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Equilibrium Strategies for Processor Sharing and Random Queues with Relative Priorities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2009

Moshe Haviv  and
Jan van der Wal
Moshe Haviv
Affiliation:
Department of Statistics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91905 Jerusalem, Israel and Department of Econometrics, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
Jan van der Wal
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
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Abstract

We consider a memoryless single-server queue in which users can purchase relative priority so as to reduce their expected waiting costs, which are linear with time. Relative priority is given in proportion to a price paid by customers present in the system. For two service disciplines, (weighted) processor sharing and (weighted) random entrance, we find the unique pure and symmetric Nash equilibrium price paid by the customers.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , October 1997 , pp. 403 - 412
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997

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