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Forecasting Popular Vote and Electoral College Vote Results: Partisan-Bounded Economic Model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 October 2024

Manabu Saeki Open the ORCID record for Manabu Saeki [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

The Partisan-Bounded Economic Model forecasts popular vote and Electoral College vote results in the 2024 presidential election based on economic growth, presidential popularity, and shifts in party identification within the electorate. Due to the partisan vote and voter inertia, presidential elections are unlikely to result in lopsided outcomes even in the face of economic turmoil or prosperity. In the Partisan-Bounded Economic Model, outliers in the annualized GDP growth are adjusted to fall within a fixed range of 5 percent to -5 percent. Any GDP growth values exceeding 5 percent or falling below -5 percent are re-coded as 5 percent and -5 percent, respectively. The model predicts that Vice President Kamala Harris will secure 52.3 percent of the party vote, 49.4 percent of the total popular vote, and 59.1 percent of the Electoral College votes.

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Article
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PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 58 , Issue 2: Forecasting the 2024 US Election , April 2025 , pp. 267 - 273
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Political Science Association

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