3.1 Right to Bequeath as an Incentive

The incentive mechanism in inheritance is more complex than that justifying income inequalities from productive occupations. In the case of income inequalities, the individual receiving the material incentive is the same person who will enjoy the additional wealth. However, in the case of inheritance, the individual receiving the incentive is the transmitter of the inheritance, or bequeather, while the one receiving the additional wealth is the receiver of the inheritance, or inheritor. Therefore, unlike material incentives for productive tasks, the supposed incentive effect from allowing inheritance lies not in the prospect of enjoying additional economic resources oneself as an inheritor but in the prospect of being able to benefit specific individuals by being a bequeather. That is, the incentive-based justification for inheritance assumes that the ability to materially benefit others – such as a spouse, children, other family members, friends or even particular organizations and causes – acts as a motivation for individuals to engage in productive activities to earn money. Regarding the interest in transmitting goods through inheritance as a motivation for work, Ferreyra (Reference Ferreyra1933: 206) emphasizes that

Inheritance can increase individual productivity if it leads individuals to work longer hours, delay retirement, or pursue more lucrative job opportunities in order to accumulate wealth to be passed on to others. As Wolff (Reference Wolff2020: 78) suggests, “people may be less prepared to innovate or work hard if they cannot pass on their acquired wealth to the next generation, and if this is so there are, therefore, reasons of economic incentive to permit inheritance”.Footnote ⁸

Until now, the term “inheritance” has been used with some ambiguity to refer to the transfer of assets upon death. However, to analyse the incentives created by the power to make these transfers, it is important to distinguish between two types of inheritance rights: the right to bequeath and the right to inherit. This distinction between inheritance rights is especially important in our societies since many Continental European and Latin American countries recognize a right to inherit that limits people’s right to bequeath.

The right to bequeath is an individual’s power to determine, typically through a will, the fate of their assets after death. The right to inherit is the power of certain individuals (generally the spouse and relatives of the deceased), protected by law, to claim a portion of the deceased’s assets, irrespective of the deceased’s testamentary wishes.Footnote ⁹ In both cases, upon the death of the owner, their property is transferred to others designated either by law or by will.

While both the right to bequeath and the right to inherit can serve as incentives when contrasted with a system that recognizes no inheritance rights, the incentive associated with the former is stronger than that of the latter. The effectiveness of the right to inherit as an incentive depends on whether the individuals legally designated as inheritors and the amounts they are entitled to receive align with the bequeather’s preferences regarding whom and how much to bequeath. What motivates individuals to work harder or pursue higher-paying occupations is the desire to benefit specific individuals to whom they have a special attachment. If there are discrepancies between those designated by law as inheritors and the bequeather’s will, it is reasonable to think that the incentive provided by the inheritance will be weaker than if the bequeather could choose whom to transfer to. Therefore, to maximize the incentive, it is more effective to recognize a right to bequeath rather than a right to inherit.

The justification for the right to bequeath as an incentive to increase individual productivity – and, consequently, overall wealth – is not new. Throughout history, various authors have argued that allowing individuals to determine the fate of their property after their death encourages work, thereby increasing society’s total wealth. In the 13th century English legal treatise known as Bracton, it was argued that restricting the right to bequeath would significantly limit individual entrepreneurship (Tate Reference Tate2008: 156–157). Similarly, Hutcheson argued that the removal of the right to bequeath would seriously discourage industry (Tate Reference Tate2008: 157). Mill further asserted that “the prospect of being able to bequeath one’s wealth was an important source of motivation to produce wealth” (Halliday Reference Halliday2018: 55).Footnote ¹⁰

Even if the right to bequeath motivates individuals to increase productivity, the question remains: is this boost in productivity sufficient to justify the resulting inequalities from inheritance?Footnote ¹¹ Can those who are not fortunate enough to inherit assets reasonably accept that others do, simply because inheritance contributes to the overall wealth of society? The Rawlsian answer is no. The inequalities produced by inheritance are only one instance of the general problem of economic inequalities and must pass the same test of reciprocal acceptability. Therefore, for inheritance inequalities to be morally justified, they must satisfy the Difference Principle.

