Eberhard argues convincingly in his 1923 volume, Das Schicksal als poetische Idee bei Homer that fate is a narrative device in the Iliad and Odyssey which guides the narration towards resolution. As an example of fate at work, he cites the narrator harnessing fate to fulfil ‘what must happen’ when Zeus finds the deaths of Sarpedon and Hector difficult. Movement towards resolution, however, is not the only force motivating the narration. Achilles' vacillations between remaining or quitting pull the narration away from resolution: such episodes suggest the idea of an apparent freedom within fate. If Iliadic fate or free will were unwavering dogmatic notions, their coexistence would be problematic. But perhaps harmony between the two is possible when free will in the Iliad is—like Eberhard's conception of fate—a poetic or narrative device.

Since W.K. Pritchett's discussion in 1965 of a Hellenistic site on the sandbar at Pylos there has grown a considerable body of support among scholars for the existence of the sandbar in 425 B.C. Nowadays it links the southern tip of the promontory of Coryphasion, which the Athenians occupied, to the mainland near Gialova, and to its north lies Osmanaga lagoon which it cuts off from the main body of Navarino Bay. The promontory is linked at two points to the mainland, at the sandbar and at the dunes to the north which curve round the bay called Voidokoilia. Thucydides in his account of the Pylos campaign at the beginning of Book Four does not mention a sandbar, and supporters of its existence generally assume that his text can be read so as to accommodate it in his account. This I believe is mistaken, for the plan attributed to the Spartans of besieging the fort only makes sense as described if there was no sandbar to use as a land bridge. The aims of this article, therefore, are first to remind readers that the plain meaning of the text at 4.13.1 strongly implies that there was no sandbar in Thucydides' day (this is the older view, clearly expressed by A.W. Gomme); second to show that Pritchett's influential inference from the Hellenistic site to a substantial fifth-century sandbar is not compelling; third to show that attempts to read the text in such a way that it is compatible with the sandbar's existence fail; and fourth to show that there is as yet no reliable scientific information to prove that in the fifth century the sandbar existed in any way that is relevant to the Pylos campaign. In these circumstances there is no reason to reject the plain meaning of the text. Further, this meaning is consistent with what few indications there are about the condition of the sandbar in the fifth century.

A murder is always a dramatic event, and, since the dramatic nature of it depends to a large extent on it being witnessed and reported, one would hope that a good author would ensure his or her report of a murder reflected that. Agrippina's death, a matricide, has often been labelled as ‘dramatic’ by modern commentators, yet a comprehensive and satisfactory analysis of the reports as described in three ancient sources is still outstanding. A number of papers have given partial attempts at offering proof of the dramatic nature of the reports. My aim in this paper is to bring in two further significant connections between the historians’ accounts and other domains (Greek drama, rhetoric) which have to my knowledge been overlooked. These new factors force us to re-evaluate earlier attempts of finding the sources of inspiration for Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio. I will do this by spelling out certain allusions implicit in all three authors, but with special emphasis on Tacitus, showing that, despite its understated nature, his succinct account could be highly evocative to his audience, alluding to the pathos appropriate to both tragedy and rhetoric. These two strands of influence on the reports not only enhance the effect of the passage at issue, but also make a full and proper reponse of the audience to it more plausible.

The Bobiensian scholiast tells us that the speech Pro Archia was delivered by Cicero in a court presided over by his brother Quintus as praetor, who held this office in 62 B.C. The scholiast makes two clear references to Quintus (ad Pro Archia 3):

(a) Archias presented this case, dealing with the Papian law on Roman citizenship, in the court of Quintus Cicero, the brother of this Marcus Tullius …

(b) It is significant that he makes mention of the praetor himself, that is of his brother Quintus Cicero, who was in charge of the trial. Indeed, it is most appropriate that he speaks in praise of a fine poet in the court of someone who takes pleasure in pursuits of this kind, for Quintus Cicero was a writer not only of epic, but also of tragedy.

The purpose of this note is to suggest Semitic, specifically Akkadian, etymologies for two Greek nouns, and thus for words derived from these. The first noun in question is κίναιδος, for a person participating in certain male homosexual acts. The authors suggest that this word is ultimately derived from the Akkadian noun ‘qinnatu’, meaning anus, or more generally, the rear. This noun was productive in Greek, and also passed into Latin as ‘cinaedus’.

The second Greek noun for which we suggest an etymology is πυγή denoting buttocks. Our hypothesis is that this word is derived from the Akkadian ‘pūqu’ meaning cleft or buttocks. Within the Greek language itself, the noun καταπύγων was developed from the noun πυγή by use of a prefix.

The imbuing of the visible world with Reason necessitated for Plato an intermediary realm in heaven where physical bodies are seen to move with uniform and circular motion. Such an expression of celestial order was in keeping with Greek physical thought, and was adopted in turn by the later astronomers as they sought to account for apparent irregularities displayed by those very bodies in the heavens. The sophistication of the Greek scientific endeavour and especially Hellenistic astronomy led, however, to an ever increasing body of evidence which ultimately refused reconciliation with the mathematical constructs proposed to maintain the presumed uniformity.