases owned by the EU’.Footnote 97 However, this is not feasible ‘without a permanent structure’.Footnote 98 Thus, proclamations were made to
dedicate further efforts to defence matters. A new European Defence Fund is in the offing. As is a Permanent Structured Cooperation [PESCO] in the area of defence. By 2025 we need a fully-fledged European Defence Union. We need it. And NATO wants it.Footnote 99
Correspondently, concrete steps were soon proposed by the Member States:
The European Council calls for the fulfilment of the PESCO commitments and the further development of the initial projects and the institutional framework … welcomes progress on military mobility in the framework of PESCO and EU–NATO cooperation, expects the military requirements under the EU Action Plan on military mobility now to be finalised, and calls on Member States to simplify and standardise relevant rules and procedures by 2024. These efforts, which should fully respect the sovereignty of the Member States, be mutually reinforcing and follow a whole-of government approach.Footnote 100
Hence, it can be observed that both the Commission and the European Council are aligned in their goals for the establishment of a collective defence fund, PESCO as well as military mobility initiatives, increasing the EU’s defence capabilities. However, these developments largely unfolded without explicit acknowledgement of the concept of strategic autonomy. Yet, as the European Council emphasised that ‘military and civilian aspects need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner with a focus on concrete deliverables’,Footnote 101 the discourse around the total defence idea was still clearly gaining strength.
Indeed, the 2019 EUGS follow-up acknowledged that the EU had made ‘historic breakthroughs in the field of security and defence … working towards the goal of strategic autonomy as set out by the Council’.Footnote 102 These included developments in information sharing and new platforms for pooling resources (such as CARD; MPCC;Footnote 103 PESCO;Footnote 104 EDF;Footnote 105 European Peace FacilityFootnote 106) and establishing joint funds, but also structures for more effective collective decision-making.Footnote 107
In 2022, the European Council expanded its ambitions for joint action capabilities, calling for ‘Member States to make full use of collaborative instruments and frameworks’Footnote 108 to enhance mobility infrastructure and rapid deployment capabilities. In addition, they supported ‘investment in strategic enablers, such as cybersecurity and space-based connectivity, as well as in the resilience of critical infrastructure’.Footnote 109 What followed was the 2022 Strategic Compass,Footnote 110 which mentioned the concept of strategic autonomy only once,Footnote 111 asserting that the document ‘will enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy’,Footnote 112 and went on to set out specific goals and propose concrete initiatives to strengthen the EU’s capacity to act. The suggestions were mainly focused on entwining civil–military capabilities, perceiving collective efforts such as the establishment of ‘the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, military mobility, live exercises, enhancing space security, countering cyber and hybrid threats and addressing foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI)’Footnote 113 as of particular importance. To that end, the Union is to ‘work to reinforce our crisis management missions and operation and will develop an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity to allow us to quickly deploy up to 5,000 troops for different types of crises’.Footnote 114 These EU-level structures are being implemented specifically to enable collective action and ‘to increase the defence readiness, resilience and security of the Union’.Footnote 115
In conclusion, these steps illustrate how the EU has increased its material and institutional power in the field of total defence, particularly in the civil defence pillar. That is reflected in the discursive alignment between the Commission’s and the European Council’s objectives, which have led to the establishment of material resources and institutional structures to counter hybrid and cyber threats; strengthen interoperability through PESCO, the European Defence Fund, and military mobility initiatives; and bolster crisis preparedness, further entwining the civil–military dimensions. These established instruments potentially bolster the EU’s ideational power as well, especially when deployed as ideational persuasion tools (in power through ideas). Although connections to the concept of strategic autonomy have been more evident in the civilian dimension than in the military, the EU is now clearly better positioned to advance the idea of European total defence. Yet, Juncker’s ambition of achieving a fully-fledged European Defence Union by 2025 has not materialised – why is that the case?
Power in ideas: Towards European total defence?
The answer to this puzzle can be found in the background ideational processes that ultimately determine the success or failure of certain ideas – the power in them. The following analysis examines two such processes that shape the EU’s unity and, by extension, its capacity for collective action in total defence: the Union’s identity construction and the divergent perceptions of NATO’s role. It traces the discursive evidence of these processes and their impact on the evolution of both the total defence idea and the concept of strategic autonomy.