3.2 When and How Does Inheritance Satisfy the Difference Principle?

What distinguishes Rawls’s justification of the right to bequeath from other incentive-based accounts of the kind mentioned in the previous subsection is that, on the view that I have offered, inheritance would be justified not only by its contribution to society’s overall wealth but also by the benefits it provides to the least advantaged members of society. It may seem surprising, as this is not often emphasized in the literature, but Rawls himself appears to endorse such a justification. He argues that the greater economic resources enjoyed by inheritors can be justified if the capacity to transmit these resources acted as an incentive for the transmitters to increase their productivity and this benefits those with fewer resources. Rawls (Reference Rawls1999: 245) explicitly states this, asserting that

How can we ensure that the economic benefits generated by inheritance actually reach the least advantaged? Just as we address inequalities arising from productive activities, we can ensure that those resulting from inheritance benefit the worst off through fiscal institutions – specifically, through taxation (such as income or expenditure taxes) and redistributive policies. In this scheme, taxes preserve their two primary functions: first, funding the policies that enable those who have fewer resources to benefit, in this case, from the recognition of the right to bequeath and second, limiting economic inequalities that do not serve as incentives and, therefore, lack moral justification.

To the extent that the recognition of the right to bequeath generates economic outcomes that benefit the least advantaged, there are compelling reasons of justice for not eliminating this institution. Just as with income inequalities, it would be unreasonable for those with fewer resources to protest against the greater wealth enjoyed by inheritors. The benefits gained by those who inherit ultimately extend to those who have less thanks to the financial institutions in place. Demanding a more egalitarian distribution would worsen the position of those with fewer resources. Therefore, the distribution of resources resulting from the recognition of the right to bequeath will be reciprocally acceptable, and thus justified, if it serves as an incentive that benefits both inheritors and non-inheritors.

To illustrate this point, consider a society (with Groups A and B of equal size) under two alternative institutional arrangements (Arrangements 3 and 4) (see Table 2). Under Arrangement 3, bequeathing is not permitted; under Arrangement 4, it is. Under Arrangement 3, each member of Group A has 50 resources, while each member of Group B has 30. Under Arrangement 4, the recognition of the right to bequeath results in each member of Group A having 70 resources, while each member of Group B has 40. According to the maximin criterion, Arrangement 4 is more just because the least advantaged have more than they would under Arrangement 3. Therefore, the greater inequality resulting from inheritance under Arrangement 4 may be justified because it benefits those who have less.Footnote ¹²

Table 2.

Distribution of resources under alternative arrangements with and without inheritance

The Difference Principle-based justification offered here could, however, be challenged by appealing to other elements of Rawls’s Theory of Justice. The Difference Principle is lexicographically subordinate to other principles of justice that seek to mitigate the influence of social contingencies on individuals’ life prospects. Among other things, this entails that an individual’s social and economic class should not affect their educational opportunities or chances of attaining positions of political authority. In line with this aim, the principles of fair equality of opportunity and the fair value of political liberties may preclude, under some interpretations (Gosepath Reference Gosepath, Schmidt, Halliday and Gutmann2023), any right to bequeath, given the risks that inherited wealth inequalities pose to those principles.Footnote ¹³ For instance, within the family, the more freedom parents have to confer advantages to their children, the greater the threat to equal educational opportunities.

To respond to this potential objection, it is important to stress that the principles of fair value of political liberties and fair equality of opportunity are not concerned with wealth inequality per se. What matters is the extent to which social contingencies, including one’s social and economic class origin, affect access to positions of social advantage or political authority. This is why Rawls (Reference Rawls1999: 199, 243) holds that institutional mechanisms – such as public campaign financing and publicly funded education – can offset the impact of wealth inequalities on these lexically prior principles.

Still, there may be cases in which, despite the presence of institutional safeguards, the accumulation of inherited wealth threatens the fair value of political liberties and fair equality of opportunity. As Rawls states, these principles “are put in jeopardy when inequalities of wealth exceed a certain limit” (Rawls Reference Rawls1999: 246). In such circumstances, when no policies successfully prevent wealth inequalities from violating lexically prior principles, inheritance would indeed be unjust. Therefore, to preserve justice, it may be necessary to restrict inequalities that would otherwise be permitted under the Difference Principle.Footnote ¹⁴

3.3 Advantages of a Difference Principle-based Justification of the Right to Bequeath

Justifying inheritance by appeal to the Difference Principle offers several advantages over other approaches. One of its key merits is its commitment to liberal neutrality. In this debate, neutrality requires “that political morality, including the political morality around bequests and inheritances, must be interpreted neutrally – that is, without giving preference to some ambitions in life, or conceptions of the good, over others” (Bou-Habib and Olsaretti Reference Bou-Habib and Olsaretti2023: 69). Rawls explicitly endorses this idea of neutrality, holding that political justifications must exhibit this character (Rawls Reference Rawls2005: 10, 192).Footnote ¹⁵ This Rawlsian commitment is especially valuable as it enables an overlapping consensus in which citizens with diverse comprehensive doctrines can nonetheless endorse the same institutional arrangements. A state that instead adopts controversial comprehensive views to justify its institutions would disregard those who do not share these views, making its institutions incapable of being reciprocally accepted by reasonable citizens.

Clayton (Reference Clayton, Cunliffe and Erreygers2013) points out that there are at least two ways in which many well-known justifications of inheritance and its limits tend to rely on perfectionist assumptions that undermine state neutrality: the idea of posthumous interests and the idea of legitimate partiality.

One debate concerning inheritance revolves around the question of whether individuals can or cannot be benefited or harmed by events occurring after their death. Some argue for inheritance on the assumption that they can, i.e. appealing to the moral relevance of posthumous interests; others, by contrast, criticize inheritance, arguing that no legitimate interest would be undermined if inheritance were abolished, as there is no posthumous harm.Footnote ¹⁶ From a neutrality perspective, making the justification of inheritance hang on these questions is problematic. As Clayton (Reference Clayton, Cunliffe and Erreygers2013: 101) highlights, “in a free society there will inevitably be significant disagreement about ethics and well-being”, so “if our aim is to offer an account of just inheritance that is justifiable to reasonable citizens, that account must be one that refuses to take sides with respect to such disagreements”.

A similar issue arises with the idea of legitimate partiality. Among the many non-neutral approaches used to defend inheritance, Nozick (Reference Nozick1989: 30–31) has argued that it is justified because it expresses parental love and intensifies intimate bonds and, for that, is an essential component of a meaningful life. Others contend that some inheritance should be allowed because it fosters a sense of family belonging and identity that constitute an important family value (Brighouse and Swift Reference Brighouse and Swift2014: 139–140; Pedersen and Bøyum Reference Pedersen and Bøyum2020: 306–308; Neves Reference Neves2023), because it helps individuals remember and honour those they were close to (Schmidt am Busch Reference Schmidt am Busch, Schmidt am Busch, Halliday and Gutmann2023) or because materially benefiting family members and loved ones is a virtue (Nagel Reference Nagel2009: 120). Conversely, critics of the right to bequeath may argue that bequeathing is not a virtue nor is it essential for expressing parental love, preserving family identity, fostering a sense of belonging, or remembering loved ones (Halliday Reference Halliday2018). As in the debate around posthumous interests and inheritance, these arguments, for and against inheritance, rely on controversial conceptions of the good and are subject to reasonable disagreement. Therefore, given the commitment to liberal neutrality, such arguments should not serve as the foundation for justifying either inheritance or its limits.Footnote ¹⁷

Justifying inheritance and its limits through the Difference Principle does not rely on controversial ideas about the significance of posthumous interests, the nature of a good life, the value of family relationships or of love. Instead, it rests on a broad and largely uncontroversial premise: that people may be motivated to change their economic behaviour by the ability to benefit others by bequeathing them.

Apart from its commitment to liberal neutrality, another strength of the proposed justification is that it integrates the widely recognized and significant role of inheritance’s incentive effects within a theory of justice. Unlike views that consider that demands of justice should be balanced with efficiency, Rawls, through the Difference Principle, incorporates efficiency concerns into his own theory of justice. Although efficiency is subordinate to concerns about improving the situation of the least advantaged, it still plays a role in the reasoning behind distributive justice. This enables his theory to be an internally consistent egalitarian liberal view that does not rely on a trade-off between justice and efficiency.

4.1 Disincentive Effects of Receiving Large Inheritances

The first important aspect to consider when justifying inheritance as an incentive is the impact that receiving wealth has on productivity. A regulatory framework sensitive to incentives must balance the motivational effect of the right to bequeath for the bequeather against both the direct disincentive experienced by the inheritor and the broader indirect social impact. As West (Reference West1893: 430) notes, “the inheritance of a large fortune may prove an encouragement to idleness rather than an incentive to industry, and may result in injury both to the heir and to society”.