The EU’s authority in any domain rests on unity, which is tied to its identity as an (global) actor as well as the sovereignty of its Member States. Only when this foundation is secured can the Union act collectively and project power – whether externally on the global stage or internally among its Member States. And nothing puts European solidarity to test like a crisis. But when hopeless division and stalling make way for collective solutions, the process of overcoming deadlock also strengthens togetherness and capacity for collective action. To name a few examples, the EU’s unity was tried in dealing with the global financial crisis;Footnote 116 its solidarity was put to test during the migration crisis;Footnote 117 its (lack of) autonomy was tested by the global pandemic in 2020;Footnote 118 and its capacity for collective action was stretched in relation to the war in Ukraine.Footnote 119 In many of these areas, the EU has found a way forward, ultimately strengthening its core identity regarding solidarity amongst its Member States and its geopolitical actorness. As a testament to this, von der Leyen declared ‘the birth of a geopolitical Union – supporting Ukraine, standing up to Russia’s aggression, responding to an assertive China and investing in partnerships’.Footnote 120
However, unity is more contested in the security field than in these examples, not least due to the intergovernmental nature of decision-making, which requires unanimity rather than the qualified majority of other policy areas. Hence, Member States preferences play a more significant role in achieving unity. As identified by most of the literature on the EU’s security and defence policy in general and strategic autonomy in particular, core ideational constraints in this field come from the Member States’ diverging perceptions on transatlantic relations, and the role of NATO in European security architecture.
Throughout the years, many attempts have been made to counter this narrative, dating back to when Commission President Barroso made a case for the European Defence Union in 2011. He then stressed that
Long gone is the time when people could oppose the idea of European defence for fear that it might harm the Transatlantic relationship. As you have noticed, today it is the Americans themselves who are asking us to do more as Europeans.Footnote 121
However, that did little for reaching coherence in this question. Although it was indeed the European Council – hence the Member States – that brought up the concept of strategic autonomy and made ‘a strong commitment to the further development of a credible and effective CSDP’,Footnote 122 they did so stressing that this move was to be made ‘in full complementarity with NATO in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each’.Footnote 123 This discourse became typical of strategic autonomy discussions connected to military capacities, which often mentioned complementarity with NATO, paradoxically further cementing NATO’s role in European security.
As the EU’s strategic autonomy discourse grew, so did the arguments that positioned it in the context of transatlantic relations, where the Commission emphasised that
We should also move towards common military assets, in some cases owned by the EU. And, of course, in full complementarity with NATO … More European defence does not mean less transatlantic defence and solidarity.Footnote 124
The EUGS argued along the same lines, that ‘a more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States’Footnote 125 but also rationalised that, while in terms of collective defence,
NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States … EU–NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO … European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO.Footnote 126
The concept of strategic autonomy was clearly intended to satisfy both those states that relied on NATO and those that sought European solutions. The use of an autonomy discourse to balance the EU–NATO relationship in European security was also evident when Juncker insisted that ‘by 2025 we need a fully-fledged European Defence Union. We need it. And NATO wants it’,Footnote 127 but later clarified this ambition by claiming that ‘we will not militarize the European Union. What we want is to become more autonomous’.Footnote 128 This highlights the ideational constraints the concept imposed on the materialisation of total defence, stemming largely from the ambiguity of the discourse and the mixed signals it conveyed.
However, while the idea of NATO as ‘the foundation of collective defence for its members’Footnote 129 remains deeply rooted in the European security discourse, not least with two additional EU Member States joining the alliance, there is still room for the EU’s security policy to evolve alongside NATO, especially in ‘countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference, crisis management and the relationship with strategic competitors’,Footnote 130 areas also pointed out in the previous section of this analysis.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the ambitions for a Defence Union are conceived of in relation to not only autonomy and transatlantic relations but also the EU’s more fundamental identity and its place in the world. In 2021, von der Leyen emphasised that
The European Union is a unique security provider … We can combine military and civilian, along with diplomacy and development – and we have a long history in building and protecting peace. The good news is that over the past years, we have started to develop a European defence ecosystem. But what we need is the European Defence Union.Footnote 131
The Strategic Compass repeated this emphasis on the EU’s unique and important role:
We must use the new momentum to ensure that we, finally, equip ourselves with the mind-set, the means and the mechanisms to defend our Union, our citizens and our partners. In so doing, the EU will also help to strengthen NATO and become a stronger Transatlantic partner: a partner that is more capable of sharing the burden of maintaining international peace and security. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shown both how essential NATO is for the collective defence of its members and the important role that the EU plays in today’s complex security and defence environment.Footnote 132
The EU’s unique identity enables the Union to take further steps in the areas in which it has already carved a space for itself – that is, civil–military coordination, diplomacy, and development, as well as crisis preparedness. While NATO and Member State interests remain central to military defence (thus far), its underlying identity as a unique security provider has opened a space for the Union to enhance and coordinate ‘military and civil preparedness and strategic management … in an all-hazards and whole-of-society approach. This should be done in synergy with NATO … and taking into account the security and defence interests of all Member States’.Footnote 133
In conclusion, the analysis of power in ideas shows that cohesion in EU security is hampered by diverging views on NATO’s role, with the concept of strategic autonomy ultimately reinforcing NATO’s central place in Europe’s security architecture. This has constrained the materialisation of collective European military capabilities and a credible total defence. At the same time, the EU’s identity as a unique actor has allowed it to advance in less contested areas, carving out a complementary role to NATO. As such, the Union has laid strong foundations to become one of the key pillars of European total defence.