The concern that inherited wealth may reduce the inheritor’s productivity has been raised by numerous liberal thinkers, including Godwin, Mill and Smith (Halliday Reference Halliday2018: 53). The worry is that the person who inherits a significant amount, if she has more than enough means to support herself and her family, is less motivated to use her productive capacities as fully as she might have prior to inheriting. This impact of inherited wealth on the inheritor’s work effort has been labelled the “Carnegie effect” after Andrew Carnegie (Reference Carnegie1962: 56), a 19th-century industrialist who suggested that “the parent who leaves his son enormous wealth generally deadens the talents and energies of the son”.

This disincentive effect may already arise before the inheritance is received, when the person anticipates receiving a substantial inheritance.Footnote ¹⁸ Wedgwood (Reference Wedgwood1929: 207–208) points out that inheritances

Perhaps the most important empirical study regarding the Carnegie effect is that by Bø et al. (Reference Bø, Halvorsen and Thoresen2019), who conducted an examination of the entire Norwegian population. In that study they showed that the reduction in labour supply – measured in terms of wage income, working hours and early retirement – caused by inheritances increases with the size of the bequest. They highlighted that this effect on labour is negligible for small inheritances but significant for large ones. These conclusions confirm previous studies. The study by Holtz-Eakin et al. (Reference Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen1993: 413) estimated that “a single person who receives an inheritance of more than $150,000 is about four times more likely to exit the labor force than someone with an inheritance of less than $25,000” (updated to 2025 equivalent values: approximately $330,000 and $55,000, respectively). Similarly, Brown et al. (Reference Brown, Coile and Weisbenner2010: 6) found that inheritors who receive substantial inheritances are more likely to retire earlier than those who do not. They show that receiving an inheritance increases the probability of retirement by 2.3 percentage points, or about 12% of the baseline retirement rate, within the two years following its receipt. Moreover, increasing the value of the inheritance by $100,000 (updated to 2025, around $180,000) over the median raises that probability by roughly 2 percentage points, or about 10% of the baseline rate.Footnote ²⁰

The disincentives experienced by inheritors who receive substantial inheritances are further compounded by wider social consequences (Haslett Reference Haslett1986). One concern raised is that the economic inequalities perpetuated by inheritance may enable inheritors to access educational and employment opportunities that remain inaccessible to others. Besides being unjust in itself, this inequity can have effects that need registering by the lights of the Difference Principle argument, insofar as these events might prevent individuals who may be more capable or suitable for certain occupational opportunities from occupying them, thereby reducing overall productivity (Abrahamson Reference Abrahamson2018: 28).Footnote ²¹

Additionally, another disincentive effect that inheritance may produce has been presented by Haslett (Reference Haslett1986), who argues that inheritance affects societal productivity by distorting the idea of fair competition for desirable positions. He illustrates this with an analogy, asking us to imagine

Large inheritances may negatively impact overall productivity, then, through both direct and indirect effects. Directly, receiving or anticipating an inheritance can discourage individuals from fully applying their productive potential. Indirectly, inheritance may reduce societal productivity by preventing some talented but less advantaged individuals from occupying productive occupations or by removing some incentives to compete for, or work hard at, desirable positions.

The tension between the incentives produced by the right to bequeath and the disincentives that inheritance may generate presents a complex policy trade-off. While an unconstrained right to bequeath creates incentives for the bequeather, it can also generate disincentives for the inheritor; conversely, abolishing the right to bequeath entirely would eliminate the disincentive, but at the cost of removing the incentive as well (Halliday Reference Halliday2018: 55). One way to balance the incentive and disincentive effects of inheritance is through an inheritance tax that takes these dynamics into account.

One compelling reason to favour an inheritance tax over other possible mechanisms for addressing the incentive trade-offs generated by inheritance is that it fits naturally within the institutional framework of a Rawlsian property-owning democracy. This system aims at the broad distribution of wealth and capital against a background of equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity (Rawls Reference Rawls1999: xiv–xv). According to authors such as O’Neill and Williamson, Rawls envisions an inheritance tax “as the principal mechanism by which large accumulations of capital are to be diluted over time” (O’Neill and Williamson Reference O’Neill, Williamson, O’Neill and Williamson2012: 4). As Rawls states, a property-owning democracy places its emphasis “on the steady dispersal over time of the ownership of capital and resources by the laws of inheritance and bequest” (Rawls Reference Rawls1999: xv).Footnote ²³

There are various tax designs compatible with the incentives and disincentives associated with inheritance. I will now outline three possible schemes that take these factors into account. Since the disincentive arises from receiving wealth, all three models tax the wealth received by the inheritor rather than the estate itself. By adopting a progressive tax on the inheritor, as all these schemes propose, the bequeather can lower their tax burden by distributing assets more broadly. This not only makes the system more responsive to productive incentives – since wealth can always be transferred with lower tax liability if dispersed – but also fosters a more egalitarian distribution of wealth.

Since the productivity losses depend on the size of the inheritance, a progressive tax based on the amount received – such as the one proposed in Bø et al.’s (Reference Bø, Halvorsen and Thoresen2019) study – offers a suitable institutional response. Such a system would help mitigate the negative productivity effects of receiving a large inheritance while preserving the motivational benefits of allowing a right to bequeath. This tax can be structured as a tax on individual asset receipts or as an accession tax, which progressively taxes according to the total amount an individual receives over their lifetime through gifts or inheritances (Meade Reference Meade1964: 56–58).

While a standard progressive tax on inherited wealth features increasing tax rates without an absolute marginal cap, an alternative approach involves a lifetime inheritance cap, as proposed by Haslett (Reference Haslett1986) and Robeyns (Reference Robeyns2024). Under this model, any inheritance received above a certain lifetime threshold would be subject to a 100% tax rate, establishing an absolute limit to the amount any individual could inherit over their life. Against this proposal, it could be said that in a progressive system based on the amount received, as long as the marginal rate remains below 100%, the right to bequeath can always function as an incentive, since any additional accumulation by the bequeather can always increase the heir’s inheritance.Footnote ²⁴

A third option is to adopt Bamford’s (Reference Bamford2014) hourly averaging taxation system, in which tax rates depend on the number of registered hours that the inheritor has worked over their lifetime. The more they have worked, the lower their tax rate. Those who have never worked face a high tax rate but can gradually access their inherited wealth by working. In other words, inheritors must work to claim their inheritance.

Although Bamford’s system may seem the most effective at addressing disincentives, its implementation raises difficulties. The number of hours worked may not necessarily be a reliable measure of productivity, as individuals expecting to inherit – or who have already done so – might take low-productivity jobs simply to increase their working hours. Moreover, this system might unfairly limit inheritance for those who, despite not having registered working hours, are still productive (such as self-employed workers or carers (Folbre Reference Folbre1994; Fraser Reference Fraser1994)). Finally, from a practical standpoint, compared with the simpler progressive tax system based on the amount received, this approach seems more vulnerable to fraud, involves significantly more complex calculations and requires extensive state oversight to implement effectively.

4.2 Scope of the Incentives of Benefiting Specific Others

An inheritance tax justified by the Difference Principle must also consider the effects of any particular scheme on the very incentives that ground the right to bequeath. A crucial question that arises here concerns the effects of allowing transferability beyond the first bequest. While a person may be motivated to work more or pursue a higher-paying profession in order to bequeath wealth to a specific individual, what are the effects of allowing, or not allowing, the subsequent transfers of that same wealth? For example, if A was incentivized to work harder to benefit her daughter B, this may justify the hereditary transfer of asset X from A to B. However, we should also consider the productivity effects of allowing, or disallowing, B to then transfer this same asset to her descendant C, and C’s transfer to her daughter D, and so forth. This would be relevant for determining whether inheritors’ ability to bequeath what they inherited could also be justified as an incentive. These questions concern the extent of the property rights transferred through inheritance, particularly the degree to which these transmitted rights should include the power to further bequeath the inherited assets.

To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine individuals’ perceived interest in benefiting others that underlies the justification for inheritance. The incentive effect behind inheritance appears to be limited to transfers to individuals with whom the decedent shared emotional ties. For instance, an individual may be motivated to work harder to secure an inheritance for their children, and even for their grandchildren. However, this motivation is likely to weaken when it comes to future generations. As Ferreyra (Reference Ferreyra1933: 223) suggests, it seems intuitive to think that parents do not work for “distant relatives whom they hardly know and are not closely related to them”. In a similar vein, Birnbacher (Reference Birnbacher, Gosseries and Meyer2009: 282) argues that moral motivations are strongly tied to face-to-face relationships and that individuals from the distant future are perceived as “faceless and invisible”, as “abstract recipients of goods” rather than “concrete and experientially accessible objects of attitudes such as love, friendship, reverence, or solidarity”. Consequently, the well-being of distant generations is likely to provide a weaker productive incentive than the well-being of nearer people.Footnote ²⁵

Rawls himself, in a different discussion from that of inheritance, endorses the assumption that the interest in benefiting others diminishes as the relationship becomes more distant. When discussing the just savings principle, Rawls (Reference Rawls1999: 111) suggests that people have an interest “to further the well-being of at least their more immediate descendants”. The notion of “immediacy” in this passage reflects our intuitions regarding the limited scope of our interest to benefit others.