A ‘quantum leap forward on’ European total defence
By tracing the trajectory of EU security discourses from 2010 to 2024, this article has shown a growing emphasis on total defence at the EU level, combining civilian and military capabilities, well before the recent resurgence of the concept of strategic autonomy. The findings suggest that while strategic autonomy has certainly elevated the European total defence idea and catalysed the development of EU total defence capacities, most notably in the civilian domain, it has simultaneously reinforced NATO’s role as the main constraint on its full realisation. NATO thus remains a decisive factor in shaping the prospects for a European Total Defence Union, particularly on the military side. Nonetheless, the discursive advances towards the institutionalisation of the idea of total defence and the establishment of collective EU resources in both the civilian and military dimensions have strengthened the Union’s unique identity as a security provider, carving out space for it to complement NATO within the European security architecture and to position itself as a key actor in total defence. This long-standing discursive evolution strengthens the foundations for a potential European Preparedness Union, as proposed by the Commission in 2025.
Theoretically, the study demonstrates an application of the ideational power framework in the novel case of EU security policy, to analyse how agents use discursive arguments to work within and shape institutional structures and deeper ideational processes. The analysis of power through ideas found that the idea of total defence was mainly justified by cognitive arguments relating to broad threat perceptions and demanding a whole-of-society approach. When the concept of strategic autonomy re-entered the discourse, it was initially linked to military defence, but then used to justify a total defence approach, calling for more resilience and capabilities in the civilian domain too. The analysis of power over ideas found that the concept of strategic autonomy was a catalyst for increasing or establishing collective EU resources, most visibly in the civilian domain. In contrast, its configuration in military topics was limited, although the idea of total defence still clearly gained traction, most notably regarding capability building to counter hybrid threats and to enhance interoperability and civil–military coordination, as well as crisis preparedness. This, potentially, provides the Union with more power over the idea of total defence, although further research is needed to offer a more nuanced analysis of EU actors’ capability to impose, resist, or counter the European total defence idea. The analysis of power in ideas found that while the autonomy discourse was strongly shaped by and reinforced existing deeper beliefs, it arguably strengthened the ideational power of total defence in the EU. That is particularly the case in terms of implementing the civilian components, due to its preestablished identity as a provider of civil security and crisis preparedness, and its competence in regulating critical societal sectors of its Member States.
That said, the evolving nature of transatlantic relations and the ongoing war in Ukraine have certainly intensified the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy as well as total defence. This shift has cast the EU’s defence ambitions in a more urgent and pressing light, with more Member States searching for European solutions. A key question remains as to whether this will finally overturn existing philosophies – especially regarding the role of NATO in the European security architecture – and strengthen the power in the idea of a total defence, ultimately reinvigorating the EU’s long-standing ambition to reach a fully-fledged European Total Defence Union. This article’s examination of the EU’s security discourses over the past decade and more makes clear that the Union has long harboured ambitions for a total defence posture and is well positioned, and armed with ideational power, to establish itself as a key actor, particularly on the civilian side of total defence. Whether the profound shifts in transatlantic relations and the acute threat posed by Russia will serve as ‘the windows of opportunity’ for ideational and fundamental policy changes within the EU remains to be seen, although the ambitions underpinning the European Preparedness Union certainly point in that direction.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the reviewers and editors for their valuable and constructive comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Sincere thanks are also extended to Associate Professor Rikard Bengtsson and Professor Jonathan Polk for generously offering their time and insight throughout the development of this article.
Jana Wrange is a researcher at the Department of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden. Her research interests include small-state security, defence policy, and international cooperation. She has authored a PhD dissertation on the (re)emergence of civil defence and has published articles in journals such as European Security and Defence Studies.
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