Nozick (Reference Nozick1989: 30) expresses a similar intuition regarding the decreasing moral significance of bequests over successive generations. He argues that while it may be appropriate for individuals to bequeath assets to loved ones as an expression of personal bonds, this justification weakens when wealth continues to be passed down to distant descendants unknown to the original earner. To address this, he suggests allowing individuals to make bequests, but limiting these to a single transmission that cannot then be repeated.

According to the viewpoint presented here, the scope of the incentive to benefit others through inheritance – while stronger for immediate descendants – weakens with more distant generations. If individuals are primarily motivated to work and accumulate wealth for the benefit of those closest to them, and if we are committed to an egalitarian economic distribution, there is a strong case for limiting the intergenerational reproduction of inherited wealth. From the perspective of the Difference Principle, it is difficult to justify the free receipt of goods from a distant ancestor, since the original accumulation was unlikely to be motivated by a desire to benefit a remote descendant. An institutional design aligned with an egalitarian economic distribution and attentive to the scope of incentives underlying bequests should therefore be sensitive to how many times inherited wealth is passed on.

One of the institutional proposals that integrates both egalitarian values and the kind of incentive-based sensitivity addressed is the system of “progressivity over time” suggested by Halliday (Reference Halliday2018), based on Rignano’s (Reference Rignano1919) ideas. According to Rignano’s scheme, the second time certain wealth is transferred through inheritance, it should be subject to higher taxes than the first time it was transferred, and if it is transferred a third time, it should be taxed at an even higher rate.Footnote ²⁶

To illustrate this proposal, imagine the following scenario: Grandmother builds a business from the ground up and bequeaths it to Mother. An inheritance tax of 20% is levied on the amount Mother receives. If Mother does not create any new wealth and simply retransfers what she inherited to Daughter, the entire amount is taxed at a 40% rate. However, if Mother creates new wealth, different portions of her estate are taxed at different rates. The inherited wealth from Grandmother and retransferred to Daughter is taxed at 40%, while any new wealth that Mother generates and is given to Daughter is taxed at the original 20% rate.Footnote ²⁷ Therefore, wealth derived from remote generations is subject to higher taxation than wealth more recently generated.Footnote ²⁸

In addition to the aforementioned reason concerning the scope of the interests in benefiting others, a transfer-numbers-sensitive progressive taxation system also fosters individual productivity by incentivizing each generation to create new wealth. Under this scheme, inheritors who merely maintain inherited wealth face substantial tax liabilities when transferring it, whereas newly created wealth is taxed at a lower rate. Consequently, this tax scheme motivates inheritors to work and accumulate additional wealth if they wish to sustain or enhance the benefits passed on to subsequent beneficiaries.

Although Rignano originally proposed his tax scheme for utilitarian reasons related to optimizing incentives for inheritors, it has also been defended by Halliday (Reference Halliday2018) for its ability to limit the negative impact of dynastic wealth on equal opportunities. According to Halliday, wealth passed down over successive generations is particularly detrimental to equality of opportunity because “it helps maintain group-based wealth inequalities over time, so that one’s prospects in life become dependent on the fortune of being born into a family that already possesses substantial wealth, which it has managed to retain through the passing of its generations” (Halliday Reference Halliday2018: 1). Rignano’s scheme, by weakening dynastic wealth transmission, would promote a fairer distribution of opportunities.

The Difference Principle-based justification of inheritance offers an additional, independent rationale for Rignano’s proposal. This is valuable for two reasons. First, even those who do not fully endorse a relational-luck egalitarian view, such as the one defended by Halliday, may still find compelling reasons to support Rignano’s scheme. Second, for those who question the scheme’s effectiveness in dismantling inherited advantages (Fleischer Reference Fleischer2020: 88–89), its sensitivity to the scope of productive incentives nonetheless offers a strong efficiency-based justification for its adoption.Footnote ²⁹